

32

Second Series

Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru

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32

A large, white, stylized signature of Jawaharlal Nehru, consisting of the letters 'Jh' followed by a long, sweeping horizontal stroke that curves upwards at the end.A small, white, stylized signature of Jawaharlal Nehru, identical in style to the larger one, consisting of the letters 'Jh' followed by a long, sweeping horizontal stroke that curves upwards at the end.

“So the story of Jawaharlal Nehru is that of a man who evolved, who grew in storm and stress till he became the representative of much that was noble in his time. It is the story of a generous and gracious human being who summed up in himself the resurgence of the ‘third world’ as well as the humanism which transcends dogmas and is adapted to the contemporary context. His achievement, by its very nature and setting, was much greater than that of a Prime Minister. And it is with the conviction that the life of this man is of importance not only to scholars but to all, in India and elsewhere, who are interested in the valour and compassion of the human spirit that the Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund has decided to publish a series of volumes consisting of all that is significant in what Jawaharlal Nehru spoke and wrote....the whole corpus should help to remind us of the quality and endeavour of one who was not only a leader of men and a lover of mankind, but a completely integrated human being.”

Indira Gandhi

**Selected
works of
Jawaharlal
Nehru**



AT TEEN MURTI HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 1956

Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru

Second Series

Volume Thirty Two

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FOREWORD

Jawaharlal Nehru is one of the key figures of the twentieth century. He symbolised some of the major forces which have transformed our age.


When Jawaharlal Nehru was young, history was still the privilege of the West; the rest of the world lay in deliberate darkness. The impression given was that the vast continents of Asia and Africa existed merely to sustain their masters in Europe and North America. Jawaharlal Nehru's own education in Britain could be interpreted, in a sense, as an attempt to secure for him a place within the pale. His letters of the time are evidence of his sensitivity, his interest in science and international affairs as well as of his pride in India and Asia. But his personality was veiled by his shyness and a facade of nonchalance, and perhaps outwardly there was not much to distinguish him from the ordinary run of men. Gradually there emerged the warm and universal being who became intensely involved with the problems of the poor and the oppressed in all lands. In doing so, Jawaharlal Nehru gave articulation and leadership to millions of people in his own country and in Asia and Africa.

That imperialism was a curse which should be lifted from the brows of men, that poverty was incompatible with civilisation, that nationalism should be poised on a sense of international community and that it was not sufficient to brood on these things when action was urgent and compelling—these were the principles which inspired and gave vitality to Jawaharlal Nehru's activities in the years of India's struggle for freedom and made him not only an intense nationalist but one of the leaders of humanism.

No particular ideological doctrine could claim Jawaharlal Nehru for its own. Long days in jail were spent in reading widely. He drew much from the thought of the East and West and from the philosophies of the past and the present. Never religious in the formal sense, yet he had a deep love for the culture and tradition of his own land. Never a rigid Marxist, yet he was deeply influenced by that theory and was particularly impressed by what he saw in the Soviet Union on his first visit in 1927. However, he realised that the world was too complex, and man had too many facets, to be encompassed by any single or total explanation. He himself was a socialist with an abhorrence of regimentation and a democrat who was anxious to reconcile his faith in civil liberty with the necessity of mitigating economic and social wretchedness. His struggles, both within himself and with the outside world, to adjust such seeming contradictions are what make his life and work significant and fascinating.

As a leader of free India, Jawaharlal Nehru recognised that his country could neither stay out of the world nor divest itself of its own interests in world affairs. But to the extent that it was possible, Jawaharlal Nehru sought to speak objectively and to be voice of sanity in the shrill phases of the 'cold war'. Whether his influence helped on certain occasions to maintain peace is for the future historian to assess. What we do know is that for a long stretch of time he commanded an international audience reaching far beyond governments, that he spoke for ordinary, sensitive, thinking men and women around the globe and that his was a constituency which extended far beyond India.

So the story of Jawaharlal Nehru is that of a man who evolved, who grew in storm and stress till he became the representative of much that was noble in his time. It is the story of a generous and gracious human being who summed up in himself the resurgence of the 'third world' as well as the humanism which transcends dogmas and is adapted to the contemporary context. His achievement, by its very nature and setting, was much greater than that of a Prime Minister. And it is with the conviction that the life of this man is of importance not only to scholars but to all, in India and elsewhere, who are interested in the valour and compassion of the human spirit that the Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund has decided to publish a series of volumes consisting of all that is significant in what Jawaharlal Nehru spoke and wrote. There is, as is to be expected in the speeches and writing of a man so engrossed in affairs and gifted with expression, much that is ephemeral; this will be omitted. The official letters and memoranda will also not find place here. But it is planned to include everything else and the whole corpus should help to remind us of the quality and endeavour of one who was not only a leader of men and a lover of mankind, but a completely integrated human being.



New Delhi

18 January 1972

Chairman

Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund

EDITORIAL NOTE

The present volume covers the period from 1 February to 30 April 1956. There were important domestic developments connected with the reaction of political parties and the general public to issues in states reorganization. The major developments were however, still waiting to happen. The Prime Minister is very much interested in the economy of the country and the planning process at a crucial period of transition between the First and the Second Five Year Plans. There is also the genuine dilemma within the economic establishment in the country and in Jawaharlal Nehru's own mind about the relative importance of heavy industry and small-scale industries. Here, internal and external developments merge and we see Jawaharlal increasingly interested in possible collaboration with foreign nations and organisations as well as the need to re-emphasise self-reliance. On the whole, however, in the domestic field it is an uneventful interlude. It is in foreign policy that there are many exciting developments both outside India, in the Asian region and also in the Soviet Union. These are all carefully observed, discussed and articulated by Nehru during his conversations with several foreign statesmen who visited India at this time. This is also a period of activist diplomacy overcoming the limitations of India's strategic reach and economic weakness. New Delhi began to play an active role in helping the resolution of major conflicts everywhere.

The question of reorganizing India's political geography was occupying the attention of everyone in the country. Nehru was, on the whole, in favour of scrupulously abiding by the conclusions of the States Reorganization Commission, but it is clear that he himself would be happier with larger regions than small linguistic states. When the proposal for a merger of Bengal and Bihar comes from the two Chief Ministers, Nehru is happy. He was generally toying in his mind with a vague idea of a single South Indian State. He would have been happy with the continuance of the Maharashtra State with Bombay as capital. In all these things it is interesting to note that his thought processes diverged from those of his great mentor. Gandhiji in the early twenties decided to have provincial committees of the Congress on a linguistic basis cutting across the internal borders of British India. The States Reorganization Commission in the final analysis followed this logic. Nehru is careful in not criticizing or opposing this model but we can see his discomfort when some one like Gadgil in Maharashtra questioned the theoretical basis of trans-linguistic economic zones. Nehru was impressed by the success of economic planning in the larger Republics in the Soviet Union. These interesting options are now, of course, of academic interest. But it is important to remember that many leaders of the National Movement were happy with larger economic

regions rather than culturally self-sufficient but economically vulnerable linguistic states. One specific problem is that of the future of the Bombay city. Here again, the importance of Bombay as the economic capital of India makes Nehru and his colleagues anxious for the retention of Bombay city as either the metropolis of a territory comprising Maharashtra and Gujarat or an economic entity with special links with the Centre of the Union. This problem would be leading to important results in the next one or two years during which the decision to include Bombay in Maharashtra, as had been done earlier, to include Madras in Tamil Nadu would be taken. Apart from these important major problems the totally unexpected civil commotion in many cities leading to virtual anarchy for short periods worried Nehru. He was, however, determined in his decision to go ahead with the implementation of the Commission's recommendations with changes when absolutely necessary.

Many of the speeches and the documents in the volume deal with the achievements, failures and prospects of the First Five Year Plan, the Community Projects and the National Extension Service. Here, Nehru is seen at his charming best, an optimist, blissfully unaware of the problems ahead. His world outlook makes him realize also the link between economic development at home and the external relations with the powerful foreign developed states. The relationship with Western Europe, particularly Britain and the United States, continues. But what is interesting and new is the possibility of involving the Soviet heavy industry in promoting India's own machine-building capacity. Here again, one of the basic dilemmas of Indian economic development such as how to go about building huge industrial complexes without in any way affecting the growth of the small-scale and cottage industries. These are theoretically fascinating aspects in this context, of the Nehru era, with Gandhiji's *Hind Swaraj* sitting like Banquo's ghost at the meetings of the Planning Commission. But there is no doubt that Nehru himself realizes the simultaneous importance of both approaches—centralisation and devolution, heavy industry and handicrafts, the need for encouraging the rural masses to march forward along with rapid technological progress at the top. This period of transition between the First and the Second Plans is important in the ultimate evolution or lack of it, of the Indian economy.

The external links of the Indian economy both in the multilateral and bilateral fields are becoming more and more relevant. In this volume there is a fugitive discussion with Dr Eric Johnston, an American economist on the possibility of creating an Asian Development Bank. This institution was to play a major role in India's future planning. The Colombo Plan is already very much in place and India has an important role in it. The possibility of cooperation in the atomic energy sector with Canada is vigorously pursued. The United States itself is interested. The interchange of visits with the Soviet Union leads to plans for cooperation between the two countries in steel production and heavy industries. An entirely new field of possible collaboration between Moscow and New Delhi is tentatively discussed—the import of defence

equipment, particularly light aircraft. The British who were already in the field and in the final stage of supplying the 'Gnats', were not at all happy; apart from losing out in cornering the market, they argued that Soviet technicians would find out secrets about the British planes. The idea of purchasing the ILYUSHIN II aircraft from the Soviet Union was given up for the present. This was, however, to lead to major acts of collaboration in the sixties.

The major events are of course, in foreign affairs. The creation of the South East Asian Treaty Organization with its totally illogical Pakistani membership comes up again and again for discussion during Nehru's talks with the four major statesmen who visited India at this time—Selwyn Lloyd (United Kingdom), John Foster Dulles (United States), Foreign Minister Christian Pineau (France) and Anastas Mikoyan (Soviet Union). The Indian position on the South East Asian and Baghdad Pacts is clearly explained by Nehru. The reactions of the great men from outside are interesting. Mr Selwyn Lloyd says that England is not very much interested in South East Asian security problems. It was America which was pressing them to go ahead. With equal emphasis Dulles says that it is the British who were being insistent about the Baghdad Pact; the Americans were not really interested. These conversations are examples of extremely civilized and urbane interactions between widely differing approaches and conclusions. At the end of it, however, there is a certain common acceptance among these foreign dignitaries on the importance of India as an individual actor in the international scene, and also as a useful negotiating channel on important issues. In the discussions with Dulles for example, Taiwan, the offshore islands, and the ambassadorial talks between America and China in Geneva figure. In the conversations with the French leader, Algeria comes in and the final resolution of the problem of the French possessions in India. In fact, there is much more in common between New Delhi and Paris than between New Delhi and any other capital in the developed world. The conversations with Selwyn Lloyd are extremely friendly and genial but the basic problems remain. More importantly, throughout these conversations one gets an idea of the beginnings of the major Suez crisis which would erupt at the end of the year.

It is in this context that India's relations with the developing world are important during this period. Nehru sends important letters to U Nu, Soekarno and Tito. With Pakistan, a continuous conversation is kept up in spite of one major irritant, the continuing exodus from East Pakistan. There were serious but minor incidents on the distribution of the canal waters. There was, however, always, a dialogue between the two neighbours. Egypt looms large in Nehru's world vision. Because of the serious anti-colonial problems involved in Egypt's relationships with Israel and Britain, there was also complete personal empathy between Nehru and Nasser. Both with Soekarno and U Nu, Nehru shares his views on world developments and, in this first stage of the Bandung to Belgrade voyage, the bricks are being assembled for building a new structure of the developing countries.

Two external developments interest Nehru in his diplomatic efforts. First, the obdurate attitude of the Diem Government in South Vietnam makes it difficult for the International Commission for Supervision and Control to function and India seeks the help of the two Co-Chairmen of the Indo-China conference in Geneva, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, to discipline Saigon. These are early days, as yet in this ongoing tragedy but India under Nehru is very clear on its responsibilities in the Commission.

The most important development during this time was, of course, the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. The famous anti-Stalin speech of Khrushchev reverberated throughout the world and it is fascinating to see the manner in which Nehru discusses this with his foreign guests. He is hopeful, almost buoyant, about the future of communism in the Soviet Union—a socialist system devoid of authoritarian practices. At the same time he is shrewd enough to point out to his guests that China, at this stage, would not be able to afford such reforms.

In addition to these extremely clear and transparent discussions with the foreign guests and with his Indian constituency in his speeches and in his letters to Chief Ministers, there is one important document in this volume which deserves special attention. This is a long, very long, confidential address to a meeting of Indian Ambassadors. It is a remarkable example of articulation, frankness and transparency. A careful comparison between the manner in which he deals with the world problems in this domestic gathering and the tactful manner in which he addresses them in his conversations with foreign statesmen would reveal the total integrity of his approach in foreign policy. In a sense, this particular speech can be compared with the Tibor Mende conversations in the previous volume. One of the abiding charms of these volumes is the congruence as well as sometimes the dissonances between private, intimate conversations and public discourses. These are, of course, problems and opportunities common to all leaders and statesmen. But with his specific personal background Nehru's practice is extremely useful and even revelatory for succeeding generations.

Personal matters coming up in this volume are only of minor quaint interest. There is a difference of opinion between the Prime Minister and C.B. Gupta of the Uttar Pradesh Government on his continuing his association with the Lucknow University while he was a Member of the State Cabinet. It took some time to sort it out but C.B. Gupta finally agreed to give up the University association of which he was very fond.

It is our very pleasant duty, in placing this volume before its readers, to thank various individuals and institutions for their support and help in bringing it out. Shrimati Sonia Gandhi has graciously permitted us to consult the papers in her possession referred to as the JN Collection. The Nehru Memorial Museum and Library has, as always, assisted in the publication of this volume by granting access to the papers of Jawaharlal Nehru. The Secretariats of the President and the Prime Minister, the Ministries of External Affairs and Home Affairs, Planning Commission, National Archives of India, All India Radio and the

Press Information Bureau have allowed us to use relevant material in their possession. We wish to acknowledge, in particular, the permission given to us by All India Radio to use the tapes of the speeches of Jawaharlal Nehru. Some classified material has necessarily been withheld.

Last but not the least, it gives us pleasure in acknowledging the help and support we received from our colleagues in the creation of this volume. Indeed, we are deeply indebted to Shri Tapan Kumar Karanjai, Dr Bhashyam Kasturi, Shri Shyamal Roy, Shri Amrit Tandon, Ms Geeta Kudaisya, Ms Shantisri Banerji, Dr Etee Bahadur and Dr Jawaid Alam, all of whom rendered scholarly assistance in the collection of archival material and its subsequent organisation. We are no less deeply indebted to Ms Malini Rajani and Ms Saroja Anantha Krishnan for undertaking the necessary typing work and assisting in the preparation of the index. Without their labour and commitment, this volume, with its rich historical data, could not have been placed before the scholarly community and lay citizens alike, interested in the life and works of Jawaharlal Nehru.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AFP	Agence France Presse
AFPFL	Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League
AICC	All India Congress Committee
AIR	All India Radio
AITUC	All India Trade Union Congress
ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand, United States Treaty
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CID	Criminal Investigation Department
CPI	Communist Party of India
CS	Commonwealth Secretary
CSIR	Council of Scientific and Industrial Research
CWC	Congress Working Committee
DIB	Director, Intelligence Bureau
DRVN	Democratic Republic of Vietnam
DVC	Damodar Valley Corporation
ECAFE	Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
FICCI	Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry
FS	Foreign Secretary
IAS	Indian Administrative Service
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICS	Indian Civil Service
IIT	Indian Institute of Technology
ILO	International Labour Organization

INTUC	Indian National Trade Union Congress
J & K	Jammu and Kashmir
MEA/EA	Ministry of External Affairs
MHA	Ministry of Home Affairs
MLA	Member of Legislative Assembly
MP	Member of Parliament
MPCC	Madhya Pradesh Congress Committee
NAI	National Archives of India
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDC	National Development Council
NEFA	North East Frontier Agency
NMML	Nehru Memorial Museum and Library
NNC	Naga National Council
NR & SR	Ministry of Natural Resources and Scientific Research
NWFP	North West Frontier Province
PCC	Pradesh Congress Committee
PEPSU	Patiala and East Punjab States Union
PM	Prime Minister
PMS	Prime Minister's Secretariat
PPS	Principal Private Secretary
PSP	Praja Socialist Party
PWD	Public Works Department
RAF	Royal Air Force
RSS	Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
SEATO	South East Asia Treaty Organization
SG	Secretary General
SRC	States Reorganisation Commission
TNCC	Tamil Nadu Congress Committee
UK	United Kingdom
UNO/UN	United Nations Organization

UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UP	Uttar Pradesh
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WH&S	Ministry of Works, Housing and Supply

1 GENERAL PERSPECTIVES

1. The Integration of India¹

Sisters and brothers,

I do not know how many of you would be able to understand my language. I would like to say a few words specially to the people who have come from nearby villages. But they should be able to understand it. I have requested Ramakrishna Raoji² to translate my speech in brief for the villagers.

I have come for the first time today to Nizamabad. I wander about a great deal in India and meet different people. I have seen something of Hyderabad also. But I have had no opportunity of coming here before this. I want to meet my countrymen and understand them and hope that they can understand me a little because we have to do a great deal together. There are great tasks at hand, so we must understand one another and the tasks that await us.

Since I have come here for the first time, I want to tell you the story of modern India. It is a very long story. You must understand your role in it, for the story of India is after all your own story. It is not the story of some people sitting in Delhi, Bombay or Madras. It is the story of the millions of people in India. The path of planning that we have chosen is aimed at improving the condition of the millions of people of India. Its goal is to lighten the burden of the people and put them on the path of progress. So ultimately the story of India becomes your story, whether you know it or not. There is a great deal to be done. But there is no magic formula. It requires hard work and the cooperation of everyone.

I have come to attend a conference of the Bharat Sevak Samaj.³ It is a big organization, comparatively new. It is four years old. Its only aim is to work hard for India's progress. It does not get into futile political debates about ideology and philosophy. We have to build a new India which is possible only through the hard work of you and the millions of people in India. So we must think how to go about this task and the steps that we need to take.

1. Speech at a public meeting, Nizamabad, Hyderabad State, 5 March 1956. AIR tapes, NMML. Original in Hindi.
2. B. Ramakrishna Rao, Chief Minister of Hyderabad.
3. On the same day Nehru spoke at the fourth annual convention of All India Bharat Sevak Samaj in Nizamabad.

You often shout *Bharat Mata ki Jai*. Have you ever paused to consider who this *Bharat Mata* is? Is she a woman? You will say *Bharat Mata* is our country. True, but what makes a country? There are huge mountains and rivers, cities, villages, fields and forests and many other things as well. So where then is *Bharat Mata*? India is all these things and more, especially the people who live here. Ultimately India is you, you and the millions of people, men, women and children who are spread throughout the country. All of them are little parts of India. There are many provinces spread right across from the Himalayas to the south, with innumerable districts, cities and villages, different languages, etc. But all of them together make up this huge country. There are various religions in India. The majority of the people are Hindus. But there are large numbers of Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Jains, Buddhists, Parsees, Zoroastrians and others. All of them belong to this country.

India does not belong only to you or me but to all of us. *Bharat Mata* does not belong only to the people of Hyderabad or Uttar Pradesh alone. All of us are parts of India and the whole country belongs to all of you, from the Himalayas down to Kanniyakumari. You cannot tell me that Hyderabad and Nizamabad belong to you and Allahabad and Delhi to me. I too have a right in Hyderabad just as you have a claim to the Himalayas, Delhi and other places. All of us have inherited this vast country with its thousands of years of the past, as well as the present and the future. Ours is an invaluable heritage of history, culture, civilization and learning. All that India has achieved in the last thousands of years is part of our heritage. You must always remember this because we often tend to forget it and attach more importance to the corner where we live. We often quarrel over petty issues, about our provinces, language, etc. If you think like that, you will be giving up this great inheritance of thousands of years of history and culture for the sake of a handful of earth. So you must always bear in mind that the whole of India is like one huge family to which all of us belong. Whether we live in the north or south, irrespective of the religion and caste that we belong to, all of us are part of one big family. We stand or fall together. When India got Independence, it was for the whole country, not for any one province alone. All of us are in the same boat and therefore we must cooperate with one another and progress. Those, who try to create disunity among us, weaken us and harm India's interests. We must remember these things because there are big tasks ahead.

Our most urgent task was to free India from the yoke of foreign rule and establish people's rule in the country. After a great deal of effort and hard work under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi, we finally succeeded in winning freedom for India. But Independence did not solve all our problems. India is a poor country and the people are groaning under heavy burdens. So,

immediately after Independence we had to embark on yet another journey to ensure a better standard of living for the people and to eradicate poverty from the country. So we took to planning. You must have heard about the First Five Year Plan which is coming to an end. The Second Plan is now being drafted. They are aimed at rooting out poverty and unemployment from India and improving the standard of living of the masses.

The most urgent task before us is to wipe out poverty from the country. We must make sure that the basic necessities of life like food, clothes, education, houses to live in, health care and means of earning a livelihood are made available to the masses. How is all this to be done? We cannot wait for aid from other countries. We can lift up the country's millions only through our own effort and hard work, by producing more wealth and ensuring the equitable distribution of that wealth so that the masses may benefit. The problem concerns the masses, the farmers who toil in the fields and the factory workers and others. We have to ensure their welfare. These are big tasks which can be accomplished only when all of us work together in mutual cooperation. We are implementing the five year plans with this goal. Everyone must strive to understand them and cooperate with one another to make them successful.

When it is clear that India is one country and that cooperation is a must, why do people quarrel over petty issues?

As you know we have a States Reorganization Commission to go into the question of demarcation of boundaries of States. A Report was submitted and it is being debated. Most of the recommendations have been accepted.⁴ But there were riots in Bombay, Orissa and in a couple of other places.⁵ What is there to fight about? These are matters to be settled by mutual consent. Are we enemies arrayed on opposite sides of a battlefield that we should resort to rioting and brickbats.

4. The SRC submitted its Report on 30 September 1955 and the Government of India accepted most of its recommendations on 16 January 1956. For details of the Report see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol.31, p. 153.
5. For instance, following the Central Government's decision of 16 January 1956 to divide the Bombay State, there were riots, arson, looting, firing, destruction of property and disruption of road and railway services in Bombay city and other areas of the State. Congressmen, Praja Socialists and Communists formed Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti to jointly oppose the Central decision. In Orissa twenty leading Congressmen resigned from the party on 17 January 1956 following rejection of their claims to certain areas of Bihar and Madhya Pradesh. Demonstrators attacked Government buildings in Puri and Cuttack and disrupted railway and air traffic.

Disunity is a grave weakness of ours which has brought disrepute and shame to our country. You may be aware of the recommendations made by the Commission regarding the state of Hyderabad.⁶ I have repeatedly said that I was not in favour of breaking up the state because it is a flourishing province. But when I found that the people were in agreement with the Commission's recommendations, who was I to force my views down their throats. This is not how a democracy works. Therefore, though it was my firm opinion, I gave it up.

Then when we went into the details and the question of dividing the Hyderabad State with a part of it going to Marathwada and others to Maharashtra and Karnataka a problem came up, the problem was what was to happen to Telengana. Some people felt that it should be merged with Andhra creating a greater Andhra. Others wanted that Telengana should remain separate. Both sides have their own logic. But we have to arrive at a decision with a calm mind. The Commission has recommended that it should remain separate for five years and could then be merged.

Well, we gave it a great deal of thought and consulted innumerable people. We found that the people in the Telengana region were afraid that a merger with Andhra would mean losses to them in matters of land tenure, jobs, education, etc. They were afraid that the people of Andhra would walk away with all the jobs and seats in schools and colleges. If that was their fear, it had to be taken into account because ultimately the chief consideration was the welfare of the people of different regions in India and above all, what is in the national interest.

I mentioned the riots and loot and arson in Bombay, Orissa and other states in which many people were killed. As a result, the atmosphere was vitiated by hatred but it had no impact on the decision regarding Bombay or Orissa because you must understand quite clearly that the problems of a great nation are not solved in this manner. Otherwise, the country will be ruined. Internal feuds of this kind are extremely harmful to the national fabric and they do not help the basic issues in any fundamental way. I am happy that almost all the tangled issues of states reorganization have been satisfactorily sorted out. A couple of

6. The SRC had recommended that apart from Raichur and Gulbarga districts, the Marathwada districts should also be detached from the State of Hyderabad. The residuary State, which should continue to be known as Hyderabad, was to include the Telugu districts of Hyderabad, namely, Mahbubnagar, Nalgonda, Warangal (including Khammam), Karimnagar, Adilabad, Nizamabad, Hyderabad, Medak (including Bidar district) and Munagala enclave of Nalgonda district.

them remain which must be solved peacefully by mutual agreement. Ultimately the people have to live together.

Similarly we gave a great deal of thought to the issue of Hyderabad and Telengana. The Congress Working Committee gave its recommendations.⁷ We met the people who were in favour of a greater Andhra and the others who wanted a separate Telengana. As I said, both sides had some logical arguments to advance. It is not that either side was wrong. On the one hand, it seemed wrong to postpone something, to be done after five years, to keep it pending for that long. On the other hand, there was fear in the hearts of the people of Telengana, of being displaced by the people of Andhra. Both these things had to be resolved.

Some took all these things into account including the new thinking which favours large states, rather than small ones so that the barriers are fewer and progress is faster. In these circumstances it seemed improper to have two separate states of Andhra and Telengana. The new outlook pointed to a greater Andhra. Then we had to think how to reassure the people of Andhra and assuage their fears. So you may have heard of the new proposal that a greater Andhra should be created with its two regions having their own separate identity and say in their development. It also envisages safeguards for the people of Telengana regarding their land, admissions to schools and colleges, language, jobs, etc.

This is broadly what has been decided and the proposal will soon be presented to you. This decision has been arrived at after prolonged discussions with both sides and great care has been taken to see that feelings on either side are not exacerbated. The people of Andhra and Telengana have to lead their lives and progress as parts of the larger entity, India. Therefore petty arguments and tensions will lead nowhere. I hope all of you will accept this new proposal wholeheartedly and put it into practice. I want that you should become a part of greater Andhra and benefit by it.

However, why should the question of Madras, Bombay, Maharashtra, Telengana, Andhra or Punjab loom so large before us? The important thing is India. In the last few years, India has burst upon the world firmament, a bright

7. On 9 November 1955, the CWC accepted the "division of the present Hyderabad State" and felt "it would be desirable, subject to the wishes of the people concerned, for the Telengana area to be attached to the Andhra State...". For the full text of the CWC resolution on the SRC Report, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol.30, pp. 265-267.

shining star, the star of free India and all of us are part of it. It is our duty to add lustre to it. The eyes of the world are upon us, on what we are doing all over India. Bombay, Madras, Calcutta, Hyderabad or Delhi are not important by themselves. The eyes of the world are upon the thirty-six crore of people in India who have embarked on a long journey towards progress after centuries of stagnation. We are free once more to march ahead with rapid strides. This is a major event in the history of the world and all Indians are part of it. Issues like, which areas go to which province are petty in this larger context. You and I are engaged in making history—India's history and the history of the world. Indian history dates back to thousands of years. But time alone cannot create history. History is made when a nation or race takes up a great task. There have been periods in the history of India when our country has shone like a bright jewel and we made a mark. Those great epochs move us to this day. Then there have been periods when we became stagnant and were incapable of doing anything big, physically or mentally. Today, India has taken yet another turn and once more we are ready to write a new chapter of our history.

This is how we must look at these things. We are engaged in great tasks and as it happens with the nation, race or individual engaged in great tasks, we are growing in stature because we keep aloof from petty issues. I want you to look at these things from this angle. The narrow-minded people, who cannot grasp the idea of India fully and do not have the vision of thousands of years of India's history or the brilliant future which awaits us, have no place in India. They should go elsewhere.

We have been born at a time which is historic for India and the world. It is our good fortune to be alive at a time like this. But such good fortune brings its own responsibilities with it and we have to work hard for it. There are great tasks and responsibilities awaiting us. We have to be bold and large-hearted. We cannot progress if we are narrow-minded or get bogged down in petty issues. We must let the great principles and ideals of the past guide us. Mahatma Gandhi taught us the lessons of cooperation and unity among people of different religions, castes and provinces. We are all part of a large family and together we have to build the edifice of a new India.

I am here to invite you to participate in this great task of building a new India. Let us write a glorious chapter of our history and allow nothing to mar the greatness of our country. We have taken up great tasks and want India to grow in stature. Greatness does not come out of pettiness or disunity. We have to abide by our noble ideals and follow the path of truth, hard work and unity. Let us write our history in such a manner that the generations to come may remember this period as one of great awakening after long years of stagnation. Let us leave India a great country by our hard work and great effort. *Jai Hind!*

2. What the Farmers Must Know¹

Mr President, sisters and brothers,

Anyone can see that there is a new awakening in the country. One sign of that is that every third day there is a big conference, people come from all over India, and big speeches are made. This Talkatora Garden has become a special place for conferences. When a nation is on the move, it is bound to spread itself in every direction mentally and physically. Holding conferences is one of the things it has done. But, sometimes I get the feeling that if the energy that is spent on holding conferences were to be utilized elsewhere, perhaps it will be more fruitful. You hold a conference and we from the Government of India come in large numbers and sit here. More often than not, I am asked to inaugurate the conference, whether I know anything about the subject or not. I have some good qualities, but I have never done farming. Therefore, I cannot tell you very much from my own personal experience. You know all about it because you have done it. Yes, I have certainly read some books on the subject and talked to people about it. There is no doubt that whenever we think of the country's future, the people who work on land occupy a very prominent place. The urban areas with its cities and industries are also important. In fact, both these are closely interlinked. They cannot be separate. But ultimately if we have to judge the progress that India has been making, the first thing that we will have to see is how the farmers of India are progressing because they are in a majority in the country. Another way of judging is to see how the small farmers in India are faring. 'Farmer' is a word which has a very wide connotation. The big *jagirdars* and zamindars and *talukdars* are also farmers and so are the small landholders. One way of judging the progress of a country is to see how the small farmers are progressing. Going a step further, the question arises of the people who work on land but are themselves landless. They should also make progress. They have a right to do so. So we must see how they benefit from our policies and what progress they make. They must be given either land or some employment or the other. They must not remain unemployed.

1. Speech at a national convention of farmers while inaugurating the All-India Farmers' Council, New Delhi, 3 April 1956. AIR tapes, NMML. Original in Hindi.

The day before yesterday I went to see some slums in Delhi.² I have seen some of them before, but whenever I see the squalor and filth that our men and women and children live and grow up in, it hurts me terribly. The thought that comes to my mind is that if the progress of a city like Delhi is to be judged, it should be done not from its palaces but its slums.

Huge buildings are coming up perhaps they are necessary. But ultimately, the way to judge the progress of a city is not by its palaces and huge office buildings but by the standard of living of its poor people. It is obvious that you cannot judge the prosperity of India by a few big cities like Calcutta, Bombay, Madras and Delhi though they are also parts of India. We have to judge by the millions of villages in the country because the masses live there. If there have been certain developments in India which give us confidence in our future and hearten us, the most important in my opinion are the community projects aimed at rural development. They are creating a new atmosphere of self-confidence, self-reliance and cooperation, and a new way of working in the millions of India's villagers.

What can I advise you on your special subject of farming? You know more about it than I do. I can put a few broad principles before you because it is essential that you should understand them. Otherwise you will not be able to take full advantage of whatever we are doing in the country. The first one does not have anything to do with farming. It concerns every man and woman in India for they have to understand where our duty lies in the new era that has begun in India's history after Independence. It is obvious that the first thing that everyone in this country must realize, no matter which province, village and town he may live in, is that India is one large family in which thirty-six, thirty-seven crore of people live and their losses and gains are closely interlinked. This seems a simple thing but people do not pay full attention to it and are led astray by petty quarrels. But if we are to succeed in building the edifice of a new India as we are trying to do, the foundation for that is unity and a realization among the people that they are all one, whether they come from the south,

2. On 1 April 1956 Nehru, accompanied by Brij Krishna Chandiwalla, convener, Delhi branch of Bharat Sevak Samaj, and others, visited the slum areas of Paharganj, Kishanganj, Subzi Mandi, Mori Gate and Ajmeri Gate where over three lakh people lived in deplorable conditions. Nehru reportedly had sanctioned Rs. 1,50,000 to the Samaj to work out a pilot scheme for clearance of slums in Delhi. The Samaj had already submitted to Nehru a note on slum-clearance and city-cleaning. See also *post*, pp. 157-158 and 163-165.

from Madras, Travancore or Cochin, or from Punjab, Kashmir or elsewhere in the country. India has myriad forms but there is an underlying unity which keeps it together. You may say that it is the Constitution and Parliament which bind us. That is true, but the real thing which binds us together is our thoughts and emotions, which gives strength to the nation. A people cannot be tied together artificially by a string of laws. This is the first thing that you must realize.

I am telling you this because I see how quickly we fight among ourselves over petty issues of state, language, etc. This weakens us tremendously and stops the progress of the country. In fact it has always been a weakness with us for thousands of years and it becomes more prominent today. This weakness of ours makes it difficult for us to work in harmony with one another. There are many historical factors behind it. Casteism and communalism in particular, have created barriers among the people and weakened us.

So, whether you work on land or live in the city, you must remember this important point. We live in separate provinces and speak different languages. Our Indian languages are very strong and powerful as well as beautiful. We want that all of them should flourish and grow and benefit from one another. This is the first thing for you to remember. Secondly, you must remember that in the last nine years since we became free, we have achieved a great deal in this country and at the same time, failed to do many other things which we wished to do. But the world has had many ups and downs during this period and we are living in revolutionary times. Revolution does not mean violence or breaking heads. That is childish and only fools will think like that. Revolution means a change in the people's way of life and progress in their economic standard. Revolution can be political, social or economic. In fact, a complete revolution is one which includes all three. The political revolution took place in our country when we got Swaraj. Now, the question of economic and social revolution is before us. Except for a handful of men, the rest of the people are extremely poor. So we have to think about some revolutionary measures to ensure progress in India and get rid of the social evils and weaknesses which prevent our growth and create barriers among us.

We have passed some laws. For instance, there is a law prohibiting untouchability and the suppression of our Harijan brethren³, and the situation is better today. But ultimately mere laws are not enough. We have to think of

3. The Untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955.

ways of changing the people's minds. Believe me, freedom and progress on the one hand and suppression of one section of the people on the other cannot exist together in India today. The only principle which can apply is that of equal opportunities to everyone. It may not be possible to do all this at once. But we have kept it as a goal before us that everyone should get equal opportunities so that each one can progress according to his ability. Everybody knows that people today do not get equal opportunities. These things cannot be done by law alone. Under the law, everyone is equal and has the right to vote and stand for elections. But that does not mean that everyone is really equal. The people who live in the Delhi slums are not the equals of the rich people who live in the bungalows of New Delhi.

Yet we have to adopt measures in this revolutionary world which would ensure equal opportunities for everyone and increase the wealth of the nation. Now, how are we to remove the poverty in the country? We cannot do it by distributing some money here and there. Where does the money come from? Where does it come into the Government treasury from? It does not come from heaven or from some foreign country. It comes from the people's pockets, from your pockets, in the form of taxes, or as public loans which the people subscribe to. That money is spent for the welfare of the people. There are many things which are essential and require a great deal of expenditure like the maintenance of an army and police, education and health care, building of roads, rail engines, aeroplanes, ships, etc. We need to increase production from land and of electricity. All this expenditure has to be met by the people. The more we can get by way of taxes, the more we will have to invest in their progress. We must remember this because a nation does not progress by the help of others. For one thing, nobody can help to that extent and secondly, if we try to depend on the help of others, we will become weak and not have the strength to go ahead. We will become crippled if we always try to walk with the help of others.

Therefore, we must shoulder this burden ourselves. The more we do so, the stronger we will become and gain in self-confidence and increase the nation's wealth. After all, wealth does not mean gold and silver. Wealth is what we produce from land or industries and by other means. So the question that arises is how to produce the maximum wealth in a country, and, secondly, how to ensure the equitable distribution of the wealth thus produced so that it does not remain in a few pockets. We do not want that with an increase in wealth, the rich become richer and the poor poorer. That is not right. There should be equitable distribution. The social structure should be such that the wealth produced in the country reaches the people by various means and in this way, their standard of living improves.

These are complex problems which are being deliberated upon by our Planning Commission which drafts the five year plans. Even in domestic matters, if you have to run a large house, the problems are pretty complex. But if that household extends to the whole country in which thirty-six, thirty-seven crore people live, then the complexities multiply, as you can imagine. But the knots can be unravelled by intelligence and hard work. In the last five years we have progressed a great deal because of our Five Year Plan and our self-confidence has grown.

Now that we have laid the foundations, we should be able to progress faster during the Second Plan. Our progress is not as fast as we wish and we must move faster. On the one hand, production is increasing. At the same time, our population is also increasing very rapidly. It means that there are more mouths to feed and more persons to provide clothes and other amenities for. The most urgent task is that we should increase our production to such a degree that it more than meets the demands of the increasing population easily. If we only have enough to meet the requirements of the additional population, our situation will remain unchanged. If there are more mouths to feed and the production is less, then the situation worsens. It is only when we produce more than we need that we can hope for some progress. The more we produce, the more progress there will be.

There is yet another difficulty. Take the instance of the United States. Once their production from land and industries increased, their income went up enormously. Just as rich men save easily, rich countries are also able to save a great deal in spite of enormous expenditure. No other country produces so much as the United States. They produce so much that sometimes they have to throw it away. Yet they earn so much that there are large savings. Therefore, the United States have a great capacity to achieve progress. Whatever is left over from day-to-day expenditure can be invested in the tasks of nation-building. Countries like the United States and England, which have been advancing for the last 150 years, have reached a stage where their savings are enormous and can be invested in new tasks of development and progress. The problem with poor countries is that they have nothing leftover to save. What they earn is not enough to meet even their basic requirements and so their progress is impeded. When a nation starts making progress, its momentum carries it forward and the pace becomes faster day by day. The poor countries have to cross a barrier before they can gather the necessary momentum to carry progress forward.

Broadly speaking, there are two or three basic requirements like food and raw material for industries. The people in villages need many machine-made

goods. So you give the produce from land to the people in urban areas and take what they produce in return. It is essential that both sides of the balance should be equal and both should benefit from the transaction.

The basic question is how to increase production from land and industries and, improve the quality. In most countries the production from land is much more than in India. What is the reason for that? It is not that our people are less hard-working or intelligent. But in other countries they have adopted new methods of production and are using machines and electricity. These have increased their capacity tremendously. If we could produce as much per acre as they do in other countries, our national income will become three or four times greater than now. Our income will increase by crores of rupees which will mean more savings and more investment in development.

In today's world, machines occupy an important place. It is because of them that the United States and England and other European countries have advanced so much. Now, we do not want that the machines should strangle us. Machines are for human beings, not the other way round. But what is a machine? A hundred and fifty years ago, a great American defined man as a tool-making animal.⁴ It is true that man may not have much strength in his limbs. But he is different from animals because he made tools, whether they were hammers, saws, swords or something else. He made them first out of stone, then with iron and gradually he became stronger than animals.

The charkha is a simple machine. But there are far more complex machines available today. The most complex of all of them are the machines that produce atomic energy. They can be of great benefit to the world if used properly or destroy the world if misused. We have reached a stage when unless people are made to realize the dangers of the situation and the need to bring this great source of energy under control, the world will come to an end. Atomic energy is extremely powerful, much more so than electricity. We are using electricity in agriculture and industries. Lighting our houses and streets is a superficial thing. Its real use lies in doing big things.

Man has been progressing in this way through the medium of tools. The more sophisticated he became and the more sources of energy he tapped, the more powerful he became. Electricity had always existed in nature. But nobody had understood it. People used to be afraid of lightning and thunder. Some foolish people even offered puja and beat drums to protect themselves from

4. "Man is a tool-making animal." Benjamin Franklin (1706-1790).

lightning. The intelligent ones have tried to understand nature and realized that the vast sources of hidden energy could be brought under control. There was nothing to be gained by fighting with nature. Electricity was one great energy and now yet another, more powerful thing, has made its appearance, i.e., atomic energy.

We are living in revolutionary times and must take advantage of these new sources of energy. If we think that we can go on in our old ways, we shall slip back. We do not wish to fight with anyone. But if war is thrust upon us, we cannot fight with bows and arrows when there are guns, machine guns, tanks and aeroplanes on the other side. What I mean is that we must understand and adopt the new sources of power available in the world if we want to exist in this world and progress. Secondly, as I said in the beginning, we must remember in all this that it is essential to have a clear picture in one's mind. We must be clear in our minds about how far modern advance can benefit the poor in the country. We cannot build India on a foundation of poverty. We want that everybody should progress but it is very essential that our first priority should be to work for the progress of the poor.

I talked to you about the question of land. Whether an individual has a thousand acres or half an acre or one acre of land, he is a farmer. But our effort should be to see that the maximum number of people should work on land. A few individuals must not be allowed to own all the available land. Those days are gone and now the effort is to put an end to the *jagirdari*, *talukdari* and *zamindari* systems. A great deal has already been done in this direction.

The small landholders may not find it easy to adopt new methods of farming. So what is the solution? It is obvious that the answer is only cooperation—cooperative farming. That does not mean forming a cooperative society merely to sell your goods, though that is an important aspect of it. It means, as far as possible, to do everything together. In this way, all the members of the cooperative society benefit. Marketing and selling through cooperatives is an old thing which did not work very well in India. Now effort is being made once again to start it.

But we must understand the cooperative method better and adopt it because the interests of the farmers will be served best by agrarian cooperatives. The alternative is the *zamindari* system in which big landholders can adopt modern methods of farming. But that is no longer feasible in today's world. Therefore, agrarian cooperatives are the only answer, for they are large farms and at the same time are not the private property of individual landowners. There are different kinds of cooperatives but what we need in this country is agrarian cooperatives in which the members work together and the profits are shared by

everyone. Such institutions are stronger because the work of buying, selling and everything else is done by mutual cooperation. There is one more thing. Suppose two hundred or five hundred individuals form an agrarian cooperative. They will earn more in a year and have something leftover to save which they can invest in development activities. It opens up an entirely new world of opportunities which is not there when individuals form small landholdings. They have to work extremely hard for small profits. Therefore, I want to draw your attention particularly to agrarian cooperatives which should undertake all the functions of farming and are not confined to marketing.

The cooperatives may be big or small. That is a matter that has to be decided by practical experience. Nor is it necessary that all of them should be of the same type. You can adopt whatever seems most suitable and do the kind of farming that you like. You can take up paddy or wheat and use tractors or not, as the circumstances permit. But the basic thing is that we must take advantage of the machines and new methods of farming which are available today. This cannot be done in small farms.

Europe is making tremendous progress in agriculture. China is going about it in her own way. In the last two or three years, millions of agrarian cooperatives have been formed there. They believe in smaller cooperatives of thirty, forty, fifty people but they are being formed in large numbers. According to their Government, from the moment the cooperatives were formed, their production has increased enormously and the farmers have benefited by it.

You must have heard about the meeting of the Congress in the Soviet Union recently.⁵ There was a hint at a parting of ways from the old, but not in fundamental principles. A country where a great revolution took place is now finding its feet and becoming stable once again. Their economic principles are the same except for minor changes. So it is a big thing.

The important problem before us is to understand where our duty lies in the present situation. It is a crucial question which is chasing us relentlessly. We cannot afford to sit back and relax. Either we progress or we feel the pinch. So we have to move forward. So, we must develop a friendly spirit of competition with other advancing countries.

The major problem before us is to eradicate poverty from India and alleviate the misery and sufferings of the people. Whatever the condition of the people is at present, I want that at least our children must be properly looked after and

5. The Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of Soviet Union, held in Moscow from 14 to 25 February 1956, was attended by over fourteen hundred delegates.

fed, clothed and educated. I feel very sad when I see even one child who is not getting proper attention and care or is hungry and naked, or living in dirty surroundings. Children are our national wealth and must be given every opportunity to grow and develop. What is a country good for if it cannot look after its children? If we put up great big industries and fail to look after our children, what good will our industries do? After all, they are meant for human beings, for the people and for the children of today who are our future citizens. Therefore, whatever we do for the adults today, we must pay special attention to the future of the country and the welfare of our children and provide them opportunities for development.

Then there is the question of village or cottage industries. They are extremely important today. We used to talk about them earlier too. It is true that on the one hand we are going for heavy industries, for producing steel and aeroplanes and what not. So far we had two steel plants which were producing twelve lakh tonnes of steel a year. Now we are going to put up three new steel plants and we want that by the end of these five years, our steel production must go up five times and become sixty lakh tonnes a year. Now that is a very large amount. Then in the next five years we want to double that because you can judge a country's progress by the amount of steel that it produces. At the same time, we are also paying attention to village industries. For one thing, we feel that they will help us to reduce the unemployment in the country. But apart from that, we feel that village industries will strengthen our economic condition. Heavy industries will come up. Please do not think that there is a clash between heavy industries and village industries. That is not so. They are two different sectors. We have to understand the importance of village industries because they will be organized in the villages. Village industries do not imply working with old and outdated tools. We must use the best tools and small machines that are available in village industries and the best techniques too. Only then will they yield profits.

As I said in the beginning, I do not dare to put forth my views on your special subject because you are pundits and I am an ordinary man. Whatever I may be, I am not a *Krishi Pundit*. I belong to the other breed of pundits, the book learning ones.

So I have talked to you about a few things which are extremely important. You must understand not only what you must do on your land, but what is happening in the world and what your duty is towards this India of ours. All of us must be aware of these things because we have to work together whether we live in the Himalayas or Kaniyakumari or the east or the west. *Jai Hind!*

3. Self-rule in Villages¹

Sisters and brothers,

I am happy to have the opportunity of meeting and talking to all of you, officials of the panchayats of the Allahabad district, *Pradhans* and *Sarpanches*, who are assembled here. As you know, I too belong to Allahabad, though I am not able to come here very often nowadays. But I used to roam all over the villages of this district twenty or thirty years ago. I keep in touch with what is happening here, the good as well as the bad.

New panchayat laws have been passed and elections held all over Uttar Pradesh.² Uttar Pradesh is a very big state and millions of people voted and elected their representatives. The question arises what the next step should be. It all depends on how the panchayats function and whether they succeed or not.

The panchayati system is an ancient one in India. It is not something established by new laws. It has come down from ancient times and is fairly well known. But during the British rule, many of these institutions fell into disuse. The administration was run along different lines. That chapter has come to an end. Now, we are trying to pick up the threads once again. We are keeping the basic principles of the old system and adapting them to the changed conditions so that the villages enjoy autonomy and make progress at the same time. The panchayat courts will be empowered to settle minor village disputes.

You heard just now that eighteen to nineteen lakh such cases are decided by the panchayat courts. Innumerable roads and other development activities are also taken up by the panchayats. All this is no doubt pleasing, but let me tell you that I am not completely reassured. I have found that so many of these things exist only on paper and have nothing to do with reality. I am speaking

1. Speech at a conference of elected representatives of village panchayats of Allahabad District, Pandila Village, 5 April 1956. AIR tapes, NMML. Original in Hindi.
2. Following the passage of UP Panchayat Raj Amendment Act of 1954, panchayat elections were held in the hill districts of Dehra Dun, Tehri, Garhwal, Almora and Nainital from 17 October to first week of November 1955. In the second half of December 1955, more than two crore adult villagers in 41 districts exercised their franchise to choose presidents and members of about 55,000 panchayats. Polling in 12,929 panchayats of Azamgarh, Basti, Gorakhpur, Deoria and Ballia districts was postponed to February 1956 as these regions had not recovered from the ravages of floods.

from past experience. I am not criticizing the work being done here in any way. I have in fact received a number of reports of the good work being done here. On the other hand, I have also received innumerable complaints about local disputes, the injustice of the panchayat decisions, groupism in the villages with different groups pulling in different directions, those who were not elected raising the flag of opposition, etc. Now, if I were to praise you and leave it at that, it will not be right. I have come neither to praise you nor to hear my praises sung. We are all colleagues and must work together. There is no question of praising one another.

You have presented me with an *Abhinandan Patra*, which talks about the situation in the world. Our country has acquired a status in the world and must be ready to shoulder the responsibilities of world issues. But ultimately the biggest task before us is to set our house in order for without that we cannot hope to do anything in the world. So the first priority is our country. Then comes our state, and after that our district and village and our individual houses. It is only if the affairs of the country function smoothly that we will become strong. Mere size on the map is meaningless. A country has to be strong internally. A man may be tall but if his limbs are weak, he will not be able to withstand the slightest shock. So, it is not enough to be big in size. We need internal strength, physical and mental strength, and the capacity to work. When it is a question of innumerable human beings, then even one man's strength is not enough. One individual can do the work of one or two, or if he is very strong, of ten men. But here it is a question of millions of human beings. We can be strong only by being united. There are thirty-six or thirty-seven crore Indians. If each one pulls in a different direction, the country will remain weak. But if they are organized into a united whole, it can be a mighty force.

You have seen all that happened during our struggle for freedom. Those of you who belong to my generation will remember the unusual events of the last thirty or forty years and the lessons taught by Mahatma Gandhi. Do you remember the plight of our peasants and farmers earlier and the transformation that took place after the arrival of Mahatma Gandhi on the scene and the impact that his message had on the nation? Our tenancy laws were changed, the zamindari system was abolished and all sorts of things happened. It was Mahatma Gandhi's message to the nation which made all the difference to the poor, helpless peasants with their bent backs living in grinding poverty. They immediately began to gain self-confidence and acquired strength, all because they learnt the lessons of unity and cooperation. This is how the mighty organization of the Congress spread to the whole country. There can be no strength if there is no unity. The doors of the Congress were open to everyone

in India and the organization spread from the Himalayas to Rameswaram in the south. People of all the provinces and religions, Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsees, etc., joined the Congress. It was an organization of the people and taught them the value of unity and cooperation. As it gradually spread all over the country under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi, a new and mighty force which had been hidden so far was unleashed. It was this force which challenged the might of British imperialism. There were many ups and downs—we stumbled and fell—the people had to undergo great hardships, lakhs went to jail and had to face firings and so on. But we never lost hope and somehow went on till we reached our goal. British rule was removed and the people got the reins of power into their own hands. All this was possible because the people learnt to work together as an organized force and broke the barriers which had existed among them.

Mahatma Gandhi laid great stress on religious tolerance. He also emphasised the importance of truth and integrity for he believed that ends did not justify the means. He stopped a movement at its height if he felt that wrong means were being used. We felt perturbed when he suddenly stopped in midstream. But he remained adamant that wrong means did not justify right ends and great national tasks could not be done by wrong methods. This is how Mahatma Gandhi taught us to work and gain in strength.

Mahatma Gandhi worked for the whole country. But he toiled especially for the poor and the downtrodden who had been suppressed by society. His style of living was like that of a poor man. He spoke out against the injustice perpetrated by the Hindus against their Harijan brethren and stressed the need to lift them up and give them an equal place in society. The old injustices have to be rectified because democracy has no place for inequality. Everyone knows that equal opportunity is not available to all the people. The rich can provide good standard of living and education to their children, which the poor cannot. I feel very sad when I see that our beautiful children in the rural areas do not get proper opportunities for development. If we cannot look after our children, who are the nation's wealth, what will our future be like? A nation's wealth is its people, not gold and silver. It is the trained and skilled people who are the wealth of a nation because it is through their effort that wealth is produced. So we have to serve the people first and train them, make them better off, especially the children. There should not be a single child in the country who is not properly looked after. In a sense, children are the responsibility of the Government and I agree that so long as we do not fulfil our responsibilities, so long as there is even one child who is not properly looked after, we will be

failing in our duty. There can be no excuse for us. I agree that big tasks take time. They cannot be done by magic. We have to work hard and all the children in the country should get equal opportunities to progress.

Therefore, it is essential to have a clear picture in our minds about our goals and principles. Otherwise we will be led astray and cannot reach our goal. A few days ago we took a decision, both in the Lok Sabha and in the Congress, to adopt a socialist pattern of society which will ensure equal opportunities for all. The question is how to go about it. It is a difficult task, for it involves millions of people who are poor. It takes time. But we want to go ahead as rapidly as possible. The sooner we do it, the stronger we will become. But it cannot be done by passing laws even if they are very good laws. The thirty-six crore people in India will have to strive for it and work hard. We have to make socialism the goal of our pilgrimage on which the thirty-six crore men and women of India have to embark. I cannot do it alone, nor is it possible to let a few people go far ahead of the others.

It is a difficult task to take so many people with us. That is why planning becomes necessary. You may have heard of the five year plans and the Community Development projects, whose aim is rural development. After all, it is the people who must progress. It is not enough for a few people at the top to go ahead.

Now, how is all this to be done? It cannot be done by violence. It has to be done by mutual love and cooperation. Today, we have a democratic form of government in the country. The old ways will no longer do. The Government is chosen by the people. As you know, our people elect and send their representatives to Parliament and the Assemblies and it is they who pass laws. Similarly at the lower levels, that is, in corporations and municipalities and *gram* panchayats we want people's representatives to have the reins of administration. We want to apply that principle from top to bottom. It is essential that the people who are in charge of administration must be honest and good and cooperative. If they fight with one another or there is groupism or enmity, no work will get done, whether it is in the panchayats or the Parliament in Delhi. If the people do not have confidence in the integrity of their representatives, the administration will come to a standstill. Therefore it is essential that the people who are elected to office, whether it is to Parliament in Delhi or to the Assembly at Lucknow, should understand their duties and responsibilities well. Being elected to office does not entitle them to give orders or take revenge on people whom they do not like or take sides. That is not proper, for it will bring disrepute to the institutions.

As you know that every country has a symbol of its own. What is ours since we became free? It is the tricolour on which there is a wheel. This is a very ancient symbol of ours—nearly 2500 years old—and has come down to us from the time of Asoka. This wheel is the symbol of truth and dharma. I do not mean religion but the code of conduct which demands justice for all. This is the symbol that we have adopted. You may remember that the Congress flag has a charkha on it which is also a national symbol. You may have seen the four-lion pillar with a chakra at the bottom, which has also come down from the time of Asoka. That chakra is the symbol of truth and love. You will find this in Benares with the inscription *Satyameva Jayate* at the bottom. What does it mean? It is a very old slogan of India which has been taken from the Upanishads and means that Truth alone will be victorious. This has been India's slogan from ancient times. It has been gleaned from the Upanishads and means that truth alone is victorious in the end and not falsehood or lies. So we have adopted it too.

Our great leaders including Mahatma Gandhi taught us many lessons and to the extent that we understood them, India grew strong and began to be respected in the world. Why is India held in great respect in the world today? We are not more intelligent than the others. In fact in the other countries people are much more educated and have learnt to handle huge machines, which we cannot do. Yet India is respected, firstly because the path that we have chosen, the path shown by Mahatma Gandhi, of truth and peace, was a unique one. Secondly, the people of India fought for their freedom by peaceful methods and faced great difficulties and dangers cheerfully and did not allow any bitterness or hostility to linger. This is why we are respected in the world. If we forget these things, then the entire structure of Government in Delhi or Lucknow, etc., becomes meaningless. If we are useless people, small and selfish people, who do not have the welfare of anyone at heart, we will fall and lose our reputation in the world.

So all of you must remember the larger picture. India is a great country. We do not want that her people should be useless or dishonest. We do not want that they should be narrow-minded. We do not want casteism to flourish, with one caste suppressing the others. We do not want to lose the respect of the world. The huge pillar inscriptions of the days of Asoka are still standing as reminders of the principles that he had stood for 2500 years ago. His famous message to the world was that the man who respects the religions of others earns respect for his own. So we must learn to respect other religions because unless you do so, nobody else will respect yours.

So you can see that for thousands of years, the great Indian leaders taught these lessons and whenever we followed them, India became famous in the world. Now, that we have got freedom, we must remember the old lessons and also learn new ones. Both are necessary in today's world. India is a very ancient country. Now, we are engaged in building a new India to fit into the modern world clothing her in new garb and taking on new tasks in agriculture and industries so that everyone can get jobs, the country may become wealthy and her poverty is removed. These are big things which cannot be done merely by passing laws. We have to work for them. It is for this that the five year plans have been drawn up. All this will take time but we are steadily marching towards our goal. The situation in the country has improved in the last five years. The next five years will be better.

Now, there is the question of panchayats. The political organization of the country which we have adopted has a government and Parliament at the top then assemblies and state governments and, lower down come the panchayats. In fact, the panchayats are the foundation of the whole structure. Therefore, it is essential that they should be strong because a weak foundation is dangerous for the edifice on top. So the panchayats should be strong organizations and good people should be elected to them. I want that able, trained and intelligent people should come into the panchayats. This is absolutely essential. Even if the people who are chosen are only moderately intelligent, they should be honest and truthful and not dishonest or fond of fomenting trouble. We must ensure this if we want to lay a strong foundation for the edifice of new India.

Now, the panchayats have two tasks. One, is the all round development of the villages. In fact it is part of our five year plans. The second is dealing with local disputes and deciding cases. Of these two tasks of the *gram sabha*, I consider the first more important though both the jobs have to be done. But if the *gram* panchayats pay proper attention to the development of the villages, they will be going in the right direction. When the people are engaged in something constructive, there is less time and opportunity for indulging in petty feuds and quarrels. If they are idle they get into court cases and other disputes. Our kisans have been ruined enough in the past through fighting court cases. We must put an end to it. Its all right that the panchayats should decide cases, but there should be justice and impartiality. Ultimately the biggest task is rural uplift in which all of you must participate. You have to bring it about fast. You will get help from outside. But there should be a healthy spirit of competitiveness among the villages to see who progresses faster. You must show to the others what you can do by building new roads, schools, panchayat houses, renovating old houses, etc.

I want to remind you again that these are big things which are happening all over the country. We have got an opportunity after hundreds of years and we must take advantage of it. You must also remember that all of us are partners in these great tasks and so the burden has to be shared by all of us, men as well as women. We must pay special attention to this because there are two strange trends in this country. If you see the history of India, you will find that Indian women have done great things and excelled in intelligence, bravery and service. Indian women have earned a great name for themselves in history. This is on the one hand. On the other hand, the position of women in India has not been good for a long time. Women have been suppressed by law and custom and tradition which is not a good thing. Even today we have first-rate women officers in high posts. Our women have gone out as ambassadors to foreign countries and have been made governors of provinces. But there is no doubt about it that our women have been suppressed for a long time by law and custom. They have not been able to progress. No country can progress unless its women grow and progress, for they are half the country. The greatest influence on a child is that of the mother. If the mothers are not given an opportunity to be educated, the children are also suppressed right from the beginning. They learn nothing or learn the wrong things. Therefore, it is very essential that our women should have an opportunity to advance. I have seen that whenever they have had the opportunity, they have advanced a great deal. A country's progress is judged by the status of its women. If the laws and customs of a country regarding the status of women are good, then the country is progressive. If not, it is considered backward.

So we have to work for the progress of women not only in cities but in villages as well. The village women work in the home and also in the fields and carry a tremendous burden. Just before coming here, I was at the Kamala Nehru Vidyalaya³ which was opened last year. Women from all over the Allahabad district come there. It is not an ordinary school. It is a special school for training and educating women to work better in their homes and outside. The school has done good work in the last year or fourteen months. I was happy to see our village women in that school and hope that the work will continue. You must also visit the school. I hope that other such centres for education and training will be opened in the other districts.

3. Earlier in the day, Nehru spoke to the women trainees of the Kamala Nehru Vidyalaya, about twelve miles from Allahabad.

I hear that people of this area hesitate to send their women to this school. The chief argument seems to be that they come into contact with women of other castes and so their caste is destroyed or something like that. You must understand the times that we live in and where India is going. What does religion mean? If it is merely a bundle of kitchen rituals and taboos, you will remain where you are. Religion and dharma mean good conduct, truthfulness, cooperation, etc., and not taboos on eating and touching. The world advanced while we remained steeped in casteism and suppressed our own brothers. We must get rid of these tendencies. We must achieve progress, not become more backward.

When I visited the womens' school, I told them that I liked their school. I am happy that they are being given an opportunity to progress. It should be done in other districts too, for it will immediately make a difference. I will not say much about children. As I have already said it is the foremost duty of all of us, and of your panchayats, to look after the children. We must ensure that they get a good education, clothes and food. I would say that the test of a panchayat should be the way it looks after the children. If it does not look after them well, the panchayat is useless. You have to look after not only your own children, but the children of the entire village and make proper arrangements for them.

All of you have been elected to the *gram sabha* and the panchayats. It is a serious responsibility and you have now become participants in the tasks of nation-building. I have pointed out a few things which you must think about and discuss with your colleagues when you go back to your villages. India is progressing and the attention of the entire world is upon us. So we must do everything after due consideration. Hasty action will bring disrepute upon us and we will achieve nothing. We must take up the great tasks before us with courage and intelligence and large hearts. Small people cannot achieve great things. You must fulfil your responsibilities in the great posts that you have been elected to with courage and vision. *Jai Hind!*

4. Planning for Self-propelled Growth¹

Mr President² and friends,

I have come back to this organisation after a number of years. I was attracted to it for a variety of reasons, among them being the dominating presence of Shri Visvesvaraya.³ I should like to pay a tribute right at the commencement today to this grand old man of India. I am amazed and inspired by his vitality and by his deep interest even at this fairly advanced age of his, in the industrial and economic development of India. He writes to me from time to time and indicates his impatience at the slowness of progress and sometimes thinks that our Planning Commission would do much better if it followed his advice more closely than it has done.

As a matter of fact, our Planning Commission has always paid the greatest attention to whatever Shri Visvesvaraya has written. You referred in your address to a scheme for rural industrialisation which he started in Mysore and which is being continued there and which, indeed, has been partly adopted in parts of Bombay and in other areas. It was not through any lack of appreciation of that scheme that we did not adopt it wholesale elsewhere, but because to do so would have meant an upsetting of many things. In fact, we are going in a parallel direction through our community projects which, I think, are a revolutionary line of action in this country.

In the course of your address you have said many things with which I agree very largely.⁴ In fact, you have broadly associated yourselves with many of the

1. Speech while inaugurating the sixteenth annual conference of the All-India Manufacturers' Organisation, New Delhi, 14 April 1956. AIR tapes, NMML.
2. Murarji Jadavji Vaidya, Chairman, All-India Manufacturers' Organisation, 1953-56, presided over the conference.
3. M. Visvesvaraya, engineer, statesman and a pioneer of planning in India, was a powerful inspiration in the starting of the All-India Manufacturers' Organisation. He presided over its first conference in 1941 and continued to be associated with it as its founder-president.
4. M. J. Vaidya praised the industrial progress of India and the efforts to restore the basic strength of an integrated economy of the rural population. He felt that enough attention was not being given to encourage 'medium industries.' It was imperative, he added, that the democratic character of society should be preserved and care had to be taken to see that economic power and wealth was not concentrated, in the process of expanding the public sector, in the hands of those in whom political and administrative power was already concentrated.

objectives and policies of the Planning Commission as stated in the draft outline of the Second Five Year Plan. I am glad of that not merely because you have expressed your agreement, but because you are men of experience in your own line, and it is out of that experience that you have said what you have stated in your address or in your resolutions.⁵ It is commonplace now to say that we are, in India and in the world, going through quite an extraordinary period of transition, in which it might well be said that almost everything that has been previously said in the domain of policy or programme is out of date. Entirely new considerations have come in which upset all the theories of all the old pundits in every department of human activity, whether the art or science of warfare or in economics or in so many other things.

New powers have been let loose, or are going to be let loose. The pace of industrial and technological development has been so tremendous in the recent past say, the last twenty or twenty-five years, that they have changed the whole conception of things.

If our friends, the communists today rely on Marx, who was a very great man and who threw a tremendous light on the development of various processes in history, well, they rely on something that is completely out of date. I think Marx was a very great man and all of us can learn from Marx. But the point is that it is grossly unfair for anyone to ask Marx, in the middle of the nineteenth century, to tell you what to do in the middle of the twentieth century. This may be said about others, who have written books mostly in the nineteenth or the early twentieth centuries, under conditions which were entirely different. This is much more so, as far as we are concerned; because those books were written with Europe or America in view and not the conditions in underdeveloped countries like India.

Personally, having been some kind of a student of history and historic forces, I am fascinated by this perspective of these technological changes, not merely from the point of view of the manufacturer or the engineer, for whom they are very important, but from the historic point of view, because they are changing the whole texture of human life and are likely to usher in a world, if not in my lifetime, in the lifetime of most people alive today, which will be radically different from the world we know of today.

5. The Manufacturers' Organisation emphasised that adequate financial resources should be made available to the private sector.

Just as the world coming after the Industrial Revolution in Europe became radically different from the pre-Industrial Age, so, I think, we are likely to emerge into a social structure—all over the world which is likely to be radically different from what we know them today. We in India have not passed through fully even the Industrial Revolution. We are, indeed, at the beginnings of that Revolution. We have to take a jump over various periods, various phases, that is to say, we have to pass through the Industrial Revolution when we have also to pass through what might be called the Atomic Revolution. That is a confusing thing. It may, of course, be helpful, in a way, that we do not have to go through all the painful processes of the early days of the Industrial Revolution. So all this should make us, continuously alert mentally, so that we might not get into old grooves.

We talk, and I am glad you agree with it, that we want a socialist pattern of society. That is a phrase which means, in one word, socialism. Do not imagine that it means anything else but socialism. A socialist pattern is socialism. Some people seem to make fine distinctions about socialistic pattern, and socialism. They are all exactly the same thing without the slightest difference. But what they are is not a very easy thing for anyone to put down and define, except in the broadest terms. We have not approached this question in any doctrinaire way. And that is good, because doctrinaire thinking leads to rigidity and rigidity of outlook at a moment of great change in the world is bad, because it leaves you somehow out of touch with changing conditions. You are left high and dry. Nevertheless, it should not mean that we think of a socialist pattern of society in some flabby, goody-goody kind of way. There are many people, perhaps more in India than elsewhere, who indulge in rather sloppy thinking on these subjects, who think that by an expression of goodwill to all and sundry they have done their duty. Well, expression of goodwill is right. One should feel good and express one's goodness, but that should lead to thinking in terms of concrete action.

After all, we live in a social set-up which has its good points and which undoubtedly has its bad features. It is not much good our expressing vaguely our disapproval of the bad features or taking them for granted. We have to fight them and remove them just as, let us say, we disapprove of untouchability and caste. Well, it is no good passively just expressing our disapproval. We have to actively do something to remove an evil in our social structure which comes in the way of human happiness, human cooperation and human progress.

Therefore, when we say that we are not doctrinaire it does not mean that we should confine ourselves to this kind of vague goodwill and not follow it up by clear thinking. At the same time goodwill is essential, the human approach

is essential. There is a tendency in the best of us, whether we are economists, government officials or belonging to any other profession, to forget that, whatever our job is, we have to deal with human beings. Human happiness is the measure of success and, therefore, that has to be kept in view. Having said that, it should be a clearly thought-out approach, always taking into consideration the changing circumstances, taking advantage of the experience of the human race thus far, but not getting tied down by that experience. We must realise that everything is changing all over the world. Apart from that, conditions in different countries are not the same. Therefore, the idea of adopting wholesale some other country's experience to one's own country without thinking how far it is adaptable, is not wise. One adapts as much as one can, but one maintains one's own foundations. It is not a question merely of using a new machine, we are dealing with human beings. Human beings differ from each other. Even their thumb impressions are supposed to differ, much more their minds and other things. One deals with uncertain factors. An engineer knows the strength of his steel, or the strength of his wood or stone or whatever he works with. The person who works with human beings finds it much more difficult to lay down any specifications about human beings.

Therefore, our approach has to be a knowledgeable approach, an open-minded approach and always a human approach. The moment we forget the human approach, somehow, the foundation of our thinking becomes shaky.

I said that we are going through tremendous technological changes. Honestly, I do not know where they are going to lead us. Scientists have developed what is called a machine with a memory. It can do things almost as well as a human being to whom you give orders and tell him what to do. All this is not only fascinating but rather frightening. Now, the machine is gradually becoming human in a most inhuman way. At the same time, the human being is tending to become less human because of the machine. I am mentioning all this to you because it is important that people keep these in view and not merely proceed by some casual statistical method of progress, how much of this, and how much of that, we have to produce and so on. We have to have statistics. But all the statistics in the world somehow miss out the basic factor as to what the human being is, how far he has progressed and how far he has not, except in material terms. Important as material development is, unless something else is developed, we are in for all kinds of dangers. As a symbol of technological development and the tremendous forces that have been released, I often refer to the atomic bomb or atomic energy. This force is so powerful that it has more or less put in the shade all the other types of force and violence. The ultimate violence has become so big that it will destroy both parties in a

conflict or all parties. We have arrived at that ultimate stage. We talk about capital intensive and labour intensive methods. The atom bomb is the last stage of a capital intensive method.

Now, what can control it? Nothing can control it except the mind and the heart of the human being, except a developed human being, who is something more than merely a person who possesses enormous power in his hands. So in these matters we come to the borders of what might be called ethical approaches. In the face of the atom bomb the only possible approach is some kind of ethical approach because having a bigger atom bomb is not the answer. It only means going the wrong way more and more. In this sense, all our planning, which must be based naturally on material considerations, must have for its background certain other highly important considerations.

We talk a great deal about the virtues of the democratic structure. We attach certain values to what is called the democratic method. The democratic method is not merely a method of casting a vote once in a few years. It is something much more. It is a habit of mind, a way of doing things, a way of tolerance, of living with people with whom you might disagree, a way of coexistence in the national and international spheres.

We talk of coexistence. Coexistence is the essential consequence of the democratic outlook. The persons who reject the idea of coexistence, reject basically the democratic outlook in international affairs. We cannot live in compartments or say we are democratic in our house but not in our city or in our state, or in our country. In fact many of us are very democratic in our politics and hopelessly undemocratic and reactionary in our domestic sphere. We have to have some integrated outlook about these matters.

In our draft Second Plan which is going through its finalising stages and will be placed before Parliament fairly soon, stress has been laid on heavy industry on the one hand and, on cottage industries on the other. In your address, Mr President, you have gently complained about not enough emphasis having been paid to small industries and medium industries. Well, you are partly right in saying that, but not completely right. No one thinks that medium industries are not important. Obviously they are. But the point is, what the State should encourage. In fact we do so, but essentially it can hold on its own if the State creates a favourable atmosphere for it. Only a day or two ago I was reading a report by one of our senior officers who went to the Punjab. He said he had gone there specially to see the small and the medium industries, not the cottage industries type but a little bigger, and he was astonished to notice the great progress made by these in the Punjab. Tremendous initiative had been shown by the people there, many of whom were newcomers, the displaced persons

who had come from Pakistan having lost all their property and with practically next to nothing. They had built up these small industries and showed enormous ability and inventiveness even to the extent of making their own tools. For instance, a man was using some kind of a small machine which was serving his purpose very well. He was asked "where did you get this"? He said, "I made it. You see, I went to the industrial exhibition⁶ in Delhi and I saw a machine in the Polish pavillion, which I rather liked. It was much too expensive for me, too complicated, so I drew a little chart of it and I have made my own machine and it serves my purpose very well". Now, that is an extremely valuable quality in a human being, this spirit of doing things, of inventiveness, of adapting, not waiting for others to do it, not waiting for machines to come down from the United States or from Russia or Japan, but setting about it himself and getting things done. I do not wish to compare one state with another, but I should like to congratulate the Punjab and the Punjabis on possessing this quality. It is this quality that will tell ultimately. We talk so much about policies. Policies are important, naturally, but only in so far as they help in releasing national energy and opening out opportunity to people who want to work.

We talk about industrialisation. Previously people's idea of industrialisation was increasing the output of consumer goods with consequent increase in employment. The idea now is, and I do not think it can be challenged, that if we really wish to industrialise, we must start from the heavy, basic, mother industries. There is no other way to do it. We must start with the production of power on a large scale. We must start with the production of iron and steel on a large scale. We must start with the production of the machine which makes the machine. These are basic things. So long as you have not got these basic things, you are dependent on others and you can never really grow rapidly enough. Once you have got these basic things then you can grow as rapidly as you like. You start a process of self-growth.

A country gets moving only when it has started this process of self-growth. The difficulty in an underdeveloped country is that it has not got that process of self-growth; it has to be pushed all the time. Its poverty is pulling it back, its underdevelopment is pulling it back. Once you have crossed that barrier and that self-growth business comes in. The automatic processes have been generated which carry it forward.

Heavy industry is essential, if you think in terms of industrialisation. I would say it is essential also, if you think in terms of preserving your freedom

6. The Indian Industries Fair was inaugurated by Nehru in New Delhi on 29 October 1955.

and independence. Without it in the modern world you have to face enormous risks and dangers. It might almost be said that no country is thoroughly and fully independent today and has to rely on another country for various essential articles, whether it is for defence or other purposes.

I should imagine that two of the best tests of the progress of a nation are how much iron and steel that nation is producing and how much power it is generating. I do not want a list of our factories. If you tell me so much power is produced, then I can immediately form some idea of the industrial development of our country. So also with iron and steel. These two things. Now, you know why we are pushing ahead as fast as we can with three new iron and steel mills.

We really have to plan to be able to set up an iron and steel plant ourselves. In the next stage, we must produce the machines for doing that, if not one hundred per cent, at least eighty or ninety per cent.

We come into the stage of long-term planning or perspective planning. We try to have a picture of ten or fifteen years from now. That need not be a rigid picture. It should be a flexible picture. But we must have some picture towards which we steadily go. Otherwise at the end of the period we find that because of the lack of something, we cannot move ahead.

Having struggled through various stages of thinking in the last five or six years, we are gradually getting our thoughts a little clearer now. Our economists are very helpful. Our statisticians provide much more material to us, although, even now, the material at our disposal is very limited in regard to social and other statistics.

This afternoon I am attending what is called a university forum on planning.⁷ At our invitation, every university is sending two or three persons, a professor and one or more senior students to discuss this matter because this is essentially a matter which people should understand, discuss and put out ideas on. It is not for some very wise man at the top to impose his ideas on the country and insist on those being carried out.

Your organisation can obviously perform a very important task in this business of thinking and making suggestions to us. We require clarity on two or three matters. One is the essential nature of centralisation today. If we have an iron and steel works, well, it is there. We cannot have little bits and call it an

7. On 14 April 1956 Nehru inaugurated in the Parliament House the first conference of University Planning Forums which was attended by about 130 delegates representing 65 universities and colleges.

iron and steel works, or if we have a machine for making huge machines, it must be centralised. Yet centralisation has its dangerous aspects. Therefore, we are in favour of decentralisation. After allowing for the essential parts of the centralised structure, we want as much decentralisation as possible, and we want that decentralised sector to be worked on cooperative lines. Certainly all the cottage industry sector should be worked, I think, on cooperative lines. The land sector, which is so important, I think, should be worked on cooperative lines, because, as soon as you think in terms of small patches of land under peasant proprietorship, you have to think of somehow making them cooperative and the only way out appears to be agrarian cooperatives. So that we attach the greatest importance to the cooperative approach, whether in land or industry. I do not say that it is applicable everywhere, but it should be applicable in a very large number of cases.

The work we are doing in India is difficult, but it is extraordinarily exciting and fascinating. It is not repeating something that has been done. It is really evolving something new in new circumstances. And therefore, it has an element of creativeness, of artistry, and I want you to appreciate that.

We have our community projects. Now, our community projects are not something absolutely new. And yet they are not a copy of anything else in the world. We have profited by others' experience, no doubt, but we have developed basically out of our own experience. It is something which is raised on the soil here and fits in with our growing experience. And that is why it is a success, while attempts in the past years at creating a model village were not. You won't have a community project in the United States of America or in the United Kingdom or the other highly developed countries. Conditions there are entirely different. If you try to do something on the American lines, it won't fit in at all because conditions are different. Therefore, we have to develop on our own lines. Our community projects have achieved remarkable success. A certain creativeness in our mind and activities is helping us to lay the secure foundations of India, not only in the industrial sphere or economic sphere, but also in the moral, ethical sphere. These are all parts of a whole. Just as you cannot break a human being up into bits and put him into separate compartments, so is it in our planning. Although we may not put all these factors in our Second Five Year Plan or something else, we have to bear all these factors in mind, because we are trying to produce an integrated human being, not a neurotic person who is going to pieces and who may earn more but what he earns he mis-spends and probably is more unhappy than he used to be even previously. So all these factors come up.

Thank you for inviting me.

5. Engineers and New India¹

Dr Roy,² Director,³ Professors, Teachers and Graduates of the Institute,

When I look at the young men, the new graduates,⁴ I have a feeling which is slightly akin to envy. Perhaps envy is not the right word, but I can think of no other. Because I see them launching out, not only on their careers, which is an exciting business for every young man or young woman at this time of life, but launching out on it at a time of particular significance to this country and to them. I suppose that I am partial to India in my thinking. I cannot help it, because India is in my blood and bones and everywhere and in my thought and everything I try, nevertheless, in so far as I can, to see this India in the larger context of the world today, in the larger context of history. Looking at it in this way, it seems to me that at the present moment there is no more exciting place to live in than India. Mind you, I use the word exciting. I did not use the word comfortable or any other soothing word, because India is and is going to be a hard place to live in. Let there be no mistake about it. There is no room for soft living in India, not much room for leisure, although occasional leisure is good. But there is any amount of room in India for living the hard, exciting, creative and adventurous life. It is therefore that I said that I rather envy the young men and young women who, having acquired a certain training, launch out on this adventure at this particular juncture of India's history.

I have no reason to complain, because people of my generation have also led rather exciting lives and have had our full measure of adventure. We have also seen many things happening. There was a time, and the time is not past, when we indulged in all kinds of dreams, and it was exciting to work for those dreams and to see those dreams come true. There is no greater joy in life than to work for a great purpose and gradually to see the realisation of that purpose. We, people of my generation in India allied ourselves to this great purpose of freeing India. And because we allied ourselves to a mighty purpose, something

1. Speech at the first convocation of the Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur, 21 April 1956. AIR tapes, NMML.
2. Bidhan Chandra Roy, Chief Minister of West Bengal, was chairman of the Board of Governors of the Institute.
3. S.R. Sengupta was the Director of the Institute.
4. One hundred and fifty engineering graduates received their degrees at this convocation.

of the greatness of that task fell on us also. The higher you act the higher you think. The nobler the enterprise, something of that nobility comes to you. If you indulge in small activities, in small thinking, then you remain small. But if you dare and go in for the really big things of life, then in your endeavour to realise them, you become big in the process.

So I have no reason to complain of our lives. We had adventure and even fulfilment in full measure. Nevertheless, the great part of our lives was spent not in building directly, although there was plenty of building, but rather in breaking up political and economic and other structures which had grown up and which confined India and prevented it from developing. It is true that during the last eight or nine years we have had a chance of taking up constructive, creative effort, and we have taken advantage of it to the best of our ability. This process, no doubt, will continue.

As I stand at this place, my mind inevitably goes back to that institution, for which this place became famous twenty or thirty years ago, the Hijli detention camp.⁵ Your institute which stands for India's urges, India's future in the making, stands where there was the Hijli detention camp. This is symbolic of the changes coming to India. Seeing these young men who have taken their various degrees, looking at their bright faces, I feel happy, and shall I say again, a little envious. I am long past my prime. I have lived a hard life working for India. It is left to you now and the likes of you to build this country. It is well that that should be so, because no generation should impose itself upon another.

The world would be in a bad way if there was too much imposition of one generation over another. There is always a tendency to do that. As we grow older we tend to impose ourselves upon the younger people. We tend to bully them a lot by good advice and the like. Good advice is often needed, I suppose, but ultimately the good develops in us not by the advice and the sermons that we hear, but by other factors. If you have been trained here in this Institute, in the proper way, leaving it to you to develop your personality, your thinking, then you are developing along right lines, and whenever difficulties face you, you will be able to overcome them.

5. In Hijli detention camp near Kharagpur in Midnapur district a number of young men detained merely on suspicion of their being freedom fighters without charging them with any offence were fired upon on 16 September 1931 when two persons were killed and twenty injured. Subsequent official enquiry found that firing was unjustifiable. Hijli incident shook the whole country. For Nehru's reaction to the incident see *Selected Works* (first series), Vol. 5, pp. 256, 294 and 310.

So I am not here to dole out advice to you and tell you to be good and do this and that. We are up against far too great and tremendous problems for us to solve them by some cheap advice to each other. It is true, that all your training in your Institute of Technology or in any other Institute will not take you very far if inside you there is no strength of character, strength of mind, strength of purpose, some objective in life, some real function in life, not merely getting a salary and doing an odd job. I do not call that a function. Unless you have that function of doing something that is worthwhile and putting all your heart and soul into it, you cannot really experience the real joy of life. Most people in this world live lives which do not have too much meaning for anybody, least of all to themselves. They may be interested in their domestic affairs, in making money, in spending it and so on. I do not blame them. That is the common lot of most of us. But in India today uncommon things are necessary. Uncommon efforts are necessary. Uncommon application to work, creativeness and the like. Remember, in India today we are attempting a task, which is rather unique. I did not mean that India is superior to other countries and in that sense our task is unique. Do not fall into that error of a narrow nationalism, of thinking that your country is somehow superior to others. The people of every country think in that way, and take pride in the fact that somehow or other they are superior to others. That is not a wise approach. Every country has its good points and bad points. Every country has to make good through its own efforts and, therefore, every country faces an exciting adventure. As I said, India is going through a rather unique period of her existence, and even from the world point of view, there are some unusual and unique features about our present endeavours. Other countries are far ahead of us in many ways, in technology, in science, in the application of science and in the very matters which you are learning here. There are countries in Asia which are behind even us, although we are still classified as an underdeveloped country. The developed countries have gone through a process of change for one hundred and fifty years or more and gradually adapted themselves to these changing circumstances. Some countries, like the Soviet Union, have hustled and hastened through these processes in a particular way, and arrived at a certain goal of technological efficiency and progress, paying a very heavy price for it, and adopting a system which I am not here to criticise or to praise, but which is different from the system that we endeavour to follow here.

We want to advance in the technological sphere rapidly, and yet we want to adhere to certain methods which, normally speaking, do not help rapid advance. That is the problem before us. Well, only future history will show how far we have succeeded. All I can say is that even with the brief experience

of the last seven to eight years, we have done well, in spite of any number of difficulties and obstructions.

Where do the difficulties and obstructions come from? Not from anybody outside us, not from any other country, any other people. The difficulties and obstructions arise out of our own failings and weaknesses which make us stumble and fall, and pull us back. At no time have I ever had the slightest sensation of fear or apprehension from any external quarter. I am not afraid of what any country, big or small, can do to India. Of course, other countries can do good to India or, do ill to India. They can make a difference to our problems, I do not deny that. But, what I said was that I have no sensation of fear from any country and that is saying a very big thing, because there is plenty of fear in the world today. Fortunately, among the many lessons that it was my privilege to learn, working under Gandhiji, the foremost was not to be afraid. So, I am not afraid of anything happening to us from outside. But, I shall be quite frank with you, doubts and apprehensions arise in my mind about our own internal weaknesses and failings. If we function rightly, if we function with unity and cooperate with each other, there is nothing in the wide world that can come in our way.

Unfortunately, one sees certain pictures of India which are distressing, pictures which break up the unity of India, which divide up the people of India into numerous compartments, thereby taking away from that cooperative and united effort which is so necessary for any big undertaking. We saw in the last few months a tremendous noise about this business of the reorganisation of states and about what part of India should be in this state or that. These are important matters, no doubt, but are they really so important that we should forget Indian unity, that we should glare and stare with bitterness at our neighbour who speaks another language or lives in another state? Surely, if that is so, then we have lost all sense of India's unity. It means we have reverted to some past period of history and not realised that we are living in the middle of the twentieth century, when we have attained our freedom and are determined to make good in other ways as well.

When there are big problems for us to tackle, people go about doing sâtyagraha and disobeying laws and going to prison and shouting that they do not want this and they do not want that. Is it not something which can only be called infantile. Are we grown up human beings to behave in this manner and try to solve our problems in this manner? I am astonished at the things that are happening, but politicians work in devious ways. Nevertheless, there should be some sense of proportion.

Look at the world today, full of the most tremendous, most exciting problems, apart from the political problems, apart even from the mighty problem of war and peace. We are on the threshold of the atomic age, something which is likely to bring in changes in the world comparable to or perhaps greater than those brought in by the Industrial Revolution. The Industrial Revolution has only partly come to India, but it has revolutionised living conditions in Europe, in America, etc. The Industrial Revolution is coming to India now. But, at the same time the Atomic Revolution is also coming here. They both come together, and we dare not finish one and then go to the other. We have to take both at the same time. So in this period, when people talk of One World and realise that even the nation state is no good, it is too small, getting wildly excited about provincial and linguistic boundaries indicates that some of us live in a remote past age which has no relation to the present age. In any event, however right our thinking and our urge and our desire might be, the major thing to consider is the means and methods we adopt to achieve those ends. Remember always what Gandhiji used to tell us, that means are often more important than ends. Obviously, if you want to travel from here, let us say, to Madras, and the road you adopt leads you to the Himalayas in the North, you will not reach Madras. The road, the means you take, must be the right means. That was perhaps the basic lesson of Gandhiji. I am afraid that we tend to forget his teachings, although subsequent generations will go back to them.

India, I said, presented to me a spectacle of exciting adventure. I should like you to have that sensation of excitement and adventure. I should like you to feel that wherever you may work, you are partners in a tremendous and historical process. Something very big is happening in India, all over the world, but after all you and I are more concerned with India. We cannot take the world's burdens on our shoulders. To take India's burdens is big enough. India, I say, not Bengal, not Bihar, not Maharashtra, not Gujarat, not Madras. I have had enough of these names of provinces thrust down upon me and people going about staging satyagraha for this province and for that province. It is about time that men of goodwill and good sense stood up against this provincialism that is becoming the curse and ruin of this country. There is no harm in your being proud of your province and of your language. Undoubtedly you have every right to be. But we must guard against this spirit of negation, of being against the other, of separateness. We have enough of separateness in this country. There are communal barriers which separate us, there are provincial barriers, there are caste barriers. There are so many things that separate us, while the essential thing in India today is to bring about what I would call the emotional integration of India.

Politically we are one, of course. On the map we are one, in government we are one, but we want something deeper than that. We want the emotional integration of the Indian people. It is obvious that it has not happened yet. If it had happened, you would not see all this shouting about state boundaries. Emotional integration means an understanding coming to all our people, that we are members of one vast family, the family of India, whatever our state or province, whatever our religion, whatever our caste, whatever our language. Once that comes, and come it will sometime or other, then India becomes unassailable, unbreakable and nobody can touch India. But so long as that does not come, India will be weak. This is the real danger, not some external adversary.

You are engineers, and this world today comes more and more into the hands of engineers. There was a time when administrators played the primary role in a country's government and development. Administrators always have to play an important role. You cannot minimise it. But the time has now come when the engineers and the scientists play an infinitely greater role than anybody else. In fact, these divisions into administrator, engineer and so on, will gradually fade away. As I see it, many of our administrators in future will have to be engineers and many of our engineers might well have to be administrators, because the major work of the country today deals with these vast engineering schemes of various types. We are building up a new India and the administrator who is completely ignorant of engineering does not help much in administrating. You will find that when a country is technologically developed, engineers and scientists play a far more important role even outside their sphere of engineering and science. That is bound to happen in India.

Your Director or someone referred to employment of the graduates who go out of this Institute. If we take all the trouble to put up this very expensive Institute and train people here, and then do not utilise the services of those people, then there is something very wrong about the governmental apparatus or whoever is supposed to deal with this matter. Such a state of affairs can only be described as fantastically stupid—to train people for certain purposes and then waste them. I am not for the moment thinking in terms of the individual's employment. I am thinking in terms of the nation. It is fantastically stupid to make a great effort to train people for particular types of specialised activity and then allow them to go to seed. To some extent that does happen today, but I think that it is much less than it used to be. I have no doubt that this kind of thing will completely end. The proper course should be for our big enterprises, either run directly by Government or indirectly as corporations, which are all the time hankering after engineers and the like, to keep in touch with such Institutes and tell them, "We want this type of trained personnel," so that even

before the person has finished his course here, he has practically been allotted to a special job somewhere. He will, of course, begin as an apprentice. He may be good at his examination and perhaps not so good at the actual job. But anyhow, after his training he should not be forced to wait for something to happen, some job to come his way and go on applying from pillar to post, when actually there is so much work to be done. As a matter of fact, apart from our own great needs in India, all kinds of demands come to us now from friendly countries, chiefly in Asia, partly in Africa, for technical personnel, for even administrative personnel, for people who have some training in our community projects, and it is becoming very difficult for us to meet these demands. We want to help them, of course. Even now, there are several hundreds of our technicians, whom we have sent to countries in Asia and Africa. But the demand gradually will run into not hundreds but thousands, and I would like to send them because these countries of Asia and Africa and we are all in the same boat, being underdeveloped countries. If we are a little ahead of them, then it is up to us to help them. There is going to be no lack in India of trained people having opportunities of doing worthwhile work, and if there is some difficulty it means that our organisation has gone wrong, has slipped somewhere. Demand is there, so that it becomes a question really of planning from the earliest stages to see who is being trained where, where can he fit in, and keeping trace.

I came here just a little more than four years ago to lay the foundation stone of this building,⁶ and now I have come back and have seen the building. It always produces a deep sense of satisfaction to see buildings and institutions coming up. There are some kinds of growth which you cannot see, but the visible growth of our big national laboratories and these Institutes and other places fills me with joy. I see this great drama of India being enacted in our history, and this drama itself is a part of the vast drama of the world. As I said at the beginning, when people are engaged in big undertakings, they imbibe something of the bigness of the undertaking and grow bigger. It is given to all of you to grow bigger and bigger. The job we have, you and I, and all of us, is a tremendous job. If we do it in the right way, in the right spirit, then we shall find our real function in life. Without it, it does not matter what you do, how much money you may earn, you will be unhappy, you will be purposeless and become neurotic. I am not neurotic whatever else I may be. I am full of function. It is a functionless person who becomes neurotic. So ally yourselves with your work in a big way and grow big with it. Thank you!

6. Nehru laid the foundation stone of the main building of I.I.T. at Kharagpur on 3 March 1952.

6. Non-Violence and Modern India¹

Mr Chairman, sisters and brothers,

I have reached here very late. I had promised to be here at seven o'clock and have come only at a quarter to eight for which I want you to forgive me. I was busy in something important and so it was not possible to come here earlier. Even now I could get away only with great difficulty.

Today we are assembled here to celebrate the anniversary of a very great man of India and the world. I often wonder if we feel that our duty is done merely by remembering them. It is more important that we try to practise their teachings in our lives.

The person who was speaking when I came in was saying that the fruits of the *tapasya* (concentrated striving) of these great men have come to us after two thousand five hundred years. He gave the example of our Constitution. This is a very belated effect and somehow the example of our Constitution does not seem quite appropriate. Great men do have an impact and their influence continues to be felt for a long time, whether we realize it fully or not. But the question that arises is whether we should fall into the error of thinking that our duty is done by taking the names of great men and then doing what we like.

Recently, the Hindi poet Dinkar published a book on Indian culture and he asked me to write a foreword, which I did.² I said there that the thought often comes to my mind that the people of this country have split personalities. On the one hand, we repeat the highest of thoughts and principles and tell the world about them; on the other hand, in practice our actions are very far removed from them. This may be true to some extent of every country in the world. But it is a little more obvious in India. The others do not talk so much about high moral principles as we do but in practice I feel they are a cut above us. Now, this is, individually or as a nation, a way of deceiving ourselves. We tell others

1. Speech at a public meeting held under the auspices of the All-India Mahavir Jayanti Celebration Committee, New Delhi, 23 April 1956. AIR tapes, NMML. Original in Hindi.
2. For Nehru's foreword written on 30 September 1955, to *Sanskriti Ke Char Adhyay* by Ramdhari Sinha 'Dinkar', an eminent Hindi writer and Member of Rajya Sabha, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 30, pp.213-217.

that there have been great men in our country like Mahavir, Buddha, Krishna and Rama. They were great men and we have undoubtedly been influenced by them for thousands of years and by Gandhiji in our own time. Nobody can deny that. But we tend to sing their praises and then go our own way. It is obvious that there are some good qualities in us for if we did not have them we would not have lasted for so long, in spite of the tremendous ups and downs in our history. But we have weaknesses too, which led to our downfall time and again. We were enslaved by other nations, and remained stagnant while the world advanced. So there are both good points as well as bad in us. The task is to understand our weaknesses and root them out. Only then will our good qualities come to the fore and we can progress. If our weaknesses outweigh our good points, we shall lag behind.

So, we should try to learn a lesson from history. Though it is difficult to understand the modern times from old history, an effort can certainly be made. In every season and every era, man has to understand history from a new angle and draw fresh lessons. It is obvious that in the modern age, which is a rapidly changing, revolutionary one, the old lessons and principles have to be fitted into a new way of life. Otherwise we will not move forward. It has happened time and again with us. We stand where we are while the others advanced. Please do not think, as some people often do, that we were backward only in the superficial, outward things and were great from within. Thinking so may reassure ourselves. A nation progresses both from within and without.

So what is our duty in these revolutionary times? Where should we look? What should we do? I often remind the people that a symbol of the modern times is the atom bomb or atomic energy. Atomic energy has unleashed new forces which could change the face of the world. It can bring complete ruin upon the world or contribute to progress. It depends on how it is used. But more important, is ultimately the kind of human beings who will use it. If you want to gauge India's strength, the questions to ask is whether our people are full of vitality or lifeless, strong or weak, intellectually sharp or dull? Everyone cannot be alike. Nations move at different speeds at different times. When a nation moves rapidly, it achieves great things and advances in every field. Then a time comes when it slows down and keeps repeating old lessons and does not come up with anything new. You will find repeated instances of such ups and downs in our history. You will see that when we were weak and lifeless it was reflected in everything—literature, arts and other things. In our glorious epochs, we were great in every way.

We must try to understand first of all what we should do in these complex times. If we fail to do that, we cannot find solutions to any problems. Often,

people try to look for answers without understanding the question. How can there be an answer without knowing the question?

We must understand the times we live in. There is one thing more. No nation today can live in isolation. In the olden days, for good or bad, nations lived separate lives. Communication was difficult and travelling between countries was limited. So nations lived in isolation. Now that travelling has become simple and you can go right round the world in twenty-four or thirty-six hours, it has become impossible for countries to live in isolation. With faster modes of travel and communication, the world is becoming one in a sense. Events in one part are bound to have an impact on the other. It is indeed strange that instead of increasing friendship, this closeness is breeding hostility. When countries lived in isolation, wars were also rarer. Now when they are living cheek by jowl, there can be either friendship or enmity. Therefore, the old issues have acquired a greater urgency in the modern times. The greatest problem is the choice between violence and peace in this nuclear age. These problems existed earlier too, but violence did not assume the terrible proportions that it can today. Violence today has such vast dimensions that even those who are inclined towards it are becoming wary. Consequently, circumstances have forced them to look for peaceful solutions.

Do you remember that when Gandhiji used to tell us about the path of non-violence, he would stress that it was not for the weak and the cowardly for it requires great daring? He went to the extent of saying that if someone attacked you and you ran away in fear, that was not non-violence. You must stand firm and fight violence with non-violence, no matter what the consequences are. But if you cannot do that, instead of running away, it will be better to take out your sword and fight, for running away is not non-violence. It is weakness, cowardice. In fact, the courage of a human being can be measured only by the way he faces danger. Fearlessness often stumps even the armed enemy who does not have the experience of being faced with non-violence.

What I mean is that we talk a great deal about non-violence, but we do not distinguish between that and cowardice. This is self-defeating. It is only when non-violence is accompanied by courage that it has some meaning and has an impact on the world. It is obvious that cowardice has no impact.

How far are we capable of doing this? Everyone, it is obvious, cannot be a brave hero. But we must not be under the misapprehension that our duty is done by mouthing great principles. The world has become extremely complex today and is constantly on the brink of ruin because of the atom bomb. What are we to do? If we are to follow Gandhiji's principles, we must rely on our courage and dispense with arms and military forces. If there is real courage in

our people, we could succeed. But the fact is that it requires an extreme degree of courage to do that and there is also the risk that at the crucial moment, people may run away in fear. It is absurd to say that the people of India are more courageous than others. We are ordinary human beings like everyone else, with the same weaknesses and strengths. Therefore willy-nilly, we have to maintain an army, air force, etc. But it has been an ancient belief in India which has been firmly rooted in our thinking for thousands of years—and Mahatma Gandhi reinforced it—that ultimately man's strength lies not in arms but in his inner spirit. It is the spiritual strength or whatever you may call it that is invincible.

There has not been a braver man than Mahatma Gandhi in the world in our times. He was a frail little man, with hardly any physical strength. But his inner, spiritual strength was so tremendous that even powerful nations were shaken up. But ultimately the strength of a nation has to come from within the hearts and minds of the people. If that inner force is there, a nation is strong. Otherwise it will be a superficial nation.

The problem before us is how far we are able to generate that vitality and inner strength. The outward things that we do are no doubt necessary but we must not lose sight of the inner spirit behind them. The history of India in the last thirty or forty years has been an extraordinary one. But I feel that the years to come will be even more extraordinary and India will have to face great challenges. I do not mean military challenges or wars. We will have to stand the test and prove how much ability we have to become a great nation and to advance for we shall have to rely on our own greatness and not on that of our ancestors. We will have to march towards our goal on our own feet. The memory of former greatness certainly gives us strength and courage. But the effort has to be made by us. We will have to prove what we can do in these revolutionary times.

I was in Kharagpur in Bengal two or three days ago.³ I had laid the foundation stone of the Indian Institute of Technology there four years ago. It is a first-class institution where students from all over India come to learn various types of engineering. I had gone there just now for the first convocation. I was happy to see that in the open field where I had laid the foundation stone, there are huge buildings now and good work is being done. Among the young

3. For Nehru's speech at the first convocation of the Indian Institute of Technology on 21 April 1956, see the preceding item.

engineers who passed out from there were students not only from all over India from Kashmir to Travancore and Cochin, but also from China, Burma and Malaya. One boy was given the President's gold medal for standing first. He was very bright and intelligent and I hope he will go very far and do good work in India. What interested me was that the boy was a Harijan.⁴ I was very happy to see the doors of opportunity opening to people who had so far been deprived of it.

I told the boys in Kharagpur that I envied them. Envy is not a very good word, but I could not think of a better one. I told them, "I feel envious that you are coming out into the world with your life before you when the field is wide open to achieve great things. There will undoubtedly be great achievements in India and you will have the opportunity to do them and to serve India and participate in these great national tasks. I feel sad that I shall not get the same opportunity." I feel that from the point of view of opportunity to achieve things, new avenues are opening in the world today. We dreamt of many things and it is a great thing to be able to see them come true. We have seen many of our dreams come true after thirty or forty years. So at least there is an opportunity to realize our dreams.

Though I am an Indian by birth and Indian blood flows through my veins, I am capable of looking towards the rest of the world too. But it is not surprising if I am partisan towards India. I feel that at this moment, India is the most interesting country in the world to live in and work for, because great things are happening here. The people who do them acquire greatness. But petty things are being done all the time by everyone.

All of us are small parts of India, whether we live in Delhi, Madras, Bombay or in some village. India is made up of all of us put together and to the extent that we cooperate and work together, India will become strong and succeed in her great tasks. It is a simple thing, yet it is often forgotten. You saw the tremendous passion which was unleashed in the last few months over the issue of reorganization of states. It is indeed sad. It is not that the matter is not important. It is important and a decision has to be taken after due consideration and it is also obvious that whatever the decision is, it is bound to offend some sections of the people. But to fight over it shows a fundamental weakness in our character for we are very quick to fragment ourselves and tend to live in compartments, whether it is provincialism, communalism or casteism. In the

4. Bhim Chandra Mandal.

process, our unity and strength are frittered away. This is a very grave weakness among Indians. Indians who live abroad in small groups are better. But the moment more Indians go abroad, groups will begin to be formed even there, with Gujaratis, Bengalis, Tamilians, Malayalis and Hindustani speakers tending to live in separate compartments. Each group has a club of its own. You will not find this in any other nation. The Chinese for instance are an extremely united people. But somehow casteism has had this influence on us and we have got into the habit of living in compartments. The great problem before the nation is how to get rid of this habit which weakens us. It cannot be done by law. It has to be done by changing our life style.

The customs and traditions which bind us may have been relevant at some time but they are meaningless today and in fact, they are wholly wrong. What is right in one period of time becomes wrong in another. A thing may not be good or bad in itself but with the changing times it may become irrelevant and if you stick to it, you are out of the mainstream of life. Therefore, it has now become essential for us to bring about not only an economic but a social revolution as well. We have so far had only a political revolution, which brought us freedom. By a social revolution I mean the gradual discarding of the traditions and habits which are irrelevant in the modern times and shackle us. We must preserve what is good and discard the rest. Have you ever thought about it that there is no nation in the world—and there are hundreds of nations, big and small, old and new—which can understand the taboos which prevail in India. They simply cannot comprehend them because such things are not to be found anywhere else in the world. These taboos have become much less now but they are still there. I think that untouchability was a later development for it was certainly not to be found in earlier times. It came later and it has certainly no place in India today. But it binds us and shackles us and takes up too much of our time and effort. I have given a small example but the effect is to separate us from our neighbour. Whatever separates people weakens them and there is strength in unity.

I see that our youth often shout slogans of socialism but as a matter of fact they are three or four centuries behind the times. Yesterday, when I was addressing a large gathering in Patna I asked which century they thought they were living in. Then we can set about finding an answer. Are you living in the twentieth century, or the nineteenth or the eighteenth, or thousands of years farther back in time. I ask this, because you will function according to your thinking. Now, I do not wish to criticize anyone but there are many people in our country who are very retrograde in their thinking. It is difficult for them to fit into the modern world. It makes things difficult for the rest of the world as

well. After all, we have been born in these times and will have to fit into them. So we must try to understand the times that we live in. It has not come out of the blue. You cannot say you were taken by surprise. There is thousands of years of experience behind the twentieth century. If you take our own country, what are we? We are the product, for good or bad, of about five thousand years of history. The experiences of our ancestors, good and bad, are hidden behind the present. So we are not living in an era unconnected with the past. But we cannot become prisoners of our past for that will obstruct our progress.

Therefore, we must strive to understand the times we are living in. But in order to understand the present, especially in fundamental issues we need the light that the past can shed. If we wish to build an aeroplane, we cannot look to the past. That is a product of the modern age. But the past sheds light on human character and behaviour and the broad principles that govern human beings. Perhaps people lose their moorings and go astray because they suppress the light cast by the past and fail to take advantage from it. Well, our past can cast a glorious light and we must try to link that to the present somehow in order to succeed.

I have put some of the thoughts which are uppermost in my mind before you in the hope that you will also think about them. There is no point in paying homage to the memory of a great man if we do not think about the influence his thoughts have on the world. The principle of non-violence has a special association today. But non-violence too is not a mantra to be chanted. It acquires meaning only when we understand how it can be applied in the modern world and implement it. *Jai Hind!*

NATIONAL PROGRESS

I. ECONOMY

1. To Mehr Chand Khanna¹

New Delhi
5 February 1956

My dear Mehr Chand,²

Your letter of the 1st February, in which you suggest that permission should be given to put up some textile mills in refugee townships. Much as I want to help in providing work in these townships, the point you have raised involves a question of principle which has deeply agitated many people in Parliament and in the Planning Commission. There are strong views about it. It is not, therefore, such an easy matter as you appear to imagine. No doubt, the whole question will be considered by the Planning Commission and ultimately by the Cabinet.

Perhaps you have heard about the Ambar Charkha.³ Have you thought of this in terms of giving employment in these refugee townships?

I am merely writing to you to point out that the question is a complicated one and will have to be considered in all aspects.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. A copy of this letter was sent to T.T. Krishnamachari, Union Minister for Commerce and Industry and simultaneously for Iron and Steel.
2. Union Minister for Rehabilitation.
3. For Nehru's views on Ambar Charkha, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 31, pp.57-64.

2. To V.T. Krishnamachari¹

New Delhi
29 February 1956

My dear V.T.,²

I enclose a letter from Keshava Deva Malaviya.³

As far as I have been able to make out after some talks with the Russian experts and others, there is a very good chance of our succeeding in finding oil in some of the places we are exploring. It is obvious that the chances of finding oil are far greater if we take up a number of such places at the same time. Success in one place even will not only make up for all other failures but bring us substantial profit.

On the last occasion that we discussed this in the Planning Commission, I think it was agreed, at the suggestion of the Finance Minister, that this work should be carried out. It was not necessary to make any additional specific grant for it, but it was to be understood that the work will not suffer for lack of money. Now, that we have to deal with the Russian experts and make positive arrangements about boring and the engagement of technicians, etc., as well as the training of our own people abroad, we have to be more precise. I think that what the Finance Minister said on the previous occasion should be adequate, and there should be a clear understanding that this work can be proceeded with as rapidly as possible. Whatever money may be needed, will be forthcoming.

Anyhow, I should like the Planning Commission to make this clear.

I would gladly have a meeting of these foreign experts together with you and others, but I fear I cannot do so in the course of the next few days. There is the Governors' Conference⁴, and Selwyn Lloyd⁵ is coming. Then, I go to Hyderabad.⁶

1. File No. 17(204)/56-66-PMS.
2. Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission.
3. Union Minister of State for Natural Resources.
4. The Conference of the Governors and Rajpramukhs was held at Rashtrapati Bhavan in New Delhi on 2 and 3 March 1956.
5. Selwyn Lloyd, the British Foreign Secretary, was in New Delhi from 3 to 5 March 1956.
6. Nehru was in Hyderabad on 5 March 1956.

Then Dulles⁷ comes and the French Foreign Minister.⁸ I suggest, therefore, that you, Nanda,⁹ Swaran Singh¹⁰ and Keshava Deva Malaviya might meet the Russian experts. If it is at all possible for me to come for a while, I shall come. Could you please get in touch with Keshava Deva Malaviya directly?¹¹

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

7. John Foster Dulles, the US Secretary of State, was in New Delhi on 9 and 10 March 1956.
8. Christian Pineau visited New Delhi from 11-13 March 1956.
9. Gulzarilal Nanda was Union Minister for Planning, and Irrigation and Power.
10. Union Minister for Works, Housing and Supply.
11. Nehru again wrote to V.T. Krishnamachari on 10 March: "I have received some additional information, rather informally, which indicates that the prospects of large supplies of oil being found in India are good. I think we should make every effort to get hold of those. If we are even partially successful, it would mean a tremendous help to us in many ways."

3. To K.C. Reddy¹

New Delhi

1 March 1956

My dear Reddy, ²

The question of the Ambar Charkha has come up several times before us. There have been long arguments about it. It has been suggested that, because of the expected capacity of the Ambar Charkha to meet all demands for yarn in the future, we should not start any more spinning mills. As you know, there have been many arguments about it, and long papers have been prepared.

And yet, we have no precise information about the working and cost of the Ambar Charkha yet. We are thus arguing in the air. It was because of this reason that the meeting of the Economic Committee the other day suggested that your Ministry should prepare a paper and put it up before the Cabinet in about two weeks' time. I do not know if you will be in a position to give precise facts about the Ambar Charkha's working by that time, but you should certainly be able to give some kind of a picture of the Ambar Charkha on the economic side, presuming that it is technically an efficient instrument.

This question is not only an important one but a very urgent one. The cloth position is becoming more and more difficult, and, as it is, we are likely to face a shortage. If we do not prepare for the future now, we might well be compelled to have recourse to all kinds of controls. Therefore, we have to come to some decision very soon.

There are two aspects of the Ambar Charkha, both inter-connected. One is its technical efficiency and what it can produce. The other is an attempt at calculating costs of production. The latter attempt can be made on the presumption that the Charkha is technically good. That will, at any rate, give us some picture to proceed with. Otherwise, we merely go on talking round and round the subject.

In finding out the technical efficiency of the Charkha, it is not enough for some high expert to work it for a few days. We should have not only the experts to use it but the average person who is likely to be asked to use it, and

1. File No. 17(69)/56-57-PMS. A copy of the letter was sent to U.N. Dhebar, President, Indian National Congress. Also available in JN Collection.
2. Union Minister for Production.

then find out how much they can produce in a stated time, say, eight hours. Then, again, a man may work for eight hours and produce a certain quantity, but is he likely to produce the same quantity in a month of thirty eight-hour days? The question of fatigue comes in and other psychological factors. There is also the question of the quality and strength of the yarn produced. The normal mills measure the strength by some machine. That may be helpful, but what we really require is the weaving quality and not necessarily the strength.

Then, again, much will undoubtedly depend upon the quality of the cotton supplied. If we experiment with some very high quality cotton and are unable to supply this in large quantities to others, the results will not be helpful. The cotton to be supplied should be easily available.

The question of manufacture of these Ambar Charkhas in large numbers also arises. It is not enough to say that a number of carpenters will make them, although even that has to be calculated. There are certain parts of it which probably are more or less precision parts, such as, the *takali*. Will it be advisable to have these precision parts made at one or more centres so as to be uniform and good?

Please have all this information collected as soon as possible to enable us to come to decisions. These decisions will have to take into account the money factor. At present, we subsidise khadi in two ways—an initial subsidy for production, and then by payment of higher prices for the prepared article. How will the khadi made out of the Ambar Charkha yarn compare with other khadi in regard to these subsidies? A large sum of money is required, first of all, for the manufacture of Charkhas and their proper distribution and arrangement for servicing. Cotton has to be supplied. What will be the cost of manufacture of the cloth? Then comes the question of transport, though it need not have to go far. How much will a person earn working eight hours a day? All these and many other questions have to be answered.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. The Socialist Pattern¹

Mr Chairman² and friends,

You will forgive me if I do not enter into any kind of discussion on some topics that you have mentioned in your address³, whether they relate to the Budget which has been placed before Parliament, or to matters like life insurance, which are not wholly to your liking, and to which you made reference. These are all parts of a connected whole. It is no good my discussing the step we have taken in regard to life insurance⁴, as if that was an independent step unconnected with anything else. It is part of a certain philosophy of approach to our various problems. If we accept that philosophy of approach, then that is easy to understand. If we do not, then naturally we resist it.

I can very well understand that many of you find some difficulty in accepting wholly that particular philosophy of approach. In fact, I must say that I have

1. Speech while inaugurating the twenty-ninth annual session of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, New Delhi, 4 March 1956. AIR tapes, NMML. Also available in JN Supplementary Papers, NMML. Nehru first spoke in Hindi (speech not included) and then in English.
2. Shantilal Mangaldas (1901-1977); Chairman, New Jehangir Vakil Mills Co. Ltd, Bhavnagar; Chairman and Managing director, Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd., Ahmedabad; President, Ahmedabad Millowners Association, 1946; member, Senate of Bombay University, 1928-43; attended Textile Committee meetings of ILO at Brussels, 1946 and at Geneva, 1948; President of the FICCI, 1955-56.
3. Mangaldas perceived the central problem as how to bring all sections of community on a footing so as to get equality of opportunity while retaining the essential incentives necessary for maintenance and increase of social efficiency. He also referred to the doubts and apprehensions of the business community regarding Government policies. These related to shortfall in investment by the private sector allocated for First Plan in industry, nationalisation of life insurance, setting up of a State Trading Corporation and decentralisation of economic power by placing ceilings on income and holdings and by revival of cottage industries.
4. All life insurance companies were brought under Central Government management and control with immediate effect by the Life Insurance (Emergency Provisions) Ordinance promulgated on 19 January 1956. Mangaldas argued that half of the resources of the insurance companies were already available to the Central, State and Local Governments under the statutory restrictions and Government's decision to nationalise life insurance on the ground that it was essential for the implementation of the Plan, came as a great surprise.

been pleased at the extent of the effort you have made to appreciate that philosophy and to adapt yourself to it. I think it does you credit, because after all our philosophies in life are the results of our own experiences, not something out of the air. It is our experience that condition us as individuals, as a group or as a nation. All your experiences, your profession, has made you function in the particular way, the way of private enterprise—the particular way, if I may use the word, of fitting into, what might be called the acquisitive society. That has been the common lot over a large part of the world for a long time. It is natural to think in those terms and so, it is very commendable for you to try to appreciate and adapt yourself to changing conditions in India. Therefore, I am not complaining at all, rather I am appreciating. Nevertheless, I would like you to think of these problems in this somewhat wider context.

I often refer in various contexts to the atomic bomb and to the hydrogen bomb, because quite apart from the terrible destruction that it might bring, the atomic bomb is the symbol to me of many things. It is a symbol, apart from destruction, of enormous forces coming into the world and ushering in a new age. It is a symbol of something not quantitatively different, but qualitatively different. It is not a question that if you use an atom bomb, more damage is done. Of course, great damage is done. But, it is something much more, it is a qualitative change that has come about. Just as in the domain of warfare something qualitatively different has come because of the atom bomb and the hydrogen bomb, in the domain of politics and economics also, something revolutionary has happened because of the rapidity of technological advance. It has become exceedingly difficult for most of us to keep pace in our thinking with the facts of life.

There are, broadly two types of thinking. One is, what you might call more or less static, that is, following old grooves of thought. The other is, what you might call dynamic or revolutionary, one that is constantly thinking of change. Obviously, both are necessary. You cannot uproot something without having to pay a heavy price and having to build the whole thing afresh. At the same time, you cannot, in a fast changing world, stick to something, that is static. You get left behind. On the other hand there is the grave danger that these revolutionaries having a dogmatic approach to an essentially changing phenomenon. The static person may be very reactionary. But some of the persons who call themselves revolutionaries may be equally reactionary, in the sense that they get wedded to a fixed dogma and forget that the world changes.

Now, take capitalism and socialism and communism and all that. Broadly speaking, the capitalism of today in the highly developed capitalist countries is very very different from what it was a hundred fifty years ago, or even fifty

years ago. Many of the theories that were formed then about it, both by the pro-capitalists and the anti, have been proved to be not true, although some may be true. It has shown fresh context for growth and production and much more life than many people had imagined. Take the other side, socialism and communism. The first thing is that even the most conservative capitalist systems have tended, in spite of what they say, towards adopting several socialistic features. It is inevitable in modern society.

You will have seen something rather important that has happened recently, and that is the new direction that has been given to the policy of the Soviet Union. I am not going into whether it is right or wrong. That is none of my business. But what I am venturing to point out is that even in a country which in terms of economic theory had become very rigid and where theorising was very important, circumstances have compelled them to change their rigid theories and rigid approaches. All of us tend to be rigid, whatever party or group we belong to. We think of a person who may talk about a socialist society here or elsewhere as some fire brand or a dangerous red. So far as the representatives of the capitalist structure are concerned, the average cartoonist continues to show them as pot-bellied individuals. I must say the lack of intelligence shown by our cartoonists is just amazing. They have imbibed some ideas and they go on repeating them regardless of whether they make sense. All capitalists are not pot-bellied. Some may be.

What I venture to plead for is that, first of all, there must be a realisation that we live in an age where new thinking is necessary. Naturally, our thinking is based on old principles, our own experience and the world's experience. But we have to realise that our thinking requires a different dimension. I say that because the change is not quantitatively different but qualitatively different. Of course, the new dimension does not come on suddenly, but it is rapid enough. A choice has to be made between terrible disaster or great progress by every country and by the world at large. All our old ways of thinking become rather out of date.

That is the first fact to be realised. The second, which follows from it, is that our thinking and our approach to our problems must be flexible, open-minded, again based on certain principles. The moment dogma comes in, your mind is closed and you are lost to some extent, just as, if I may say so with all respect, the great virtues of a religion are largely lost the moment dogma comes in and closes your minds to its great qualities. So, if you allow your approach to economic theory to become something in the nature of a dogmatic religious approach you have lost the initiative, you have merely become the repeaters of old slogans and old mantras.

The third thing is that the measure of our approach must be the common good, not the loss or gain of any group. If we are thinking of India, we must keep in mind the good of the three hundred and sixty millions of Indians all the time, and aim at reducing the disparities between them. There are terrific disparities in our country. They are psychologically bad, politically bad, and economically bad. All people must have the same opportunity. Having got the same opportunity, some may be fleet of foot, they can go further ahead; some may be keener of mind, they can assume larger responsibility; that is a different matter, but they must have the same opportunity.

This applies to India of course, but it applies to whole world. You cannot have for very long a world which is excessively prosperous in one corner and miserable in another corner, where there are tremendous differences of wealth and poverty. This has happened in the past, but today the world has become so compact and its people have come so close to each other that one part affects the other. Therefore, one has to aim at lessening disparity if a part of the world remains without the normal necessities of life and another part has so much that it wastes and can indulge in extremes of luxury, there is bound to be trouble. I do not mind luxury, but luxury becomes out of place, and rather vulgar and anti-social and dangerous, by the side of a lack of necessities. One country helping the other is a matter not of generosity, but of good sense. It is, if you like, a kind of self-insurance or whatever you like to call it.

When I say this, I should like to add that in the world and in India, the trend, instead of reducing disparities, is of increasing disparities, like the Biblical saying, unto those who have even more shall be given and from those that have not, even what they have shall be taken away.⁵ I am not blaming any country or any individual, but the forces at work today encourage the richer nations to become richer and richer quickly, and leave the poorer nations to move more slowly forward, so the gap becomes bigger and bigger. And within a country too, it so happens that there is a tendency for the gap to become bigger. Oddly enough, even in our development schemes, there is a tendency for the somewhat more prosperous state to advance more rapidly than the poorer state and the gap between the more prosperous and the less prosperous states becomes bigger instead of lessening. The more prosperous state have more resources, and the other poor state, although we help it, moves more slowly. This is the trouble

5. "Unto everyone that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance: but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath." Matthew : 25: 29.

of the whole of our social framework too. The lower and less privileged ranks do not make as much progress as other sections. This has to be rectified.

The fourth point is that in the difficult and intricate problems that we have to face today, solutions should be sought by peaceful methods, whether the problems are political, national, international or economic or social. Again, I would remind you of the advent of the atom bomb. The method of violence has reached such an extreme stage that it destroys you as well as others. Therefore, you cannot really use the atom bomb in the settlement of international problems. It will destroy the world without solving any problem. If violence has overreached itself, then violence has ceased to be a method of solution of problems. Apply that to our other problems, national, political and economic. The same principle applies. We may not have the atom bomb here, and we do not propose to have it here, it is no good to us. But, the fact of the presence of the atom bomb in the world has made a difference, a qualitative difference, not a quantitative. It has shown up the essential nature of violence, that is, that violence is self-destructive. We did not notice it so much when the effects were not so widespread. Now, we see that violence and whatever may go with violence, like hatred and the like, are self-destructive, and no real solution can come by following those methods.

There is no doubt that there are conflicts of interests on the economic level. There are class conflicts. Any person who denies that shuts his eyes to a patent fact. By denial of a fact the fact does not cease to exist. By non-recognition of, let us say, the People's Republic of China, China has not disappeared from the world. It is very much there. What we need is not denial of the fact of class conflicts but finding ways of solving those conflicts and removing them.

The first thing is that we should accept the fact that problems can be solved only by cooperative and peaceful methods. The old methods of conflict, of lock out and strike, are out of date today. They come in the way of national progress. Mind you, in the old days, the strike was the only weapon of workers to gain some rights and privileges. It was a very valued weapon. Without the strike probably, they would not have made any progress at all. But, the time has come when these methods of trying to threaten each other are gone, they injure both parties, they are wrong, basically wrong. But then, if the class conflict is there, what are you to do? Of course, you can have boards of arbitration to settle these problems. These are temporary expedients. But, ultimately, one must remove the cause, and change the structure which produces this class conflict. In fact, have no classes, so that there is no conflict. Obviously, that is the ideal to be aimed at. It may take long. But if one aims at a structure of society which may be called the socialist structure of society,

there should be no possibility of class conflict because classes gradually cease to exist. That is the obvious line of advance for humanity.

So, I want you to appreciate that when we say we shall have a socialist structure of society, it is not a phrase, a slogan used. It is something which we consider essential, which we consider inevitable. There is no other choice in the long run. In the short run, of course, there are many choices. But as I said, even the highly capitalist countries of the world unconsciously are moving in this direction to a socialised economy more and more, although they would not admit it. There is no other solution in this context of tremendous power symbolised by atomic energy. You cannot leave these mighty sources of power in private hands. Private hands may be good, private hands may be bad, private hands may be terribly wicked too. You dare not in the modern world leave these tremendous sources of power in private hands and give them the chance of producing a hydrogen bomb and terrorising humanity, because the time is coming when the hydrogen bomb will be relatively easy to produce. That is why I say you have to think in a different dimension now, and the inevitable result of that thinking, to my mind, is that we go towards the establishment of a socialist structure of society. What the details of it might be may vary. There need not be a regular, fixed plan or fixed dogma about it. I do not like dogmas in religion or economics or anything. But it is no good challenging something which seems to me to flow automatically from the conditions of modern life. It is not a question of my liking something or your liking something.

May I also refer to the discussion in the press and some comment that while a year ago we used the word 'socialistic' structure of society, now we use the word 'socialist'. I wish people, before commenting, studied the facts a little more. In the resolutions passed last year at the Avadi Congress it is true we used the word 'socialistic' structure in one place. In two other resolutions passed at the same time we used the word 'socialist' structure. You may rightly complain, why this needless using two words? Anyhow, that may be a drafting mistake, but the point is nobody thought that the two were anything different from each other. There was no conscious attempt at change because we had accepted that last year.

I have ventured to put before you these broad considerations which govern our thinking. From thinking of course flows action. I try to take an integrated view of my responsibilities, whether in the international field or in the national field, in the political field or the economic field, for me they are not separate compartments. They are an integrated whole. My picture of the world and my country, and my people, is a changing picture. I see in that picture that we have entered an age which is progressively, qualitatively different from past ages,

not only quantitatively. Therefore, our thinking has to be progressively of a different dimension. It has to be flexible, not dogmatic. It has always to take into consideration that it has to be based on the good of the vast mass of the people, because no other solution is practical. We have to remove disparities, not only because that is good, but because no other solution is practical. And finally, that peaceful methods have become essential if this world is to survive, whether it is in the international sphere or in the national. Thank you!

5. To C.P. N. Singh¹

New Delhi
16 March 1956

My dear C.P.N.,

You wrote to me a long letter about steel requirements for Bhakra-Nangal.² But I did not gather clearly from it what exactly the position is. I am not interested in what was said in the past by the Minister of Commerce & Industry. The question is what your requirements are and how they are being met. I spoke to T.T. Krishnamachari today and he told me that he was supplying Bhakra-Nangal requirements as and when needed. He is buying steel all over the world. I gather he went to Bhakra-Nangal some little time ago and discussed the matter with the engineers there also....³

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 17(137)/56-PMS. Also available in JN Collection. Extracts.
2. Singh wrote on 3 February 1956 seeking Nehru's intervention for meeting steel requirements of Bhakra Dam for 1956 to which Harvey Slocum, head of advisory team of American engineers to Bhakra Nangal Project, had drawn his attention. Singh had also enclosed four statements showing the demand and supply position for steel.
3. On 18 March, Harvey Slocum also told Nehru that the work schedule of Bhakra depended on steel, cement and personnel and if the supplies did not come on time, all the work would be hung up resulting in a great loss. Slocum added that it would be worthwhile paying a little more for steel.

6. To M.K. Vellodi¹

New Delhi
18 March 1956

My dear Vellodi,²

I met a colleague of mine from Allahabad today. His name is Bahuguna,³ and he is an MLA in the UP. He had apparently come here in connection with the proposed retrenchment of some Defence personnel. He is, I think, the Vice-President of some Employees' Union. He is a good, sensible man.

He told me that 4,800 skilled men were going to be retrenched. I remember our discussing this matter previously and deciding that where retrenchment was essential, this should take place. Nevertheless, I do not understand retrenching skilled personnel, including skilled carpenters and fitters, etc., when I think many of these must be required elsewhere. Carpenters today are in tremendous demand almost all over India. I hope you will take some interest in this matter. Both Railways and, I imagine, Irrigation & Power as well as Cottage Industries might be able to absorb some of these people. It would be a pity to lose track of them.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File no. 26(5)/56-57-PMS. Copies of this letter were sent to Gulzarilal Nanda and Lal Bahadur Shastri.
2. Secretary, Ministry of Defence.
3. H.N. Bahuguna (1919-1989); imprisoned during the Quit India movement, 1942-45; member, Central Executive, INTUC, 1954-57; member, UP Assembly, 1952-71 and Minister in UP Government, 1958-67; member, Lok Sabha, 1971-73 and 1977-80; Union Minister for Communications, 1971-73; Chief Minister, UP, 1973-76; founded the Congress for Democracy Party with Jagjivan Ram, February 1977; Union Minister for Chemicals and Fertilizers, 1977-79, and for Finance, July to October 1979; rejoined Congress in November 1979; formed the Democratic Socialist Party in 1980; later joined the Lok Dal.

7. To K.D. Malaviya¹

New Delhi

21 March 1956

My dear Keshava,

I hope that you are satisfied with the position in regard to the exploration and exploitation of oil, so far as the financial arrangements are concerned. I think they are adequate, and you will certainly get more money as and when needed. I might tell you, however, that at a meeting of our Defence Committee, the question of oil came up. It arose in a different context, but the point was the need of our Defence Forces for oil in an emergency. In this connection, it was pointed out that the sooner we could increase our own supply of oil, the better for defence. For this reason, apart from others, it was made clear that we must go ahead as fast as we can with oil exploration and exploitation in India.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No.17(204)/56-66-PMS. Also available in JN Collection.

8. To V.T. Krishnamachari¹

New Delhi

1 April 1956

My dear V.T.,

A few days ago, I received a copy of a Draft Resolution on Industrial Policy.² I am naturally much interested in this subject, and I should like to be present at the meeting of the Planning Commission which considers it.

I have rather rapidly read this draft. In the main, it appears to carry out the general indications which we gave when the Planning Commission considered this matter. I would like it, however, to state a little more concisely what our objectives are. At present, there is some vagueness about it. We need not be rigid about this matter, but it would help clear thinking in the people generally if we gave these objectives. The general objective is to evolve a socialist pattern of society (I prefer "socialist" to "socialistic"). We are aiming at rapid economic development and the growth of the public sector, both absolutely and relatively to the private sector. In the socialist pattern aimed at, the public sector will necessarily be dominant, though there is no reason why the private sector should not function. Therefore, somewhat greater stress appears necessary for the growth of the public sector. The only limiting factor is our capacity. I take it that the final picture should be one of public sector plus the private sector organised on cooperative lines, whether in land or small and cottage industry. This may take some time to develop, but we should constantly keep that in view and try to develop accordingly.

Rapid economic growth means speeding up industrialisation. Industrial development means developing heavy industry and machine-making industries. Emphasis should, therefore, be laid on the development of heavy industry and machine-making industries, which necessarily must be in the public sector. These basic industries should not be dependent too much for anything required by them, on the private sector. To some extent, of course, this will naturally happen but, broadly speaking, they should be in a position to have control of the material that is necessary for them.

1. File No. 17(150)/56-PMS. Also available in JN Collection.

2. See *post*, pp. 72-79.

The public sector should control not only mineral oils but the minerals and their exploitation, power and transport. I see that, in the provisional list sent, fertilisers, sea transport and the generation and distribution of electricity are placed in schedule B. I should have thought that their proper place was in schedule A.³ In effect, the fertiliser plants that we are putting up, are in the public sector. The generation and distribution of electricity is one of the most important public utilities. Sea transport, though at present largely in private hands, should progressively be a State concern. This need not mean nationalisation of the present privately-owned concerns but rather that in future they should be in the public sector. We need not be very rigid about this as small power stations, etc., may be privately established.

I do not see any mention of the manufacture of drugs anywhere. We cannot put this, I suppose, in schedule A, but I do think that, in the main, manufacture of drugs should be in the public sector. There is often quite a racket in this connection and great profits are made, and poor people cannot even get the drugs they need.

I think it should be clearly stated that it will be open to the State to start any industry which is now left to the private sector, if the needs of planning so require, or there are other important reasons for it.

It is stated in the Draft Resolution that direct assistance from the private sector will preferably be in the form of participation in equity capital, especially when the amount involved exceeds a crore of rupees. Why is this limit put there? Why should not we normally participate in the equity capital even when the assistance is much less? This seems desirable and may prove helpful in the future.

There is no mention of State trading. As a matter of fact, we have practically decided to enter the field of State trading. I think some mention of the State entering into industrial and commercial operations should be made. This has already become necessary in the case of trade with the Soviet Union and like countries. This will be a way of increasing the surpluses at our disposal. Special stress might be laid on the organisation of cooperatives for industrial purposes as well as, of course, in agriculture.

I think that you might state more clearly also that our objective is to prevent private monopolies as well as the concentration of financial or economic power

3. For Schedules A and B of the Industrial Policy Resolution, see *post*, p. 75.

in private hands. The objective of increasing gainful employment might also be mentioned.

It would be desirable, I think, to state in connection with the industrial policy that we shall constantly aim at the improvement of the living and working conditions of workers and raising their standard of efficiency.

These are some points rather hastily jotted down after a reading of the Draft Resolution.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

9. To T.T. Krishnamachari¹

New Delhi

1 April 1956

My dear T.T.,

Your letter of the 1st April.²

I have not received any intimation about the Planning Commission's meeting tomorrow to consider the draft of the Industrial Policy Resolution. I suppose this is some internal meeting of the Planning Commission tomorrow. I should certainly like to be present when this matter is fully considered by the Planning Commission. I have written to V.T. Krishnamachari accordingly.

2. You know how keen I am on our developing the heavy machine-making industry, more particularly in regard to the machines required for our Iron & Steel plants. You envisage increasing our steel production greatly in the Third Plan period. That means putting up new plants. If we are not in a position even then to make our own plants, then we shall continue to be dependent on all kinds of factors and be little better off than we are today. That would be a tragedy. As far as I can see, all our future industrial development revolves round the production of heavy machines in India. Therefore the sooner we set about this, the better.

3. There is no need for us to copy China. But it is also not wise to ignore what China is doing. They are going fast ahead in machine-making industry.

1. File No. 17(138)/56-57-PMS. Also available in JN Collection.
2. Krishnamachari discussed the prospects of development of heavy machine-making industry in India. In his opinion, the need to import would grow with the expansion of machine-building capacity of Indian economy. By the end of the Third Plan period, the largely uncovered areas would be heavy machinery for iron and steel industry, mining industry, fertilizer plants etc., and the public sector should develop the capacity to meet these demands in the Third Plan period. He also emphasized that real gap in planning was in respect of specialised requirements of major heavy industries which would need to be developed in the Third Plan period at a faster pace than in the past. This meant heavy investment of funds and recognition of the time limit beyond which manufacture of heavy industries could not be telescoped. Krishnamachari opined that expanding the list of industries falling in the public sector without providing for adequate funds would result in slowing down, rather than accelerating development. He felt that in this situation the gap should be filled up even partly by others.

4. I think, therefore, that special provision should be made in our Plan for this purpose. I have little doubt that we shall have to think again about additional resources and further that we can raise them, provided we put out a big enough plan which inspires the people.

5. I am glad you discussed the question of putting up a plant here like the URAL MASH Factory with Mikoyan.³ In fact you have publicly stated this and many people are expecting something to be done in this matter. We should in this connection certainly get particulars from other countries. But I imagine that, for our purposes, the model of the URAL MASH Factory would be more suitable, as it is more or less self-contained. In the UK they have a large number of plants spread out. We have not that advantage and there is no point for us at this stage to follow that line of development.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Krishnamachari wrote about the encouraging response from Mikoyan, the First Vice-Chairman, Council of Ministers of USSR, to the possibilities of setting up a plant in India on the lines of URAL MASH Factory. He also wrote about the interests shown by the UK, Germany and Czechoslovakia in this field.

10. The Future of Khadi¹

Those who wear khadi will do so no matter what the price is. But whether others will do so will depend on a number of other things. We have to bear in mind that to attract people who are not bound to wear khadi, we shall have to find ways and means especially if the prices are more or less the same. One way is for the Government to give subsidies to the khadi industry in order to reduce the price. But then it depends on how long we can continue to subsidize, for it cannot be done on a permanent basis. We can give subsidies only as long as they are required to enable khadi to stand on its own feet. I do not say that we will stop subsidies but any industry has to be intrinsically strong. The question is how economically viable the khadi industry will be in five or ten years' time. There does not seem to be a clear-cut answer to that.

Ever since the Ambar Charkha has made its appearance, the glimmerings of a solution has been visible. Now, there is a hope that a way may be found to go into the whole question and to solve this problem. There are two or three things which have to be borne in mind regarding the Ambar Charkha. First of all, we must use the yarn spun on the Ambar Charkha to make khadi. Secondly, the weavers must be persuaded to use this yarn instead of other mixed yarn. That depends upon their inclination. If they feel that the yarn spun by the Ambar Charkha serves their purpose, they will do so. We cannot force them to use it. Once we can win the weavers over to using the Ambar Charkha yarn which I think will be good for them, it will make a big difference, provided it can be made available to them at a reasonable price. For, we immediately capture the entire handloom market for khadi. The third question is whether khadi can compete successfully with mill-made cloth.

So, it becomes essential to go into the economics of the Ambar Charkha yarn. Its quality is good and can be improved upon with a little more experience. Even in the few months since the Ambar Charkha was introduced, there have been technical improvements in it. But it is difficult to say how far it can go. There will have to be more improvements, for so far attention has not been paid to its technological aspects. I feel that if it had been done earlier, the

1. Speech on the occasion of the first anniversary of the Khadi Gramodyog Bhavan, New Delhi, 13 April 1956. AIR tapes, NMML. Original in Hindi.

product would have been very good. What is called the Ambar Charkha, neither looks nor works like a charkha. In a sense, it is a small, box-like, machine. Anyhow, the appearance is not so important. The point is that it is for village industry and can be manually operated. Perhaps in future, electricity can be used to run the Charkha. So the most essential thing just now is to make it an economically viable proposition.

11. To V.T. Krishnamachari¹

New Delhi
15 April 1956

My dear V.T.,

Three days ago I received the revised draft of the Industrial Policy Resolution. I have been so busy that I could not deal with it till tonight. I have now read it carefully and have just dictated another revision of it.² I have not read this after typing. No doubt it can be improved upon. Anyhow, I hope it will help in further consideration of this subject. I enclose two copies of it.

Apart from other changes here and there, I have given in full the parts of the Constitution dealing with Directive Principles, etc. I think it is desirable to do so.

I have not touched the lists given in Schedule A and B as sent to me.

I suggest that you might circulate this to the Members of the Planning Commission. Also to the Ministers who have been taking part in these discussions such as the Home Minister, Commerce & Industry Minister, the Production Minister and any other you can think of. You might send it also to Krishna Menon who arrived today. Krishna Menon should be invited to the full meeting of the Planning Commission.

On a suitable date, a meeting of the Planning Commission might be held to consider it, and, I hope, finalise it. It will then have to be sent up to the Cabinet.

When this has gone through all these processes and has emerged from them, I think that it will be desirable for me to place it before Parliament.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. See the next item.

12. The Industrial Policy¹

The Government of India set out in their Resolution dated the 6th April 1948, the policy which they proposed to pursue in the industrial field.² The Resolution emphasised the importance to the economy of securing a continuous increase in production and its equitable distribution, and pointed out that the State must play a progressively active role in the development of industries. It laid down that besides arms and ammunition, atomic energy and railway transport, which would be the monopoly of the Central Government, the State would be exclusively responsible for the establishment of new undertakings in six basic industries—except where, in the national interest, the State itself found it necessary to secure the cooperation of private enterprise. The rest of the industrial field was left open to private enterprise though it was made clear that the State would also progressively participate in this field.

2. Eight years have passed since this declaration on industrial policy. These eight years have witnessed many important changes and developments in India. The Constitution of India has been enacted, guaranteeing certain Fundamental Rights and enunciating Directive Principles of State Policy. Planning has proceeded on an organised basis, and the First Five Year Plan has recently been fulfilled. Parliament has accepted the socialist pattern of society as the objective of social and economic policy. These important developments necessitate a fresh statement of industrial policy, more particularly as the second Five Year Plan will soon be placed before the country. This policy must be governed by the principles laid down in the Constitution, the objective of socialism, and the experience gained during these eight years in the planned development of the country.

3. The Constitution of India, in its preamble, has declared that it aims at securing for all its citizens:

1. Draft Resolution on Industrial Policy as revised by Nehru, 15 April 1956. JN Collection. See also the preceding item. The final resolution of the Government of India in regard to industrial policy was placed before the Lok Sabha by Nehru on 30 April 1956. Major changes between the two have been indicated in the footnotes.
2. For Nehru's speech on this resolution in the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 6, pp. 297-304.

Justice, social, economic and political;
 Liberty of thought, expression, belief,
 faith and worship;
 Equality of status and of opportunity;
 and to promote among them all Fraternity
 assuring the dignity of the individual and
 the unity of the nation.

In its Directive Principles of State Policy, it is stated that the State shall strive to promote the welfare of the people by securing and protecting as effectively as it may a social order in which justice, social, economic and political, shall inform all the institutions of the national life. Further that the State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing—

- (a) that the citizens, men and women equally, have the right to an adequate means of livelihood;
- (b) that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good;
- (c) that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment;
- (d) that there is equal pay for equal work for both men and women;
- (e) that the health and strength of workers, men and women, and the tender age of children are not abused and that citizens are not forced by economic necessity to enter avocations unsuited to their age or strength;
- (f) that childhood and youth are protected against exploitation and against moral and material abandonment.

4. These basic and general principles were given a more precise direction when Parliament accepted in December 1954, the socialist pattern of society as the objective of social and economic policy.³ Industrial policy, as other policies, must therefore henceforward be governed by these principles and directives.

5. In order to realise this objective, it is essential to accelerate the rate of economic growth and to speed up industrialisation and, in particular, to develop

3. For Nehru's speech in the Lok Sabha on this, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol.27, pp. 350- 364

heavy industries and machine making industries, to expand the public sector, and to build up a large and growing cooperative sector. These provide the economic foundations for increasing opportunities for gainful employment and improving living standards and working conditions for the mass of the people. Equally, it is urgent, to reduce the wide disparities in income and wealth which exist today, to prevent the growth of private monopolies and the concentration of economic power in different fields in the hands of small numbers of individuals. Accordingly, the State will progressively assume a predominant and direct responsibility for setting up new industrial undertakings and for developing transport facilities. It will also undertake State trading on an increasing scale. At the same time, as an agency for planned national development, in the context of the country's expanding economy, the private sector will have the opportunity to develop and expand. The principle of cooperation should be applied wherever possible and a steadily increasing proportion of the activities of the private sector will be developed along cooperative lines.

6. The adoption of the socialist pattern of society as the national objective, as well as the need for planned and rapid development, require that all industries of basic and strategic importance, or in the nature of public utility services, should be in the public sector. Other industries which are essential and require investment on a scale which only the State, in present circumstances, could provide, have also to be in the public sector. The State has therefore to assume direct responsibility for the future development of industries over a wider area. Nevertheless, there are limiting factors which make it necessary at this stage for the State to define the field in which it will undertake sole responsibility for further development, and to make a selection of industries in the development of which it will play a dominant role. After considering all aspects of the problem, in consultation with the Planning Commission, the Government of India have decided to classify industries into three categories, having regard to the part which the State would play in each of them. These categories will inevitably overlap to some extent and too great a rigidity might defeat the purpose in view. But the general directions given have to be followed, keeping always the basic principles and objective in view. It should also be remembered that it is always open to the State to undertake any type of industrial production.

7. In the first category will be industries, the future development of which will be the exclusive responsibility of the State. The second category will consist of industries, which will be primarily State-owned and in which the State will generally take the initiative in establishing new undertakings, in which private enterprise will also be expected to supplement the effort of the State.

The third category will include all the remaining industries, and their future development will, in general, be left to the initiative and enterprise of the private sector.

8. Industries in the first category have been listed in Schedule A of this Resolution.⁴ All new units in these industries, save where their establishment in the private sector has already been approved, will be set up only by the State. This does not preclude the expansion of the existing privately owned units, or the possibility of the State securing the cooperation of private enterprise in the establishment of new units when the national interests so require. Railways and air transport, arms and ammunition and atomic energy will, however, be developed as Central Government monopolies. Whenever cooperation with private enterprise is necessary, the State will insure, either through majority participation in the capital or otherwise, that it has the requisite powers to guide the policy and control the operations of the undertaking.

9. Industries in the second category will be those listed in Schedule B.⁵ With a view to accelerating their future development, the State will increasingly establish new undertakings in these new industries. At the same time private enterprise will also have the opportunity to develop in this field, either on its own or with State participation.

10. All the remaining industries will fall in the third category, and it is expected that their development will be undertaken ordinarily through the initiative and enterprise of the private sector, though it will be open to the State

4. Schedule A listed 17 items, namely, arms & ammunition and allied items of defence equipment; atomic energy; iron & steel; heavy castings and forgings of iron & steel; heavy plant and machinery required for iron & steel production, for mining, for machine tool manufacture and for such other basic industries as might be specified by the Central Government; heavy electrical plant including large hydraulic & steam turbines; coal & lignite; mineral oils; mining of iron ore, manganese ore, chrome ore, gypsum, sulphur, gold & diamond; mining & processing of copper, lead, zinc, tin, molybdenum & wolfram; minerals specified in the Schedule to the Atomic Energy (Control of production & use) Order, 1953; aircraft; air transport; railway transport; shipbuilding; telephones & telephone cables, telegraph & wireless apparatus (excluding radio receiving sets); and generation and distribution of electricity.
5. Schedule B listed 12 items, namely, all other minerals except "minor minerals" as defined in section 3 of the Minerals Concession Rules, 1949; aluminium and other non-ferrous metals not included in Schedule A: machine tools; ferro alloys and tool steels; basic and intermediate products required by chemical industries such as the manufacture of drugs, dyestuffs & plastics; antibiotics and other essential drugs, fertilizers; synthetic rubber; carbonisation of coal; chemical pulp; road transport; and sea transport.

to start any industry even in this category. It will be the policy of the State to facilitate and encourage the development of these industries in the private sector, in accordance with the programmes formulated in successive Five Year Plans, by ensuring the development of transport, power and other services, and by appropriate fiscal and other measures. The State will continue to foster institutions to provide financial aid to these industries, and special assistance will be given to enterprises organised on cooperative lines for industrial and agricultural purposes. In suitable cases, the State may also grant financial assistance to the private sector. Such direct assistance, especially when the amount involved is substantial, will preferably be in the form of participation in equity capital.

11. Industrial undertakings in the private sector have necessarily to fit into the framework of the social and economic policy of the State and will be subject to control and regulations in terms of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. The Government of India, however, recognise that it would, in general, be desirable to allow such undertakings to develop with as much freedom as possible, consistent with the targets and objectives of the national plan. When there exist in the same industry both privately and publicly owned units, it would continue to be the policy of the State to give fair and non-discriminatory treatment to both of them.

12. The division of industries into separate categories does not imply that they are being placed in water tight compartments. Inevitably, there will not only be an area of overlapping but also a great deal of dovetailing between industries in the private and the public sectors. It will be open to the State to start any industry not included in Schedule A and Schedule B when the needs of planning so require or there are other important reasons for it. In appropriate cases, privately owned units may be permitted to produce an item falling within Schedule A for meeting their own requirements or as by-products. There will be no bar to small privately owned units undertaking production, such as the making of launches and other light-craft, generation of power for local needs and small-scale mining. Further, heavy industries in the public sector may obtain some of their requirements of lighter components from the private sector, while the private sector in turn would rely for many of its needs on the public sector. The same principle would apply with even greater force to the relationship between large-scale and small-scale industries.

13. The Government of India would, in this context, stress the role of village and small-scale industries in the development of the national economy. In relation to the problems that need urgent solutions, they offer some distinct advantages over large-scale industry. They have a greater employment potential;

they provide a right method of ensuring a more equitable distribution of the national income and they facilitate an effective mobilisation of resources of capital and skill which might otherwise remain unutilised. Some of the problems that unplanned urbanisation tends to create will be avoided by the establishment of small centres of industrial production all over the country.

14. The State has been following a policy of supporting village and small-scale industries by restricting the volume of production in the large-scale sector, by differential taxation, or by direct subsidies. While such measures will continue to be taken, whenever necessary, the aim of the State policy will be to ensure that the decentralised sector acquires sufficient vitality to be self-supporting and its development is integrated with that of large-scale industry. The State will, therefore, concentrate on measures designed to improve the comparative strength of the small-scale producer. For this it is essential that the technique of production should be constantly improved and modernised, the pace of transformation being regulated so as to avoid, as far as possible, technological unemployment. Lack of technical and financial assistance, of suitable working accommodation and inadequacy of facilities for repair and maintenance are among the serious handicaps of small-scale producers. A start has been made with the establishment of industrial estates and rural community workshops to make good these deficiencies. The extension of rural electrification and the availability of power at prices which the workers can afford will also be of considerable help. Many of the activities relating to small-scale production will be greatly helped by the organisation of industrial cooperatives. Such cooperatives should be encouraged in every way and the State should give constant attention to the development of cottage and small-scale industry.

15. In order that industrialisation may benefit the economy of the country as a whole, it is important that disparities in levels of development between different regions should be progressively reduced. The lack of industries in different parts of the country is very often determined by factors such as the availability of the necessary raw materials or other natural resources. A concentration of industries in certain areas has also been due to the ready availability of power, water supply and transport facilities which have been developed there. It is one of the aims of national planning to ensure that these facilities are steadily made available to areas which are at present lagging behind industrially or where there is greater need for providing opportunities for employment, provided the location is otherwise suitable. Only by securing a balanced and coordinated development of the industrial and the agricultural economy in each region, can the entire country attain higher standards of living.

16. This programme of industrial development will make large demands on the country's resources of technical and managerial personnel. To meet these repeatedly growing needs for the expansion of the public sector and for the development of village and small-scale industries, proper managerial and technical cadres in the public services are being established. Steps are also being taken to meet shortages at supervisory levels, to organise apprenticeship schemes of training on a large scale both in public and in private enterprises, and to extend training facilities in business management in universities and other institutions.

17.⁶ It is necessary that proper amenities and incentives should be provided for all those engaged in industry and workers should be associated progressively, wherever possible, in management. The management of public enterprises should be along business lines and wherever possible, there should be decentralisation of authority.⁷

18. The Industrial Policy Resolution of 1948 dealt with a number of other subjects which have since been covered by suitable legislation or by authoritative pronouncements of policy. The division of responsibility between the Central Government and the State Governments in regard to industries has been set

6. In the final resolution, paragraph 17 read: "It is necessary that proper amenities and incentives should be provided for all those engaged in industry. The living and working condition of workers should be improved and their standard of efficiency raised. The maintenance of industrial peace is one of the prime requisites of industrial progress. In a socialist democracy labour is a partner in the common task of development and should participate in it with enthusiasm. Some laws governing industrial relations have been enacted and a broad common approach has developed with the growing recognition of the obligations of both management and labour. There should be joint consultation and workers and technicians should, wherever possible, be associated progressively in management."
7. In the final resolution, following paragraph was inserted after this paragraph: "With the growing participation of the State in industry and trade, the manner in which these activities should be conducted and managed assumes considerable importance. Speedy decisions and a willingness to assume responsibility are essential if these enterprises are to succeed. For this, wherever possible, there should be decentralisation of authority and their management should be along business lines. It is to be expected that public enterprises will augment the revenues of the State and provide resources for further development in fresh fields. But such enterprises may sometimes incur losses. Public enterprises have to be judged by their total results and in their working they should have the largest possible measure of freedom."

out in the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. The Prime Minister, in his statement in Parliament on the 6th April 1949,⁸ has enunciated the policy of the State in regard to foreign capital.⁹ On labour problems, some laws governing industrial relations have been enacted and a broad common approach in dealing with such problems has developed with the growing recognition of the obligations both of management and of labour. The need for joint consultation at all levels and closer collaboration is being increasingly appreciated. It is, therefore, not necessary to deal with these subjects in this resolution.

19. The Government of India trust that this re-statement of their industrial policy will receive the support of all sections of the people and will assist in the maintenance of industrial peace which is essential for the rapid industrialisation of the country.¹⁰

8. For Nehru's statement, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 10, pp. 49-51.

9. In the final resolution, the rest of the paragraph was substituted by one sentence: "It is, therefore, not necessary to deal with these subjects in this resolution."

10. This paragraph was substituted in the final Resolution with the following: "The Government of India trust that this statement of their Industrial Policy will receive the support of all sections of the people and promote the rapid industrialisation of the country."

13. To T.T. Krishnamachari¹

New Delhi
28 April 1956

My dear T.T.,

Your letter of the 28th April.²

I agree that we should go ahead with this matter and expedite the export of iron ore.

As for the Ministry which should deal with this matter, I take it that there are two aspects of it—the mining of the ore and then transport and selling. Presumably, Keshava Deva Malaviya wanted his Ministry to be in charge of the mining. I remember his writing to me on the subject, and I believe I wrote to you also. I do not know all the facts and, therefore, am unable to express any opinion. But, I gathered that the Government of Orissa, with whom you were dealing, was arranging the mining with a number of small concerns. *Prima facie*, this does not appear to be a very effective or efficient way, as the small concerns may fail you. The Orissa Government has little knowledge of mining or like matters. It might be quite possible that we could speed up this process much more if we did the mining directly. I suppose the Ministry of NR & SR is competent to do so and can more or less guarantee you delivery of the iron ore required at stated times.

Also, generally speaking, mining should be done by a governmental agency as far as possible.

Not knowing all the facts, I am merely indicating to you what my broad reactions are. However, I do not wish any delay to occur in this matter, and some of these questions could be settled later, as you have suggested. The question apparently is not so much as to which Ministry should deal with it but, rather, as to whether the actual mining should be done on behalf of Government or by a number of small parties.

1. T.T. Krishnamachari Papers, NMML. Also available in JN Collection.
2. Krishnamachari cited administrative hassles in exploitation of iron ore from the Sukhinda mines in Orissa and lack of railway wagons for carrying the ore to the Calcutta Port as the main difficulties in fulfilment of the contract with Poland in regard to export of iron ore in exchange for a certain quantity of iron & steel and cement. He suggested taking over of the export of iron ore by the State to maximise the use of railway wagons.

Perhaps, my letter is not very clear. This is because I have not quite understood the position. Anyhow, I am anxious that there should be no delay about this and that you should be in a position to fulfil your contracts with the Polish or other governments.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

II. SCIENCE

1. Calendar Reform¹

You are probably aware that the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research appointed a Calendar Reform Committee. This Committee went rather deeply into this matter and presented a fairly exhaustive report.² I have not read this long report, although I have seen its summary.

2. I sent this report to all the Chief Ministers. I have received a number of replies from them, though most of the Part 'C' States have not replied yet.

3. As far as I can see, it is not proposed to put aside the official and normal use of the existing Gregorian calendar. The Committee was rather concerned with the multiplicity of the other calendars and wanted to bring about a uniformity in them. In effect this meant a certain uniformity in our holidays which are based on our own indigenous calendars.

4. Also it has been proposed to prepare an Indian ephemeris and nautical almanac. The present *panchangas* are often very inaccurate as they are based on inaccurate calculations. I understand that some of them are based on foreign almanacs which are a little more correct.

5. Most of the answers from the States approve of these proposals. I do not quite know which Ministry in the Government of India is supposed to deal with such matters. I think this report should be put up before the Cabinet with a note. We could without difficulty come to some decisions about the future, that is we could recommend the proposed calendar for the observance of certain holidays. We could also take some steps for the preparation of the nautical almanacs, etc.

6. It is suggested to have a permanent Standing Committee to be called the Indian Ephemeris and Nautical Committee.³ It is also suggested that a

1. Note to G.B. Pant, Union Home Minister, 12 February 1956. JN Collection.
2. The Calendar Reform Committee, constituted in November 1952 under the chairmanship of M.N. Saha, submitted its report in 1954. It recommended that a unified national calendar using Saka era should be used in all States of India for civil purposes in place of local calendars.
3. This was to be attached to a scientific department of the Government of India.

National Astronomical Observatory should be established. This latter proposal is likely to be expensive.

7. I am sending you the report of the Calendar Reform Committee, the replies from the State Governments and a note by my PPS.⁴

4. B.N. Kaul.

2. To M.N. Saha¹

New Delhi

15 February 1956

My dear Saha,²

I am sorry for the delay in answering your letter of the 25th January.

As a matter of fact, I had already told you in my letter of the 21st January that this question could only be dealt with at Government level.³ We have made Atomic Energy entirely a Government concern. We have not asked any other country for atomic reactors, or indeed for anything else. Whenever we have asked for anything in the field of Atomic Energy, we have paid for it. The only exception is the Canadian Indian reactor where the initiative came entirely from the Canadian Government.⁴ Even so, the Government of India will be bearing roughly half the cost of installing the reactor and that runs into several crores.⁵

There have been some talks in Russia and here on the subject of atomic cooperation. Mention was made then that a small atomic reactor might be given to us, such as the one that has been given to China, Poland, etc. It was stated, however, that this would require an agreement similar to the one signed by those countries. Such an agreement would be contrary to our general approach in foreign policy. But we made it clear that we would gladly cooperate with USSR on specific projects and, in fact, we made some enquiries about these.

As you know, recently, after some discussions, the five year programme of the Institute of Nuclear Physics was settled. This did not include a reactor and it was clearly stated then that the five year grant would neither be decreased nor increased during this period.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Founder Director, Institute of Nuclear Physics, Kolkata, and Member of Lok Sabha.
3. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 31, pp. 134-135.
4. On 16 July 1955, Louis St. Laurent, the Canadian Prime Minister, conveyed to Nehru his Government's offer of an atomic reactor to India. For Nehru's reply, expressing thanks to St. Laurent, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 29, p. 142.
5. The Canadian-Indian reactor of NRX type, was finally inaugurated on 16 January 1961 at Trombay, near Mumbai, with the combined efforts of the Atomic Energy of Canada Limited and the Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India. The reactor would help advanced research in agriculture, biology, medicine and promote the use of atomic energy for the generation of electric power.

3. To Swaran Singh¹

New Delhi
22 February 1956

My dear Swaran Singh,

As you know, we have made good progress in our atomic energy work, which is being increasingly recognised by other countries. We are cooperating in this matter with the UK, Canada, the USA, France and some other countries. Canada has given substantial financial and other assistance in order to enable us to construct a reactor in Bombay. Our first research reactor will probably be functioning in June this year.²

All this means that the work of the Atomic Energy Department must proceed at top speed, without encountering any of the delays involved in repeated references to ministries and departments in Delhi. We have tried to avoid these delays but not with great success, and some urgent and important work has thus been hung up. The Canadian reactor requires work at high speed in order to keep to the schedule and fit in with Canadian requirements in India.

In particular, the question of construction for the reactor, etc., involves delay if it is to be referred in the ordinary course to the Central PWD. Bhabha³ has repeatedly asked me to get these rules relaxed so that he can carry out the additions, etc., quickly on the spot. Normally, this would not be in accordance with our rules, and the Central PWD would be entrusted with the work. I feel, however, that in this particular case we should make an exception. That exception need not be a precedent for other cases which are completely different.

Bhabha and I had thought of having a semi-autonomous statutory authority for the Atomic Energy Department, as in some other countries, but we finally decided that, for the present, a Department might be created. This could later be converted at the appropriate time into a semi-autonomous statutory authority. Any attempt to pass legislation now or in the near future would have involved delay. Also, we wanted to be quite clear as to the constitution of this statutory authority before we took any formal step to that end.

1. File No. 17(52)/56-66, PMS. Also available in JN Collection.
2. The first atomic reactor Apsara, of the swimming pool type, designed, engineered and built entirely by Indian scientists and engineers, went into operation at Trombay on 4 August 1956.
3. Homi J. Bhabha was Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission since 1949 and Secretary, Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India since 1954.

This question has been discussed by Sukthankar⁴ more than once with the Secretary in your Ministry⁵ and representatives of other Ministries concerned. It was suggested by these Secretaries that it would be desirable for the Government to come to a decision to convert the Department of Atomic Energy into a semi-autonomous authority. Meanwhile, however, it should be arranged to treat the Department as a de facto statutory authority in advance of the passing of the necessary legislation, so that it could start building up its own supply, engineering and finance organisations. These organisations within the Department of Atomic Energy should be manned by permanent officers sent on deputation from the Ministries of Finance and Works, Housing and Supply. The officers would be under the administrative and technical control of the Department of Atomic Energy during their period of deputation.

I do not understand all the financial and other rules applying to such matters. I am anxious that the work of the Atomic Energy Department should proceed rapidly and effectively, and at the same time there should be proper checks. The proposal made by the Secretaries appears to suggest a way out. I hope you will agree that the measures suggested are necessary to enable the Department to proceed with its work with all the necessary speed, and that you will kindly spare for this purpose officers of marked ability working under you. I intend mentioning this matter at a Cabinet meeting in the near future.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Y.N. Sukthankar was the Cabinet Secretary.

5. M.R. Sachdev.

4. Constitution of a Science Panel¹

I enclose a letter from Dr Ghosh.² I certainly think that a Science Panel should be constituted. I have no objection to the names suggested by him except that the list seems to me too long. Anyhow, you can finalise this matter in consultation with Dr Ghosh.

1. Note to Maneklal S. Thacker, Director of the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, 24 February 1956. File No. 11/11/64, RSR Division, Planning Commission.
2. In his letter of 13 February, J.C. Ghosh, Member, Planning Commission, reminded Nehru of a small Committee appointed in January 1955 with Homi J. Bhabha, D.S. Kothari, Dewan Chand Sharma and P.C. Mahalanobis as members and J.C. Ghosh as Chairman, to examine recommendations of the Reviewing Committee of the CSIR and to cooperate with the Planning Commission in scientific aspects of planning. The Committee had completed its work so far as organisation of the National Laboratories was concerned. The other aspects could not be dealt with due to the long absence of Bhabha and Mahalanobis from India. Ghosh, therefore, suggested reconstitution of the Committee as a Science Panel by including some of the Directors of the National Laboratories and non-official scientists of eminence in India.

5. Need for a Scientific Civil Service¹

I agree with your broad approach to this problem and think that some changes and revisions are needed in the scales of our pay. I cannot express any definite opinion about the details of your proposals.²

2. You can certainly put this up before the Governing Body. I think, however, that it will be desirable if you could discuss this matter previously with Dr J.C. Ghosh of the Planning Commission. We should like the Planning Commission's support to our proposals.

3. I agree with you that it is better to stop further recruitment to the posts of Senior Scientific Assistants and Junior Scientific Assistants till the Scientific Civil Service Committee has made its recommendations. Instead a system of senior and junior fellowships might be started. I am inclined to think that this system of fellowships is a better way of dealing with this problem.

4. Dr Bhabha, I think, prefers contract appointments for a period to regular service appointments. But I take it that this would refer rather to senior men. He seemed to think that the influence of a static service career is depressing for the person concerned.

5. I do not remember what the terms of reference are of the Scientific Civil Service Committee and what they include in the term "scientific or

1. Note to M.S. Thacker, Director, CSIR, 27 February 1956. JN Collection
2. In his note of 25 February 1956, Thacker pointed out that the most important factor preventing first rate scientific workers from joining the National laboratories was poor salary. Referring to the recommendations made by a Special Committee of CSIR in the matter and subsequent appointment of a high-power Committee by the Prime Minister in this regard he stated that same interim measures should be taken urgently to provide some relief to the problem. Citing some recommendations of the Special Committee for immediate implementation and accepted by CSIR like (1) A Senior Scientific Officer should not start at a salary less than Rs. 410/- per month and (2) scale of Asstt. Directors should be at least Rs. 1000-50-1200-100-15000 per month, Thacker pointed out that the recommendations did not take into account other categories of staff which also required urgent attention regarding principles governing refixation of pay of individual members of scientific staff. Thacker proposed working out of a formula and constitution of a small Committee to examine cases on the basis of this formula and recommend the pay to be fixed.

scientist".³ In England, I believe, they have recently started a Scientific Civil Service, as something separate from the administrative Civil Service. This Scientific Civil Service includes all kinds of technicians and science is used in the wider sense of the word. Personally I think that we should have some such scientific civil service here also. We shall require more and more scientists, technicians and the like.

6. But your problem is somewhat different and will not be wholly covered by this Scientific Civil Service.

7. Anyhow, I suggest that you might discuss this matter with Dr J.C. Ghosh and possibly also with the Cabinet Secretary. It would be advisable to consult Finance. You need not send this to the Finance Ministry but consult your Financial Adviser. All these previous consultations will be helpful to us at the time when we consider this matter in the Governing Body.

3. The Prime Minister in his capacity as President of the CSIR, had constituted a Scientific Civil Service Committee to make detailed recommendations in this regard.

III. EDUCATION AND CULTURE

1. Claiming Indian Art Treasures from Other Countries¹

...Some questions were asked in Parliament from time to time. They referred to Indian art treasures in the United Kingdom and, more especially, to the India Office Library and to Indian exhibits in the Victoria and Albert or the British Museum.

2. I do not quite understand on what grounds we claim these art treasures back, except that we would like to have them back. That hardly seems to me an adequate ground. Every country collects art treasures from various parts of the world in its museums and art galleries. They make special efforts to get artistic and valuable exhibits from distant countries. The whole purpose and value of a museum is that it should exhibit a wide range of artistic objects from various parts of the world. In fact, the great museums of London and Paris are full of exhibits from other countries. The American museums chiefly consist of articles purchased abroad either by private collectors or by the museum authorities themselves. Representatives of these great museums travel about all over the world spending large sums of money for this purpose.

3. If we had foreign artistic objects in our museums, as we should have, would we easily agree to part with them? I doubt it. Then again, from the purely national viewpoint, it may well be said by Pakistan that we have many artistic treasures which are of great interest to them and they would like to have them, just as we may say that Pakistan has many such treasures which we would like to have in India.

4. I suppose the country which has most of these historical and artistic treasures is England. The United States of America and France are also likely to have a considerable number. Other countries will have relatively few which have come to them in various ways in the course of hundreds of years. Nearly all of these are lodged in national museums which are not purely Government concerns. I really do not see how we can get these objects back. I can understand some particular object of great sentimental or historical interest to us being asked for, though even so it would be difficult to get it.

1. Note, 3 February 1956. File No. 40(25)/56-PMS. Also available in JN Collection. Extracts.

5. To ask odd countries like Egypt, Afghanistan, Czechoslovakia, Japan, Switzerland and Turkey, which presumably have some few Indian artistic treasures, to return them to us seems to me unreasonable and unjustifiable. Surely, they want to keep some specimens of Indian art. Why should we object to this?

6. The real question that arises is in regard to the United Kingdom. I remember the case of the Elgin marbles there which were taken away probably by Lord Elgin² from Greece and are now in the British Museum.³ These were, I believe, just forcibly removed. The Greek Government might have a claim to them and I believe they have raised this question on some occasions. But there is not the least chance, so far as I know, of the Elgin marbles being returned to Greece.

7. If we can claim our treasures from foreign museums, so can other countries. The principle is the same, except for the fact that the British controlled India. The result of these claims and counter-claims would be either a rejection of all of them or museums to be confined to their own national treasures and none others.

8. The biggest concentrated collection of Indian manuscripts, books and other treasures is in the India Office library in London. We have failed to get this and there appears to be little prospect of our succeeding in the future. To raise any other question with the British Government now would be odd and quite unrealistic. To raise similar questions with other countries, on much weaker grounds, also appears to me to be unrealistic.

9. The only reason which might be considered adequate by a foreign museum is when some such treasure has great religious significance. Thus,

2. Thomas Bruce, seventh Earl of Elgin (1766-1841); joined the British army in 1785; British envoy at Brussels, 1792-95; Envoy extraordinary at Berlin, 1795-99; Ambassador at Constantinople, 1799-1803; after his return to England in 1803 he took little part in public affairs.
3. The Elgin marbles was a collection consisting of portions of the frieze, metopes and pedimental sculptures from the temple of goddess Athena at Athens and other parts of Greece. These antiquities suffered constant damage at the hands of the Turks when Greece was part of the Turkish empire. Lord Elgin, after his appointment as British Ambassador at Constantinople, removed these antiquities to England with the permission of the Turks. The operation led him into financial debt and by 1815 he was obliged to hand over these antiquities to the British Government, for a nominal amount. The antiquities were deposited in the British-Museum in 1816.

we have obtained from the British Museum some ancient Buddhist relics. Some of these came a few years ago; others are arriving in a day or two. Because of the strong religious feeling about them the British Government agreed to hand them over.⁴ Because of this very feeling, we have agreed to send part of these relics to Burma and Ceylon.

10. Apart from this reason, I see no other adequate ground for the foreign museums to part with their treasures from India, and our asking for them is not only not likely to yield results but will create difficulties.

11. In any event, I am quite clear that it is not proper for our missions to be addressed on this subject and to be asked to make a general request or even a special one for a number of articles. The most we can do is to select something of great historical value (artistic is not enough) and try to get it back. Something may be of great sentimental and historical interest to us and not so much to the other country. If it has a greater artistic value, it would be at least of equal interest to the other countries and they would not like to part with it.

12. I think therefore that it will not be advisable to address our missions on this subject at all. We should try to make as complete a list as possible of all these Indian objects abroad. In so far as manuscripts are concerned, photostat copies or microfilms could be obtained. Having done all this, if we then think it necessary we may concentrate on the recovery of a very few of such articles. Even so, we should be prepared to pay for them. To exploit our good relations with some country to obtain free gifts from it of valuable articles does not seem to me desirable. On the other hand it does seem to me desirable that foreign museums should have Indian objects of art.

4. On 5 February 1956 Nehru handed over the relics of Mogalliputta Tissa Thero, who presided over the third Buddhist Council held in India under the patronage of Asoka and on whose advice Asoka sent a mission to Sri Lanka, to D. Valisinha, General Secretary of the Mahabodhi Society of India at Palam airport. Those 2,300 years old relics, found in 1851 in one of the Buddhist stupas at Sanchi and taken to the UK and kept in the British Museum for 100 years, were brought to India by Vijayalakshmi Pandit, Indian High Commissioner in London.

2. To Sampurnanand¹

New Delhi
14 February 1956

My dear Sampurnanand,²

From the enclosed cutting from the *Leader*,³ it would appear that the Banaras Hindu University is practically run by the R.S.S. group. It is really extraordinary that all this galaxy of principals, professors, teachers, etc., should function in this way.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Chief Minister of UP.
3. The *Leader* of 12 February 1956 published an appeal signed by Dr Syama Charan De, former Pro-Vice Chancellor of Benares Hindu University and a large number of principals and professors exhorting the people of Banaras to participate in the celebrations of fifty-first birthday of M.S. Golwalkar, *sarsanghchalak* of the R.S.S. on 8 March and to contribute to the fund to be presented to him, who's "life and work is symbolic of the hope, faith and strength of the Nation."

3. To Vishnu Sahay¹

New Delhi
15 February 1956

My dear Vishnu Sahay,²

With reference to my conversation with you on the telephone, I enclose copy of a letter sent by Humayun Kabir.³ This was two years ago when the first request was made to have microfilm copies made of the Gilgit manuscripts.⁴

The person who came to see me today is Prof. Ludwig Alsdorf.⁵ He is touring about India lecturing at various universities. I think he has come here at the invitation of the Government of India for this purpose, though I am not quite sure.

I do not understand how anyone can refuse to allow copies to be made of an old manuscript. This is a dog in the manger policy which is totally opposed to scientific or literary research. Normally, the Government or the authority concerned should itself publish such a book. If that is not done, at least permission should be given for copies to be made.

The Gilgit manuscripts contain portions of the lost Buddhist canon in Sanskrit. These are considered important as throwing light on several parts of the old canon.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 19/17/56-K-MHA.
2. Secretary, Kashmir Affairs and Labour.
3. In his letter of 17 March 1954 to Professor Helmut Hoffmann of the University of Munchen, Humayun Kabir, Secretary, Union Ministry of Education, wrote that he was not in a position to supply the photostat copies of the Gilgit manuscripts to him as those were the property of the Jammu and Kashmir Government which had not authorized the Education Ministry to release copies to scholars.
4. Subsequently, on 15 January 1957 the photostat copies were supplied to Prof. Hoffmann.
5. (1904-1978); German Indologist and authority on Jainism; Reader for German and French in Allahabad University, 1930-32; lecturer in Berlin University, 1932-38; Professor of Indology in Hamburg University, 1950-72; author of, *India, Geography and Culture* and *Des Estudes Jaina*.

4. Preserving the Remains of Nagarjunakonda¹

2.... The points to remember are:

(1) Excavation should be expedited in every possible way, before the floods come.²

(2) Arrangements should be made for depositing sculptures and other articles dug out, in some proper place, that is, a museum.³ It is obvious that the present museum is not properly situated and should not be extended. Therefore, a new building has to be put up to receive these articles, and this building ought to be on the hill top. The building need not even be completed, but part of it may be built so as to receive these articles.

(3) Important monuments should be re-erected on the hill top. As to what these important monuments should be, is a matter which can only partly be decided now because excavations are not complete. Those mentioned by Shri Humayun Kabir certainly deserve re-erection on the hill top. There may be others. Presumably, it will be necessary to take numerous photographs and may be movie pictures of these monuments as excavated, so as to enable proper reconstruction.

(4) The hill top should be prepared by the museum and for the reconstruction of these monuments. Levelling should only be done where it is considered absolutely necessary. I do not like the passion for levelling that exists among our Delhi architects and engineers. Ups and downs and slopes and occasional big boulders add to the attractiveness of a place. Buildings should be accommodated accordingly. This saves money also. Of course, approach roads have to be built.

1. Note to the Ministry of Education, 24 February 1956. File No. 40(21)/56-63-PMS. Extracts.
2. As the construction of a masonry dam on the Krishna river would submerge the valley of Nagarjunakonda which was the seat of the Ikshvaku Kings of Andhra and Mahayana Buddhism propagated by Nagarjunacharya in the second century A.D., the Government of India decided to excavate the site thoroughly and remove the remains and ruins to a safer place. See also *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 30, pp. 220-221 and Vol. 31, pp. 3, 9-14, 103-106 and 108-109.
3. The Archaeological Survey of India was finally successful in transplanting and preserving the antiquities in the Nagarjuna Island Museum, located at a distance of 11 kms. from the dam.

3. We need not trouble ourselves at this stage at all about the tourist aspect. We must concentrate on getting things excavated and removed. The tourist aspect may be considered later.

4. Of course, if a large number of workers have to work there, proper accommodation for them and services should be provided.

5. In this matter, the closest touch should be kept with the Dam authorities and the Irrigation Engineers. The Governor of Andhra,⁴ more especially, should be consulted at every step and his help taken.

6. As I have stated previously, there will be no difficulty in finding money for all this excavation, removal, etc. We need not trouble ourselves at this stage with the erection of buildings unless they are necessary for this purpose. Some one, however, should plan for these buildings in future so that wrong steps may not be taken now, which may come in our way later.

7. I agree that it is desirable to create a post of an architect attached to the Department of Archaeology.

4. C.M. Trivedi.

5. The School of African Studies¹

I have read these papers. It is not clear to me what the summary² is for.

2. As regards the constitution of an Advisory Board, there appears to be some confusion. In one place, it is stated that the Minister for Education is in favour of such a Board. In another place, it is said he does not agree with the suggestion to set up a Board to supervise the African students. Then, again, it is stated that the idea of having a Board is being ruled out.³

3. I think that an Advisory Board would be desirable. This is not so much to deal with complaints and the like, but rather to keep the problem of African students in view. We need not make them a problem group but, undoubtedly, they require special consideration and, sometimes, some special treatment. To herd them together with the others under some general rules, is likely to prove unsatisfactory. I think, therefore, that there should be an Advisory Board, and Dr Kunzru⁴ and Mr Panikkar⁵ may be made members of it, apart from representatives of E.A. and Education.

4. I do not see why we should rule out summarily the proposal that some good students of the School might be used in our foreign missions. Whether they are taken into our Foreign Service is another matter. But a person who has specialised in African studies, will obviously be helpful in our Missions in Africa. What is the point of his specialising otherwise?

1. Note to Commonwealth Secretary, MEA, 13 April 1956. File No. 33(20)/55-AFR II, MEA.
2. The Ministry of External Affairs prepared a summary regarding (a) the appointment of C.J. de Graft Johnson, an African Economist from Gold Coast University, as Reader in Economics in the School of African Studies of Delhi University and (b) the constitution of an Advisory Board consisting of representatives of the Ministries of External Affairs and Education to ensure closer cooperation between the MEA and the School of African Studies.
3. On the one hand, the Education Minister was of the view that it would be desirable to have an Advisory Board with persons like H.N. Kunzru and K.M. Panikkar associated with it in addition to the representatives of the Ministries of Education and External Affairs. On the other hand, he felt that the African students should not be treated as a "problem group" to be dealt with by a special board and they should be looked after by the Indian Council for Cultural Relations and that the Council might appoint a small sub-committee for this purpose, if necessary.
4. Member of Rajya Sabha.
5. K.M. Panikkar was ambassador to France at this time.

6. To Abul Kalam Azad¹

New Delhi
14 April 1956

My dear Maulana,²

You are aware of the Dolls' Exhibition³ organised by Shankar⁴ last year. This was a remarkable and unique exhibition. Nowhere else had such an attempt been made with such success. Since then these dolls have had no proper resting place. Ultimately some provisional arrangement was made for them at 6, Bhagwandas Road. This house, however, has been taken by the All India Women's Conference and the dolls will have to go out in a month or two.⁵

Meanwhile, many foreign Embassies here have been so much interested in this exhibition that they are arranging to get a large number of additional dolls from their respective countries. There is an element of friendly rivalry among countries in this matter. The result is that the dolls with us are growing in number and variety. They will form an absolutely unique collection.

I think that we should house them properly. Indeed, I think that we should try to have a regular children's museum which, to begin with, will have these dolls. Toys could be added to it and, of course, there are any number of children's paintings already available and growing year by year. Gradually many other things could be added suitable for children. This museum would, of course, be a public museum unless some committee is appointed by Government. It might be desirable to have a small entrance fee which would cover the cost of the running of the museum.

There is no suitable place where this museum can be fixed and the only way appears to be to put up a special building for it.⁶ This building need not be

1. JN Collection.

2. Union Minister for Education.

3. The International Dolls Exhibition was inaugurated by Nehru on 18 March 1955 in New Delhi.

4. K. Shankar Pillai, well known cartoonist and founder-editor of *Shankar's Weekly*.

5. Subsequently, the dolls, packed in boxes, were kept in the Theatre Communication Building which was situated in Connaught Place where Palika Bazar was built in 1970s. See also *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 30, p. 225.

6. The dolls were finally shifted to the Dolls Museum set up by Shankar in Nehru House on Bahadur Shah Zafar Marg. The Museum was opened by S. Radhakrishnan in November 1965.

very big but there might be room to make additions to it as need arises. Swaran Singh is prepared to take up this matter if you agree and the Education Ministry asks him to do it.

There is the question, of course, of cost of the structure and the Education Ministry probably has no funds available for it. Special arrangements will, therefore, have to be made. I think it should not be difficult to get the additional money. May I suggest, therefore, that you might give thought to this matter and the Education Ministry might move in it? If you so wish, it could be mentioned in Cabinet by you.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

7. *An Autobiography* : Persian Translation¹

I am happy to learn that my *Autobiography* is appearing in Persian dress. This book was written by me more than twenty years ago and a great deal has happened since, to India and to me.² If I sat down to write my autobiography now, it would probably differ considerably from what I wrote then. Probably, also, it would not represent so faithfully the moods and urges of those days.

In a sense, the book is a little out of date in regard to many matters of local concern. Still, I suppose there is some virtue in it as it represents the thought and activities not merely of one person but of large numbers who participated in India's struggle for Independence under Mahatma Gandhi's lead.

It is a peculiar pleasure to me that this book is appearing in Iran. I hope that it will help in a greater understanding of India in Iran. Our ancient contacts were broken when western imperialism came into Asia. Now that our countries are free again, we are naturally trying to pick up those old threads and old memories revive. I look forward to ever-closer contact and friendship between Iran and India.

My *Autobiography* is the story not so much of my individual self but of a generation in India. That generation is gradually passing away, giving place to another. That period also of India's struggle for freedom has become a part of history. We have today to face other struggles of a different kind, struggles for social and economic growth and to put an end to the curse of poverty in this country. This is a mighty task, a much more difficult one than the fight for Independence.

We are wedded to peace because our great leader, Mahatma Gandhi, trained us and India in that way. We are wedded to it also because it is only in peace that we can build up our country and solve our social and economic problems. We want no wars anywhere except a war against poverty and all its evil consequences.

1. Foreword to *An Autobiography*, Persian edition, 16 April 1956. JN Collection.
2. This book, except for the postscript and certain minor changes, was written entirely in prison between June 1934 and February 1935. Nehru was imprisoned in different jails during this period.

That, perhaps, is the concern not only of India but of many other countries in Asia which lost their dynamism some centuries ago and became static and unchanging. With the achievement of freedom, again has come a certain dynamism and a great urge to march ahead as fast as possible and build our countries anew so that our peoples might have not only political but economic freedom. Indeed, if we do not do so, we are likely to go under again and lose even the freedom we possess.

Since this old book of mine is appearing in the beautiful language of Iran, I send through it my greetings and good wishes to the people of Iran.

IV. THE LANGUAGE ISSUE

1. To J.C. Ghosh¹

New Delhi

13 February 1956

My dear Ghosh,

Your letter of the 13th February.²

I agree with what you say. I think we should be very careful in imposing Hindi in non-Hindi areas. I am rather apprehensive about the report of the Official Language Commission.³

In effect, we accept the two proposals you have mentioned. I think that much more work can be done in the encouragement of regional languages through the Sahitya Akademi. In fact, some work has already been done in that respect.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. Ghosh had written that "the more serious are the efforts of the Central Government and some State Governments to make Hindi the official language of the Union and these States the more intensely are the people of the non-Hindi speaking regions clinging to the idea of linguistic States where the regional languages will have the status of official languages." He also felt that the Central Government should show equal interest in the progress and development of all regional languages by (1) making grants to the academies of regional languages and (2) making provision for the teaching of an Indian language other than Hindi in the secondary schools of Hindi-speaking areas. The report of the Official Language Commission should not be given effect to and published in a hurry if it gave rise to fresh controversies, Ghosh added.

3. A 21-member Official Language Commission, with B.G. Kher as Chairman, was constituted by the President on 7 June 1955. The main recommendations of its report, submitted on 6 August 1956, were: (1) Hindi should be the linguistic medium for pan-Indian purposes; (2) English should continue as an alternative medium and its discontinuance should take place after a sufficiently long notice; (3) Devanagari should be used for writing Hindi and other Indian languages; (4) reasonable measure of knowledge in Hindi might be prescribed by Centre as qualification for entry into Government services; (5) instruction in Hindi should be compulsory at secondary stage of education in non-Hindi speaking areas, but learning of a regional language other than Hindi by the Hindi-speaking students should not be made compulsory; and (6) a national academy of languages should be established for the development of Hindi and regional languages.

2. To Sampurnanand¹

New Delhi
15 February 1956

My dear Sampurnanand,

For some time past, I have been repeatedly asked to receive a deputation on behalf of the Anjuman-i-Tarraqqi-i-Urdu of Lucknow.²

As I have been exceedingly busy, I could not receive this deputation. Thereupon, a memorandum was sent to me by Hayatullah Ansari,³ Secretary of the Anjuman. I enclose a copy of this memorandum.⁴

Apart from one's own likes or dislikes, the question raises a constitutional issue and some precise and constitutional answer has to be given to it. Indeed, we have had their last formal representation pending for a long time now.

You know how the question of language has excited people all over the country. I think it is unwise not to recognise Urdu and give it the fullest facilities as we do to many other languages which are spoken and written by far fewer

1. JN Collection.
2. Founded in 1903 for promotion of Urdu language and literature, the Anjuman-i-Tarraqqi-i-Urdu had branches at Lucknow, Hyderabad and other places. Tej Bahadur Sapru, Abul Kalam Azad, Abdul Huq and Tarachand were associated with it.
3. Editor of *Qaumi Awaz* since 1945 and member of Uttar Pradesh Legislative Council.
4. The memorandum dated 7 January 1956 pointed out that Urdu was not recognised as an official language under Article 347 of the Constitution by the Uttar Pradesh Government. In fact, in 1948, the UP Government issued a circular which stopped the teaching of Urdu throughout the State. But under pressure from the Anjuman-i-Tarraqqi-i-Urdu, the Government issued a circular directing that Urdu be taught at the primary and secondary levels of schooling and applications in Urdu should be accepted in offices and courts. But the circular had no impact and the UP Government was not taking any action on this.

persons. In what form this should be done is a matter for consideration. But to deny it this recognition seems to me to go against the spirit and even the letter of the Constitution, apart from causing frustration to many.

There is or can be no question of Urdu coming in the way of Hindi. The position of Hindi is completely assured, and it will no doubt progress rapidly. I should like you to give thought to this matter. The question has become an even more urgent one because of the SRC Report and the safeguards that are likely to be included in the Constitution in regard to languages.⁵

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. The States Reorganisation Commission, in its Report submitted on 30 September 1955, recommended that constitutional recognition should be given to the linguistic minorities to impart instruction in their mother tongues and Central Government should acquire power to issue appropriate directives for enforcement of this right on the lines of the provisions contained in Article 374 of the Constitution. It also recommended that a State should be treated as unilingual when one group constituted about seventy per cent or more of its population but where there was a substantial minority constituting thirty per cent of the population the state should be recognised as 'bilingual' for administrative purposes. Regarding representation of minorities in state services the Commission felt that a suitable legislation should be brought out.

3. Development of Hindi and Regional Languages¹

The Prime Minister stressed that in his view one of the fundamental considerations to be constantly borne in mind was that our policy regarding the introduction of Hindi should not disrupt or jeopardize the sense of unity in the country. Whatever we may want to do in this regard has to be done carrying the non-Hindi speaking areas with us because any development of Hindi that takes place in a contrary manner would not only imperil the vital consideration of the country's unity but in the process do harm to Hindi itself. Some of the regional languages were undoubtedly more advanced than Hindi was. Our approach to the development of Hindi must therefore be positive in the sense of promoting it in all the various possible ways but not thereby prejudicing the growth or development of the regional languages in their respective territories and for their appropriate spheres. The Prime Minister emphasised that it should be our purpose to encourage not merely Hindi but all the languages of the Union including the tribal dialects or the numerous other less developed forms of speech. He instanced in this connection the policies pursued in the NEFA area under the aegis of the Central Government.² In this list of languages that we should sponsor and encourage, he went on to add, should be included the English language as well. The Prime Minister quoted as an example the policy followed by the Sahitya Akademi of which he was the President. The Sahitya Akademi gave encouragement to and recognised merit with reference to books

1. Note prepared by S.G. Barve, Secretary, Official Language Commission on the discussion held between Nehru and B.G. Kher, Chairman of the Commission, 19 February 1956. JN Collection.
2. The policy of the Central Government in the NEFA was to promote tribal languages, including Tibetan where necessary, as the medium of instruction in the primary schools, and Assamese and Hindi were to be taught at a later stage. Special effort was also to be made to publish simple textbooks in tribal languages in Devanagari script. For Nehru's instructions in this regard in April 1952 to the Governor and Chief Minister of Assam and Union Education Minister see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 18, pp. 361-365. On 14 April 1956 J.N. Hazarika, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of External Affairs, informed the Lok Sabha that an ad hoc fact-finding Committee had been set up to study tribal intonations and collect data about the suitability of writing them in Devanagari. A script committee would later go into their findings to ascertain whether any simplification or modification of Devanagari was necessary for the tribal languages.

published, besides any of the Indian languages, by Indians in the English language also. Our attitude to the problem should be governed by these fundamental considerations and if the practicable pace having regard to these prove to be too slow to attain our objectives within the period mentioned in the constitutional provisions, then obviously it might be necessary to review these provisions at the appropriate time. Of course, one does not proceed to contemplate amendment of constitutional provisions except on clear and demonstrated necessity. However since the constitutional provisions are themselves a means, the ends being more fundamental objectives, one must not rule out any such adjustment should it eventually and in spite of best efforts, be found unavoidable.

The Prime Minister quoted with approval the suggestion made by Shri Subramaniam, Finance Minister of Madras, during the recent Amritsar session of the Congress³ that the Central Government should assist and encourage the development not merely of Hindi but of all the regional languages. The Prime Minister also expressed the view that *prima facie* it would seem that the work such as that of evolving terminology and other programmes bearing on the development of languages would be more appropriately executed by a semi-autonomous separate agency rather than in the departmental processes of one of the Ministries of the Government of India. He stated that at present the procedure was that long lists of words prepared in the Education Ministry on the advice of certain Committee were submitted to the Cabinet before they were adopted. Obviously in the Cabinet there could not be enough time and perhaps not even the appropriate expertise for giving close or competent consideration to all these terms individually. It would seem that this work and allied work of developmental character is much better done by bodies other than a Secretariat department. Since the Sahitya Akademi was concerned mainly with literature it would have to be done either by a separate wing of the same body or by a new institution set up for the purpose.

As regards the place of the English language in the linguistic set-up of the future for our country he envisaged that in the time to come it would be necessary to ensure that the knowledge—more especially the up-to-date knowledge in scientific matters—which was most conveniently to be had in the medium of the English language should be readily available to our scientists, technicians

3. The Amritsar session of the Indian National Congress was held on 11 and 12 February 1956.

and others concerned. We must outgrow any 'complexes' that may be still lingering with us with reference to the English language as the speech of our former political masters. Of course it is fantastic for anybody to suggest that the English language could be eventually the national language of the country or anything like it. The country's administration must be conducted so that the largest number of people in our democratic republic have the means to follow, or if they desire to actively participate, in the discussion and evolution of governmental policies and this could be done only through the medium of Indian languages and not through the English language of which sufficient knowledge is possessed by such a small microscopic minority of the population. Nevertheless, we must bear in mind the importance of the English language which had grown apace since the close of the last War. In international bodies and conferences, English has in the last ten years clearly shot ahead of other languages which previously used to share the field along with it, such as French. Now the English language is unquestionably the foremost of the world languages and several countries which used to resort to French or other media of expression in international contacts in the past have been adopting it in substitution thereof in recent years. The Prime Minister quoted in this connection the practice followed in Russia where practically for all purposes English was being used for the greater part as a compulsory second language in the educational system. It was already necessary for scientists and technicians of most countries to know English to keep pace with the advance in knowledge in their respective departments of study. This was realised in Russia no less than elsewhere. May be that in course of time Russian would forge ahead as the language of science and we may have to encourage the study of that language also. Today, however, amongst world languages English was easily the first.

The Prime Minister agreed that we must eschew any narrow considerations of so-called language 'purism' in this regard⁴ and take the simplest and most current words regardless of their origin. He emphasised that every new word assimilated into the language must be regarded as a gain to be welcomed and not as an inroad to be deplored. The Prime Minister also referred to the unjustified reservations about the Urdu language that still seemed to linger in some people's minds. Urdu was an Indian language and it was altogether fantastic to want to displace commonplace and current words simply because they were Urdu or of Arabic or Persian Origin.

4. In regard to terminology and unintelligibility of some of the Hindi terms evolved by some authorities.

4. Common Sense About Languages¹

Mr President,² sisters and brothers,

You will forgive me for not speaking in Punjabi, though it is not alien to me. The fact is that I used to go to Lahore often as a child. My mother came from Lahore and she used to take me with her whenever she went back for a visit. So my ears were accustomed to hearing the language and even now when I go to the Punjab, I begin to understand the language within a couple of days. It is not so much a question of the vocabulary as the manner of speaking and accent which the ear has to get accustomed to in order to understand the language better.

I have been invited to this conference in my capacity as the chairman of the Sahitya Akademi³ which is devoted to the task of promoting all the Indian languages. We do not exclude even English in the sense that English has come to stay in India. It has been spoken for more than a century in India. Indians have written books in English. So we have not looked at this matter in a narrow-minded way but included any book written by Indian authors within our purview, no matter which language it is written in. It is obvious that we will not give primacy to English. There are other people to do that. I am merely pointing out to you that we do not wish to look at the issue of languages in a narrow-minded way but regard all of them as legacies.

Hindi is regarded as the national language of India. But all the other languages included in our Constitution are in a sense national languages. It is not possible to judge all languages by any one yardstick and regard any of them as superior or inferior. It is obvious that some of the languages have a richer literature than others. There is no sense in making comparisons. For a long time now, I have felt that it is a most dangerous tendency on the part of the protagonists of any language to make comparisons and compete with other languages instead of concentrating on promoting their own language.

1. Speech while inaugurating the second All India Punjabi Conference, New Delhi, 14 April 1956. AIR tapes, NMML. Original in Hindi. G.B. Pant, Union Home Minister, presided over the opening day's session of the Conference. Gurmukh Nihal Singh, Chief Minister of Delhi, and Chairman of the reception committee of the Conference, welcomed the delegates.
2. Jodh Singh, President of the Punjabi Sahitya Akademi.
3. Nehru was the Chairman of the Sahitya Akademi from 1954 till his death in 1964.

Ever since my childhood, I have seen great rivalry between Hindi and Urdu. The fact is that Urdu was strongly entrenched during the British rule and Hindi lacked the opportunity to grow. Urdu had been the official language used in courts, etc., since the olden days and the British continued that. As a result, there was great rivalry between Hindi and Urdu which did great harm to both. Hindi had the right to come into its own, which it did gradually. But trying to drag down another language in the belief that that would promote our own is wrong. The protagonists of Hindi and Urdu were engaged in dragging one another down, with the result that neither made headway. If each of them had paid more attention to its own growth both would have undoubtedly prospered. Languages do not stand in the way of one another. In fact progress of one helps the others.

Take the famous European languages—English, French, German, Italian and Spanish. These five were not regarded as great languages at all by the learned people of Europe until three hundred years ago. Scholars of England, France, and Germany wrote in Latin. It was in France that there was a revolt against this for the first time in the sense that some French writers decided to write in their native French rather than in Latin. The articles written on the subject are available to this day. They are extremely interesting, expressing great resentment over the fact that their language should be considered rustic.

In India, the fact is that Sanskrit has not been a spoken language for nearly two thousand five hundred years ever since the time of Gautama Buddha. But it remained the language of scholars as Latin was in Europe. Books were written in Sanskrit down the ages. The dominance of Sanskrit made it difficult for other languages to grow. Intellectuals used it in preference to their mother tongues. Then Persian gained influence. So Sanskrit and Persian together prevented the growth of other Indian languages. But they managed to grow in their own way.

I was giving you the example of European languages. About three hundred years ago, they began to emerge as self-reliant languages. They were greatly helped by one another. English and French borrowed from each other as did German, Italian and Spanish. All these languages had derived from Latin just as most of the Indian languages are derived from Sanskrit. Greek also contributed to their growth. Since the major European languages belonged to different countries, the question of competition among them never arose. The growth of one helped the growth of the others. If a good book was published in English, immediately it was translated into four or five other languages. This helped thoughts and ideas to spread. People in Europe are often conversant with several languages. The educated intelligentsia in particular speak not

only their own language but at least two or three other European languages. The individual who knew only one language was not considered very well educated. A language grows by borrowing from others. There are great differences between English and French. I am not referring merely to their vocabulary but the spirit of these languages. Yet they are very close. All these European languages grew and flourished and influenced one another. I am giving you this example to show how absurd it is to think that one language can grow only at the expense of the other. The moment there is a rivalry both languages limit the scope of their growth. They may still grow, but it makes for great difficulties.

I am amazed when people complain that Hindi is a very difficult tongue because it has too many Sanskrit or Persian and Arabic words. I am amazed at the ignorance which these people display. If an Englishman does not understand French, he will be too ashamed to say so. But here we parade our ignorance from the roof tops. We make a great show of our lack of education and knowledge. There is nothing to be proud of in not knowing something.

We have entered a new era in India and we want our various Indian languages to grow and flourish. The moment we think that our language can only flourish at the expense of the other there can be nothing but pushing and pulling. I would say that we should not adopt this attitude even towards foreign languages. English is the foreign language spoken all over India. Others like Chinese, Russian, etc., will also be learnt as our contacts with the outside world grow. Even now, our ambassadors as a whole know fifteen or twenty languages. I do not mean that everyone learns all of them. The number continues to increase. We must understand that the growth of one language depends on taking advantage of other languages. We must not allow the feeling to develop that one language can grow only by suppressing the others. That can only lead to tussles and competition which stand in the way of progress. We must bear this in mind particularly in India because linguistic tensions are apparent throughout the country. A language grows on its own steam and to the extent to which it is used by the common people and the kind of literature that it produces. A great deal depends on how far it helps in our national tasks. For instance, if a language does not keep pace with technological progress, we will have to learn another language otherwise we fail to keep up with the times. That is obvious.

Take technical terms. It is difficult to coin new technical words in Hindi and in the other languages. It would be a good thing if they were coined. But to coin an entirely new word, leaving aside the one which is current makes it entirely artificial. A language cannot grow by such artificial methods. A

language derives its strength from the vocabulary of the masses. Even if it is not very beautiful from the literary point of view, it imparts vitality to a language.

When Kemal Ataturk, the revolutionary leader in Turkey wanted to get rid of the Arabic words from Turkish and to make the latter more powerful, he sent a commission to the rural areas to collect words commonly used by the people.⁴ The commission sent by Kemal Ataturk drew up a list of ten thousand Turkish words which were prevalent in the rural areas and hardly used by the urban folk. Then an effort was made to incorporate many of them into the Turkish language. I do not remember what the result was. But what is noteworthy is that he went in search of words used by the common people instead of artificially coining words. Such coinage cannot last. Moreover they create a barrier between the ordinary man in the field and the educated elite. This is happening to some extent today in our country. The people in the Sahitya Akademi and elsewhere tend to speak and write in chaste, literary phrases, which may be all right in the Akademi but not outside. So it will not catch on.

I have often said that I am unable to understand one thing. It is true that literacy is very low in India in the sense that only seventeen or eighteen per cent of the population are considered literate enough even to write their names. But even eighteen per cent is a pretty large number in a population of thirty-six or thirty-seven crores of human beings. It is more than the entire population of some countries. Well, when the number is so large why do so few people read books and so few are printed or sold? Leave aside books, even newspapers are not read by many people. Let alone Europe, even if you go to Egypt you will find that though it is much smaller in size than India with a population comparable to that of one of our states, the number of people who read newspapers runs into ten or twenty lakhs. There is no newspaper in India which boasts of such a large circulation. Why? Very few books are sold. Isn't it amazing?

So I have reached the conclusion that as far as books and newspapers are concerned, the writers keep the Sahitya Akademi and not the common people

4. After his re-election as President of Turkey by the National Assembly in 1923, Kemal Ataturk (1881-1938) devoted all his energies in modernising Turkey. One of the steps taken was to make Turkish, the language of the common people, independent of its Arabic and Persian derivatives and establish it as the national language. The Latin alphabet was adopted for writing Turkish instead of the old Arabic alphabet. Moreover, with the help of the linguists and phonetic experts a new purified Turkish vocabulary was formed. The Quran was also translated into Turkish and all mosque services began to be conducted in Turkish.

in mind. So they do not reach the masses and a barrier has been created. It is difficult to break it down once it is put up. But let me give you the example of Hindi. I am convinced that if newspapers are brought out in simple language easily understood by the masses, it will open up a new world to them and millions of people will read them gladly. There are people who work in my household who know Hindi and yet say that they are not able to understand the language of the Hindi newspapers.

So, for a language to grow, it must have its roots among the masses. It is obvious that the language of the common people cannot be regarded as high class literature and there are bound to be some differences between that and the literary expression. But a language must have its roots in the vocabulary of the masses if it is to grow. Otherwise, it will lack vitality. It is extremely important that there should be no barrier between the educated elite and the ordinary literate person.

I do not know all the Indian languages. But let me give you an example of Bengali. As far as I know, the greatest Bengali writers and poets like Rabindranath Tagore and others wrote in simple language, easily understood by the man in the street. Though their works have very high literary merit there is nothing artificial in Tagore's writings. His songs are sung all over Bengal and his books are read by everyone. It is a strength of Bengali that it has not created a barrier between its educated elite and the ordinary literate people. This is important for all languages.

As far as I think—you would know better—Punjabi derives its vitality from the masses and it should hold on to it. If you start giving it an artificial garb, it will lose its vitality. As I said, literature grows and sprouts leaves and flowers, when its roots are firmly embedded in the soil.

There is one more thing. No language should be tied to a province. It is immediately shackled. What I mean is that while a language should be rooted in the soil and the people, if it is linked to a state, other people will not identify themselves with it. You restrict the scope of a language in this manner. A language should be given full scope to grow. Gurmukh Nihal Singhji gave the example of Bengali spoken in East Bengal and Punjabi which is spoken in West Punjab. There is no reason for them not to flourish in Pakistan if they have vitality. It is extremely difficult to suppress a living, vital language. You will find that in the history of Europe, languages which were suppressed for hundreds of years have managed to remain alive and are sprouting new shoots.

On the other hand, no language can be made to grow by artificial methods. If it lacks vitality and has not put down roots, no amount of superficial tending



AT A CONFERENCE OF GOVERNORS AND RAJPRAMUKHS, NEW DELHI, 2 MARCH 1956

Seated (L to R): B. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, K.M. Munshi, Jairamdas Doulatram, Yadavendra Singh, Jamsaheb of Nawanagar, Jawaharlal Nehru, President Rajendra Prasad, Vice-President S. Radhakrishnan, Maharaja of Gwalior, Maharaja of Jaipur, Sri Prakasa, R.R. Diwakar and Karan Singh, Sadr-i-Riyasat, Jammu & Kashmir
 Standing (L to R): Bajrang Bahadur Singh, P.S. Kumaraswami Raja, C.P.N. Singh, C.M. Trivedi, H.K. Mahtab and M. Thirumala Rao



RECEIVING THE BUDDHIST RELICS BROUGHT FROM LONDON,
NEW DELHI, 5 FEBRUARY 1956

will make it grow. I can give you examples of this too among the European languages. Governments tried to give a filip to some languages without any success. They did not disappear but they did not put down strong roots either. So language is a strange thing. It can be served and tended, but how it grows cannot be predicted. We can only create the right atmosphere for it to grow in. But, ultimately it grows because of the people and the way they use it. Otherwise it cannot grow.

There is no doubt about it that all the Indian languages are progressing. I am only concerned that the protagonists of one language must not try to suppress other languages. It is wrong not only from the point of view of nationalism but also from the point of view of the language. It is fundamentally wrong for people to try to suppress Urdu. To think that Hindi cannot progress unless Urdu is suppressed is absolutely wrong. Such narrow-minded thinking can never lead to the progress of a language or a nation. Urdu is widely spoken in the Punjab and I would advise you to cherish it.

Hindi is spoken by a very large number of people in India. Punjabi is also a great language and you must serve its cause. But there is no reason to think that Urdu can come in the way of Punjabi or Hindi. A language is enriched by taking something from other languages. I feel that Punjabi and Hindi can both benefit from Urdu and vice versa. The special genius of a language must be taken advantage of by the others.

India has entered into a new era, politically, socially, economically and in literature. When a nation is on the move, it develops in all directions. When there is a revolution, it has an impact on all aspects of national life. If you want to know what revolutionary developments are taking place in India, you must not go to the Lok Sabha speeches or the laws enacted by it, though they may give you an indication. You must look at the impact on our literature, arts and crafts. It is a great achievement that many of the old and famous Indian dance forms which were disappearing have suddenly gained a new vitality. I am not referring to the classical dances alone but to the folk dances too. Their new vitality is a much more vital symbol of the nation's progress than laws passed by Parliament. They show a new zest for life which is ultimately the yardstick for judging a nation. You cannot give life to something lifeless. No amount of patting can have any effect on the dead. When there is life in something, it makes itself felt by its spring, its jauntiness, as in the case of a language. You cannot judge a language by rigid norms and rules and regulations. A language which is too guarded and measured seems lifeless. On the other hand a folk song or something rustic, even if it lacks literary merit, may be full of life and zest.

So, the important thing is the vitality of a nation. If the people of India have vitality, as I think we do, well then in spite of all our mistakes, we will pull through and achieve our goals. Otherwise, all our efforts will not take us very far. In the days of British rule, an officer built a model village with a few houses and a road or two. But it made absolutely no impact on the life of the villages because it was a superficial thing. The Community Projects and the National Extension Scheme which we have taken up are making a tremendous impact on the people because they are not something artificial imposed from above but have emerged out of the life of the people and are directly related to it. They gain their vitality from the people. So they are making a tremendous difference.

In short, this is a great opportunity for all our languages to grow and progress. Punjabi can go very far provided you give it right direction and enrich it by borrowing from other languages instead of competing with them. Every language in India has its own rightful place and can help others to grow. In my opinion, in spite of all their faults the people of the Punjab are full of life and vitality. So their language is bound to reflect that. You must remember that there are many yardsticks to judge a nation. But it is said that the most effective yardstick is its language. You can judge the strength and vitality of a nation by its language, its philosophy, etc. Language is the mirror of the life of a nation. If it is artificial, our nation cannot go very far. The problem is that nowadays there is too much attention to promoting languages artificially.

As far as I know, Punjabi is not an artificial language. Yes, it is not very well developed. But that does not matter. It is bound to grow because it has vitality. If you serve the language well, you will be richly rewarded.

5. The Place of English¹

Colleagues,

I hope you will permit me to call myself a colleague of the poets and writers assembled here. My writing days are over. Immersed in other tasks now, I have fallen from that high position. But I am happy to be here because I am fully in agreement with the reason, as explained by Dr Keskar² for which this conference has been organized. Apart from ensuring that all the Indian languages grow it is absolutely essential to establish a closer relationship between them so that they may contribute to the growth of one another. We should not be compelled to depend on a foreign language for our understanding of these languages.

But right at the outset, you can see the dilemma we are in. Dr Keskar recommends that you should learn other Indian languages and he does so in English. I am not criticizing him. When I asked him he said that many of the delegates to this conference were from the South and they wanted that the proceedings should be in English so that they could understand it. So I cannot object to that. I am merely pointing out the problems and complications which have to be unravelled. It cannot be done by merely expressing a desire loudly. In fact, things become more complicated if you pull this way or that too hastily. The knotty problems connected with the issue of language directly concern the feelings and emotions of the people and so the matter becomes more delicate. Everyone in India must bear this in mind at all times. But the greatest responsibility rests with the people of North India. It is the bigger part of the country and the North Indian languages are spoken by the majority of the population. This has nothing to do with our language being superior to the others.

On the one hand we express disapproval of the fact that English, a foreign tongue, is being used to conduct the work in Parliament and in our offices. On

1. Speech while inaugurating the Radio Literary Forum, New Delhi, 29 April 1956. AIR tapes, NMML. Original in Hindi.
2. B.V. Keskar, the Union Minister for Information and Broadcasting, said that the Radio Literary Forum's main objective was to enable the litterateurs to present to the public from one platform their own creative works and also of others in their particular languages.

the other hand, we are forced by circumstances to continue to use it. So there is nothing to get worked up about. We must accept the situation as it is and then try to find a way. I shall go a step further and say that though English is not an Indian language, to some extent it has become a part of this country. Therefore, there is no reason for us to throw it out. For one thing, it is wrong anyhow to spurn knowledge of any kind for it only diminishes our storehouse and nothing is gained by such a step. Secondly, for our languages and literatures to grow and progress, it is essential that our contact with the languages of other countries should increase. I do not mean only with English but with other foreign languages also. Today, of all the European languages, the use of English is perhaps most widespread. In our country also it is spoken by a large number of people. So why should we not take full advantage of it? It would have been useful at all times but particularly in these revolutionary times, it has become even more essential. When I say revolutionary, I mean in the sense that the world is changing very fast and reaching a stage when something that is new today becomes outdated by tomorrow. The same thing applies to machines. Discoveries made by scientists are soon overtaken by other, newer discoveries. The result is that anything that you read today—I am not talking of poetry and things like that but science and technology—becomes outdated even before the book is published. In these times if you wish to keep abreast of the changing world, you would have to read hundreds of magazines and journals from all the countries to know what is happening day by day. Now the difficulty is how to do this when there are hundreds of magazines in many different languages. There is progress everywhere. There is some linkage between the various European languages and translations are being done. In our country, leave alone the new writings, translations are not available even of our old classics, and though we are advancing in the field of science, it is obvious that we are still some distance away from doing original research and making discoveries. What I mean is that the issue of language becomes extremely important if we wish to keep up contacts with the world of ideas and thoughts. If we cut ourselves off even a little, we will fall behind. There is no doubt whatsoever that our contacts are mostly through the English language. I want that we should establish the same contacts with the other prominent European languages like the French, German, Russian, etc.

If we cut ourselves off from the world of ideas, we are cut off from the progress that the outside world is making and we will suffer in the field of science and technology. Suppose we progress so much in our country that the world wishes to learn from us, which will undoubtedly happen—it is already happening in a limited way—it will be compelled to learn our Indian languages,

not merely for the sake of our literature but to learn about new ideas and thoughts. So anyone who wishes to learn something new in this rapidly changing world will have to learn the languages of other countries. However advanced a country may be, it cannot afford to cut itself off from the other countries and their ideas and thoughts in today's world. Otherwise it will stagnate. Therefore, we must not be hostile towards English but treat it as one of the fringe languages of India.

Ultimately, however, the main thing is that all our languages should grow. We will keep the doors of knowledge of English open. In my opinion, so long as we do not encourage our languages to grow, there can be no true national integration. This is not open to debate.

The other thing that Dr Keskar emphasized is equally important—the contact between the various languages of India and mutual help in their growth. The difficulty is that the language issue generates great heat and people get carried away easily. Usually the protagonists of each language strive for the progress of their own language but more often than not, an effort is made to suppress the other languages. It is felt that the progress of one language is dependent upon suppressing others, which is fundamentally wrong. No language can grow by suppressing the others. It can grow only by the other languages flourishing and a mutual exchange of ideas and thoughts. This should be clearly understood by everyone, for often there is fuzziness.

As you know, there have been enough upheavals in the country in connection with the language issue. Great passions are unleashed over the question of the reorganization of the states on a linguistic basis and often the more fundamental issues are forgotten. So if we succeed in propagating the idea that the languages of India can grow and flourish only by mutual help and by a joint effort and not by cutting themselves off from the others, it will benefit the whole country. It must be clearly understood that we want all the languages of India, big or small, to progress equally well, and not the suppression of one or the other.

All India Radio can help a great deal in these matters because it has a wide network. There should be broadcasts in all the languages so that the people become familiar with them. One of the things for your consideration is how to take advantage of the medium of radio. This applies to the Sahitya Akademi also and it is trying as far as possible to provide equal opportunities for all the languages to grow.

V. NAGA INSURGENCY

1. Telegram to Bisnuram Medhi¹

Thank you for your letter of February 21. I am glad that situation in Naga Hills District is improving and many Nagas are now cooperating with Government. I think that we should try to put an end to all these troubles rapidly, and as far as possible, before rains set in and make movement difficult. Rebel groups siding with Phizo cannot be allowed to roam about and terrorise villages.² I realise the difficulty of dealing with these bands in mountainous areas. Nevertheless, I am surprised that we have failed completely to contact these armed gangs. I think that while armed police should certainly be used, the Assam Rifles will be more effective in this respect. The presence of Army patrols is also very helpful in raising morale of people. Therefore, Assam Rifles and Army Company should not be confined to static duty but joint aggressive and offensive programme should be drawn up and put into effect as rapidly as possible. Full coordination is essential. This should be brought about by the Joint Headquarters which has been set up.

2. Slow action at this stage gives opportunities to hostiles and prolongs our work greatly. We should hit hard and swiftly and, in particular, gain contact with Phizo's gangs.

3. It should be clearly understood by the people that there is going to be no dealing with Phizo and his group, and we are not going to weaken in any way because of violent activities. Also, it should be understood that we cannot even consider any political or like changes so long as complete calm has not been restored over these areas.

1. New Delhi, 28 February 1956. JN Collection. Bisnuram Medhi was the Chief Minister of Assam.
2. The Naga extremists under the leadership of A.Z. Phizo, President of the Naga National Council, incited violence in the Tuensang Division of NEFA from March 1955 onwards and called for the establishment of an independent Naga state. The situation was brought under control in January 1956 but the trouble had also started in the Naga Hills District of Assam bordering the Tuensang division in the latter half of January. Violent activities like arson, murder and extortion occurred on a large scale and as a result the Naga Hills District was declared a disturbed area on 31 January 1956. See also *Selected Works* (second series), Vol.31, p. 142.

4. If necessary, more troops can be sent, because half measures are seldom helpful or effective. Unless situation is brought under full control soon, far larger operations will be necessary later. In Tuensang Division the revolt was effectively dealt with by our forces and everything is quiet there now.

5. Your Governor³ is coming here soon and I hope to discuss this situation with him also. It seems to me that basic approach should be quick action with adequate forces and every attempt to contact Phizo and his gangs. This necessitates consultative body functioning rapidly and with authority. I am enquiring into possibility of sending further troops there.⁴

3. Jairamdas Doulatram.

4. The same day Nehru stated in a note to the Secretary General, MEA that he could not form any opinion about the question of sending more troops—a matter to be considered by the Army authorities. He advised the Secretary General to discuss the matter with the Army authorities and the Home Ministry. He also felt that appointment of an overall Administrator for the Naga Hills District and Tuensang Division was not desirable and feasible and any such attempt would delay the work aimed at.

2. Telegram to Jairamdas Doulatram¹

Continuation my telegram of March 8.² The three Nagas Megorto, Vizol and Zashie³ represented that they had come in their individual capacity and not on behalf of Phizo or the NNC. They were therefore seen by officials of this Ministry who made it clear to them that there can be no question of any negotiations or talks with NNC or with Phizo.⁴ It was also made clear to them that the first task of Government and the people was to restore law and order and the people must cooperate with the authorities in bringing the offenders to book. If they non-cooperated they would be severely punished.

2. Although the three Nagas said they did not represent anybody we have a feeling that they must have contacted Phizo and were probably sent by him to sound us. Having got a rebuff in Delhi they may now try to approach other individuals and organizations. It is important that they should not receive encouragement anywhere. Our policy is clear, that is, no dealing with Phizo and insistence on people's cooperation in restoring law and order and bringing offenders to book.

3. Please pass copy of this and my earlier telegram to Chief Minister.

1. New Delhi, 9 March 1956. JN Collection.
2. Jairamdas Doulatram informed Nehru on 8 March 1956 that a delegation of three Nagas was sent by Phizo to Delhi to negotiate for solution of Naga question and this move of Phizo was his same old tactics for recovering his influence with Nagas. Doulatram suggested that the delegation should be refused interview and combing operations of armed forces should be intensified in the entire disturbed area. Nehru replied on the same date (not printed) that there was no question of negotiating with any representative of Phizo, or any other person, whoever he might be.
3. Zashie Huire.
4. T.N. Kaul, Joint Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs, met the delegation and explained the policy of the Government.

3. Telegram to Bisnuram Medhi¹

I have been glad to notice that some progress has been made in dealing with the Naga agitation. I feel however that more effective steps are needed to prevent this trouble continuing for long. In particular, it should be largely controlled before the regular monsoon begins. I understand that hostile elements are recruiting thirty to forty men from each village and Deputy Commissioner Carvalho² was also recently ambushed.³ There is a report that civilians are evacuating Kohima owing to intensification of Naga activities round about.

2. We are informed that Joint Headquarters meeting on 18th March considered situation and asked immediately for army reinforcements amounting to two battalions so that active and effective steps should be taken now and final steps immediately after monsoon. General Shrinagesh⁴ has also visited area and taken part in consultations in Shillong. We are told that urgent action in this respect is necessary.

3. We are anxious about this matter and feel that there should be no delay in dealing with the situation which might otherwise deteriorate and drag on indefinitely.

1. New Delhi, 21 March 1956. JN Collection.

2. S.J.D. Carvalho (b.1919); confirmation in the Indian Administrative Service, 1948; Deputy Commissioner, Naga Hills District, 1953-57; Secretary, Education and Medical Departments, 1957.

3. On 18 March 1956 when Carvalho was returning from Chiesama, where the Assam Rifles and Police had destroyed a Naga hideout killing eight Nagas and injuring several others, there was an unsuccessful attempt on his life by hostile tribesmen near Narhima village in Naga Hills District.

4. S.M. Shrinagesh was the Chief of Army Staff.

4. Telegram to Bisnuram Medhi¹

Your telegram 4634 March 27.² We have discussed the latest position³ with the Defence Ministry and Army Headquarters. In my telegram to you 21570 of March 27 paragraph 4, I had indicated that it may become necessary to have an overall Commander with adequate authority to undertake operations. In your telegram you had referred to your decision to hand over Chakesang and Sema and some other areas to Army. Our Defence Ministry and Army Headquarters are definitely of opinion that we should now have an overall Commander with adequate authority to undertake operations both in Naga Hills District and Tuensang Frontier Division. This will help in bringing situation under control speedily. We agree with this view. I am sure that you will also agree with it.

2. We have appointed Major General Kochhar⁴ as the Force Commander with Headquarters at Kohima for this purpose. The Army Commander, accompanied by the new Force Commander and Joint Secretary, Defence, are

1. New Delhi, 29 March 1956. JN Collection.
2. Medhi wrote that an extra battalion of army troops had reached the Naga Hills and taken up position but the situation had further deteriorated since March 24. All Police and Assam Rifles personnel were placed under direct control of army to ensure effective coordination in Chakesang and Sema areas. Sema area adjoining Tuensang Frontier Division was especially the scene of large-scale ground battles and the police outpost at Satakha had to be abandoned on 25 March in face of strong and well-planned attack by hostiles backed by adequate fire power. The Sakhai outpost was attacked on 26 March and was in imminent danger. Every effort was being made to rush rescue columns and air drop supplies and ammunition. Army had to take control of operations at Losepu in Tuensang and Mokokchung subdivision as information was received that hostiles were planning attacks on these areas also. Companies of armed police offered by Madhya Pradesh had been accepted, but two more battalions were required in Naga Hills District immediately, Medhi added.
3. The Naga hostiles had snapped telegraph and telephone wires linking Kohima, capital of Naga Hills District, with the outside world since 22 March 1956. The passenger and mail services along the Manipur road, linking Assam and Manipur, had been suspended in view of sniping activities by hostiles.
4. Raj Kumar Kochhar (b.1913); Commissioned in the Corps of Engineers, 1933; commanded a field company in Burma, 1942, and 3 Engineer Battalion, 1944; Director of Movements and Quartering, 1950-53; Military Attache at Beijing, 1953; General Officer Commanding, Assam, 1956-58; General Officer Commanding, Madras, Mysore and Kerala area, 1958-61; Quartermaster General, Indian Army, 1961.

flying to Shillong tomorrow. They will meet you and explain these arrangements. I have no doubt that you will give your full cooperation to the new Force Commander.

3. These new arrangements do not interfere with the normal responsibility for running the administration which will continue to remain with the civil authorities both in the Naga Hills District and Tuensang Frontier Division. But overall command of operations will vest in new Force Commander, Major General Kochhar, who will have all the troops, Assam Rifles and Armed Police in these areas under his command for purposes of operations.

5. To U.N. Dhebar¹

New Delhi
30 March 1956

My dear Dhebar Bhai,

I understand that at the instance of Mridula Sarabhai² you have met some Nagas who are here and further that you might meet them again.

There is no harm in your meeting them. In fact, it will be a good thing if you meet them. I have, however, refused to meet them. Pantji met them. It amazes me how Mridula manages to create a difficult situation much more difficult. I have given up talking to her about any matter. It is impossible for me to make her understand how harmful her activities in regard to Kashmir³ have been. And now she is meddling in these Naga affairs without knowing anything about them and encouraging them in various undesirable ways.

We are all very much concerned in these Naga areas. But the fact is that Phizo, their leader, is a completely unreliable and most objectionable person. He is at present carrying on an open rebellion with arms and we have had to send armed forces to deal with this. There have been regular battles, if I may call them so, and a number of our officers and men have been killed in ambushes. It is quite impossible to deal with this matter at this stage except in a military way. I have given clear instructions to our Commander always to remember that we have to win over these people. But the fact remains that this is today purely a military situation and we cannot interfere with that in any way. These Naga hostiles have assassinated some of their own men simply because they would not follow them.⁴ They have looted and burnt a great deal of property and committed many acts of sabotage.

I have found in the past that my meeting with any of these persons is always exploited and misrepresented. Therefore, I did not see them.

1. JN Collection.

2. A prominent social worker and a devoted Gandhian.

3. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 25, pp. 326-327; Vol. 26, pp. 303-304 and Vol. 27, pp. 245-247, 249-251.

4. T. Sakhrie, a moderate Naga leader who opposed violent methods of Phizo, was kidnapped on the night of 18 January 1956 and killed. The hostile armed gangs had also killed eight leaders and interpreters and kidnapped ten others who did not support their violent movement.

But, as I have said above, it would be a good thing if you saw these men. I wanted, however, to give you the background.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. To Jairamdas Doulatram¹

New Delhi
31 March 1956

My dear Jairamdas,

Your letter of March 29th.² As you know, we have now given the overall Command of operations in the Naga Hills District and the Tuensang Division to a senior Army Officer. I hope this will lead to satisfactory results.

The three Nagas who came here, and who apparently are still here, asked for an interview with me. I refused to see them. Pantji, however, saw them, and I think Dhebarbhai also met them. There was no question of any "proposals". I think they have met some Members of Parliament also and, I am sorry to say, Mridula Sarabhai has probably encouraged them a little. She acts according to her own judgment regardless of what we may think.

There is no question of our dealing with the Naga National Council or of any promise or assurance of any kind. On no account is there going to be the slightest recognition of independence.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Copies of this letter were sent to Secretary General and Foreign Secretary.
2. Jairamdas Doulatram wrote that Zashie, one of the three Nagas who went to Delhi recently, was again intending to go to Delhi with some 'proposals' on behalf of Phizo. Phizo seemed to have suggested that Defence, Communications and External Affairs might remain with the Government of India for a specified period and after that the Naga Hills should be independent. Doulatram suggested that there should be little room for any talk as long as Phizo's violent activities continued. He also added that there was some vague suspicion that Pakistan was helping the Naga rebels through some of its nationals or other agents, but this would require definite confirmation.

7. To Rishang Keishing¹

New Delhi
12 April 1956

Dear Rishang Keishing,²

I was not here yesterday when you spoke in the Lok Sabha. I have, however, seen the report of your speech.

You have said, in the course of your speech, something about my not granting interviews to the Naga leaders. As a matter of fact, I must have seen some Naga representative or other at least half a dozen times in the course of the last two or three years. I used to make it a point to meet them either here or in Assam. I found that often this interview with me was exploited by some of them for wrong purposes. Wrong accounts were published in the press and an attempt was made to impress the Naga people that they were dealing with us directly above the heads of the local authorities.

You refer to some telegram which they received late.³ As far as I remember, I gave interviews to some people after that incident also.

It is not an easy matter for the Prime Minister to give interviews to everybody who asks for them. Nevertheless, I had gone out of my way to meet these people on several occasions. I came to the conclusion, however, that these interviews did little good unless two points were made perfectly clear. These two points were: violence must be given up clearly and definitely and that I was not prepared to talk to any persons in regard to the claim for independence which must be given up. I propose to adhere to these. When recently three Naga representatives came here to Delhi,⁴ I did not meet them myself but I asked people in my Ministry to meet them. I understand that the Congress President also met them.⁵

1. JN Collection.

2. Member of Lok Sabha.

3. Rishang Keishing said in the Lok Sabha that the Naga National Council had sent a telegram to Nehru asking for an interview in May 1955, which was granted by him, but the reply from the Prime Minister was perhaps held back by some of the officers and handed to the Council only on the day the interview was to take place, when it was too late.

4. See *ante*, p. 120.

5. See *ante*, pp. 124-125.

You refer to some kind of amnesty being given to the Nagas.⁶ I do not know to whom this refers. If it refers to persons who have committed deliberate murders or other crimes against respected citizens, then this would be highly improper. Otherwise our instructions are to treat the Nagas as friends and fellow countrymen.

You say something about a letter which you received from my Principal Private Secretary about the Extension of the Forest Act. I do not understand where the question of challenging your loyalty comes in.⁷ The sole question was as to when and to what areas the Act had been extended. If you are referring to some other paper, I do not know what this is.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. In the course of his speech, Rishang Keishing appealed to the Government of India to immediately issue an appeal to the extremist Nagas to surrender as this would have a positive effect on their supporters and encourage those who were underground to come out. Keishing also appealed to the Home Minister to grant amnesty to the Nagas.
7. Rishang Keishing said in the Lok Sabha on 11 April that he had written to the Prime Minister suggesting that the Extension of Forest Act should not be implemented in the hill areas of Manipur until sufficient steps had been taken to improve the local conditions, but the reply sent to him, after a reference to P.C. Mathew, Chief Commissioner of Manipur, stated that it was incorrect that the entire hill areas of the State belonged to the tribal people as distinct from the Government. Denying that he had ever said that the area exclusively belonged to the tribal people, for this would amount to a demand for another independent state, Keishing averred that the argument attributed to him was a challenge to his loyalty to the country, and alleged that the Chief Commissioner had deliberately misinformed the Prime Minister in this regard so as to spoil Keishing's image.



WITH UPENDRA NATH ASHK, A HINDI WRITER, AT THE INAUGURATION OF THE RADIO LITERARY FORUM,
NEW DELHI, 29 APRIL 1956



SIGNING AN AGREEMENT ON CANADA-INDIA ATOMIC REACTOR PROJECT, NEW DELHI, 28 APRIL 1956
Seated (L to R): H.J. Bhabha, Escott Reid, High Commissioner of Canada, Jawaharlal Nehru, and V.K. Krishna Menon

VI. REHABILITATION

1. To Mehr Chand Khanna¹

Camp: Amritsar
12 February 1956

My dear Mehr Chand,

I have seen copy of your letter to Maulana Sahib dated 8th February. This refers to the land of evacuee owners which is now held by displaced persons.

It seems clear to me that the evacuee owners have right on their side. It was through no fault of theirs that their lands were taken away from them and given to others. The only question that arises therefore is as to whether they should be given this original land or an equivalent land or other forms of compensation. If the original land cannot be given without much disturbance and difficulty, then the choice lies between giving them other land or compensation for it. Probably, land would be preferable, and the land should be easily accessible to them. If the Ministry of Law has suggested that this can be done by making a new rule under the Evacuee Property Act, there appears to be no necessity to amend the law itself.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. To Mehr Chand Khanna¹

New Delhi
25 February 1956

My dear Mehr Chand,

Dr Channa Reddy,² Minister, Hyderabad Government, has sent me a copy of a letter he has addressed you. This relates to the rehabilitation of people in Bidar, Osmanabad and one or two other districts. I have been much interested in this work ever since I went there and saw the miserable condition of a large number of women and children. This was not only poverty and destitution, but the fact that most of their menfolk had been killed.³ It was an extraordinary social situation. There were very few Muslim men left and the Muslim population consisted of women and children. Something has been done there, but it is not at all enough.⁴ I am not able to judge myself. But Dr Mahmud went there recently and pleaded for more action to be taken.⁵

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. M. Channa Reddi was Minister for Agriculture, Supplies and Rehabilitation in the Hyderabad Government.
3. Nehru visited Bidar and Osmanabad on 26 and 27 September 1952 to help the minority community whose shops and houses were looted and destroyed and whose menfolk were killed after police action.,
4. The Hyderabad Government provided Rs. 50,000 for rehabilitation of the Muslims and also set up a committee to look after the proper distribution of relief to deserving people. See also *Selected Works* (second series), Vol.20, p.272.
5. In fact on 14 February 1956 Nehru wrote to B. Ramakrishna Rao that Syed Mahmud, Minister in the External Affairs Ministry, after visiting Bidar and Osmanabad, informed him that the actual money sanctioned by the Government of India for relief and rehabilitation was Rs.13,15,000 but only Rs. 5,11,743 was spent. Mahmud also made some suggestions for improving rehabilitation work. Nehru asked Rao why more effective relief was not given when money was available. Nehru also wrote to Channa Reddi on similar veins when the latter wrote to Mehr Chand Khanna on 24 February asking for more help from the Centre.

3. To Mehr Chand Khanna¹

New Delhi
30 March 1956

My dear Mehr Chand,

As you perhaps know, I have had a crowd of people demonstrating in front of my house for the last ten days or more. We have not interfered with them in any way and allowed them to demonstrate. On the whole, they have behaved, except for shouting slogans when I pass them.

One of the officials of your Ministry came here and told me that these persons had taken unlawful possession of the quarters built by your Ministry. They had been given a time to vacate them, and they had refused to do so, and they could not be allowed to continue in this way. I agreed, and I told them so also. I said that they could have no sympathy from me in this matter but that, quite apart from this particular case, we were always trying to find accommodation for displaced persons, and individual cases could be looked into.

...I should like to know how you propose to deal with this matter, apart from getting them out of their present habitations. What happens to these people afterwards? There are a large number of women and children with them too. I was told that previously they must have lived somewhere, probably with friends. That must have been so. But, is there any chance in future of their getting some place to live in?

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

4. To B.C. Roy¹

New Delhi
18 April 1956

My dear Bidhan,

Your Governor, Dr Mookerjee,² has sent me a very long letter about the activities of the West Bengal Branch of the United Council for Relief and Welfare.³ In this letter he has indicated that during the last six years or so they have collected and spent a total amount of Rs.35 ½ lakhs. Of this, Rs.17 lakhs were from gifts and kind. I sent him from the Prime Minister's Fund Rs. 3,80,072. From the Central Government he received Rs. 25,000 and from the State Government Rs. 8,246. The Central Social Welfare Board also made a grant of Rs.5,000. The balance of donations in cash amounting to Rs. 14,31,681 was collected from people in West Bengal.

Among the principal activities mentioned are: (1) medical and educational relief for refugees, (2) milk centres, (3) a tube well scheme, and (4) a tailoring scheme for refugee women. According to him, a sum of Rs. 3,00,000 is required for these activities and he asked me to send him Rs. 2 lakhs from the Prime Minister's Fund.

I am writing to him today⁴ and I enclose a copy of this letter. I am sending him a cheque for Rs.1 lakh. I should imagine that your State Government should help him for the tube wells for refugee colonies. The Rehabilitation Ministry should also be able to help him.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

1. JN Collection.

2. H.C. Mookerjee.

3. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 25, pp.146-147 and Vol. 26, pp.184-186.

4. Nehru wrote to Mookerjee that considering his useful work done for the refugees from East Bengal, he should certainly be able to get assistance both from the State Government and the Ministry of Rehabilitation. When it comes to tailoring schemes or other small industries, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry might be able to help it if it was approached by the State Government.

VII. ISSUES CONCERNING HARIJANS AND MINORITIES

1. Harassment of Harijans by Moneylenders¹

Mrs Manmohini Sahgal² has sent me the enclosed letter. What she says is very pertinent but it is not quite clear to me how I can help. It should be possible, and it is certainly desirable that something should be done to save these Harijans from the moneylenders.

2. You might write to the Chief Commissioner of Delhi³ drawing his attention to this and tell him that this matter cannot be left as it is and we have to make a beginning. I do not know how far it is legally permissible for these money-lenders to charge these tremendous rates of interest. Surely, there are laws about debts and interest.

3. The problem may be a very big one but some beginnings can be made, and I do not think this need require any large sums of money. Someone should investigate this with the help of the particulars supplied by Manmohini Sahgal, and a settlement should be arrived at reducing the fantastic sums claimed as interest. After that, monthly payments could be made but not directly. They should be made through some agency. If it is possible to form some kind of a cooperative society, this might help. We might be able to help in this if some initial sum is required.

4. I should imagine that the Bharat Sevak Samaj is the right organisation to deal with this matter. You might refer to them also.

5. Please write to Manmohini Sahgal, acknowledging her letter and saying that I am interested and concerned about this matter. I cannot give any advice to her offhand but I am enquiring what can possibly be done. You might mention to her that the Bharat Sevak Samaj might perhaps be able to help.⁴

1. Note to B.N. Kaul, Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, 6 February 1956. JN Collection.
2. (1909-1994); political and social worker; arrested twice during Civil Disobedience Movement, 1930 and 1931; sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment when she defied the order of Punjab Government, 1932; represented Indian women in the talks with Sir Stafford Cripps, 1946.
3. A.D. Pandit.
4. On 20 February Nehru wrote to the PPS enquiring whether he had written to the Delhi Government and Bharat Sevak Samaj about the harassment of Delhi Harijans by moneylenders.

2. Difficulties Faced by Muslims¹

This raises a difficult case. I am not so much concerned about the political usefulness of Maulana Nur-ud-Din Bihari. I am concerned about two matters. One is that I believe in his bona fides, however foolishly he might have acted. Secondly, in spite of every effort of ours, the fact is that Muslims have to face a great many difficulties in India. Their entry into the Services is greatly restricted. The Evacuee Property Laws (now abrogated) came in the way of their business and there are many other difficulties. Hence I am inclined to take a more generous view in their case and, more especially, in the case of a man whose bona fides I believe in. Therefore, I accept your proposal that a sum of Rs. 5,000 may be paid from the discretionary fund to Maulana Nur-ud-Din Bihari and Dr Sharma² might be asked to postpone recovery of the rest.

2. I think that Dr Sharma's difficulties are also real. It is difficult for him to make exceptions without getting into big trouble. So far as the Food Ministry is concerned, they are only interested in recovering a loan from the Bhopal Government. The Bhopal Government on its own part can do what it likes.

1. Note to the Principal Private Secretary, 12 March 1956. JN Collection.

2. Shankar Dayal Sharma, the Chief Minister of Bhopal.

3. To Shankar Dayal Sharma¹

New Delhi
18 April 1956

My dear Shankar Dayal,

I have been much disturbed at recent occurrences in Bhopal. I had a note on them from Kanhaiya Lal Khadiwala.² I enclose a copy of my reply to him.

The general tendency seems to be to lay the blame on some Pakistani who is said to have come there to create trouble. Also, there is reference to an old woman throwing some bones. Further, there have been incidents of images from temples being defiled and treated with disrespect.

All this may be true. Even if it is true, it means that a few persons have misbehaved and they should be dealt with. The woman, I understand, admits having thrown some bones outside.

What I am concerned with is that for three years running, I think, there has been trouble in Bhopal at the time of Holi. When we have this experience, why should the Administration and, more especially, the Police force not be able to avert any such occurrence? Basically, the Muslims in Bhopal are a minority afraid of the majority. They can be overwhelmed at any time by the majority. They are a frightened people, although individuals or some small groups among them might misbehave. I cannot conceive of their adopting aggressive and insulting tactics.

On the other hand, the Hindu Mahasabha of Bhopal has always been aggressive and intensely communal. The presumption, therefore, is that some Mahasabha elements deliberately create trouble and get away with it. At the meeting held on the 6th April, the language used by the General Secretary of the Madhya Bharat Hindu Sabha, Bhagwandas Saraswat, was very bad. I am also told that Keswani, who is Secretary of the Bhopal Hindu Mahasabha, as well as some other people also delivered violent speeches, which were highly objectionable. Subsequently, processions were taken out, and there was trouble.

I cannot, of course, judge of the succession of events, but I can form some idea of the basic conditions prevailing in Bhopal and what is likely to happen. It seems to me that what has been stated in some of the official communiques

1. JN Collection. A copy of this letter was sent to the Chief Commissioner of Bhopal.

2. President, Madhya Bharat Pradesh Congress Committee.

about a Pakistani being responsible for this trouble, is not an adequate way of dealing with the situation. It is a way of escaping responsibility. I am not very satisfied with the inactivity of the Police when they should have known very well that Holi is a dangerous time and, more particularly, when these violent speeches have been delivered. The Hindu Mahasabha in Bhopal seems to get off very lightly.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

PROBLEMS OF GOVERNANCE

I. CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

1. Government Expenditure on Congress Sessions¹

I shall be grateful if the Home Minister will read the note of the Auditor-General² and advise me as to what should be done in the circumstances mentioned by him. It seems to me desirable that some clear rules might be laid down to avoid confusion or criticism in future.³

2. It is not easy to lay down precise rules. Broadly speaking, we might say that a political party should pay for any expenditure arising from any meeting or session. But when these sessions are on a vast scale and very large numbers of people come there, certain responsibilities have to be shouldered by Government. Indeed, Government insists on doing many things, for security and other reasons, in which the political party itself might not be greatly interested. Also, sometimes, as in the case of Kalyani the West Bengal Government was interested in developing that area for future use. They took advantage of the Congress session to do this. It was Government's intention then to use Kalyani as a great educational centre and possibly even transfer part of the Calcutta University there. I do not quite know what they have done since but I believe Kalyani has developed as a township.⁴ In such a case, the actual money spent by Government was more than was required for the Congress session itself.

3. In Amritsar, apart from the Congress session,⁵ there were two other major conferences, the Akali Conference⁶ and the Maha Punjab Conference.⁷ The rules we frame should be more or less applicable to all of them except that the Congress was a much bigger affair and required arrangements on a bigger

1. Note to the Union Home Minister, New Delhi, 15 February 1956. JN Collection.

2. A.K. Chanda.

3. A question had arisen during the past sessions of the Congress, of expenditure incurred by the Government in connection with the Congress sessions.

4. A railway station was built at Kalyani and other infrastructural development was undertaken for the 1954 Congress session. In November 1954, Birla College of Agriculture was opened at Kalyani which formed the nucleus of a university.

5. The sixty-first Congress session was held on 11 and 12 February in Amritsar.

6. On 11 and 12 February 1956.

7. On 12 February.

scale. Indeed, the Akali and the Maha Punjab Conferences really came into being because of the Congress.

4. I am writing a letter to the Chief Minister of the Punjab, a copy of which I enclose.⁸

5. I should like the advice of the Home Minister in this matter.

8. Nehru wrote to Kairon, the Chief Minister, on 15 February that some care should be taken not to cast the burden of expenditure incurred on the Amritsar Congress session, on the Punjab Government and the same governmental rules should be followed for the Akali and Maha Punjab Conferences.

2. Representation of States in Conferences in Delhi¹

A day or two ago, the Ministry of Agriculture apparently summoned Ministers of Agriculture from all the states presumably for some conference here. As usual, some kind of circular letters were issued to all the states, including those which had Chief Commissioners. These people no doubt foregathered here.

2. I know nothing about this conference or the purpose for which these people were summoned. I got to know however that the Chief Commissioner of Kutch² had come here for this particular purpose. He had left his State at a time when a very serious incursion had taken place into Kutch territory from Pakistan.³ It was his business to remain there, and yet he took this long journey to attend some conference here at this critical moment. As soon as we got to know of this, we asked him to go back immediately which I believe he did. His coming here was an act of irresponsibility.

3. I am rather concerned at the numbers of conferences held here to which Ministers of the States are invited. I should like you to collect some information about the various conferences held in Delhi, say during the past year, to which Chief Ministers or other Ministers of States have been invited. The name of the sponsoring Ministry should be mentioned.

4. Of course, some of these conferences are important like the ones held to consider the draft of the Second Five Year Plan. But I rather doubt if all these conferences necessitate the gathering together in Delhi of representatives from all the states. There is perhaps a tendency to summon them whenever someone has a bright idea. Often not only the Ministers but a number of senior officials accompany them. All this is not only a costly business but must interfere with the work of the states. Indeed some States have complained to me about these frequent invitations.

1. Note to Cabinet Secretary, New Delhi, 23 February 1956. File No.F.9/5/56-T, MHA. Also available in JN Collection. A copy of this note was sent to the Home Ministry.
2. S.A. Ghatge.
3. Fire was exchanged between troops of India and Pakistan on 19 February when a Pakistan Army contingent trespassed into Indian territory and attacked an Indian Military patrol in Chhad Bet, a 35 mile pasture island in the Rann of Kutch, injuring three Indian soldiers and killing three camels. See also *post*, p. 310.

5. In any event it seems to me quite unnecessary for the Chief Commissioners to be summoned here for these conferences except on very special occasions. Broadly speaking, Ministers or representatives of Part A and Part B states need only be invited. Many of the problems discussed have little bearing on Kutch or Ajmer or Bhopal or Coorg or Manipur or Tripura.

6. For the present, I suggest you collect the information I have asked for. You might however suggest that in case any Ministry invites such a conference they might inform me of the fact and that normally it is not necessary to invite people from the small States mentioned above.

7. This of course does not refer to officials or others coming here for a special purpose, apart from conferences.

3. To G.B. Pant¹

New Delhi
26 February 1956

My dear Pantji,

Some days ago you sent me a note about IAS pensions. You had also spoken to me about this matter a little earlier. If you so wish it, we can discuss this matter at your leisure.

I feel, however, that these piecemeal approaches to these problems are not very satisfactory. As you know, I have long been worried about some of our service conditions which we have inherited from British days. It was bad enough for us to give all the guarantees that we gave to the Senior Services. For my part, I objected strongly to this at the time. A deputation of senior ICS men, headed by Girja Shankar Bajpai, came to see me about them. I told them that I did not agree with them and even in their own interest it would not be right for them to claim these guarantees in the Constitution. I then went away to Indonesia I think and was absent for about a month.² During my absence, the relevant guarantee clauses in the Constitution were adopted,³ at the instance of Vallabhbhai Patel. I was told at the time that Vallabhbhai almost threatened to resign if these clauses were not adopted by the Constituent Assembly.⁴

There the matter rested and we had far too many other things to do to give thought to the consequences of what we had done. We had thought of these consequences in terms of pay and pensions. Much later, to my intense surprise, I discovered that these consequences included some very special privileges which were totally unbecoming and even insulting to our independent and

1. JN Collection.

2. In fact, Nehru visited the USA and Canada in October and November 1949.

3. Article 314 of the Constitution guaranteed every person, appointed to a civil service by the Secretary of State, entitlement to enjoy "the same conditions of service as respects remuneration, leave and pension and the same rights as respects disciplinary matters or rights as similar thereto as changed circumstances may permit as that person was entitled to immediately before such commencement." Later this Article was omitted by the Constitution (Twenty-eighth Amendment) Act, 1972.

4. Patel said in the Constituent Assembly on 10 October 1949: "So, once and for all decide whether you want this Service or not. If you have done with it and decide not to have this Service at all, even in spite of my pledged word, I will take the Services with me and go. The nation has changed its mind."

national status. I drew attention to this matter in the Cabinet on more than one occasion. Although most people agreed to what I said, nothing very much resulted. After repeated references inside and outside Cabinet, the Cabinet decided on the 6th February, 1953, as follows:

“The Ministry of Home Affairs should, in consultation with the Ministry of Finance, examine this matter and put up proposals to the Cabinet.”

The particular matter referred to there was the question of free passages to certain ICS officers under the Lee Commission.⁵ I think I also referred to certain other rather extraordinary provisions, such as, pay being calculated in sterling and at a certain very advantageous exchange rate. All this was obviously done for the advantage of British officers serving in India. Then, on the plea of Indian officers claiming equality, they were also given the same privileges.

It seemed to me monstrous, in independent India, for us to accept these special privileges. I was not thinking so much in terms of money but of the indignity involved to our national status. I was indeed surprised that any of our senior officers should wish to continue these very special privileges meant for foreigners under British rule.

I must have written ever so many times to Kailas Nath Katju on this subject when he was Home Minister. Nothing happened. It seemed to me that there was no eagerness on the part of many of our senior officers to deal with this question.

The Cabinet decision referred to above passed in February 1953, remained a dead letter for two or three years. I wrote some notes.⁶ Partly I must confess that the fault was mine also because I allowed long periods to elapse before I took up the matter again. Most of us were very busy with other matters and the question of revising Service rules was a complicated affair.

However complex the wider question was, the immediate question that I had raised was about these anomalies which had descended to us from British times and which, as I have said, were derogatory to our status.

5. The Royal Commission on the Superior Civil Services in India, also known as Lee Commission, was appointed in 1923 under the chairmanship of Lord Lee of Fareham. Its report, submitted in 1924, suggested increase in pay, passage to England, concessions and pensions for the existing British ICS officers, and establishment of a Public Service Commission.
6. For Nehru's earlier notes, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 30, pp. 291-293, 295-296, 305.

On one or two occasions, I had discussed this matter with the Auditor General, Asok Chanda, who had previously sent me a general note on the Services.⁷ His notes were forwarded by me to the Cabinet Secretary and they remained with him for quite a considerable time. Ultimately, he did send his comments on one or two matters, more especially these questions of overseas pay and free passages and payment in sterling etc. This was, I think, three months ago or more. These months have been full of work and worry for all of us and the matter has again been kept pending but on this occasion chiefly because of my delay in dealing with it. Today, I have again gone through some of these papers. There is among them a letter and an aide memoire which the Auditor General sent me on the 19th December, 1955. This aide memoire broadly discusses these questions of the Services. I am enclosing it. The Auditor General suggests in his note the appointment of a high level Commission to consider the question of the reorganisation of the Administration and of the Services. I confess that I am a little afraid of Commissions, and yet I do not know how we can possibly tackle this matter otherwise. Our attempts to do so during the last four years or so have ended in total failure. Even relatively small and specific matters have proved intractable. I should like you to glance through Asok Chanda's note and then we can talk about it. I am very sorry to inflict this upon you when you have so many burdens, but I have this on my conscience.

I think, on the whole, that some kind of a small Commission should be appointed. What kind of a Commission should this be? It should not be a pure Service Commission and indeed I am inclined to think that it should consist of people who are not themselves dealing with Service matters. They have got too much in the ruts and cannot get out of them. We should have a senior Service man in it and I can think of no better person than N.R. Pillai. The Auditor General should be on it who is both a Serviceman and has other experience also. I wonder if Dr Radhakrishnan would consent to be the Chairman of this Commission.

Even if such a Commission is appointed, I think we should separate the question of free passages, sterling allowances and other derogatory rules and deal with these separately and immediately. It is said that after all, these particular privileges apply only to a few persons now. That is no argument for

7. For Asok Chanda's notes on Services and Nehru's comments, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol.25, pp.272-292.

delay. In fact, it is an argument the other way. If any Englishman in our service is affected by it, I would be prepared to make an exception for him, but I see no reason why any Indian should continue to enjoy a privilege which is not in consonance with free India.

I would draw your special attention, in regard to these particular privileges, to paragraphs 18 to 24 of Asok Chanda's aide memoire.

Apart from this important question of removing anomalies and derogatory provisions, there is also the aspect of removing as far as possible the class character of our Services. I am not thinking so much in terms of salaries or persons, etc., but the whole structure which produces this class character. If we want to pay special salary to somebody, let us pay it, but let us do so in a different way.

Then, there is the question, often discussed in the Planning Commission, of reorganising our Services with a view to making them fit in with new developments in the country. In the United Kingdom, repeated changes have been made in the organisation of the Services. Recently, they started a single Scientific Service including all kinds of technical services. They have also, I believe, a single Civil Service with various grades. Here, in India, the whole subject is supposed to be so sacrosanct that we cannot touch it. Of course, we are a Federal Constitution and, therefore, cannot wholly apply the British parallel. Nevertheless, there can be much greater simplicity in the structure of our Services.

I have indicated some points I have in mind. There are many others too. However, what I am anxious about is that something should be done for us to get going.⁸

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

8. Pant replied on 3 April that the emoluments of the officers governed by Article 314 need not be reduced; payment should be made in rupees except to the remaining few British Civil Servants and in their case the amount should be converted into rupees at the existing rate; there should be no difference in the matter of leave and leave salary; passage concessions should cease; overseas pay should be withdrawn excepting two non-Indian officers; 25 years' retirement rule might be reconsidered. He also wrote that he did not "quite relish the idea of a full-fledged Commission being appointed" for the reorganisation of Services.

4. To G.B. Pant¹

New Delhi
20 March 1956

My dear Pantji,

I understand that the American sponsored Democratic Research Service,² under M.R. Masani³ in Bombay, regularly received copies of my fortnightly letters to Chief Ministers, etc., as well as other secret papers which are sent to Rajpramukhs and Governors. Apparently, this organisation gets them from the Nizam through Taraporvala.⁴ I am writing a letter to the Nizam on this subject, a copy of which I enclose.

I hope the Home Ministry will be careful in sending secret papers to the Nizam. I have also written to Ramakrishna Rao about this.⁵

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

1. JN Collection.
2. In November 1950, Minoo Masani, with the help of Vallabhbhai Patel and Morarji Desai, established the Democratic Research Service, a research and information centre on a non-official basis to combat communist subversion among the intelligentsia.
3. Author and Congress leader, later joined Swatantra Party.
4. Khan Bahadur Cooverji B. Taraporvala (b. 1896); worked for the Imperial Bank, 1921-1929; Government Auditor, Nizam's State Railway, 1938; Deputy Financial Secretary, 1940; Additional Financial Secretary, 1945; Financial Secretary, 1946; Deputy Managing Director, Hyderabad State Bank, 1947; Financial Adviser to the Nizam of Hyderabad since 1949.
5. Rao was the Chief Minister of Hyderabad. Nehru also wrote to the Nizam on the same day and instructed his PPS that in future copies of his fortnightly letters would not be sent to the Nizam.

5. Issue of Double Nationality¹

I am sending you a letter² from Shri Surendra Mohan Ghose³, MP, who is a devotee of the Aurobindo Ashram. I rather doubt if it is possible now to have a double nationality.⁴

1. Note to S. Dutt, Foreign Secretary, 21 March 1956. File No.33/20/55-F II (I.C.), MHA.
2. Referring to the willingness of "The Mother" of Pondicherry Ashram to accept the Indian Citizenship without renouncing her French nationality, Ghose had written on 21 March that this question should be taken up with the French Government during the negotiations for the de jure transfer of French settlements.
3. Surendra Mohan Ghose (1893-1976), eminent revolutionary freedom fighter, politician and social activist; joined Jugantar Party in Bengal at an early age and suffered imprisonment for long period; joined Indian National Congress in 1920; President Bengal PCC 1939-1950 Member, Constituent Assembly, 1946-1950, and Provisional Parliament, 1950-52; Member, (i) Lok Sabha, 1952-56 and (ii) Rajya Sabha 1956-68.
4. The Home Ministry commented on 5 April that "The Mother" would have to opt either for French or Indian citizenship.

6. To C.D. Deshmukh¹

New Delhi
29 March 1956

My dear Deshmukh,

Please refer to your letter dated March 12/13, 1956, in which you refer to the Economic Committee of the Cabinet.

2. I wanted to find out what the practice has been here in the past and also the British practice. I remembered having some correspondence on this subject with Matthai² when he was Finance Minister. I have now looked up these old papers and also enquired about the British practice.

3. I entirely agree with you that the Department of Economic Affairs should be in full touch with all economic activities of the Government, more especially in the next Plan period. For this purpose you suggest that the Joint Secretary of the Department of Economic Affairs should also be Joint Secretary in the Cabinet Secretariat as this would help in maintaining these contacts. In particular, you say that the present arrangement deprives the Economic Affairs Department, to a certain extent, of direct contact with what is happening in other Ministries and the Cabinet Secretariat does not have the same facilities of coordination as the Department of Economic Affairs.

4. The normal practice in the UK is for the Cabinet Secretariat to be in full charge of such activities and, more especially, of coordination between various Ministries and their work. I think this is a healthy practice. If there are two sets of coordinating agencies, they will move in separate circles. At present, we have not only the Economic Committee of the Cabinet, but also quite a number of other Committees dealing with economic matters. Thus we have the Heavy Industries Committee, which is a Standing Committee, and a number of ad hoc Committees of the Cabinet. There are also several Committees of Secretaries:

- i) Committee of Economic Secretaries
- ii) Heavy Industries Committee of Secretaries
- iii) Oil Negotiating Committee of Secretaries

1. JN Collection. A copy of this letter was sent to the Cabinet Secretary.

2. John Matthai.

5. All these Committees deal with various Ministries and, of course, with Finance and Economic Affairs. All of them, I think, contain representatives of Economic Affairs. In the Economic Committee the Finance Secretary is always present. Then there is the Planning Commission which also deals with economic questions and, in doing so, has the advantage of the presence of officers of the Department of Economic Affairs. In effect, the Department of Economic Affairs is connected with all these Committees as well as all matters having financial or economic significance.

6. The only question that arises is what might be called servicing and coordination. I think that it would be far better if, as is done in the UK, all the servicing and coordination was done by the Cabinet Secretariat. That will bring about a certain unity in the work. The Economic Committee itself was enlarged considerably some time ago and later new Committees put up to deal with specific subjects. Where are we to draw the line and, wherever the line might be drawn, it would result in the Cabinet Secretariat being somewhat out of touch with these major activities. The Cabinet Secretariat is under one of our most senior officers who happens to be also the Secretary of the Planning Commission. He can deal with other Ministries much more easily from that position than would the Joint Secretary in one particular Ministry. Therefore, it seems to me that the business of coordination should always be the charge of the Cabinet Secretariat.

7. But as it is important that the Department of Economic Affairs should be in the closest touch with all matters affecting it, this can be brought about, if considered necessary, by a representative of the Department of Economic Affairs attending the meetings of the Economic Committee as well as other Committees dealing with Economic matters. That would be in addition to the Finance Secretary. This should meet your wishes without disturbing the basic arrangement and the final responsibility of the Cabinet Secretariat.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

7. Gifts from Foreigners¹

This question of gifts received from foreign guests in India or by our Delegations which visit other countries is becoming more and more troublesome.² No rigid rules that we can frame can meet the variety of cases that arise, and yet some rules have to be kept in view and applied. Broadly speaking, the rules framed by the Home Ministry for this purpose might be applied, though I can well see that some difficulties might arise occasionally. In the case of such difficulties in individual cases, the matter should be considered by itself.

2. I do not think that any distinction should be made, in regard to these presents, between officials as such and Ministers, that is, Ministers and officials should be treated for this purpose more or less in the same way. It is difficult to apply any rules to non-official members of our Delegations, that is, those who are neither Ministers nor officials. (Parliamentary Secretaries should be treated in the same way as Ministers in this connection.) Even in regard to non-officials, however, some attempt should be made, by advice or otherwise, to have some uniformity of practice.

3. Wives of members of Delegations should be treated in the same way as their husbands.

4. Small personal gifts may be allowed to be kept. I think the Home Ministry has fixed the value of such personal gifts at Rs. 200/- or less. Anything of real value should not be kept as a private possession.

5. Whatever is good enough to be placed in a museum should be sent there. Other articles should be kept apart for such use as we may make of them later. It is not always possible or desirable to sell personal gifts. The present *toshakhana* is hardly suitable for any valuable thing to be kept there. It consists mostly of junk. Perhaps some arrangement could be made for such valuable articles to be kept locked up in steel cupboards and the like.

1. Note to Foreign Secretary, 7 April 1956. JN Collection. Also available in File No.19/1/60-Pub-I, MHA.
2. On this matter see also Nehru's notes dated 2 December 1955 and 9 January 1956 printed in *Selected Works* (second series), Vol.31, pp.246-47 and 269.

6. The Shah of Iran gave a number of carpets to various people, including me.³ These carpets are obviously expensive and above the limit of value fixed. They should be treated as Government property and kept or used for Governmental purposes.

7. Glancing through the list of presents received by our Cultural Delegation in China,⁴ it seems to me that most of the articles are of no considerable value, and they might well be left with the recipients. A few of them may be of value and they should be treated in a different way.

8. Anything which can be used in our art galleries, museums or national library should be sent there.

3. Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi of Iran and Queen Soraya were in India from 16 February to 8 March 1956.
4. An Indian Cultural delegation, led by A.K. Chanda, visited China in June 1955.

8. To Jayaprakash Narayan¹

New Delhi

17 April 1956

My dear Jayaprakash,

Your letter of the 6th April² about the DVC and Phulan Prasad Verma.³ I sent it to Gulzarilal Nanda. He has sent me an answer. He tells me that there can be no doubt about Verma's integrity and the work he has put in the DVC. Unfortunately, for a variety of reasons, the DVC suffered a great deal in the past on account of lack of proper direction and effective administrative control. The report of the Enquiry Committee⁴ brought to light serious deficiencies. As a result of this, it was at first decided to replace all the members of the Corporation. This was not a reflection on any one Member but rather a desire to have a new set-up because the old set-up had not worked effectively. The success of our public enterprises is a matter of very great consequence for the progress of the country.

Personally I do not think that any serious blame attached to Mozumdar, much less to Verma. But the fact remained that, in the opinion of several independent enquiry committees, we lost a very large sum of money varying from Rs. 50 lakhs to over a crore. In fact, we have not got out of the wood and this matter of past loss comes up before us repeatedly in some form or other.

1. JN Collection.
2. Jayaprakash had written on 6 April 1956 that Verma, the Acting Chairman of DVC, had "unquestioned integrity and a high sense of self-respect and dignity" but he was denied chairmanship when P.S. Rau was brought in as Chairman. He wrote that in case of a vacancy arising now, this post should go to Verma as "development projects require not only administrative ability, but also boldness of vision and courage to take risks and make experiments—qualities for which the heaven-born service (ICS) is not particularly noted."
3. (1900-1957); participated in the national movement and was imprisoned, 1930 and 1942; one of the founders of Bihar Marriage League in the 1930s; Founder-member, Congress Socialist Party, 1934; was on the editorial board of *Searchlight*, Patna; President, Patna Youth League, 1937; member, Bihar Legislative Assembly and Constituent Assembly, 1946-50, Bihar University Syndicate and Senate for many years, and Damodar Valley Corporation, 1948-57.
4. The Damodar Valley Corporation Enquiry Committee, constituted on 20 September 1952 with P.S. Rau as chairman, submitted its report in 1953.

There was a strong demand for a completely new Corporation. This was not aimed at any particular person. Because, however, both Nanda and I felt that it would be desirable for Verma to continue, we got over the objections of many others. I was glad that he continued.

The present position is that on the technical side the DVC project is being well looked after under the American Engineer Komora.⁵ But Komora is not very helpful in the matter of keeping down cost. Labour relations have deteriorated to a considerable extent and the efficiency has suffered.

Nanda tells me that there is very little interference by his Ministry in the working of the DVC. In fact he has endeavoured continuously to preserve the authority of the DVC. As a matter of fact, there is a continuous demand in Parliament for greater interference in all our public corporations. I do not agree with that. In view, however, of past experience, it is difficult to allow matters to run their course even when it is felt that a wrong step has been taken. We are still in the early stages of running these big public corporations and we cannot afford to make too many mistakes which will discredit the whole conception.

There is no question of every ICS Officer being considered capable of running a public corporation efficiently. Certainly neither Nanda nor I think so. Some of them are good. Others are not suited for it. One of our most difficult problems is to evolve a type of business executive who will combine business efficiency with a proper social outlook.

As for the arrangements to be made for a successor to P.S. Rau,⁶ the question is under consideration. These decisions are made after numerous references and consultations.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

5. A.M. Komora was the Chief Engineer at the DVC.

6. P.S. Rau was the chairman of the DVC from 1954 to 1956 and Adviser to the Rajpramukh of Travancore-Cochin from March to December 1956.

9. To V.T. Krishnamachari¹

New Delhi
17 April 1956

My dear V.T.,

I have seen a record of the meeting of the Planning Commission held on March 31st which considered the absorption of retiring army officers in civil posts. I had a talk with the Chief of the Army Staff on this subject also.

I am glad that the Planning Commission has considered this matter. Quite apart from providing employment to competent men retiring from the Army at a relatively early age, I think that many of these men would be well suited for the work we may entrust to them. They have a certain discipline and competence which most people in civil life do not have. Many of them have some technical training. I think we should make every effort to employ them not only in our existing set-ups but in many of our new enterprises which are growing up. Some of them may be suitable for the Community Schemes. Probably a short course of training would make them even more suited.

I should like to be kept in touch with this matter.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No.35/11/56-70-PMS. Also available in JN Collection.

II. STATE GOVERNMENTS

1. To R.S. Shukla¹

New Delhi

14 February 1956

My dear Shuklaji,²

I enclose some papers I have received. These refer to the opening of a liquor shop near a girls' school. It seems rather odd that this should have been done. Apart from our general policy of prohibition, surely liquor shops should not be opened near schools.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh.

2. To Amrit Kaur¹

New Delhi
27 February 1956

My dear Amrit,²

As you know, I have been greatly exercised about the terrible slums in Delhi. Having once had a glimpse of them, I was so shocked that I dare not repeat the experience. I have repeatedly spoken about this matter. Always, I am told that the matter is under consideration and in any event this will cost a vast sum of money. Some kind of arithmetical calculation is made about the value of land and the extent of the problem in Delhi.

Surely, a beginning could be made even in a relatively small way. One of the slum areas could be taken in hand.

I am now told that some kind of a decision has been made, by whom I do not know, to clear a slum area and remove the persons living there to about twelve miles away from the city. I think this is the Jamuna Bazar area. The people living there are rikshaw pullers, cobblers, tonga drivers, railway coolies, sweepers, etc. Obviously, if they are taken away twelve miles from the city, it will not be possible for them to carry on their livelihood.

I am unable to suggest anything constructive because I am not fully acquainted with the problem and with the Delhi area, but I do feel strongly that we owe a duty to these unhappy people who live in the slums as also, of course, to the whole city of Delhi which suffers in various ways because of these slums. I am inclined to think that our municipalities, improvement trusts, etc., are more anxious to make money from the rich people by selling land at high prices than to provide for the poor.

The other day, J.N. Sahni³ spoke to me of some scheme he had drawn up on behalf of the Bharat Sevak Samaj for slum clearance. He wished to begin at one place and he wanted a loan to proceed on cooperative lines there. I do not know the details of the scheme, but I told him that I shall certainly find the

1. JN Collection.
2. Union Minister for Health.
3. An eminent journalist.

amount he wanted as a loan and that he could go ahead. He wanted a small sum, fifty thousand rupees.

I took him to Swaran Singh who immediately promised to help him with double that sum or more, if something was done.

I think that money is not the basic question. It is the will to do something and the human approach to this problem, which considers these unhappy poor as human beings to be looked after. There is far too much of flaunting of riches in Delhi. Many of our people are afraid of putting these poor people anywhere where they might offend the sight of the well-to-do.

I am writing to you because you are, I suppose, in charge of the Delhi authority. I hope you will look into this matter very soon.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. To C.B. Gupta¹

New Delhi
8 March 1956

My dear Chandra Bhanu,²

Thank you for your letter of March 1st.³

Nobody has approached me in this matter who might be said to be opposed to you in politics or on personal grounds. In fact, no politician has approached me at all. The matter has come up again before me because it was mentioned at a Congress Working Committee meeting. You know that we passed a resolution about this principle a year or two ago. That resolution was not meant for any individual case, but as a question of principle.⁴ I am quite clear in my mind that it is not at all proper for a Minister to be a treasurer or an executive officer of a university. That is our Government view too and that is the Congress view. This has nothing to do with how much time you give to it or what your Vice Chancellor may feel about it. It is bad in principle and anything that is bad in principle should not be lightly accepted.

I think that our universities are far too closely associated with governments. I know that our universities and their professors are often not up to much, but their association with governments does not improve them.

It is rather odd that this matter should be kept pending for this length of time. There is no question of any propaganda or garbled and false accounts. It is the principle that is objected to.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Minister, UP Government.
3. Letter not traceable. Gupta reminded Nehru on 22 April that he had intimated that he would be relieved of the office of the Treasurer of Lucknow University at the end of the academic year in April. See also *post*, pp. 172-173.
4. The Congress Working Committee passed a resolution on 5 December 1953 in New Delhi that party politics should not be brought into the University in any way and no attempt should be made to control either the university administration or the students' union for party or group purposes.

4. To C.B. Gupta¹

New Delhi
3 April 1956

My dear Chandra Bhanu,

Your letter of April 2 about establishing some industries in the UP.² I entirely agree with you that we should establish them. There can be no doubt about the main approach. So far as a particular industry is concerned, it has to be considered from a large variety of points of view. I am sending a copy of your letter to the Planning Commission and to the Minister of Commerce & Industry. I shall be happy if some major industries are established in Uttar Pradesh.

Apart from industries, I think that there should be much faster progress in road making in the hill regions so as to open them out.³

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No.17(76)/56-PMS. Also available in JN Collection and T.T. Krishnamachari Papers, NMML.
2. Gupta had written about the growing awareness among the people about the imperative need of industrialisation in UP and remarkable unanimity among all the parties on this point. He suggested the establishment of Heavy Electrical Plant and a manufacturing unit for raw film and pointed out that cheap power would be available for large-scale industries from Rihand Dam in Mirzapur district. He also wondered why telephone and insecticides industries could not be located in the area.
3. Gupta also wrote about the need for construction of roads for exploration and exploitation of mineral resources and forest wealth in the Himalayan region, and hoped that the Centrally-sponsored industrial projects would be allotted to UP in the near future.

5. To Harekrushna Mahtab¹

New Delhi
13 April 1956

My dear Mahtab,²

We have been greatly concerned about the developments and the present situation in Orissa.³ More especially, I am concerned about the Congress Party which seems to have no cohesion left. Nabakrushna Chaudhuri⁴ has repeatedly declared that he will not continue as Chief Minister and at the most for a few more months only.

It has been suggested that there should be a meeting to consider the present and the future of Orissa and that you, Nabakrushna, Biswanath Das⁵ and Kanungo⁶ should be present at it, apart from some of us. Perhaps some such meeting should be held at a suitable time, though I am not quite clear when and how this should be arranged.

There is one matter, however, which has troubled me greatly. All our reports from Orissa talk about what is called the "Mahtab Party" which is opposed to the present Government there and whose papers run it down.⁷ It has also been reported to us that, when you went to Orissa recently, you criticised the Government and its ways and thus encouraged the fissiparous tendencies in Orissa.⁸

1. JN Collection.
2. Governor of Bombay.
3. The opposing factions of Harekrushna Mahtab and Nabakrushna Choudhuri in the Congress Party in Orissa were openly criticising each other's policies and programmes. The Choudhuri Government was criticized for its inapt handling of the flood situation and of the agitation against giving Saraikela and Kharsawan, two Oriya speaking tracts, to Bihar.
4. Chief Minister of Orissa.
5. Member, Rajya Sabha.
6. Nityanand Kanungo, Union Minister for Industries.
7. Surendra Nath Patnaik and Bijay Kumar Pani of the Choudhuri group wrote to Nehru against the "anti-party" activities of Mahtab. They alleged that Mahtab promoted a faction inside the party called the "Mahtab Party" thus weakening the cohesion and discipline in the Congress party.
8. During his visit to Orissa in December 1955 to tour the flood-affected areas and to deliver the convocation address at the Utkal University, Mahtab criticized the State Government.

What the facts are, I do not precisely know, but this is the impression we have gathered from many sources, and even when the Congress President went there, he came with this impression.⁹ If there is any truth in this, I am sorry, as it does not appear to me at all fitting that you, both in your personal capacity as well as a Governor should enter into these controversial politics, more especially within the Congress circle.

But, personalities apart, the fate of Orissa is a serious matter, and we shall have to seriously consider what we can do about it. Discipline has broken up completely there, and the opponents of the Congress have gained much ground. Within the Congress, there are groups stoutly opposed to each other. It is immaterial which group is stronger than the other because, in any event, they neutralise each other more or less, if they oppose each other.

I should like to have your views on this situation.¹⁰

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

9. During U.N. Dhebar's visit to Orissa, some legislators of the Mahtab group demanded for a change in leadership in view of the approaching second general elections in 1957 and openly asked for Mahtab's return to Orissa. The other faction also made a representation to him that Mahtab was encouraging factionalism within the Congress.
10. Mahtab replied on 15 April 1956 saying that the allegations against him were unjustifiable. He asserted that there was unity in the Congress but the party had incurred the unpopularity and dissatisfaction of the people because of the State Government's actions. He argued that he had always been loyal to the Congress in Orissa and Central High Command and would withdraw from leadership battle in favour of Choudhuri.

6. The Slums of Delhi¹

Some days ago I visited some of the slum areas of Delhi.² I was deeply shocked at what I saw. I think that it is our bounden duty to take this matter in hand positively and effectively. The argument about funds is important, I think a great deal can be done without any large-scale expenditure of funds. In some areas, for instance, I found a fairly large open space with wretched huts all round. The open space was in a bad condition. Surely it should be possible to deal with such an area easily and put up new buildings, say two-storeyed, and have a little park in between. Actually this would give more accommodation there than is available at present and would have, in addition, a garden and a park. The actual cost of acquisition should not be much. Under our Constitution now, there is absolutely no reason why we should pay heavy compensation for slum areas.

2. There are three kinds of slum areas:

- (i) belonging to the Custodian of Evacuee Property;
- (ii) in the possession of the Improvement Trust of Delhi;
- (iii) private owners.

3. Some time ago I think it was decided that the property in the possession of the Custodian should not be sold to any bidder but should be acquired by Government for improvement, etc. The amount paid by Government at the normal slum rate and not fancy rates should be paid to the evacuee pool.

4. So far as the Improvement Trust areas are concerned, they are already in our possession and we can deal with them, keeping the general principle in view. In this matter the Improvement Trust should not apply any calculation of profit, as presumably it normally does.

1. Note to the Secretary, Bharat Sevak Samaj, Delhi Branch, 14 April 1956. B.K. Chandiwala Papers, NMML. Also available in File No. SN-29, AICC Papers, NMML and JN Collection.
2. On 1 April, Nehru went round various slums of Delhi, walking through stinking narrow lanes with open drains. During the two-hour 'surprise visit', arranged by the Bharat Sevak Samaj, Nehru was reported to have said: "All this, in my opinion, should be burnt down to its very roots and foundations. The entire area should be levelled up into open ground." The slums had been declared unfit for human habitation by the civic authorities.

5. Privately owned bustees should be acquired by Government and gradually dealt with.

6. This process, I think, can begin fairly early. Indeed it is important that it should begin early, even though only a small part may be taken in hand, to begin with. Any further delay now would create great frustration and despair. People are looking to Government to do something very soon. Therefore we should choose a few of these bustees for immediate action to be taken. This would involve cleaning of the bustees completely and in fact destroying them and building anew with open spaces, etc. For this purpose bustees should be chosen which can easily be handled in this way.

7. It must be remembered always that people cannot be driven out of their bustees. They have to be provided some accommodation, while new buildings, etc., are put up.

8. Apart from these comprehensive schemes, it is urgently necessary to give some simple amenities to all these bustees, such as water, some kind of clean open drainage, proper latrines, etc. I understand that the Delhi Municipality have got plans ready to do this over 200 *katras*, some of these belonging to the Custodian. The amount necessary for this, according to them, is, I am told, about Rs.7 lakhs or under. They have asked for a grant of Rs.1,60,000/- and a loan of Rs.5 lakhs. If this money was made available to them, they could start work immediately. In this work, the Municipal Committee will be aided fully by the Bharat Sevak Samaj and many other people who are interested in this cleaning up.

9. In some of these *katras*, the residents told me that if Government acquired that land from the present owners, they would form a cooperative and build their houses according to specifications. They are prepared to do this immediately.

10. In Karol Bagh, there are some bustees which were built on Government lands in an unauthorised way. These are very dirty and some authority is pushing out people from these bustees. I gather that in one place this was done today and there was a bit of a row with the police. I think that this police eviction in this way should be avoided at this stage and the place should be examined as to what we can make of it. We must adopt a human approach to this problem. Many of these people said that if they were given a loan, they could do much themselves.

11. One of these places I visited is, I believe, called the Qadam Sharif. The Bharat Sevak Samaj has chosen this for work there. But it cannot do much, I understand, unless it is helped to some extent or received the cooperation of

the Health Ministry and the PWD. I am told that it is fairly easy to clean this up and convert it into a good colony.

12. Apart from these bustees of old Delhi, there are the temporary habitations of the construction workers in New Delhi. Their condition is bad and I think that the contractors have treated them very unfairly. I gather that the contractors are given ten per cent for amenities for labour. I am quite sure they do not spend this. The normal rule should be that the contractors must be asked to put up some kind of temporary residence, as a part of their contract. Merely giving them ten per cent of the money is not good enough. In many countries this is part of the contract and decent temporary structures are put up. At present, in these New Delhi bustees there is exceedingly little done for latrines, water, etc., although thousands live there. These people have been living there for years and are likely to continue living there as building operations go on in Delhi. Some special arrangements have to be made. I think these men and women themselves will gladly pay something.

13. I should like particular attention to be drawn to these matters which I have mentioned in this note because there is great expectation now in Delhi city that something is going to be done. I am sending copies of this note to:

- (i) The Health Minister
- (ii) The Minister for W H&S
- (iii) The Minister of Rehabilitation
- (iv) The Chief Minister of Delhi
- (v) The Chief Commissioner of Delhi
- (vi) Shri Brahm Perkash, Minister, Delhi
- (vii) The Chairman, Delhi Improvement Trust
- (viii) The Chairman, Delhi Municipal Committee
- (ix) The Chairman, New Delhi Municipal Committee
- (x) The Secretary, Bharat Sevak Samaj, Delhi Branch.

14. I suggest that after a few days a small meeting might be held of all these people to discuss this matter. Meanwhile some positive proposals might take shape.

7. Election of the Leader in Pondicherry Assembly Congress¹

I discussed this matter² with Shri Kamaraj Nadar, Chief Minister of Madras. The Home Minister was also present. (In fact as this was to some extent an organisational matter for the Congress, I mentioned it to the Congress Central Parliamentary Board meeting.)

In view of the past background of Mr Goubert³ and other facts which have been brought before our notice,⁴ none of us was very happy at the prospect of Mr Goubert being chosen as Leader. But in view of the great majority of the members of the Party in Pondicherry supporting him for leadership, we were clearly of opinion that we should allow the Party to make its own choice of Leader. If it wishes to choose Mr Goubert, it can do so.

Normally, at such Party meetings some representative of the Pradesh Congress Committee or the AICC is present. But in the present case we do not propose to send anyone there for this purpose. We want to leave the choice entirely to the Party meeting in Pondicherry without any influence from outside. Also we do not wish to be directly associated with the responsibility of Mr Goubert's elections.

Will you please, therefore, inform our Chief Commissioner, Kewal Singh, immediately by telephone or telegram (preferably by telephone but to be followed up by telegram) of this decision of ours? He should inform Mr Goubert who is at present the Deputy Leader of the Congress Party as well as the Secretary of the Party, whoever he might be that it is open to the Party to meet as soon as convenient and choose a Leader.

1. Note to the Foreign Secretary, New Delhi, 15 April 1956. JN Collection.
2. Election of a new leader of the Pondicherry Assembly Congress Party was to be held after the death of the earlier incumbent, Pakkiriswami Pillai.
3. Edouard Goubert (1894-1979); a French Indian Creole, called himself Goubert Pillai in later years; lawyer, participated in the First World War; served as a Magistrate in French India; member, Representative Assembly, Pondicherry, Councillor of the Government and first Deputy to the Mayor, 1946; member, French National Assembly, Paris, 1951; was stripped of his parliamentary position and immunity on 30 March 1954 following his support to merger; member, Representative Assembly, Pondicherry, 1955 and 1959, elected leader, Pondicherry Assembly Congress Party, 1956; Mayor, Pondicherry, 1961; Chief Minister of Union Territory of Pondicherry, 1963-64; reelected member of the Legislative Assembly.
4. Later investigations into his financial activities revealed that Goubert had used his position to his advantage, like salary double-dipping, embezzlement of liquor revenue, and gold, diamond and mercury smuggling.

8. To K. Hanumanthaiya¹

New Delhi
16 April 1956

My dear Hanumanthaiya,²

Your letter³ of April 13 about Channabasappa,⁴ your Minister for Industries.⁵ You will remember you mentioned his case to me at Jog and I told you that in my opinion, it would be better for him to resign from the Ministership. I have now given fuller thought to this matter and consulted a number of my colleagues. All of them were of the same opinion that the right course would be for him to resign from the Ministership now and stand for election.

Whatever Dr Ambedkar might have said,⁶ the issue is not free from doubt from the legal point of view. In a somewhat similar case in Madhya Pradesh, the continuance of the Minister was challenged in the High Court. As it happened, the Minister resigned before the matter came up before the High Court. I have little doubt that someone would challenge Channabasappa's continuance as Minister.

But, quite apart from the legal aspect, I think that it will be better from the point of view of your Ministry as well as of Channabasappa that he should now resign and then stand for election. That, I think, will add to his prestige. It is true that his election has been set aside on a point of law and there is no reflection on him whatever. Nevertheless it would be a good practice for Ministers to resign in such circumstances.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Chief Minister of Mysore.
3. Hanumanthaiya had written that H.M. Channabasappa's election had been set aside on a point of law but he was sure to get re-elected to the Legislature in a bye-election. Neither of them were anxious that Channabasappa should continue as a Minister. Hanumanthaiya wanted Nehru to get the matter thoroughly examined so as to establish a convention of all-India applicability.
4. President, Mysore District Board, 1947-55; Minister for Industries, and Public Works and Electricity, 1955-May 1958; Member, Mysore Pradesh Congress Committee and AICC.
5. Channabasappa had sent his resignation on 7 April in the light of the Election Tribunal's finding on 31 March that his election from Periyapatna constituency was "wholly void" as there was an improper rejection of the nomination paper of the other candidate, K.P. Kariappa.
6. Hanumanthaiya had enclosed Ambedkar's opinion expressed in the Constituent Assembly as the Mover of the Article concerned.

9. To C.P. N. Singh¹

New Delhi
24 April 1956

My dear C.P.N.,²

Your letter of April 20 with the packet of photostats from Corbusier.³

It is a little difficult for me to give a definite opinion about Corbusier's proposal to erect "The Open Hand".⁴ The conception has something in it which appeals to me, but I am by no means clear in my mind as to what the ultimate effect of this erection would be. The main thing, however, is not how I feel or you feel, but rather how many people would feel about it. You say in your letter that local opinion does not favour it. I rather doubt if most people elsewhere also would appreciate it. We may say, of course, that they are not educated enough in their artistic outlook to appreciate such bold conceptions. Nevertheless, one cannot go too far ahead of what might be called public opinion in such matters.

There is also the question of cost. When we are trying to economise in a hundred ways, it will be a little difficult to justify this fairly considerable expenditure. On the whole, therefore, I feel that for the present at least we should postpone the execution of this project. Perhaps, at a future time, the omens may be more favourable.

As you know, there is already a controversy about the Capital and the Pepsu people are trying hard to make Patiala the Capital of the new State. If we put up this Open Hand at this stage, that will become one rather odd feature of the controversy and it will be said that we are throwing money away at Chandigarh.

1. JN Collection.
2. Governor of the Punjab.
3. Le Corbusier was the Architectural Advisor to the Punjab Government on Chandigarh project.
4. Le Corbusier explained the symbolic and evocative sign of the "Open Hand" as: "Open to receive the newly created wealth, open to distribute to its people and to others. The 'Open Hand' will assert that the second era of the machine age has begun: the era of harmony." The "Open Hand", to be located between the proposed Governor's residence and the High Court in Chandigarh as an artistic sculpture upheld against the rugged profile of the Shivaliks, was to be made of steel sheets and rigged to a concrete pedestal to be free to move on its axis.

Talking about this controversy, I might inform you that I had a deputation from Pepsu Congressmen and others today pleading for the Capital to be taken to Patiala. I told them that the matter ultimately is for the people of the new State to determine, but for my part, I felt attracted to Chandigarh, which was a great experiment and which I thought would do a lot of good to the future of architecture in India. In any event, I said that in future we should not centralise the activities of the Government too much in the Capital, wherever it may be. Our new idea is that central institutes should be spread out as far as possible. Therefore, it would be desirable for Patiala anyhow to have important State establishments.

I think that some such approach should be made to this problem. Obviously, the High Court is at Chandigarh and has got a new building specially made for it. Why should not the University be situated at Patiala which has a large number of colleges already? It is not good enough just to put one or two odd Government offices in Patiala. Something more should be done.

Even from the commercial point of view, Patiala is becoming relatively important. The SRC Report makes special mention of the importance of Patiala and how it should be encouraged to grow.⁵

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. The States Reorganisation Commission recommended that the special position of Patiala city might be recognised and that some important offices of the Punjab Government might be located there.

10. To K. Kamaraj Nadar¹

New Delhi
24 April 1956

My dear Kamaraj,²

After my talk with you here,³ I informed the Chief Commissioner of Pondicherry that the Congress Party there could elect their own leader whoever they chose. This was done and Goubert was elected.⁴

After that, as you know, five members of the Congress Party decided to leave the Party and join the Opposition. This has naturally created a new situation and there is a possibility of Goubert being defeated in the Assembly.⁵

I gather that the Chief Commissioner saw you in this connection and that you stated that the only solution you could think of was for Goubert to resign from the leadership and for the dissident Congress members to return to the Congress Party in the Assembly.⁶ Since then other developments have taken place and are daily occurring.⁷ I have sent a message to the Chief

1. JN Collection.

2. Chief Minister of Madras.

3. See *ante*, p. 166.

4. Pondicherry Assembly Congress Party elected Goubert their leader on 20 April unanimously. R.L. Purushothama Reddiar, President of the Pondicherry Representative Assembly, and four other Congress members abstained from the meeting.

5. Kewal Singh, the Chief Commissioner, had telegraphed that five dissident members were determined to overthrow the Congress Government in the Pondicherry Assembly. V. Subbiah, leader of the People's Front in the Assembly, had promised full support to Purushothama Reddiar in forming an alternative government. The party position in the 39-member Assembly was as follows: Congress-19, People's Front-15, Congress dissidents-5. Goubert and his supporters suspected that this was being done under instructions from some neighbouring Congress leaders to teach the Pondicherry Congress Party a lesson.

6. On 23 April Kewal Singh suggested to Kamaraj to give suitable advice to the five dissidents in the interests of the unity of the party and stability of the Government. He also suggested postponement of any drastic reorganisation of Pondicherry Congress till after the *de jure* transfer of the French Indian territories. K.V.S. Krishnan, Vice-President, T.N.C.C., had also written on 14 April to Nehru criticising Kamaraj's ways both in Madras and Pondicherry.

7. On 23 April, on receiving a communication from the Chief Commissioner for election of the sixth Councillor, the leader of the Opposition, Subbiah, wanted 24-hour notice. But Goubert demanded immediate election, failing which he said, he would move no-confidence motion against the President of the Assembly. The Assembly was adjourned sine die and the President and all Opposition walked out. However, Goubert and his supporters, 20 in number, continued the meeting, carried the no-confidence motion, and elected a new President and the sixth Councillor. On 27 April, Subbiah appealed to the Chief Commissioner to declare this "reported" session null and void.

Commissioner that he should allow matters to take their course and should not interfere. If Goubert is defeated, we should accept the defeat in the natural course. I do not think it will be wise or right to bring pressure on Goubert to resign to please the five dissident members. This kind of changing tactics seldom pays. Also I think it would be wrong for us to show that we are frightened by the action of the five dissident members. If they can join the Opposition, then they should have no sympathy from us at all. To please them we should not go against all rules of our own discipline.

I am told that these five dissident members go about saying that they have the support of the Tamil Nad PCC. I am sure this cannot be true. I hope you will make this quite clear to them and to the people in Pondicherry. Otherwise our whole discipline and organisation will go to pieces.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

11. To C. B. Gupta¹

New Delhi
24 April 1956

My dear Chandra Bhanu,

Thank you for your letter of April 22.²

I wrote to Sampurnanandji because this matter was again mentioned at a recent meeting of the Working Committee, and much concern was expressed. I confess that I had forgotten that you had mentioned in your previous letter to me that you would be relieved of the office of the Treasurer of the University in April. I remembered vaguely that you had said that you would leave it soon. I enquired and found that you were still Treasurer and so I mentioned this matter in the course of my letter to Sampurnanandji.³

You will remember that this question has been before us for a very long time now and there has been reference to it frequently in the Working Committee meetings and elsewhere. Personally, I am quite convinced that a Minister should not be attached in this way to a university. On principle this seems to be right. Apart from this, inevitably this tends to encourage politics in a university, and several factions arise both among Professors and students.

You talk about loyalty to the Working Committee and myself.⁴ Loyalty is rather a big word, and may be interpreted in many ways. I certainly do not think that you were deliberately flouting the decision of the Working Committee, but I was surprised at the fact that it took you such a long time to give effect to it.

1. Sampurnanand Collection, NAI. Also available in JN Collection.
2. Gupta had expressed anguish and grief at Nehru's letter of 16 April 1956 (not printed) to Sampurnanand regarding the delay in Gupta's resignation from Treasurership of Lucknow University. He wrote that he had already informed Nehru on 1 March that he would be relieved in April. In fact Nehru had replied to him on 8 March, see *ante*, p. 159. Gupta also referred to his talk with Nehru at the AICC meeting in Delhi in September 1955 when Nehru "left the decision of the timetable of the same" to Gupta and asked him to continue as an ordinary member of the University syndicate.
3. In his letter of 16 April 1956, Nehru had expressed concern over Gupta's continuance as Treasurer especially when the Ministers, holding such offices in two or three other universities, had resigned after the CWC passed the resolution on 5 December 1953. Raising the question of discipline, Nehru wrote: "If the Working Committee passes a definitely precise resolution, it is supposed to be acted upon by Congressmen."
4. Gupta had written that the letter to Sampurnanand only meant that Nehru doubted his words and his loyalty towards the CWC and himself, and Gupta was willing to leave the organisation if Nehru so indicated.

I know that you are deeply attached to the University and have done a great deal to help it.⁵ But, nevertheless, it was felt that this type of association was wrong. A university is essentially a place where a certain atmosphere should flourish. Unfortunately, we have had a bad experience of the UP Universities, especially Allahabad and Lucknow. They have been centres of trouble and intrigue among students and Professors. A Government is somewhat disabled from exercising a good influence on a university if it gets involved in its internal troubles.

You are an old and valued comrade. We can ill afford to lose any colleague, much less an old and tried one.

Since you have written to me, I should like to express my very great concern at the developing political situation in the UP. Whatever the reasons may be, the fact is that Congress is losing hold rather rapidly. We have lost, I believe, seven elections running, and other reports coming to me also indicate that there is an anti-Congress sentiment which is fairly widespread. In the Agra election, I should say that Paliwal⁶ was certainly an unpopular candidate. In spite of that, he won against the Congress. What is wrong then with the Congress in the UP? Is it some general reaction all over the country or is it specially confined to the UP? At the present moment, the three States in India which are matters of concern to us are the UP, Maharashtra and Orissa. The Maharashtra situation is connected with the SRC matters. Orissa is also partly connected with that and partly it is just a collapse of the Congress organisation. In the UP, the SRC does not affect the situation and yet we seem to be going downhill.

You are the most important and responsible person in the UP in so far as organisation is concerned. I imagine, therefore, that you are worried about this, and must be giving a great deal of thought to it. Some people tell us that in the coming General Election, there might well be a Congress debacle. Newspapers have commented on this also. I think that there should be a thorough inquest into these elections to find out why all this has happened and why this trend against the Congress is increasing.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. Gupta wrote in his autobiography *Safar Kahin Ruka Nahin Jhuka Nahin*, (2000) that he had explained in 1954 to G.B. Pant, the then Chief Minister of UP, that he had been a member of the University Court since 1927, he was chosen its Treasurer in his personal capacity, not as a Congressman, and that he was willing to relinquish the Ministership. After this, Pant did not broach the subject with him.
6. Shrikrishna Datt Paliwal.

12. Agitation Against Land Acquisition in Rajasthan¹

Five representatives of the Bhooswami Sangh of Rajasthan came to see me today.² I had invited them to see me. Afterwards, I suggested to them to see you, and I sent a message to you through Srinivasan³ that you should give them as much time as was necessary to listen to their case and their complaints.

2. The complaints may be divided into two parts:

- (1) about the actual action taken in regard to their land or jagirs, including the implementation thereof, and
- (2) the treatment accorded to them, which they considered as an attack on their honour (*izzat*).

3. The story of the jagirs of Rajasthan is a fairly old one. The matter was referred to me four years ago for my arbitration. At that time, the chief persons concerned were the big jagirdars. I asked Shri G.B. Pant to help me in this matter, and he was good enough to go into it very carefully. He met all the persons concerned. Thereafter, I considered his report and accepted it, and this became in a sense my award.⁴

4. Subsequently, the matter was again referred to me because of some controversy, and Pantji again gave his views which I accepted.

5. These questions have gone up to the courts of law also and have been decided against the jagirdars.

6. The present agitation chiefly concerns the smaller jagirdars though a few big ones might be connected with them. I have not been in touch with recent developments. A few days ago, the Chief Minister of Rajasthan⁵ came to me and gave me some papers. It was then that I decided to see these men.⁶

1. Note to PPS, New Delhi, 30 April 1956. JN Collection.

2. The Sangh had been agitating for proper rehabilitation of the landowners displaced as a result of abolition of the Jagirdari system in the State.

3. C.R. Srinivasan, Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, MEA.

4. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 26, pp. 237-240.

5. Mohanlal Sukhadia.

6. Thakur Madan Singh of Danta, leader of the Rajasthan Bhooswami Sangh delegation, said after the meeting that the talks were very satisfactory.

7. The matter will have to be discussed fully with Rajasthan Government. Meanwhile, I want you to read the papers I am sending you and give the representatives of the Bhooswami Sangh full opportunity to present their viewpoint to you. You might make a note about it. I shall then see them again.

8. The Chief Minister of Rajasthan is here for the NDC meeting. I shall probably talk to him about it and find out how we are to proceed about this matter.

13. Security of Border Areas¹

I enclose a letter from Dr Lanka Sundaram,² MP, with a note by Swami Pranavananda.³ The note gives a great deal of detailed information about missionary and like espionage activities on the UP-Tibet frontier. It is possible that some of this information may be exaggerated or coloured, but a good deal of it is so detailed that it deserves notice.

2. I think we might send a copy of this report to the UP Government and ask them to enquire and to take such steps as they might consider necessary. I might mention that when I went to Almora some two or three years ago, I was rather favourably impressed by the Deputy Commissioner there, Arif Ali Shah.

3. A copy of this note might also be sent to the DIB.⁴

4. It must be more than a year ago that I wrote to you about the inner line and suggested a new line being drawn much further away from the border.⁵ I do not know why this matter has been delayed so long.

1. Note to the Foreign Secretary, 30 April 1956. JN Collection.

2. Independent Member of the Lok Sabha.

3. Alias Kanakadandi Venkata Somayajulu (b. 1896); Telugu sanyasi explorer; participated in the non-cooperation movement; served as a Congress worker in West Godavari District, 1920-26; initiated into the holy order; travelled and made explorations in the Himalayas since 1928 for more than two decades; his findings on the geography of the region were accepted by the Royal Geographical Society and the Survey of India; wrote several books including *Kailas-Mansarovar* (1949) and *Exploration in Tibet* (1950).

4. B.N. Mullik, Director, Intelligence Bureau.

5. For Nehru's views on extending the inner line in the border areas, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol.26, pp.250-251.

REORGANISATION OF STATES

1. To P. Subbaroyan¹

New Delhi
3 February 1956

My dear Subbaroyan,²

Thank you for your letter of the 2nd February.³

We have all been terribly worried about recent developments and linguistic fanaticism. Personally I would welcome the formation of one state including Madras, Travancore-Cochin, Mysore and the Karnataka areas. There is certainly some feeling in favour of this, but, at the same time, there is opposition too.⁴ As you have mentioned, we shall discuss this matter further at Amritsar.

I think that it is more feasible to have Madras and Travancore-Cochin together now. An attempt to bring in Mysore is not likely to be successful at this stage.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Member, Rajya Sabha, and Official Language Commission.
3. Favours multilingual states for preservation of unity, Subbaroyan had suggested formation of one state comprising of Mysore, Karnataka, Kerala and Madras.
4. He wrote that the Dravida Kazhagam in Madras and the Communist Party in Kerala were against this union as the former feared competition for appointments from the Malayalees and the Communists felt that "their one chance of electoral victory ... will disappear if there is union between Madras and Kerala, let alone the bigger one" of Madras, Kerala, Mysore and Karnataka.

2. To T.R. Deogirakar¹

New Delhi
3 February 1956

My dear Deogirakar,²

Thank you for your letter of February 1st,³ which I received this afternoon on returning from Bangalore. I have read your letter carefully and am taking the earliest opportunity to reply to it briefly. I hope, of course, to meet you in Amritsar soon. Nevertheless, I feel that I should send some reply immediately.

I can very well appreciate the difficulties you have had to face and the inner conflicts which not only you but many of our other colleagues in Maharashtra have had.⁴ It is no good blaming anyone for this kind of thing. We are all to blame. Certainly, I have a feeling of having failed to deal adequately with the situation that has been developing these few months. I think that the Maharashtra Pradesh Congress Committee also allowed itself to slip in a wrong

1. JN Collection.
2. (1896-1975); Congressman from Maharashtra; member, Rajya Sabha, 1952-62; President, Maharashtra PCC, 1954 and 1956; author of *Twelve Years in Parliament* and several books in Marathi.
3. Deogirakar had expressed his distress and people's dissatisfaction about the situation in Bombay city and province over the reorganisation of the region. Bound by the Party discipline, the Maharashtra Congressmen could not resort to resignations and felt helpless, frustrated and humiliated. He wrote: "Physically we are with you; but mentally we are not." He also wrote about pressures under which they worked with a sincere desire not to embarrass Nehru and convince people that the "High Command cannot be unjust and will not be unjust."
4. The States Reorganisation Commission's recommendation for a bilingual Bombay and a separate Vidarbha state was opposed by the Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti which consisted of many parties including a large section of the Maharashtra Congress. In view of the Maharashtra PCC opposition, the CWC proposed on 9 November 1955 formation of three states of Maharashtra, Gujarat and Centrally-administered Bombay city to which there was violent opposition in Bombay. Following the Central Government's announcement on 16 January 1956, Bombay city and province witnessed large-scale riots and arson and there were mass resignations from local bodies. On 19 January, Maharashtra PCC Executive called upon the MPs and MLAs to resign in protest against the decision for a Centrally-administered Bombay city. This decision was to be endorsed by their General Body on 28 January. But the CWC on 23 January asked for the withdrawal of all resignations. Consequently, in the General Body meeting on 28 January, Congressmen were asked to dissociate themselves from the Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti. All resignations were also withdrawn.

direction and thus got more and more entangled. I am not referring here to the views of the Maharashtra PCC in regard to Bombay city, but rather to the line they took, which led to these entanglements.

I think that it is always the wiser policy to be completely frank with our people, even though frankness is often disliked. Ultimately, our people appreciate it and realise that integrity is better than playing to the gallery. All politicians, more especially in a democratic set-up, tend to some extent to play to the gallery. But we have tried to learn from Gandhiji to restrain ourselves and not allow ourselves to be swept away by some momentary impulse or passion. I realise that we have not succeeded in that to any very great extent. Nevertheless, that lesson has had some effect upon us and has distinguished the Congress from other political organisations.

Naturally, I was distressed greatly, as you and your colleagues were, at the mob violence in Bombay city, in Orissa and some other places.⁵ That seemed to me a negation of all that we have stood for, more particularly because it was a stigma on Maharashtrians which they did not deserve. I am unhappy about the feeling of frustration among Maharashtrians and because I have a sense of isolation from them. I cannot conceive of India without the goodwill and cooperation of Maharashtra.

Whatever mistakes we may have made during the last three months or so, I hope you will agree that we wrestled with this problem again and again and were anxious, above all, to have the approval of the Maharashtrian leaders in any decision that we might take. It is true that, in the circumstances, we found ourselves unable to meet their full wishes. Apart from this, however, we searched every avenue and thought, on several occasions, that we had their approval. It is our misfortune that we did not succeed.

You ask me for clarification on two points.⁶ One does not arise now. The other was to the effect that I should give some assurance that Bombay city

5. Bombay city witnessed mob violence from 18 to 22 November 1955 and from 17 to 21 January 1956. In Orissa, resignations were received from MPs and MLAs and demonstrations were held disrupting train and air traffic. There were disturbances in West Bengal and Bihar also.
6. On 11 January 1956, Maharashtra Congress leaders had suggested to G.B. Pant two alternatives for the region. First, Bombay city be Centrally-administered for a period of two to three years, and thereafter be merged in Maharashtra state and function as the state capital. Alternatively, as suggested by the CWC, Bombay city be merged in Maharashtra state by a simple majority in the State legislature after the general election and till then be the administrative seat of the Maharashtra Government also.

would join Maharashtra in two or three years time. You quote something which I am supposed to have said.⁷ I do not think I could have used the words that you have given. What I probably said was that if everything calms down, it would be easy to deal with the problem later.

However, you will appreciate that no one, least of all me, can give any guarantee about the future. I think that the only way to prepare for the future is to improve the present and to do our utmost to create a feeling of goodwill and mutual confidence. After all, it is far more important for us to create this feeling than to have any kind of decision which is based on ill-will and conflict.

This appears to me the urgent necessity of the present day. We cannot write off what has happened. That is history. But we can try to put an end to its consequences and thus prepare for the future.

You know that these occurrences in Bombay city powerfully affected the members of the Working Committee, and out of this reaction came the proposal for the union of West Bengal and Bihar.⁸ There are talks of some similar development in South India.⁹ There is thus a new approach to these problems, which is not based on linguism only. Even in the Working Committee resolution, there was reference to a positive approach.¹⁰ Let us calm down and take a strong line about reverting to normal peaceful and cooperative conditions. That, obviously, is the first thing to do and we should be brave enough to put this to the public. When the atmosphere clears up, the new positive approach becomes more feasible.

I hope to meet you in Amritsar.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

7. Deogirikar had quoted Nehru as saying on 16 October 1955 during a talk with the Maharashtrian leaders, "Well Mr Shankarrao, we are now in difficulties. If we give Bombay to you, just now, it will open all the flood gates of storm, but suppose after two or three years we integrate Bombay with Maharashtra no one will even notice it."
8. For the joint statement (drafted by Nehru) of B.C. Roy and S.K. Sinha, on the proposed merger of Bihar and West Bengal, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 31, pp. 212-214.
9. See the preceding item.
10. For the CWC resolution, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 31, pp. 210-212.

3. To Rajendra Prasad¹

Camp: Amritsar
11 February 1956

My dear Rajendra Babu,

Thank you for your letter² of the 9th February with which you have sent a copy of a letter from Vinobaji to Dhebarbhai.³ I have taken the liberty to share your letter with Pantji and Morarji Bhai.

The subject of Vinobaji's letter has been very much before us and I confess to you that I have been much concerned over it. We have discussed it too in the Working Committee to some extent and even more so privately among some colleagues. We shall give further thought to it.

Generally speaking, it appears that the resolution on states reorganisation, passed by the Subjects Committee, is more or less agreeable to at least some of the Maharashtra delegates.⁴ They agree that for the present that is the right attitude. It is true that they would like some indication about the future. Vague indications, one might say, have been given even in the resolution and a little more so in the speeches delivered on it. I myself think that it would be a good thing for Dhebarbhai to say something more about it at a later stage. The

1. File No. 152/55, President's Secretariat. Also available in JN Collection.
2. Rajendra Prasad had conveyed Vinoba Bhave's concern about the situation, particularly in Maharashtra, arising out of the Government's decision on the SRC Report. He felt that unless something was done to retrieve the situation, the Congress might cease to exist in Maharashtra. In his opinion, suppression of riots with the help of state force was no solution and it was desirable to find a solution which might carry with it a good section of Maharashtrians.
3. Vinoba Bhave had written to U.N. Dhebar on 9 February 1956 that the prestige of the Maharashtra PCC had reached the lowest ebb, wrong kind of people had become active there, and public opinion was totally against it. Vinoba Bhave suggested that while announcing the three-unit formula if Dhebar also indicated that Bombay could still be merged democratically with Maharashtra, MPCC could still save its face.
4. The resolution, adopted by the Subjects Committee on 10 February at the Amritsar Congress, said that controversies had arisen in the bilingual areas but attempt, to have rigid unilingual states would hinder the movement of population, which was natural in a dynamic and developing economy. "Even more limiting is the mental approach which results from a narrow provincialism, applied to political considerations and administrative boundaries. India requires today the larger vision and the capacity for cooperation in the greatest measure, and anything limiting that outlook must be deprecated."

precise form of what he should say is not quite clear yet and will depend on him. Nobody wants it to appear that the decisions we have made are final and irrevocable. At the same time, there is a feeling that to call them quite fluid would mean a continuance of the agitation and consequent worsening of the conditions prevalent. However, the matter requires deep thought and something I feel should be done. I hope to discuss this matter with you later. This subject will of course come up in Parliament and references will have to be made then.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. To Govind Ballabh Pant¹

New Delhi
15 February 1956

My dear Pantji,

I enclose copy of a letter I have received from Shankarrao Deo.² In this he has suggested, as he has said in public, that a non-official enquiry committee should be appointed for Bombay. I should have thought that any kind of an enquiry committee would be far from helpful. It would keep alive passions and hatreds. In any event, I do not see what a non-official committee would do. It would obviously be partial and anti-government.

The other suggestion he has made is for a common Governor, common High Court and a common Public Service Commission for Maharashtra, Gujarat and Bombay.³

I should like to reply to him, but I do not quite know what to say.

I also enclose copy of a previous letter from Shankarrao.⁴

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

1. JN Collection. Also available in File No. 7/1/55-SR, MHA.
2. Shankarrao Deo, a senior congressman, Sarvodaya leader, and President of the Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti, suggested on 13 February that a non-official enquiry on the Bombay occurrences would help in allaying the passions and creating normal conditions in Bombay.
3. Shankarrao had also suggested a round table conference of the representatives of the two states to tackle their mutual problems by exploring all common avenues including economic development and planning for mutual benefit.
4. Shankarrao had written on 30 January that he was undertaking an eleven-day fast for atonement for violence in Bombay and elsewhere in Maharashtra. Regarding Nehru's viewpoint that states reorganisation was for administrative convenience, Deo wrote that a statesman and a leader like Nehru would appreciate the popular feelings. He also stated that the CWC's resolution of 23 January banning resignations was undemocratic, closing to the people the only avenue of democratic agitation.

5. To C.D. Deshmukh¹

New Delhi
21 February 1956

My dear Deshmukh,²

Your letter of the 19th February in which you refer to the occurrences in Bombay and express a wish to mention the subject at a Cabinet meeting.³ You can certainly mention it.

As for your suggestion to have a judicial enquiry, I am normally always in favour of such enquiries. But it seems to me that any such enquiry into the Bombay occurrences is very likely to lead to innumerable charges and countercharges and great bitterness against each other among the people of Bombay. If it is our object, as undoubtedly it is, to put an end to this ill-feeling or at least to lessen it, then that object will be completely frustrated. You said to me, when you saw me some days ago, that whatever else might happen, the Maharashtrians, Gujaratis and others have to live together in Bombay and it would be a tragedy if they could not do so. I entirely agreed with you. Therefore, our first business is to try to remove this ill will. A prolonged enquiry will certainly not lead to this and will have the opposite result. We can discuss this matter further.

From the information I have received from quite a number of independent sources, the facts stated in Shri Kunte's letter to you do not appear to be correct.⁴

1. C.D. Deshmukh Papers, NMML. Also available in JN Collection.
2. Union Finance Minister.
3. Deshmukh had written that during the disturbances in Bombay the police under non-Maharashtrian captains "grossly exceeded their powers of self-defence and shot almost wildly" using even sten guns. He said that the allegations of atrocities from the minority communities "were gross and deliberate calumny against the Maharashtrian community." This happened due to the fact that most of the newspapers including some Marathi papers were owned by Gujaratis. In view of the large number of casualties, Deshmukh wanted a judicial inquiry to ascertain the real facts to remove the undeserved stigma on 30 million Maharashtrians.
4. D.K. Kunte, Speaker of Bombay Legislative Assembly, had written to Deshmukh on 17 February 1956 that his wife, accompanied by some Gujarati and Maharashtrian ladies and a lady doctor, visited Gujarati and Marwari families in Seori, Lal Bagh and Parel areas and secured written statements from them which showed no case of physical injury to any man and molestation of women contrary to the press reports and rumours. Looting was carried out by men of all communities and religions who were habitual offenders against prohibition and well-known to the police but police were afraid of their knives, according to the information given to Mrs Kunte by the shopkeepers themselves.

I have asked for a full report of these occurrences giving facts and figures as far as possible and I hope to receive this in the course of a few days. It would be absurd to cast any stigma on millions of Maharashtrians. Only foolish persons can do so. But there can be little doubt that the rioting in Bombay was organised and previously prepared for, that considerable number of persons came from outside Bombay city and were the spearhead of the violence, that a large number of shops and houses were looted and burnt, and that some women were molested. Obviously this was the work largely of hooligans who profited by the occasion. They did so because presumably they thought they would have the sympathy of others.

A situation was created in Bombay which made any kind of orderly Government almost impossible. It is possible that if this had not been checked, the arson and misbehaviour would have been on an even bigger scale and enormous damage would have been done apart from other graver consequences. This had therefore to be checked. Whether, in checking it, excessive force was used at any particular place, is a matter on which it is very difficult to give an opinion. Certainly I cannot do so. But I imagine that it is no easy matter to balance these factors when a city is in an uproar and bands go about throwing acid and incendiary bombs and committing arson, etc., on a large scale.

I have been informed that no sten guns were used or even possessed by the police or others functioning in Bombay.⁵

Shri Kunte is hardly impartial in this matter, even as others might also lack this desirable quality when passions are roused. It has been a matter of great surprise to me that a Speaker should function in the manner he has done.

When I get the fuller report from Bombay, I shall send you a copy.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. Deshmukh replied on 24 February that specific enquiry should be made in regard to atrocities by Maharashtrians especially the alleged molesting of women, use of Sten guns by the police, stopping of trains by miscreants, and looting of shops. In some cases, the shopkeepers facilitated looting and total insurance damage claimed from insurance companies amounted to Rs.2 crores, he added. He stated that there was no way of stopping the campaign of calumny against the Maharashtrians unless the truth was established, and the decision not to look too closely into police handling of widespread disturbances was dangerous for the future.

6. To Jayaprakash Narayan¹

New Delhi
22 February 1956

My dear Jayaprakash,

I have received today your letter of the 19th February² with which you enclosed a letter from Narendra Deva.³ I am returning the letter to you as it appears to be the original you received.

I need not tell you how moved I was to read Narendra Deva's letter.

You do me an injustice if you think that I do not value your opinion in any matter,⁴ or that any of us wishes to ride roughshod over other peoples' opinions. I am for the present only replying briefly to you, but I would be very happy indeed to meet you and discuss this as well as other matters.⁵

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. JN Collection.

2. Jayaprakash had suggested holding a plebiscite for merger of Bihar and West Bengal and had expressed "severe disagreement with the manner" in which "the whole reorganisation business has been handled. We seem to be behaving as a routed army which just runs helter skelter without aim or direction." He continued the letter on 20 February saying that Maharashtrians were a proud, tenacious people and were last Indian rulers of India. If justice was not done to them, there would be a trail of bitterness left for which "coming generations of Indians will have to pay."

3. Narendra Deva, chairman of PSP, who passed away on 19 February 1956, had conveyed their Working Committee's opinion that Jayaprakash should ask Nehru to call an all-parties conference to consider the question of states reorganisation.

4. Jayaprakash had written: "You may however dismiss my presumptuous advice, but I do hope you will give some thought to Narendra Deva's wish."

5. Jayaprakash met Nehru in Delhi on 13 and 14 March for a discussion.

7. To Sampurnanand¹

New Delhi
25 February 1956

My dear Sampurnanand,²

Your letter of February 24.³ I am afraid it is exceedingly difficult to consider any such proposal now as the merger of Baghelkhand to UP. Quite apart from the merits of that particular proposal, (and I am doubtful about the merits) it would be very unwise indeed to undo whatever has been done. This will mean an upsetting of what remains of our decisions on the SRC Report. Its reactions would be far-reaching elsewhere.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Chief Minister of UP.
3. Sampurnanand had requested Nehru to reconsider the proposal to merge four districts of Vindhya Pradesh, popularly known as Baghelkhand, with Uttar Pradesh.

8. To B.C. Roy¹

New Delhi
27 February 1956

My dear Bidhan,²

This evening a number of Communist MPs, eight of them, came to see me.³ Perhaps one or two of them might not have been MPs, I do not know, and might have been MLAs from Calcutta. Among the others were A.K. Gopalan, Hiren Mukherjee, Ghose⁴ and Renu Chakravarti. I was not particularly happy to see them then, as I had had a tooth extracted in the afternoon and still had some pain.

They spoke to me about the proposal for the union of Bengal and Bihar.⁵ They said that they were unhappy about this and were anxious that there should be no trouble. Their difficulty was that this proposal had come like a bolt from the blue. They did not wish to discuss the merits of this with me and perhaps there might be some arguments in favour of it. But it was obvious that this had created a tremendous furore in Bengal.⁶ This was not confined to Communists and even some Congress people felt that way. As a matter of fact, nobody seemed to know exactly what the details of this proposal were, although Dr Roy had mentioned some. Other people had added many other provisos. In fact, there appeared to be so many provisos that not much was left of the Union.

1. JN Collection. Also available in File No. 6/13/56 SR, MHA.

2. Chief Minister of West Bengal.

3. A.K. Gopalan, Bimal Coommar Ghose, H.N. Mukherjee, Bhupesh Gupta, Renu Chakraborty, Kamal Kumar Basu, Tushar Chatterjee and Abdur Reza Khan pleaded with Nehru to drop the idea of bilingual or multilingual states and allow zonal councils with unilingual states to function effectively in matters concerning common economy and development.

4. Bimal Coommar Ghose (1906-1961); Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party leader; member, Bengal/ West Bengal Legislative Assembly, 1946-52, and Rajya Sabha, 1952-57.

5. For the proposal for union of Bihar and West Bengal, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 31, pp. 212-214 and 216-219.

6. On 24 February a statewide general strike was observed in West Bengal at the call of the United Front mainly comprised of leftist parties as a protest against the proposed merger. About 46 students organizations and trade unions also actively supported the strike. On the same day in Bihar about a thousand students and political activists marched in a procession to the gates of the Assembly House shouting slogans against the proposed merger.

Why then have this Union? The idea of zonal councils would serve the purpose of coordination, more especially in regard to developmental activities.

Anyhow, they asked me if this was going to be imposed upon the people of Bengal whether they liked it or not. It was clear that they did not like it, partly because they did not know the implications and consequences. Any attempt at imposition would lead to grave discontent. It was because people were afraid of some such imposition that they wanted to express their feelings strongly.

This was the burden of their argument. I told them that there could be no question of imposition against the broad wishes of the people in regard to this or any other matter and, in any event, full opportunities would no doubt be given for consideration of any proposal. There would be no final decisions suddenly. Even if the Government of India made a recommendation, it would have to be considered fully by the State Assembly and by Parliament and at the same time by the people generally. For my part, I said I thought the proposal was a good one and beneficial both to Bengal and Bihar. The fear on either side that this might lead to a loss of identity or injury to the language or culture was completely unjustified. The whole conception of the regional councils, etc., was that there should be every development of local language, culture, etc., and at the same time, cooperation on the economic level and developmental schemes. It was obvious that this would be good for both. In fact, both regions would carry on their life according to their wishes and as they had done, without any interference. But they would cooperate in the ever-increasing field of development.

I did not approach this question, I said, from just a sentimental ground or as a reaction to something I disliked. It was true that the shock of events had made us think hard and as a result of that thought this proposal had come. It had not come from me or anyone here, but when it came, we welcomed it as a practical proposition beneficial to both States as well as to India. I was becoming more and more afraid that provincial feelings would encourage separatism and erect barriers between States. It was true that nobody asked for secession from India. Nevertheless, the feeling of separateness will grow and come very much in the way of the type of cooperation for development which had been so necessary.

I was asked if this proposal was going to be put in the Bill. I did not give a firm answer, but said that it might well be included. That would be a recommendation for consideration of the States and people.

Broadly speaking, this was the gist of our talk. I added that very probably the present feeling against this proposal was due to a misunderstanding of it

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and to a vague apprehension that the language or culture would suffer. If this matter was fully considered and explained, much of the opposition might well go.

I am writing to you to keep you informed of this.

Yours,
Jawahar

9. To Amrit Kaur¹

New Delhi
29 February 1956

My dear Amrit,

Your letter of February 29.² I am afraid the Akalis have not behaved at all decently. On the last occasion that we saw them,³ they gave us definitely the impression that they were on the whole satisfied with the line we were adopting. They suggested one or two other matters for our consideration which, we said, we would consider. Immediately after going back, however, they issued a statement which came to me as a shock.⁴ (In the course of our meeting I had expressed my regret that statements were made to the Press. They had denied this and promised not to say anything. As a matter of fact, we had adequate evidence that even previously they had been speaking to pressmen.) A day or two later, Master Tara Singh, having apparently realised that the statement made on their behalf was not correct or proper, wrote a letter of apology to me about it.

I think that what we have suggested to them satisfies every possible legitimate fear or claim. In fact it causes apprehension to others.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Union Minister for Health, Amrit Kaur wrote that now Pepsu and Himachal were going to be merged into the Punjab, the Sikhs might feel that their point of view would not be adequately safeguarded by zonal councils which were going to be purely advisory bodies. Any decision on subjects relating to a minority might be decided by the Cabinet Ministers and Legislators representing that area, she suggested.
3. The five-man Akali delegation led by Tara Singh had talks with Nehru, Maulana Azad and G.B. Pant in New Delhi from 22 to 25 February on the future reorganisation of the Punjab. The Akalis demanded a Punjabi-speaking state whereas the Government of India proposed a trilingual Greater Punjab with three zonal councils for the Punjabi, Hindi and Pahari-speaking areas.
4. Talking to pressmen on 28 February in Amritsar, Tara Singh described the press reports as baseless that an agreement had been reached between the Akalis and the Central Government on the language formula, chief ministership by rotation, distribution of subjects between the zonal councils and the Cabinet of the new Punjab. He further said that an agreement had been reached only on one issue but refused to mention that.

10. To B.C. Roy¹

New Delhi
4 March 1956

My dear Bidhan,

Thank you for your letter of March 1.² I am replying to it rather briefly and in some haste. I have been busy yesterday and today with Selwyn Lloyd's visit³ and I am leaving early tomorrow morning for Hyderabad.⁴

I have not seen in any newspaper any report of the talk I had with the Communist M.P.s.⁵ I sent you a note about that talk soon afterwards.⁶ I have no recollection of saying anything about secession. Possibly I might have laid down a general principle that it is always open later on for an amendment of the Constitution if things do not work well.

You ask me three questions:

- (1) Can the two States secede after a time or within a period?

There can be no question of "secession". Secession of course does not apply to this matter. It is always open, in terms of the Constitution, for a fresh reorganisation to take place if the processes are gone through.

1. JN Collection.

2. Roy had written that during a discussion on SRC recommendations on 15 January in Delhi, Srikrishna Sinha proposed the merger of Bihar and West Bengal in the presence of A.N. Sinha and K.B. Sahay, Ministers in Bihar Government, which formed the basis of the CWC resolution of 23 January. The suddenness of the proposal created confusion among the people of Bengal and an Anti-Merger Committee was formed. To clarify the proposal, Roy issued a press note in Kolkata on 1 February replacing the word 'merger' with 'union'. He also obtained signatures of 150 MLAs out of 238 in favour of the union, when the issue came up in the Assembly during a discussion on the Governor's address on 20 February. In Roy's opinion, the Communists and the PSP wanted linguistic reorganisation to be taken even to villages and they also wanted a separate Gurkha area in Darjeeling. Congressmen and others felt that with Congress proposing the merger, they might face difficulties in the next elections. In fact, the Congress lost in many places in some subsequent municipal elections.

3. Selwyn Lloyd, Foreign Minister of UK, was in Delhi on 4 and 5 March 1956. For a record of his conversation with Nehru, see *post*, pp. 368-374.

4. Nehru addressed a public meeting and attended the fourth annual convention of All India Bharat Sevak Samaj in Hyderabad on 5 March 1956.

5. The meeting was reported on 29 February in *Amrita Bazar Patrika*.

6. See *ante*, pp. 190-192.

Therefore, there is no question of secession. If I am asked however about Constitutional provisions, there they are.

- (2) If any reorganisation takes place at a later date⁷ obviously the whole question will be opened out as to what form that reorganisation should take place. We cannot go back to some recommendation at that time.
- (3) You ask me how the regional councils can provide agencies for implementing the Five Year Plan. It is rather difficult for me to answer this. It is a matter to be considered by the people concerned or by the regional council. This has nothing to do with the Constitution. The main purpose of the regional councils will be to look after developmental and cultural matters. Therefore the implementation of the Five Year Plan would be within their purview. At the same time it is not intended to give the regional councils any executive power, as that would create a new executive agency. The councils might well supervise the implementation and report on it with recommendations to the Government.

I am going to Hyderabad tomorrow morning, returning on the 7th afternoon.

I can quite understand the difficulties you have had to face and I have admired greatly the way you have met them.⁸

Yours sincerely,
Jawahar

7. Roy had enquired whether the provision of the SRC's recommendations as modified by the Government of India would come into force if merger ceased to operate.

8. Following defeat of the Congress in the Parliamentary by-elections in Midnapur and North Kolkata, Roy issued a press note on 4 May 1956 withdrawing the proposal of union of West Bengal and Bihar, treating the election result as people's verdict against it.

11. To Hukam Singh¹

New Delhi
10 March 1956

Dear Sardar Hukam Singh,²

I have just received your letter of today's date.

You know the Home Minister³ has been dealing with this matter and it would not be proper for me, without consulting him, to make any fresh suggestions.⁴ I am sure that, within the ambit of the proposals already accepted, any minor variations would offer no difficulty. You mention, among other things, consolidation. This is an important part of land reform, which in fact is dealt with always in consultation with the Planning Commission. We try to evolve some uniform policy in keeping with the basic objectives that we have in view. The Regional Council⁵ can always send us recommendations in this, as in any other subject, within the scope of development and economic planning. But such recommendations would have to be fitted in with the general development plans and the policies pursued in consultation with the Planning Commission.

In so far as minor irrigation and wells are concerned, they can also come in the same way under development and economic planning. They are hardly separate subjects to be dealt with as such. I do not myself see any difficulty why these relatively minor matters cannot be dealt with under that broad head of development and economic planning.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Member, Lok Sabha.
3. G.B. Pant.
4. Hukam Singh had urged Nehru that when the list of subjects for the regional committees for the Punjab would be considered by the Home Minister, consolidation and minor irrigation such as percolation of wells or tube well irrigation should be placed with agriculture.
5. In order to satisfy the aspirations of different sections of the community, it was proposed to set up regional committees consisting of MLAs belonging to the respective regions for looking after certain matters concerning day-to-day life in the states intimately. The regional committees were perceived as an intermediate body between the local self-government bodies like Municipal Boards, District Boards and Central, State Governments.

12. To V.V. Nene¹

New Delhi
15 March 1956

My dear Nene,²

I am sorry for the delay in answering your letter of March 6th.³ I have been terribly busy with visits of Foreign Ministers here from three major countries⁴ and correspondence has piled up.

As you know, I have been greatly distressed at recent happenings in Bombay and Maharashtra as well as in some other parts of the country. It seems to me that, quite apart from the merits of any question, something basic in our outlook has suffered by these events. Apart from the very strong feelings which have been aroused, the attempt to arrive at results by having recourse to violent methods has been a dangerous and harmful development. If results are achieved by these methods, the consequences are two-fold. One is the encouragement of such methods for the solution of our problems; the other is the increase of bitterness and hatred among large sections of the community against each other. Both these are fundamentally bad and are likely to do injury to the causes we have at heart.

I have therefore felt that our first attempt must be to get back to normality and reduce these tensions and bitterness. Nothing good can come out of a decision based on bitter hostility of one group against the other. The first priority has thus to be given to an attempt to calm people's feelings and reduce these tensions. It is no good blaming each other because that adds to the bitterness. Hence, I have regretted the tendency to blame others. Perhaps, we are all to blame in some measure or other. Once a quieter and more normal atmosphere is created, any problem can be considered more easily and solved more effectively.

1. T.R. Deogirikar Papers, NMML. Also available in JN Collection.
2. Congressman from Maharashtra.
3. Nene, with five other Congress workers, had met Nehru at Amritsar on 12 February 1956 to discuss the problem of Samyukta Maharashtra and Bombay city. He wanted Nehru to confirm his impressions of the meeting that three-state formula was suggested by the High Command with a view to get Bombay for Maharashtra.
4. Selwyn Lloyd of UK, J.F. Dulles of USA, and Christian Pineau of France.

You quote me as having said something during our talk in Amritsar.⁵ I do not remember my exact words. But, on the whole, your quotation is correct. What I had said, I think, was that Bombay city is said to have a population of 43% Maharashtrians and 5% Konkanis who are very near to Maharashtrians. Surely, this gives the Maharashtrians a predominant position in Bombay and the future of Bombay would very largely lie in their hands. In the event of a separate Bombay state having been created, the way to any future development or change could have naturally and constitutionally taken place, without any conflicts or ill-will. If the Bombay state wished to join Maharashtra, it might well come as a cause of this natural development later. It was because of this that personally I preferred the three-state formula. This had the advantage of getting over present difficulties and putting no barrier to this possible future development which would lie very largely in the hands of the Maharashtrians themselves, whether in Maharashtra or Bombay. Unfortunately, the three-state formula was not accepted at that time and it was decided that Bombay should be Centrally administered. Even this was nothing final or irrevocable and natural developments can take place.

The main point was that we should endeavour to the best of our ability to remove a feeling of conflict and tension and bitterness and then take some other step with a large measure of goodwill and cooperation. It seems to me most undesirable that Maharashtrians and Gujaratis and others in Bombay should live in a state of tension and dislike of each other. Surely, this is not good for any of them and Bombay would suffer. Just as I would strongly advise the Maharashtrians to gain the goodwill of the others, I would equally strongly advise the Gujaratis and others to gain the goodwill of the Maharashtrians. There will not be much of India left if our various linguistic or provincial groups think more of themselves or their interests than of India.

As I have said previously, I have a sense of personal failure and I have been greatly distressed because of this feeling. That failure is not only because of events but also because of the feeling that I have lost touch with the minds and hearts of the Maharashtrians. For me this is a tragedy. Because of this I do not feel competent to give any advice when that advice is considered suspect.

5. Nene had quoted Nehru as saying: "After due discussions, bare majority may have been accepted. You form 43% and 5% Konkanis—those are Maharashtrians—that means 48% in Bombay. Couldn't you have won 4 to 5% more and got Bombay yourself? But the formula was rejected forthwith by Shri Shankarrao Deo."

We have solved, more or less satisfactorily, many very difficult problems, much more difficult than the Bombay-Maharashtra problem. We have largely succeeded in the Punjab. It is, therefore, peculiarly distressing that these inner conflicts and difficulties should have arisen among close colleagues in Maharashtra. Undoubtedly, at least part of this blame must attach to me. All I can say is that throughout these months we have given the most earnest consideration to these matters and more particularly we have aimed at gaining the goodwill and assent of the Maharashtrians.

As I have said, there is nothing final or irrevocable if we set about things in the right way, we can achieve an objective of friendly settlements. But if the way itself is wrong, then the result also will be wrong. It is the old argument of means and ends.

With all good wishes to you,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

13. To Shankarrao Deo¹

New Delhi
15 March 1956

My dear Shankarrao,

I have to apologise to you for not having replied to your two letters earlier. With the first one, you sent me your press statement. I appreciated what you had said in that statement.² I did not at that time think that you would expect any reply. Then the second letter came, to which I certainly wanted to reply, but two things came in my way.

As you know, we have had a very large number of important visitors from abroad and they have taken up a very great deal of my time and energy. We have had to discuss vital problems. My correspondence piled up, because I just could not deal with it, and sometimes even read it for some time. The result was that I replied to rather simple and urgent letters and allowed the others to remain to be dealt with later.

Your letter was one such letter which I put by. The fact is that I have been greatly distressed, as you have been yourself, by many events during the past few months. Because of this feeling of distress and inner failure, my mind was not quite clear as to what I should write to you. Because of your distress you undertook a long fast. I could understand that from your point of view. But, as you know, I do not function in that way. Nevertheless, the distress was there, and continued.

I have said publicly that I have a sense of failure. It is difficult to function adequately when one feels that way. All my strength has lain in a feeling of confidence in myself and of some community of spirit with the masses of our

1. JN Collection. Copies of this letter were sent to U.N. Dhebar and G.B.Pant.
2. As president of the Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti, Deo held that the objective of Samyukta Maharashtra about Bombay city should be realized only through peaceful methods of "persuasion and conversion." This view was expressed by him in Pune on 11 February 1956 after the completion of his 11-day fast and was reiterated on 14 February in a directive issued by the Samiti to the people "not to observe hartal, not to resort to strike or organise *morchas* or processions" but to observe silent protest on 16 February when the Bombay Assembly was scheduled to commence its budget session. Again, on 23 February in Pune, Deo said that Bombay's inclusion in Maharashtra would ultimately be achieved by negotiations and mutual understanding.

people. If that community of spirit appears to go or to lessen and I lose a large measure of confidence in myself, my capacity for action becomes, to that extent, limited.

What has distressed me most have been the tendencies which have come to the front so much in recent months. These have been so opposed to what I considered basic in our approach to problems that everything else seem to be rather secondary. I am not referring to the merits of any question but rather to the methods adopted. It is the old question of means and ends.

Apart from this, I see no hopeful future for our country if provincial, linguistic or like feelings become so acute as to lead to the hatred of one group by the other.

All these feelings have distressed me, and I have tried to see the light in so far as I could. We have been fortunate enough to solve, more or less satisfactorily, difficult problems like the Punjab problem³ and others. Why then have we failed to bring about a friendly settlement in Bombay and Maharashtra. We tried our utmost and the major consideration we had throughout was to gain the approval of the Maharashtrians. Obviously we have failed, and because I have lost that intimate touch with the minds and hearts of Maharashtrians, I feel a little helpless.

I am not much worried about political or constitutional changes. I have often said that nothing is final or irrevocable. It is easy enough, at the right time and in the right spirit, to do anything we want to, but the right time and the right spirit appear to be essential. And it becomes essential, therefore, that we should cultivate this right spirit. We have been blamed for taking wrong steps. What assurance have I that anything new that we might do will also not turn out to be a false step?

I am writing to you quite frankly as to an old colleague. I have little doubt in my mind that these difficulties will gradually pass. Meanwhile they are a burden which has to be carried and every effort has to be made to solve the problems facing us. But, as I have said above, even the approach can only be made in a temper of friendly cooperation. The approach to win people and not to coerce them.

I would be happy to discuss this and like matters with you if you come to Delhi.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. See *post*, p. 209.

14. To T.R. Deogirikar¹

New Delhi
15 March 1956

My dear Deogirikar,

Your letter of the 8th March.² I am sorry for the delay in answering it. I am much distressed by charges being made by any one community against another. This is not the way to develop a peaceful atmosphere. It should be the duty of every group, linguistic or other, to win over another group.

The proposal to have a formal and judicial enquiry into the occurrences in Bombay seems to me not a desirable one. There can be no doubt that such an enquiry will lead to charges and counter charges and constant tension and bitterness. Whatever other results might follow from that enquiry, one result is certain and that is greater conflict and bitterness and hatred. I feel that our first and primary duty is to get rid of this feeling of conflict and bitterness. Therefore, I did not favour such a judicial enquiry.

But, as a matter of fact, we have tried to collect as full information as possible, both from the Bombay Government and directly.

You refer to the statement made by the Chief Minister of Bombay that the rioters in Bombay wanted to overthrow the Government.³ It is rather difficult to say what the mass of the rioters felt or intended to do. Every riot is meant to coerce the Government in a certain measure. If the riot is widespread and on a big scale, then the attempt at coercion is on a big scale and in fact can only lead, if successful, to the overthrow of Government.⁴

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Copies of this letter were sent to G.B. Pant and U.N. Dhebar.
2. Deogirikar had written that Nehru's speech at the Subjects Committee meeting in Amritsar (see *post*, pp. 227-232) was full of feelings and was well received in Maharashtra but its effect was wiped out by two things—Morarji Desai's allegation that the rioters in Bombay wanted to overthrow the Government, and constant scandal-mongering by Gujaratis that Maharashtrians had molested women. Deogirikar requested Nehru to make private enquiry through his trusted officers into these charges.
3. Chief Minister of Bombay, Morarji Desai had made this statement while replying to the debate on the Governor's address on 20 February 1956.
4. Deogirikar observed that firing was resorted to twice resulting in the death of 25 and 75 persons but not a single policeman was killed. The rioters carried no deadly weapons or arms. Therefore, he could not believe that there was any attempt or intention to overthrow the Government.

15. Subjects for Regional Committees in Punjab¹

Sardar Hukam Singh sent me a letter dated March 17th. In this letter, he said that the list of subjects for the Regional Committees, detailed by the Home Minister, was not, in his opinion, wide enough. He sent me his suggestions for additions to this list of subjects. He further stated that he and his colleagues would like to explain their viewpoint to me; but, in any event, they would be quite willing to abide by my judgment and accept my decision in this matter.

I saw Sardar Hukam Singh at noon today and discussed these subjects with him. Later this afternoon, soon after 3 p.m., I met again Sardar Hukam Singh and Giani Kartar Singh² and we covered the same ground again.

I listened to their point of view carefully and pointed out some difficulties in regard to the further addition of subjects. However, we considered each one separately.

I pointed out to them that every member of the State Legislature, and that included, of course, every member of the Regional Committee, could raise these matters or any others in the Assembly or Council in various ways. It must be remembered that Regional Committee members all function in the Legislature and there is no difficulty in any subject being raised there in terms of the Constitution.

I further pointed out that it would be inadvisable and a wrong precedent in this connection, to bring in any subject given in the Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule (List III). The Concurrent List dealt with subjects in regard to which legislation could be passed both by the Parliament and the State Legislature. To bring in the Regional Committee in regard to these subjects seemed to me a wrong step and likely to lead to confusion.

I now deal with the proposals made by Sardar Hukam Singh separately:

LIST II (STATE LIST) OF THE SEVENTH SCHEDULE

1. (No. 4 of the State List)—Prisons, Reformatories, Borstal Institutions

It seems to me that there must be a uniform policy in the State in regard to prisons, etc. I do not see why the basic methods need or should differ in the

1. Note on proposals made by Hukam Singh regarding the list of subjects to be dealt with by the Regional Committees in Punjab, 23 March 1956. JN Collection.
2. General Secretary, Shiromani Akali Dal.

two regions because of language or culture. Minor differences may be introduced by the state authorities. It is always open to any member of the Legislature to make proposals in regard to prison reform. It will, therefore, not be desirable to add this subject to the list of subjects to be considered by the Regional Committees.

2. (No. 8 of the State List)—Intoxicating liquors

This is a State subject, but we are trying to evolve an all-Indian policy, subject no doubt to different conditions prevailing in different States. It may well be necessary to vary the rate of progress towards prohibition in different States or even in different parts of a State. But the question should be considered as a whole. It might well be harmful and lead to some conflict, if the policy in one region conflicts with the policy pursued in the other. In this matter, the Planning Commission is itself very much interested.

3. (No. 5 of the State List)—Local Government, etc.

I agree that Panchayats and Town Improvement Trusts might be considered as included under this head. Indeed village administration must necessarily include Panchayats. I might add, however, that Improvement Trusts usually require considerable funds, which the State Government has to provide. Therefore, to that extent, it will be for the State Government only to decide.

4. (No. 11 of the State List)—Education

I do not see how University education can be included in any Regional List. At present, there is only one University and clearly that cannot be considered a Regional University. If there are two Universities or more, even then they should not be limited in their scope and should serve the purposes of the whole State. It may be that one University emphasises some particular aspect. That should not be difficult. But, to think in terms of confining a University to regional demands would lower its status and conflict with the very conception of a University. I have no doubt that the Punjabi language will find an important place in any University in the State. As a matter of fact, it was admitted by Giani Kartar Singh that it would be difficult to include Universities in the Regional List, but he pressed for colleges, as such, to be so included. I do not see how this splitting up can be done or can do any good. I am, therefore, not in favour of the addition of University education to this list.

5. (Nos. 14, 17 & 18 of the State List)—Agriculture, Water and Land

Agriculture is already in the list. Irrigation is a subject which cannot be considered regionally. Indeed, it overlaps State boundaries and sometimes even national boundaries. The question of wells and nullahs is a minor one and should offer no difficulty anyhow. Also it will be exceedingly difficult to

split up the allotment for irrigation in the Budget. I do not think, therefore, that it is desirable for this subject to be included in the list.

Land means land tenure, consolidation of holdings, colonisation, etc. If any subject requires a uniform policy in a State, it is that of land tenure and consolidation of holdings. Also colonisation. Indeed, I hope we are gradually going towards some uniform land policy all over the country. I recognise that sometimes different conditions prevail even within a State and might have to be treated differently at least for a temporary period. But, even so, the subject has to be viewed as a whole. I do not see how we can split up this subject into different regions. I am, therefore, not in favour of this being included in the list.

6. (No. 24 of the State List)—Industries

Reference was made to "medium sized" industry. There is no clear definition of medium sized industry and the phrase is not used, so far as I know, anywhere except vaguely in talk. Industries are divided broadly into heavy industries, light and consumer goods industries (which may be big), small-scale industries and cottage industries. Cottage and small-scale industries have already been included in the list. It is our intention to pay particular attention to these and try to encourage cooperative management. To introduce a term like "medium sized industries", which has no clear meaning and only a vague significance, would be undesirable. While it is hoped that cottage and small-scale industries will be encouraged everywhere, bigger industries have to be considered from a number of points of view and on a State basis.

Mention is made of cotton, sugar and ginning factories. It is true that all these industries as well as many others are connected in some way with agriculture. Indeed most industries get their raw material from agriculture. The sugar factory is usually on a big scale. The whole sugar industry in India is constantly being regulated not only by the State Governments, but by the Central Government also. I do not think, therefore, that there should be any such addition as medium sized industries to the list.

7. Uplift and welfare of backward classes

Here again uniform policies are pursued and it would not be advisable for separate treatment to be accorded to backward classes in different regions. This will give rise to discontent and will otherwise also have undesirable consequences.

I have mentioned above some subjects from the Concurrent List. In principle, the inclusion of any such subject is not desirable.

Apart from this question of principle, I would have no objection to the prevention of cruelty to animals being dealt with by the Regional Committee,

but this is not a major subject and it is better not to violate the principle I have suggested above. I am myself anxious, however, that particular attention should be paid to the prevention of cruelty to animals and I hope that the members of the Legislature will interest themselves in this subject. There is at present a Committee of Parliament considering this.

Apart from the general reason involving a principle that I have stated above, I think it would be definitely undesirable for Concurrent List item 22 and 23 (Trade unions, industrial and labour disputes, social security and social insurance, employment and unemployment) to be brought into the Regional List. These are matters of wide policy which should be uniform and which only the State Legislature could deal with adequately.

No. 38 of the Concurrent List—Electricity

This is even more a matter of State and indeed all India policy and cannot be brought into the Regional List.

It seems to me that there has been some misapprehension in regard to a number of these subjects. It is clear that there can only be State legislation on these subjects. So far as any enquiry or complaint is concerned, any member of the Legislature will have the fullest opportunity to make them or to suggest any proposal in the Legislature.

The suggestion that there should be Subordinate Services Selection Boards in separate regions does not appear to me to be feasible at all. It is one thing to have one such Subordinate Services Selection Board for the whole State. To have two would practically mean a division of these Subordinate Services completely into two regions and thereby breaking up the unity of the Services. I am sure that this will not be good for the State, the regions or the persons employed. I was told of some complaints in regard to recruitment etc. These complaints have to be dealt with and remedied otherwise than by breaking up the unity of the Services.

Towards the end of our interview, Giani Kartar Singh said that what they really attached importance to were the questions of transport, consolidation of holdings and subordinate services. I have already expressed my opinion about the two latter. Regarding transport, by which is meant motor transport, in Sardar Hukam Singh's letter to me, it is stated that the policy governing this should be considered by the Planning Commission. He points out that many demobilised Sikh soldiers are concerned with this transport business. I have no doubt that full consideration should be given to these aspects. But any transport policy or legislation must necessarily be a State policy. It cannot be split up.

16. To Morarji Desai¹

New Delhi
27 March 1956

My dear Morarji,

I have received your letter of the 24th March with its enclosures. Previously I received the long note you sent me on the Bombay disturbances. I must confess that, owing to very heavy work, I have not been able to read this note thoroughly. You had, however, sent a copy of this note to Pantji and Pantji passed it on to Chintaman Deshmukh.

2. I had not myself seen the anonymous brochure entitled "Why bilingual or zonal states are not desirable."² You say you are sending me a copy, but I have not found it with your other papers. I have only received your long note in reply to it. I do not quite know how to deal with this matter. There is no doubt that all kinds of wholly unjustifiable allegations are being made.

3. This morning's paper shows a long statement³ by Shankarrao Deo. In this he refers to talks he has had with Vinoba Bhave and Jayaprakash Narayan. Naturally I do not know the substance of these talks. As you know, I had a talk with Vinobaji some time ago⁴ and, later, I saw Jayaprakash here.⁵ Both these

1. JN Collection. A copy of this letter was sent to G.B. Pant.
2. Desai wrote in *The Story of My Life* that Prabhakar Kunte had issued a public statement explaining why a bilingual Bombay state should not be forced and what damage it would cause to Maharashtra. In a pamphlet issued on 17 March 1956 "Storm Over Bombay", Kunte raised several points: (i) dominance of Gujaratis in the Congress and partisan attitude of and provocative speeches by the Congress leaders of Bombay; (ii) dominance of non-Maharashtrians in the Bombay Citizens' Committee formed by the Indian Merchants Chamber; (iii) tear-gassing, lathi charge, and firing on peaceful demonstrators in November 1955 and January 1956; (iv) role of the non-Maharashtrian controlled Marathi and English newspapers; (v) role of anti-social characters including S.K.Patil's Shanti Sena during the riots; (vi) point-blank refusal to hold a public enquiry into the Bombay incidents for fear of exposing the leaders of the Congress and the Gujarati community.
3. Shankarrao Deo had said that on his way to Delhi, he met Vinoba Bhave and Jayaprakash Narayan at Adoni on 24 March, who "represent the high moral tribunal of the country." He said that he stood for Samyukta Maharashtra with Bombay city but the question should be solved in a manner consistent with the unity and solidarity of the Indian nation through non-violent methods of persuasion and conversion.
4. On 6 March 1956. For a record of their conversation, see *post*, pp. 570-573.
5. On 13 and 14 March 1956.

talks were rather general. Vinobaji suggested to me that I might issue a statement before your Assembly considered the states reorganisation question. He even had a draft with him which had apparently been prepared by Shankarrao. There was nothing wrong with this draft except a sentence at the end. Most of the draft was a condemnation of violence. The last sentence said something about my giving an assurance that injustice would not be done to Maharashtra. As the implication was that injustice had been done, I did not quite like this.

4. Later I sent a letter in reply to Nene, one of the Maharashtrians whom I had seen at Amritsar.⁶ Nene has published this letter and you must have seen this. I do not propose to issue any other statement, but, in the course of a few days, I intend to have a Press Conference.⁷ This will be chiefly in connection with foreign affairs. But I suppose questions will be asked about states reorganisation, Bombay, Maharashtra, etc.

5. In my talk with Jayaprakash here, in the course of which Pantji joined us, we gave him no assurance of any kind except that when matters are completely settled in calm, every question can be looked at. He was anxious that we should meet a number of Maharashtrians. He gave up the idea of a Round Table Conference which he and Narendra Deva had previously suggested, but went on pressing that we should see some of these people separately. Neither Pantji nor I expressed any enthusiasm for this proposal. Indeed, we rather indicated that it was not worthwhile or desirable. Later, I understand, he sent a list of some Maharashtra names to Pantji.

6. Shankarrao had written to me two or three letters in the course of the last few weeks. I had not sent any answer then. I wrote a few days ago acknowledging these letters and saying that if he came to Delhi, I would be glad to meet him.⁸

7. Shankarrao is now talking about the Capital of Maharashtra being situated in Bombay. Both Pantji and I had indicated to Jayaprakash that this did not seem to us to be feasible although, of course, there should be no difficulty about some offices remaining in Bombay, if so desired, but the Secretariat will have to go out, presumably to Nagpur.

8. I am writing to you to keep you informed of the developments that have taken place recently.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. For Nehru's letter to V.V. Nene, see *ante*, pp. 197-199.

7. See *post*, pp. 531-544.

8. See *ante*, pp. 200-201.

17. To Tara Singh Tikka¹

New Delhi,
30 March 1956

Dear Master Tara Singh Tikka,²

I have your letter of the 29th March. As you mention it yourself in your letter, I gave a hearing to a deputation. I do not at all understand what your grievance is now and what injustice has been done to you or to any other group or individual. What we have suggested for the Punjab³ is a proposal which has been put forward by us in other parts of India also. This consists of a single Legislature and Cabinet and Regional Councils of Members of the Legislature to deal with certain specified subjects. The final decision will be that of the Legislature. I do not think that the rights of the Scheduled Sikhs have been ignored in any way or that they can be subjected to any difficulty. I hope that you will not be under any misapprehension because of tendentious propaganda.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. President, All India Shiromani Baba Jiwan Singh Mazhabi Dal.
3. As a result of the negotiations between the five-member Akali delegation led by Tara Singh and Nehru, Azad and Pant, a compromise formula was evolved for reorganisation of the Punjab. Known as the Regional Formula, it merged PEPSU with Punjab; provided for one legislature, one governor, one council of ministers for the whole of the reorganised state; constitution of two regional committees consisting of MLAs belonging to the two language regions (except the Chief Minister) to deal with legislation on the specified subjects. The State Government was empowered to demarcate the two language regions with Hindi and Punjabi as their official languages respectively. Master Tara Singh said on 15 March that the scheme fulfilled the aspirations of the Sikhs to an extent.

18. To C.D. Deshmukh¹

New Delhi
16 April 1956

My dear Deshmukh,

Your letter of April 16 forwarding to me a communication from some members of the Bombay Legislative Assembly.²

Everybody knows that Thana, Kolaba and Ratnagiri Districts are closely connected with activities in Bombay city. It does not necessarily follow, however, that the set-up proposed and the SRC Bill³ before Parliament will in any way interfere with these domestic, trade, labour or any other activities of the people from Thana, Kolaba and Ratnagiri districts in Bombay. I have no doubt that these considerations will be fully borne in mind.

In the course of your letter, you make a statement which seems to me peculiarly unjust and unfair both to the Bombay Government and more particularly to Morarji Desai.⁴ It is generally admitted that the Bombay Government and Administration have been probably the most efficient in India. Till a short while ago, I had not even heard any charge of partiality in the Bombay Government, although I keep in close touch with developments in the States. These charges had been made within the last few months or perhaps a year. I have gone into these charges and I have found little of substance in

1. C.D. Deshmukh Papers, NMML. Also available in JN Collection.
2. B.N. Dighe, D.M. Telegaonkar, A.T. Patil and M.K. Padir had written to Deshmukh on 11 April 1956 that separation of the Konkan districts from Bombay city was wrong on the territorial, economic or administrative grounds as it would deal a severe blow to the economic life of these districts. Bombay city also depended on them for water and power supply and for its expansion. Deshmukh had written that he agreed with the views of Konkan MLAs that the administrative separation of Bombay city from Thana, Kolaba and Ratnagiri districts of the Konkan area would irreparably injure the economic life of these relatively backward and poor districts, with a large percentage of Adivasis.
3. The Draft Bill on Reorganisation of States, as circulated to the state legislatures for eliciting their opinion, was placed before both Houses of Parliament by G.B. Pant on 16 March 1956.
4. Deshmukh expressed his apprehension that the situation would aggravate if the Central administration of Bombay was handled by those "who are primarily responsible for ruining the relations between Maharashtrais and Gujaratis, particularly Shri Morarji Desai, owing to their overbearing and inequitable conduct of the affairs of the present Bombay state during the last five years."

them. There might have been some minor errors. But the impression I have gathered is that the conduct of affairs of Bombay State was carried on with a considerable degree of fairness and impartiality. Opinions may differ about some particular matter. Your reference to Morarji Desai has distressed me. It is not necessary to agree with a person in everything in order to recognise the person's worth. I do not agree with some of the views of Morarji Desai. But in my large acquaintance in India I know very few persons whom I respect so much for their rectitude, ability, efficiency and fairness as Morarji Desai. I have known him and the general course of his life for a long enough time to be able to judge.

You refer to those who are primarily responsible for ruining the relations between Maharashtrians and Gujaratis. That is a big question and I suppose a large number of persons have to shoulder this responsibility. It serves little purpose to worsen these unfortunate relations. We have to improve them

I do not know how you have got the idea that the administration of Bombay city by the Centre is going to be handled by any particular person.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

19. To C.D. Deshmukh¹

New Delhi
20 April 1956

My dear Deshmukh,

Some time after I had my talk with you this afternoon, I received your letter of today's date.²

I am leaving Delhi early tomorrow morning at about 6 and returning on the forenoon of the 23rd.³ I would have liked to have further talks with you, but for the present, at least this cannot be done. In the course of our conversation this afternoon, I tried to explain to you my thinking on this subject. I am not entering into the past. We have to deal with the present as it is. I am quite sure that in the present our principal objective should be to help in removing or at least lessening the tensions that exist in Bombay and Maharashtra. Only then can any helpful consideration be given to these problems. Otherwise, it means adopting coercive methods which naturally produce adverse reactions and add to the tension and ill will. We have not only to deal with today's difficulties but look to the future. To leave an inheritance or a conflict and ill will for the future would be most unfortunate.

I feel sure that the action you suggest would not be helpful at all in producing that atmosphere which you and I desire. In any event it seems to me obvious that a Cabinet Minister cannot oppose the decision of Cabinet and Government in Parliament. That would be completely contrary to every convention of Parliamentary Government and would produce an impossible situation.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. C.D. Deshmukh Papers, NMML. Also available in JN Collection.
2. Deshmukh had written that since Nehru did not intend suggesting any change in arrangements for Bombay (see the preceding item), he wished to make an appeal to Parliament "for inclusion of Bombay city in Maharashtra" with suitable safeguards for special interests of the city. Deshmukh had asked whether Nehru would prefer "that to do so I should cease to be a member of your Cabinet."
3. Nehru delivered the first convocation address of the IIT at Kharagpur on 21 April.

20. A Separate State for Jharkhand¹

...8. Later I saw three MLAs from Jharkhand. They said that proposals had been made for some kind of union between Bengal and Bihar. They did not mind whether such a union took place or not. What they were anxious about, however, was that the hill areas containing the Adivasis in Bihar, Bengal, Madhya Pradesh, and Orissa should be brought together.

9. I pointed out to them that this matter had been put forward previously and considered carefully by the Commission and the Government. The proposal had been rejected.² Anyhow no changes were going to be made in the Bill before Parliament.

10. They talked vaguely about a regional council for these areas. I told them that there could be no regional council for areas in several States.

11. They then said that they often had some difficulties but their voice could not reach those in authority. I said that there should be no difficulty in any communication from them reaching those in authority. If there was anything important, they could bring it to my notice.

12. These Jharkhand MLAs also gave me a memorandum which I enclose.

1. Note to Sri Krishna Sinha, Camp: Patna, 22 April 1956. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. The question of formation of a new Jharkhand state comprising of Chota Nagpur division and Santhal Parganas independently or together with other areas was first considered briefly by the Sub-Committee of the Constituent Assembly on the excluded and partially excluded areas (other than Assam). The demand was presented to the States Reorganisation Commission which noted that public opinion outside South Bihar and parties in South Bihar other than Jharkhand Party opposed this. The Commission also noted that the multilingual tribal population of the area was only one third of the total population, and the northern agricultural plains balanced the Southern industrial plateau. The Commission recommended that it was not necessary or desirable to create a Jharkhand state though the special needs of the area should be recognised.

21. To Rajendra Prasad ¹

Camp: Patna

22 April 1956

My dear Rajendra Babu,

Day before yesterday afternoon (20th April), our Finance Minister Deshmukh saw me in Parliament House. He said that at an early stage of the debate on the SRC Bill he proposed to make an appeal to Parliament to attach Bombay city to the Maharashtra State. He added that if it was necessary for him to resign from the Government for this purpose, he would do so.

I pointed out to him that for a member of the Cabinet to oppose the Bill put forward by Government before Parliament would be a very extraordinary procedure. I also said that even from his point of view this would not be a helpful thing to do. I gave him various reasons for this and pointed out that I had always said that there was no finality about this proposal and one could consider the matter afresh at a suitable moment later when people's passions had calmed down. No enforced decision which created bitterness would be a happy solution as that would affect the future of Bombay city.

Later in the afternoon I received a letter from him to the same effect.² I was busy in Parliament House with a Party meeting and other matters till about 7.45 p.m. I then went to Pantji and informed him of this new development. He was clearly of opinion that under no circumstances could we agree to a member of Government acting in the manner Deshmukh had suggested. I then went to Maulana Azad and told him of what had happened. He was also of the same opinion, that is to say that if Deshmukh insisted on opposing the Government's Bill in Parliament, he would have to resign.

Late at night I sent a brief reply to Deshmukh telling him that it was against all precedent and convention for a member of Government to oppose a Government Bill, more especially of the importance of the SRC Bill.

Yesterday early morning I left Delhi for Bihar and I have been here for the last two days. I am returning to Delhi tomorrow morning. The SRC Bill itself is going to come up on a motion for reference to a Select Committee tomorrow forenoon.³

1. JN Collection. Also available in File No. 152/55-col.I, President's Secretariat.

2. See *ante*, p. 212.

3. G.B. Pant moved the motion for reference of the Bill to a Joint Committee of the Houses on 23 April.

I spoke to Pantji on the telephone this afternoon from Patna to find out if any further developments had taken place. I understood from him that Deshmukh was still insisting on opposing the Bill and resigning previously. He had not himself met Deshmukh.

I am writing to you to keep you informed of these developments. It is quite possible that when I reach Delhi tomorrow, I might receive Deshmukh's letter of resignation. In the circumstances, I have no choice but to accept it.

You will remember that on three previous occasions, Deshmukh had offered to resign and indeed sent his resignation letter to me. This had nothing to do with the SRC Report. On each occasion, I tried my best to prevent him from resigning and succeeded. It is with regret that I find myself now compelled to accept his resignation, should he insist on offering it. There is no other alternative left open to me. Unfortunately this will further worsen the situation in Bombay and Maharashtra.

I shall of course keep you informed. So far as I know, till this afternoon Deshmukh's intention was not known to many people in Delhi. It may be of course that by tomorrow morning this may be mentioned in the papers and you might see it there.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

22. To C.D. Deshmukh¹

New Delhi

24 April 1956

My dear Deshmukh,

Your letter of the 23rd April reached me rather late last night.²

We have discussed this matter amongst ourselves on several occasions and it would serve little purpose to repeat our old arguments. I understand your position and your views. Apart from the personal question involved, what I am most anxious about is to find some feasible way to deal with the difficulties that have arisen. It is from this point of view that I wish to judge any action that you or I might take. I have already indicated that there is nothing final about the decisions we have taken and it is up to us to find some way to solve these difficulties. I was thinking that in the course of the next few days we should consider these matters with this end in view, that is, a practical approach to a problem that has become so complicated.

Today I received a memorandum signed by about twenty five MPs from Maharashtra.³ I hope to have a talk with them in the course of the next few days. Indeed, we shall continue these talks, if necessary.

Your resignation will obviously not be helpful even, I think, from the point of view of helping in a solution which you so much desire. The Bill is going to be referred to the Select Committee. The final stage will arrive when it comes back from the Committee. I would like you at least to wait till then.

1. C.D. Deshmukh Papers, NMML. Also available in JN Collection.
2. Deshmukh had resigned as Cabinet Minister and ex-officio member of the Planning Commission and wished to be relieved immediately as he wanted to make an appeal to the Lok Sabha against the exclusion of Bombay city from Maharashtra which he could not appropriately do as a Cabinet Minister.
3. The memorandum, signed by H.V. Pataskar, Minister of Legal Affairs, N.V. Gadgil, and others, appreciated Nehru's stand on Bombay and Maharashtra that the decision could be changed later by proper approach. They wanted the border dispute in every case to be decided by a boundary commission after ascertaining the wishes of the people without any restriction of revenue, political or administrative division.

However, this is for you to decide. If you insist on your resignation, all I can do is to forward it to the President. It is for him to accept it. The President is not here today. He will probably return sometime tomorrow.⁴

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Deshmukh replied on 24 April that in his opinion the best way of establishing friendly relations between Gujaratis and Maharashtrians was to join Bombay city with Maharashtra, reuniting it later would be difficult. He said that since Nehru had written that "the door is not closed and banged for ever, I do not insist on speaking at this stage." He also did not insist on placing the resignation before the President immediately but asked for ten days' leave from Parliament and Planning Commission as he was "almost ill physically and sick at heart."

POLITICAL PARTIES

I. INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS

(i) Amritsar Session

1. The Constructive Programme¹

There have been a number of debates on the constructive programme. It is obvious that I am keenly interested in it and have my own views about it. I do not think it is a simple matter on which there can be a rigid line. In a changing world, our outlook has also to change. But what is even more important is that the different strands of national reconstruction work must all be woven together into the fabric of national life. You cannot pick out one strand for special attention without reference to others. All these problems are linked together and have an impact on one another.

You have formed committees to deal with the constructive programme. But I was wondering what would happen if these committees worked at cross purposes. Various problems which are linked with this issue have also to be taken into account. After all, we are engaged in building a new India. When you talk of the constructive programme, it means the building of a new India with thirty-six crore human beings. It is not as if there can be one programme for everyone. Innumerable issues are linked together. Every profession which contributes to the building of a nation has to be taken into account. The attention paid to each area may differ in degrees but as far as possible all of them have to be seen in a broad national perspective. It is difficult for any individual to understand the problems of the whole of India. But the problems of the country have to be seen in a broad perspective. Otherwise they would remain as separate strands. Each issue has to be seen in the context of others. Life is becoming more and more complex day by day. The world has become an extremely complex place. Something happens somewhere and has an impact elsewhere and innocent people become its victims.

Take for instance, inflation. Everyone is affected by it. Whether it happens because of some misguided action of the government or something else, all of us have to bear the consequences. Inflation occurs because of shortages of essential goods. How are the prices to be curbed? We imposed controls. But people complain about that too. We try not to impose controls as far as possible. But sometimes we are forced to. Otherwise the country will be ruined.

1. Speech at the All-India Conference of Constructive Workers on the eve of the sixty-first session of the Indian National Congress, (11 and 12 February) Amritsar, 7 February 1956. AIR tapes, NMML. Original in Hindi.

I am trying to show you why everything needs to be seen in a broad perspective. When there are shortages of essential consumer goods, prices are bound to rise and that affects the entire country. I agree that none of us has the capacity to absorb all the problems of India. That comes with experience. We are bound to make mistakes and will gradually learn from experience. But the important thing is to see everything in a broad perspective and not as isolated strands.

I would go two steps further. You cannot stop with the national perspective alone. You have to keep the broader international perspective in mind because it has an impact on our political as well as economic life. If, unfortunately, there is a nuclear war, it will engulf all of us. We must understand the kind of world we are living in.

Now, take the domestic problems. If a village has problems, naturally we must solve them. But if you close your minds to the problems of the hundred other villages surrounding that village, you will fail to understand even the problems of that particular village because all these things are linked together. A parochial attitude is not a good thing. To solve a problem, you have to understand it in the context of other problems. If a doctor wants to treat a patient, he has to understand not only the outward symptoms but the underlying causes of the disease as well.

You may say that there is a great deal of unemployment even now in spite of there being people's rule. But the best way to open a lock is not by breaking it. You have to find the key to it. You have to use your head and try to understand the problems in the overall context. If everyone insists on looking at problems from his own isolated point of view without trying to understand all their aspects, it will not help very much.

Apart from that, as Pantji pointed out just now, though we talk big, in moments of crisis we often behave in a barbaric and narrow-minded way.² One of our colleagues talked about the tribal society. People often tend to look down upon the tribals. In my opinion, most of the tribals are far superior to us.

2. Addressing the Conference before Nehru, G.B. Pant said, "You are discussing your problems about constructive work. But what will you achieve through it if the basic things and the foundations of the country are shaken by narrow parochial things? We all talk of big things but when the time of test comes, we behave in a different way." Pant said that the recent violent upheavals in the country on the reorganisation of States had bared the weakness of the people and the country.

I am convinced about this. I am not joking. If not in everything, they are superior to us in some things.

What does the word tribal mean? Basically all of us are tribals in a sense. A tribe means a group of people who live together more or less to the exclusion of others. Their contacts with others are minimal. The concept of a tribe is completely opposed to nationalism. The tribalism in us keeps getting out in various ways, including casteism. What are castes except tribes of a sort? We may try to throw a screen over it but it comes out in various ways, in elections, for example.

What can I say about the incidents in Orissa³ except that they acted like ignorant children, not mature adults. They exposed the tribalism in us. I do not say that all our decisions are right. But even if there has been a mistake, the question is how to reconcile two opposing points of view and rectify the mistake. An old tribal custom is that in a quarrel between two tribes, the will of the one which wins the battle would prevail. The custom is no longer followed to the letter. Until thirty years ago there used to be headhunting in parts of Assam and the North East Frontier Agency. It was their method of solving their problems. I think headhunting is more civilized than what we do nowadays.

We talk about non-violence. Other nations do not talk of non-violence. They fight wars and kill one another sometimes. But you will not find there some of the things that happen here.

I do not know what we are coming to. Our youth in schools and colleges take pride in coming out on to the streets, taking out processions and making trouble. Perhaps I have become old and so I am unable to understand what is happening now. After all, I too have been a soldier and know how to fight. But what is the meaning of such actions? Very often even ten or eleven year old children are induced to join these processions. Children from primary and secondary schools take part. My complaint is with the people who drag them into such things, no matter which party it is. I do not absolve even the Congress,

3. The SRC report suggested no boundary changes for Orissa. This evoked strong reaction in several towns of Orissa, including Cuttack and Puri with mob violence and demonstrations continuing for almost ten days beginning 17 January 1956. During the demonstrations, a goods train was derailed, rail services were disrupted, government offices were picketed and AIR offices were gheraoed, mainly in Cuttack. Some political groups in Orissa sought reintegration of the outlying tracts of Saraikeela and Kharsawan in Bihar and some areas in Bastar, Raipur and Raigarh districts of Madhya Pradesh and Srikakulam and Vishakhapatnam districts of Andhra with Orissa.

for it too does such things. We have to think about these things. Otherwise, as Pantji said, the constructive programme will have no meaning. How can we build something without the foundations? It is true that the programme might help to solve the problem by cleansing the atmosphere and creating a new confidence among the people. These problems can be solved only by a spirit of service and making an impact upon the people. But it is extremely important to have a complete picture before you.

Take non-violence. It is plain for anyone to see that if we dissociate ourselves from non-violence in the conditions which prevail in India at the moment, there is no doubt about it that there will be a civil war. Various incidents which have taken place here and there in India, though not very fundamental, give a glimpse of situations in which a civil war could break out in India. In a clash between two states, as is happening between Bihar and Orissa, or Assam and Bengal or Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, it is after all the people of India who are involved. Such disputes can either be solved by mutual agreement or through a third party which enjoys the confidence of both sides, or by fighting a battle. There is no other alternative. There can be nothing more foolish than to incite the youth to violence, loot and arson as though such methods can solve the problems.

You have given me a position of great responsibility out of your love and affection. I feel that anything that happens in India is to some extent my responsibility. I do not wish to shirk my responsibility. I am prepared to take the responsibility for all that is wrong. I am aware that I cannot set everything right. But so long as I continue in this position, the responsibility rests with me and my colleagues. We cannot lay the blame at someone else's door and absolve ourselves. A man in a position of responsibility must see to it that others stick to the right path. Otherwise the link is broken. This is how I view the Congress.

I have often said that the Congress is a cementing force in the country. That was its first task after its inception. Without that cementing force, all our bravery and sacrifice would have been in vain. The Congress forged the nation into a strong organization, set great ideals and goals before it, and to some extent instilled national discipline among the people. Issues were considered openly and decisions arrived at by democratic consensus. But once a decision was taken, everyone had to abide by it. There is no alternative. Any attempt to thwart its implementation could only lead to clashes.

It would be really dangerous if that discipline disappears from the Congress. The moment tribalism and casteism grow stronger, the Congress will be weakened. You must bear in mind that if there is no internal discipline, the factors which had made the Congress strong will vanish and it cannot serve the



AT THE AICC SESSION, AMRITSAR, 9 FEBRUARY 1956. SHRIMAN NARAYAN IS ON RIGHT



AT THE CONGRESS SESSION, AMRITSAR, FEBRUARY 1956
Also seen (L to R): M.A.K. Azad, U.N. Dhebar, the Congress President, and Shriman Narayan, General Secretary

nation. It will become irrelevant. I am not bothered about how large the Congress organization is. What I am concerned about is that it should be a strong party with honesty, integrity and discipline. Once this is assured, I can face anything.

There are grave problems before us. One of our greatest failings is that though there is no dearth of able people in the country, it is not easy for even a few of them to work together. The more able they are, the more they go their own separate ways. We must pay special attention to this. The greater our responsibilities, the more necessary it becomes to ensure the cooperation of the people whose views differ from our own. If my responsibility extends to the whole country it will be my duty to try to ensure the cooperation of everyone in the country or to lead them in a certain direction. It is a different matter that I may not always succeed. I do not belong to a small little party, I have to think not only of myself but take the thirty-six crore people in the country with me. This is the problem. There is no point in my striving for some goal by myself. I must explain it to thirty-six crore people and lead them in a certain direction. It may mean slowing down the pace somewhat or giving them a push occasionally or dragging them along. I cannot dig in my heels and insist on doing what I feel is right. I cannot then hope to have an impact on others and nor will I benefit by others' views. It is a question of mutual give and take.

Suppose we have a small committee of ten or twelve individuals. How can the committee function if each member sticks adamantly to his own point of view and does not pay heed to the others? It cannot function at all. The nation is after all a much larger entity. There has to be a general consensus in the country. If there are fundamental differences of opinion, a consensus may not be possible. But, if there is an agreement on fundamental principles, then there will be a mutual give and take and cooperation. Democracy cannot function if each individual insists that what he says is right.

Therefore, it is extremely important that we should have a broad perspective before us. The scope of the constructive programme has widened and now embraces practically all spheres of activity in India. It is obvious that an individual cannot take on everything. He can do only one or two things. But in considering any issue, one has to keep a broad perspective before oneself. We are building the edifice of India. We cannot do so on one pillar. We have to build pillars and walls and arches before the edifice can be completed. Therefore, the scope of the constructive programme has increased enormously.

What is the government after all? It is the task of the government to undertake a constructive programme for nation building. It is the task of the government to eradicate the evils of poverty and unemployment which beset the country, generate

employment and lay the foundations of national strength in every possible way. It may take years to make an impact. But this is the task of a government.

In the days of British rule, the government and public were two separate entities. On the one hand you had government officials and the police, and on the other the non-officials and the public. They were mutually antagonistic and suspicious of one another. It is obvious that when the two wheels of a nation pull in different directions, it cannot move. When we were in opposition to the government, it was in order to change it, not to cooperate with it. But now that the country is free, it is absolutely wrong for the government and the public to be on opposite sides. There has been considerable change on both sides. But I think that the government servants continue to work in the old ways. They hesitate to meet the public. The Community Projects and the National Extension Service have brought a change in the way of functioning of government servants. They have had to work among the people. There is no doubt that many of them have done excellent work which the public have liked. I would like to tell you that in many places the government servants have become public leaders because of their work.

At the same time, I would like to point out that there is great scope for improvement. It is not easy for government officials to change their method of working. Similarly there is scope for the people to change their attitude of regarding all government officials as their enemies. What is the meaning of our youth throwing stones at them? They have not come from some other country. Policemen are also Indians. Their sons and daughters read in colleges and will grow up to be police officers. All these are linked together. I concede that the police commit atrocities sometimes. That should be inquired into. But it is absurd to think of them as a foreign force or enemies and in terms of winning or losing against them. If we fight among ourselves, all of us will lose. This is how we must look at these things. The important thing is our capacity to cooperate in spite of differences. Otherwise all our efforts will be in vain.

I hope you will take all this into account. It is obvious that we will overcome our problems including casteism and tribalism. The condition of the people will continue to improve and poverty and unemployment will be eliminated. The problems of a nation are, of course, never ending. But at least we shall overcome these old problems. So we come around once again to the question of progress in the country. All our five year plans are directed towards that. It has to come gradually, step by step. The problem is that the proper cooperation should begin to enable the five year plans to succeed.

I have taken up a great deal of your time. You will of course go into the details of the various proposals. I hope you will keep a broad perspective in mind.

2. States and the Nation¹

This is more than a resolution.² It is argumentative although hardly any long arguments are required to support it. It takes up the question of linguistic provinces and language and tries first of all to point out how this idea of linguistic provinces arose in the past in the Congress, how it was acted upon, and how it has got mixed up with the question of language and then points are sought to be clarified by this resolution. Please remember that on the one hand, we must attach the greatest importance to the development of our languages. On the other hand, we have to consider matters from an administrative point of view and variety of new points of view.

The language point of view necessarily has to be considered in drawing up a state boundary. But it is not the only point; in fact, it need not be even the dominating point. This resolution points out several other matters also. It is not correct for Kakasahib Gadgil to say, that this is a violent departure from the thirty or forty years practice of the Congress.³ The Congress functioned in a different way thirty years ago. And in fact, in the last three or four years, and ever since this matter came up before the country for consideration, the Congress has repeatedly proclaimed that language is not the only consideration. It has said this so many times, that I am surprised at his statement. But let that be. I say that it indeed is a departure from the old practice or the old ideas. It is about time that we made that departure. Are we to stick to some approach to a

1. Speech on the resolution on reorganisation of states at the Subjects Committee meeting, Amritsar, 10 February 1956. AIR tapes, NMML.
2. The resolution on reorganisation of states, finalised by the CWC on 10 February 1956, was moved at the Subjects Committee meeting by G.B. Pant. This resolution stated that language could not be the dominating factor in the demarcation of states, although it was an important factor to be considered. The resolution added that "violence and methods of coercion by one group against another for purpose of provincial demarcation is a betrayal of all that India has stood for and can never be accepted as a legitimate way of tackling such problems."
3. N.V. Gadgil, Congressman from Maharashtra and a former Union Minister, was the lone critic of the resolution on the reorganisation of states. He said the resolution was a violent departure from the set policy of the Congress for the past thirty years. He added that what was in the resolution was something which was opposed to the whole trend of political thought carefully nurtured by the Congress, namely the trend towards formation of linguistic states.

question whether it is applicable and desirable or not? Again I repeat, nobody is challenging the importance of the language and of the cultural work that is done through it with its being a binding factor. All that is important, but the whole point is that there are other factors too.

One of the major things that are happening in this country in the course of the last few years, is a gradual shift of public thinking from political issues to economic and social issues. The average man in the street talks about the Five Year Plan, development schemes and all that. Now, this shift in thinking to social and economic issues, is a matter of importance as showing, if I may say so, a certain definite advance in our people. People think purely on political line when their country is a backward country struggling to free itself politically from the bonds that hold it. It may be a fighting country, it may be a struggling country, like the country was during the national struggle for freedom. But it is not an advancing country. The very fact that we have a national struggle for freedom means that we are not free, that we are backward economically, that we are under a colonial or semicolonial economy and all that. A backward country principally thinks on political lines. It is as you advance that you begin thinking on economic and social lines. Because you are grappling with the real problems of real life, the problems that affect millions of people. Mentally, political thinking is middle class thinking. It is not the thinking which applies to the millions and hundreds of millions in a country. Of course, political thinking affects the masses. A struggle for freedom affects the masses. But essentially, political thinking is largely confined to the middle class unless in some particular matter, it thinks with the masses. It is economic and social thinking that goes down to the masses. Obviously when we became independent, we had to think of economic problems. Not only think of them, but we had to take the public into our confidence and convince them that great things are happening in India. Take any country in Europe, America or wherever you like. See what type of thinking is going on there and what are the questions put and whether they are purely political or economic or social. You can give an answer as to how that nation is functioning, whether it is advancing or tied up in some old problems, which have no relevance today from the point of view of human advance.

Applying that test, this business of redistribution of provinces, important as it is surely, cannot be considered so vital from the point of view of economic and social advance. The Chief Ministers of West Bengal and Bihar announced the other day a major proposal of a union of these two great provinces.⁴ We commend them. Further we do say that this is desirable. Not on grounds of

4. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol.31, pp.212-214.

sentiment, not because of a sudden reaction from the horrors caused by this linguistic violence but because essentially we have begun to think on social and economic lines. The point is that the lines of the five year plan and planned development do not necessarily follow the linguistic boundaries. You may share, as Bengal and Orissa and Bengal and Bihar do, the richest mineral and industrial area in India. That area is developed more than any part in India. You have iron works, steel works, coal mines and so on. It has enormous potentialities for further development. Therefore, if Bengal and Bihar come together, it is very beneficial from the point of view of planned development. There is no question of language suffering. Language will flourish. The Bengali language will flourish and the Hindi language in Bihar will flourish. But the economic question gets more attention. Then again the States in South India and elsewhere will cooperate to develop water resources, forest resources and all kinds of things jointly. It is not a question of sheer sentiment. I do not particularly fancy large conglomeration of States but the economic factor is important.

Events that have happened recently have been a great shock to many of us. I am not talking particularly of the riots, etc., in Bombay or Orissa. I am more interested in the reactions to events. Sometimes the reaction to an event is more important than the event itself and it is the reaction to these events that have occurred in connection with the redistribution of states that has created this impression that some of our people attach greater importance to some state boundary than to the unity of India. They will not say so, but their actions are more eloquent than words. Kakasahib Gadgil said something to the effect that they were not in a position to control the strong feelings that had been aroused with it. I can understand that. Where does that lead us? First of all, if you sow the wind you have to reap the whirlwind. You cannot run away from it. You are either swept away by the whirlwind or you will have to fight it and control it. There is no other way. All of us make mistakes in dealing with this question. Maybe, those mistakes were made in a bona fide way, we meant well. Nevertheless, they have been made and certain situations have arisen and there is the whirlwind. All that this resolution and the Call to the Nation resolution⁵ issued by the Working Committee some two weeks ago venture to suggest to the Congress that this whirlwind should be controlled. Because giving in to whirlwind by being swept away by them means really giving up every

5. For this resolution see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 31, pp. 210-212.

faculty that you possess and simply surrendering to chaos. Now that is the basic position that you have to face. Maybe a wrong decision has been made here and a right decision there. But I say the basic position that the country faces today is not this particular matter of deciding this rightly or wrongly, but of allowing the situation in this country to deteriorate. That is the question before the country, not the question of Bombay or Maharashtra, or Punjab or Bengal or Orissa or any place. For my part, I do not care very much if this whole question is postponed except for the very valid reason that Pantji gave, lest people think that we are afraid and, therefore, we are postponing a decision. There is no sense of fear, I can tell you, only a sense of sorrow in our heart that we should have been driven into these unhappy circumstances. Therefore, let us think in perspective. Having got the perspective, and having allowed some time to elapse for people to calm down and their passions to cool, I am quite sure we can deal with any question much more satisfactorily than today. I am sorry that particularly when we are dealing with this Second Five Year Plan and big things are in the air, we should have to give so much energy to this matter. I do not agree with my friend, S.K. Patil,⁶ that for hundreds of years this thing will hang on our heads. I hope not. But this has been a bad show, there is no doubt about it.

Here we meet in this city of Amritsar. Many of you who live here, or live in the Punjab, have seen some sights here, eight and half years ago, which you will never forget. I saw sights here, and in Pakistan, and in Delhi city, which I could not have imagined, could occur. I shall never forget the horrors, yet even these horrible memories now belong to the past. They are there, but they do not impinge upon our minds and hearts. Life goes on. Bombay will take up the threads again and get going. The real problem today and tomorrow and the day after is how to heal the wounds that Bombay has suffered. When I talk about the wounds I am not referring to the buildings burnt or the physical gashes but the wounds in the hearts. And remember this, nothing is worse or more difficult to cure than self-inflicted wounds. Bombay has been wounding itself. Whether Maharashtrians, or Gujaratis, or Hindustanis, they have been inflicting these wounds on one another. It is terrible. What does it matter where Bombay city is if these wounds remain, and the people cannot cooperate? Remember, Bombay, over the last hundred, hundred and fifty years, has grown up into a complex structure, in which vast numbers of people have lived and

6. President, Bombay Pradesh Congress Committee.

cooperated. For me it is a matter of no consequence where Bombay goes. Because I attach no importance to state boundaries. For me every state is the same. I left Uttar Pradesh long ago. It is a distant State for me, Kerala or Madras is the same to me as Uttar Pradesh, Bihar or Bengal or Bombay or any. So I do not understand this passion for state boundaries. But I do understand people inflicting injuries on each other, not merely physical, but other injuries which are deeper, and that is what distresses me. I am very sorry for the Maharashtrians, for the Gujaratis, for the others. I know that much of this was done by ruffians and hooligans. It is absolutely wrong for us to hold any community responsible for this kind of thing. But it is true that we have not been careful about doing things which incite others. Often enough, we have allowed student troubles, student marches, student "action committees".⁷ We have developed a new language in this country, which does not exist in any other country of this wide world. So far as I know "action committees" of students have never occurred to anybody in the wide world except in India. And so we let these nice boys and girls and their action committees march and shout and do this and that. Gradually what happens? All the rowdies and the hooligans in the city come and join them and they take control and commit violence or arson. There is a big row and the police comes and the police indulges in some shooting and there is a hoo-haa, "the police is shooting, where are the civil liberties?" It is expected that under the name of civil liberties, arson and violence, etc., should go on and the police should look through. I just do not understand where our thinking is going to.

We have not got quite used to the fact that we are a free people. That is the difficulty. Specially those organisations, those parties which may be in the opposition. They continue thinking in the old groove that India was a country governed by an alien power, when the police was an alien police, when all kinds of things were alien to us. They cannot get out of it. So we have to be very cautious about, if I may repeat, sowing the wind and reaping the whirlwind. The whirlwind has come and did come to Bombay, and elsewhere. It is no good blaming anybody. The job today is to heal these wounds, to make the Maharashtrians and Gujaratis shake hands again, make friends again. They have lived for ages past together and they have got to live for ages to come together. Therefore, I would appeal to all of you and through you to the Maharashtrians, the Gujaratis and the others, to get to grips with this whirlwind

7. The reference is to the "action committees" formed in Bihar during the students' agitation following incidents of August 1955.

and put an end to it, to come together again, to remember that every question is easy to solve if it is approached in a temperate and a friendly way and that every question becomes terribly difficult if it is sought to be solved by violence and coercive methods and threats. Every attempt at threat arouses the manhood on the other side. Are we going to be threatened and coerced? Is the Government going to be threatened and coerced and keep quiet? Sorry, sorry, that Government had better resign and go home and do something else. Certainly our Government is not going to do that. It has no intention of resigning, or indeed to be hustled into any action which it disapproves. But it has every intention of trying to win the goodwill of the people whom it has the honour to represent, and it is a matter of the deepest sorrow to me and my colleagues in Government, that such a crisis should take place. I do not blame anybody and I am prepared to take the blame for anything wrong that happens in India. Where did we err or what have we done wrong? Maybe others have done wrong too. But, after all it is we who are responsible for it, not the others. So, I am prepared to take all the blame. By taking the blame I do not run away from my responsibility and I hope I am not obstinate. The one governing passion of my life has been love for the Indian people and wherever I have gone, in whatever part of this country, they have shown so much affection to me that I have always felt overcome and very very small before their affection. I have wondered how it is possible for us not to repay that affection and to do some little thing to serve them, and to help them to better themselves. And it pains me greatly to see some of these occurrences. Two or three years ago I went to Maharashtra and my visit there is fresh in my memory. There was scarcity there and people were suffering but they had a smile on their faces, and courage in their eyes and affection also in their eyes. I shall never forget that combination of courage and affection in spite of hardship and difficulty. What will India do without these various fine elements of the Indian people? Whether it is the Maharashtrians or the Gujaratis or the Bengalis or the Tamilians, each one is a brilliant facet of India's heart and India's head. It pains me to see these differences, I feel no difference in me. I may not know the Tamil language but I am completely at home with the Tamil people. We know each other, we smile with each other, we are happy even though we may not be able to speak to each other. So I do submit that we have to give a lead to the country to pull itself up, and prevent it going in these wrong directions, which bring conflict and bitterness. Then it is easy to solve any problem that we may have.

3. Foundations of Indian Foreign Policy¹

Mr President,² Chairman,³

Forgive me but our President has asked me to speak. He has not invited you yet. It would be a good thing if we spoke one at a time.⁴ You may have noticed that I am not speaking on the resolution.⁵ I was asked to come in only when the resolution had been presented and formally accepted after voting, so that nobody might suspect that I had a hand in this resolution. But whether I have had to do anything with the resolution or not, it is obvious that I have some connection with these matters of our foreign policy. However, anyone who thinks that it has evolved over the last four or five years from my head or anyone else's is mistaken. The fact is that you have to go back ten, fifteen, twenty years or more to understand how our foreign policy has evolved. It has been a product of the Congress thinking and yet not wholly so. I want that our foreign policy must always be true to India's thinking and outlook. It is bound to be if we were not to betray our ancient heritage.

First of all, we must understand clearly that our foreign policy is a product of India's outlook and thinking. It has not evolved suddenly at any one time but is based on certain fundamental principles. You will find that the Congress resolutions even fifteen, twenty years ago pointed in this direction. We may have had to make certain alterations according to changing circumstances. But the fundamental thinking and principles remain the same.

1. Speech on the resolution on international affairs at the open session of the Congress, Amritsar, 11 February 1956. AIR tapes, NMML. Original in Hindi.
2. U.N. Dhebar, President, Indian National Congress.
3. Gurmukh Singh Musafir, Chairman of the Reception Committee of Amritsar Session.
4. As Nehru stood on the rostrum to speak at the Congress President's request there were continuous roars of *Jawaharlal Nehru Ki Jai* from various quarters. This continued for several minutes, after which Nehru made these remarks to the audience, in a lighter vein.
5. The open session began with a discussion on the "Message of the Buddha" resolution. After this, the resolution on international affairs was moved by Morarji Desai. This resolution appreciated that *Panch Shila* had been welcomed and accepted by many countries as the basis of their relations with India. It also reaffirmed India's basic policy not to align herself with any power bloc and to work for peace through friendship of all nations.

I mentioned principles. There is no doubt about it that there is no other nation in the world which speaks so vociferously about principles. We are constantly throwing principles at other people's heads. We give good advice to others to follow principles, to maintain peace. Sometimes I wonder whether we pay mere lip service to our noble principles or believe in them. Ultimately our resolutions do not have much effect on others in the world. What really counts are our actions. Here we are passing resolutions and huge processions are taken out in Amritsar and elsewhere.⁶ Not that I have any objection to processions. People are welcome to take out processions from morning till night, three hundred and sixty-five days a year. But my advice to you is that you should engage yourself in more useful tasks and not waste your time. I want you to advise others in India that the time has come to do something instead of taking out processions. It is a different matter if you take out processions to bring some warmth into your bodies in this cold weather. I am not criticizing anyone but merely pointing out how odd the whole thing is. Where is the sense in taking out processions to intimidate one another and prove which side is stronger? The fact of the matter is that nobody is going to get the chance to wield any weapons. All this is merely for show. I am not casting aspersions on anyone. But I want to tell you that this is madness in today's world. It has nothing to do with reality. Where is the connection between nuclear weapons and this childishness?

There are two ways of thinking. One is to lay stress on arms and the might of armies. The question of an individual's bravery and courage does not arise in this case because nuclear weapons can inflict great damage at long distance. Anyhow, one method of gauging a nation's strength is by its military power and arsenals. If that is the yardstick, then lathis and swords are outdated weapons which should be relegated to museums. It has become a joke today. There is someone I know who does not believe in talking politely. So he carries a knife around with him. He thinks it is a big thing.

We talk about principles with other countries. What is much more important is how far we practice what we preach. Yesterday there were riots in some

6. Nehru was responding to the day-long processions taken out by the Akali Dal and the Maha Punjab Samiti in Amritsar to press for their rival demands of Punjabi Suba and Maha Punjab respectively. Nehru added in a lighter vein that the longer a procession, the more impressive it was supposed to be. Luckily the processionists were out to impress each other rather than the spectators—"you and me", added Nehru.

cities about which a resolution is to come up before you. First of all, there is no place for the weak and the cowardly in the world today. Two, real strength does not lie in weapons and armies but in the hearts of men. Inner, spiritual strength is what really counts. Other things will follow automatically. The greatest exemplar of peace, Mahatma Gandhi, said that unless we have courage and strength, we had no right to speak of non-violence. We must not try to hide our cowardice behind a cloak of non-violence. If there is fear or bitterness in our hearts it is better to take out the sword and fight. Non-violence must not become a cloak for fear and cowardice. Not that Gandhiji was in favour of violence. But non-violence to him was a sign of strength, not weakness or cowardice. How could a coward have challenged the British empire? Moral strength, the capacity of human beings to work together, to make sacrifices, all those are tremendous sources of strength and in the ultimate analysis even more powerful than atom bombs.

Now, we do not have the atom bomb, nor do we have any intention of making one. It is beyond us and anyhow we do not want it. So we will only make laughing stock of ourselves if we brandish sticks and swords and preen ourselves on being powerful. We are neither here nor there. Akbar Ali Khan Saheb⁷ has praised me and said that the resolution is in praise of me, that we carry the message of peace to the world and what not. Let me tell you quite clearly that I do not send any message to anyone. The only way to put across a message is through practice. Mere words have no impact. We can make an impression only if we can demonstrate something by practising what we preach. Otherwise politicians usually talk so much nonsense that nobody pays any attention to it, in India or elsewhere.

In my opinion, it is imperative to practise what we preach not merely because these are noble principles but also because it is the only viable path to follow in this world of ours today with its nuclear weapons. To eschew war and work for peace is the only safe course today for India and the world. The other course will lead to certain ruin and destruction. It is right as a principle anyhow. Secondly, if we try to put it into practice at home, it has an impact on others.

India's influence in the world stems from two or three things. First of all, the world still remembers Gandhiji and the unique method of non-violence

7. (1899-1994); Member, Rajya Sabha, 1954-66, Governor, UP, 1972-74 and Orissa, 1974-76.

which we followed to get freedom from colonial rule. It made a tremendous impact upon the world. Two, our achievements during the last seven or eight years have made an impression. The world has seen that India is on the move, that it has an inner strength which will gradually lead to its becoming a great power. So we are respected. Thirdly, after the initial doubt and suspicion, people have begun to realize that we are honest in what we say and genuinely interested in the cause of world peace. We have no desire to play a major role in the world stage. We want to keep aloof. On the other hand, I observe what is going on all around us and take an interest in world affairs. I am aware that we cannot live in isolation. On the other hand, I feel a great urge to forget about the rest of the world and concentrate on matters within the country. Once there is some progress we can play a role in world affairs. But it is simply not possible to forget the outside world. It intrudes upon us whether we like it or not. However, the fact of the matter is that our first and foremost task is to make India strong. The stronger we are, the greater the impact that we can make on others.

Anyhow, what I mean to say is that I have no desire to dole out good advice. For one thing, it is bad manners to presume to give advice to others. My first impulse is one of impatience if anyone tries to give me advice. I am sure that must be the reaction of others to my advice too. So we must stop giving advice to one another. There is bound to be a debate over the larger issues and the pros and cons are discussed at length to find a solution. But to preach like missionaries whether it is religion or politics is not liked by others. The moment that happens it implies that we consider ourselves superior or more intelligent and so we are presuming to advise others. Superiority is all very well. But you do not have to impose it on others. If we really have stature, the others will be able to gauge it for themselves. So we can do no good by doling out advice. The only way we can exert some influence is by practising what we believe in and leave it to the others to draw their own conclusions. Cooperation with the other countries of the world is bound to teach us a little about one another's good and bad points.

All right, you may ask why there are criticisms in the resolution about certain positions. You will be justified. The fact is that even if we wish to remain aloof, the world is all around us in our day to day affairs. We have to express our viewpoint. For one thing, our chief interest lies in promoting world peace because otherwise there is a grave danger of total annihilation. Therefore we want to avert anything that may lead to war. At least we try to do so. Our efforts do not go very far but sometimes when things are evenly balanced, we can tilt the balance by throwing our weight on one side. We

cannot compete with the super powers who are evenly matched in an arms race. In such a situation a third party, even a small power can make some difference. We were able to do just this in Korea and Indo-China and the outcome was good. Please remember that we did it not single handed. There were many others also. But sometimes you need an outsider to trigger off a process because the participants may feel shy of initiating the talks. There is usually so much bitterness and hatred that they consider it beneath their dignity to be the first to suggest holding talks. This is the situation in the world. We, on the other hand, have no hesitation in talking to anyone. We are quite brazen about it. So we have proved useful in solving some knotty international problems. At least we have been able to point out in the direction of a solution.

For one thing, we have participated only in the larger issues with which we are not directly concerned. The other issues are those which have a direct impact on us. How can we keep quiet when a neighbouring country starts mobilizing its forces or entering into military pacts? We feel that such activities are bound to have an impact on world peace. So we object to them. Secondly, they affect us directly too, by posing a threat to India's security and defence. We had voiced our protest against the signing of the SEATO pact though it does not affect us very much. We were concerned about the consequences in general. In our opinion it has increased tensions in South East Asia just when the region was returning to normalcy after the Indo-China war. So we protested. You cannot talk about peace and continue to prepare for war at the same time.

Now, take the Baghdad Pact. It concerns us more closely because it is bound to have repercussions on India if not today, certainly in the future. We had to voice our views because it increases our burden. We have to be more vigilant and make all sorts of arrangements. How can they claim that there is peace in West Asia when the Arab countries are divided into two camps? So we have said that we are against the Baghdad Pact.

What I am trying to say is that we have no desire to interfere in world affairs except when we feel that they concern us directly or may have a harmful effect on India. Two, we play a role when we feel that we can serve the cause of peace in the world by averting war. Three, we want friendship with all nations. These are the fundamental issues.

Panch Shila is an ancient principle of ours which has acquired a new meaning today. It has gained currency in other countries too. I feel that if all nations of the world practise it there is bound to be peace in the world. What does *Panch Shila* stand for? One, it means acceptance of national sovereignty and independence. Two, non-aggression. Three, non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries which is extremely important. Most wars are caused

by such interference. Four, coexistence and finally, mutual respect for one another.

There is no doubt about it that the principles are excellent. Nobody can deny that. But people ask what guarantee is there that they will be implemented in practice and how nations are to be trusted. What is the answer to that? You often find rifts between brothers or friends. But the basic principle is that you will be done to as you do to others. If you show love, you will gradually win love. If you are belligerent, the response will be in kind. There are no angels in this world. None of us is an angel. On the other hand, nobody is a complete devil either. The same is true of nations. No country is hundred per cent good or bad. They are usually a mixture of the two in varying degrees. If we constantly harp on the bad points of others and fail to show affection or exacerbate their feelings, we make an enemy. For instance, foreign newspapers, particularly in the west are highly critical of India. We read these reports and do not like the criticisms. Nobody likes to hear criticisms. They do have some impact on our relations with them whether we like it or not though it is wrong.

I have no doubt in my mind that if we want peace in the world, we must not criticise one another. We do not like everything that happens in the world. But who are we to sit on judgement and show everyone the error of their ways? We are sure that we can go our way if there is no interference. Today, a cold war is raging in the world. What does it imply? There are constant attempts to malign and criticize and drag down one another in every way except through armed combat. How can there be peace when everything points to war?

Everybody is agreed upon one thing. At least every sensible human being in the world as well as great leaders in some countries accept the fact that in this age of nuclear weapons, another world war will lead to total annihilation. So it is unthinkable. Leaders in America, Soviet Union, France and smaller countries are all agreed upon this. Once it is decided that a world war has to be averted at all costs, I cannot understand what a cold war is all about. It can mean only one thing and that is, it is preparation for a hot war. If there is no threat of a hot war, how can a cold war persist? It can serve no purpose except to create bitterness and tension and lead to enormous expenditure on armaments. It is absolutely meaningless. Everybody is agreed that there is no better way than to accept *Panch Shila* and its principles of sovereignty, non-interference, co-existence and mutual cooperation. Even if hundred per cent cooperation is not possible, a start can be made. At least the constant harping on war can be averted. The unlimited expenditure on armaments can be curtailed and even if one-fourth of it can be used for development, the world will be transformed.

You must have noticed that the resolution ends with an appraisal of India's strength.⁸ Our armed forces are good. But we cannot compete with the big powers. The real strength of a nation lies in its economic condition, its progress and stamina. We must put all our energy into the task of development and demonstrate to the world that we have a strong character. It is something that nobody can take away from us. By doing this we will not only benefit ourselves but can also serve the world by setting an example.

The resolution has been accepted. I want you to understand the basic tenets of our foreign policy which are rooted in the thinking in India for centuries. Circumstances may change the policy slightly. But the basic principles remain the same. The western powers are amazed at our temerity that we should follow a different path. I do not wish to criticize anyone or point out their mistakes except when our paths cross directly. Then we have to think of the consequences for India and the world.

So our foreign policy has been based on the principle of friendship with all, no military pact with any country, and working for world peace. For the rest, we wish to conserve our energy for the task of development. We shall extend a hand of friendship even to the countries which are annoyed with us for we are convinced that their anger will evaporate. If we too reciprocate in kind, there will be hardly any friendship in the world.

I have tried to outline some basic principles of our foreign policy. It is not a new discovery but the heritage of centuries and the product of forty years of thinking within the Congress.

8. The last line of the resolution read: "It reminds the nation, however, that the internal unity of India, economic and political strength and the strength of national character are imperative for the pursuit and success of the declared policies of the government in international affairs."

4. The Economic Tasks¹

Mr President and Colleagues,

I present this resolution² before you on our economic policy and the Five Year Plan. It is a long resolution. So with your permission I will not read the entire resolution because you have got a copy of it. Before I go into the details, I should like to mention that the Planning Commission have also issued big tomes giving all the details of the Second Plan. But even they do not cover everything. After all, it is a vast and complicated subject. First, we have to decide what our policy should be and secondly, how to implement that policy all over India.

But before I say anything about this, I wish to draw your attention to one thing. You have come from various parts of India to Amritsar and there is no doubt about it that this city will produce many kinds of thoughts in your minds. Many of you would have seen the Jallianwalla Bagh and other famous spots of Amritsar, including the site where the Congress Session was held in 1919, all of which have a special place in the history of India. Jallianwalla Bagh is a great landmark for it is there that the nation began a new chapter of its history. Great atrocities were committed and much blood was shed, of Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs. But today when we think of Jallianwalla Bagh, it is not with grief but with reverence as a symbol of the awakening of a nation. Why then should we grieve about it? People die all the time and everyone has to die some time or the other. But we should not grieve over a tragedy which has led to the awakening of a nation.

So Amritsar and its Jallianwalla Bagh, etc., are great landmarks in the history of India. I call it a landmark because when a nation is on the move, there is no final destination for it. There are only landmarks which the nation reaches and crosses for it can never stop. The moment a nation thinks it has reached its

1. Speech while moving the resolution on economic policy and five year plan at the open session of the Congress, Amritsar, 12 February 1956. AIR tapes, NMML. Original in Hindi.
2. The resolution on economic policy reaffirmed the Congress objective as one of establishing a socialist pattern of society. The resolution added that the Second Five Year Plan should build on the foundations already laid and to proceed more rapidly towards the solution to the chronic problem of poverty and unemployment and the achievement of a large measure of economic independence.

final destination, it will start going downhill. Many centuries ago, we Indians had got into this erroneous way of thinking and felt that we had nothing more to do. As a result, we began to slip and fall, while the other countries went ahead. Therefore there can be no final destination in the history of any nation. We have to keep marching ahead, keep progressing and combating our weaknesses and problems.

India is on the march once again after a very long time. The preparations had been going on from before. But the year 1919 was one during which the country was transformed. It was the year in which a new chapter began in the history of our country, a new wave of enthusiasm spread and in a sense, the Gandhian era began. The imprint of Gandhiji's personality and his message was on all of us and we learnt to work and grow strong under his guidance. The struggle began then and many things happened. Many of you may remember that in 1920-21, we had the non-cooperation movement. In 1930, another great event, the Dandi March, was undertaken by Mahatma Gandhi, which was yet another great landmark in our freedom struggle. Many more chapters were written in 1940, 1941 and 1942 and the final one in 1947 when we became free. It did not turn out as we had imagined, we lost a part of the country. Anyhow, we became free and the British rule was terminated after centuries. It was the end of an era. A destination had been reached. We had to embark on another immediately after that.

If you look at the history of India during the last couple of centuries, you find different landmarks and significant events. Nearly a hundred years ago, our first bid for freedom had taken place in 1857 which was unsuccessful, but it took us a step forward. The various chapters of our history when we were engaged in challenging the British were political in nature. Now with the coming of freedom, the complexion has changed and it is economic development which gains precedence over politics. I had told you in another connection that a great deal depends on the kind of problems that a country faces. If the problems are merely political and there is tension in the country, it cannot reach out to other problems. When a country thinks of its economic problems it makes real progress. Now what are the goals that we have set before us in this country? We can gauge them by the five year plans. The First one is over, the Second is just starting. The two will help us to gauge correctly how far we have reached, how much our wealth has increased and the rate of production of essential goods, etc.

Thus our emphasis on economic policies, especially the five year plans, has evolved a new way of thinking and implementation and given us new symbols of our progress. All this started when we drew up the First Five Year

Plan. The actual thinking had begun a year or two earlier. It is obvious that it was our first experience of something like that. We did not have adequate resources to implement it because the five year plan is not just a list of our wishes and hopes. That would be an easy thing to do, to put down on paper that we wish to remove poverty, provide employment to everyone, make everybody better off, etc. But that is not planning. When we draw up a plan, we must be fully aware of what our resources are and how far they would stretch. We can, of course, make a general statement saying the situation in the country is good, bad or indifferent. But we need a correct estimate of the situation in the country, its income, our shortfalls, the goods which are essential like food, clothing, etc., need for employment and other things. We have to draw up an estimate of where we fall short and then set up a target for ourselves over the next five, ten, fifteen or twenty years and plan on what we will have to do to achieve them. It is not enough to appeal to everyone to do his bit. We must have a proper understanding of the things that we need to stress and our priorities. If we try to do everything at once, we will not be able to achieve anything at all, because we can go only so far as our resources permit.

In the First Five Year Plan we did not have sufficient experience and we did not possess the correct statistical data about the country. You may feel that that is surprising, for if we were not aware of the conditions in our country, who else would be?

We were aware in a vague way but detailed statistical knowledge was lacking. For instance, before a census was done, we could have said that India's population is very large but nobody could pin-point exactly how large it was. We could have easily been wrong by five or ten crores. Therefore, statistics are important to gauge where the population is increasing, where there is increase or decrease in employment, what are the types of work that need to be provided, etc. So long as these things are not known statistically we cannot diagnose the malady correctly and find the remedy. The difficulty is that there are many doctors, *vaid*s and *hakim*s in our country who are prepared to treat an illness without even trying to understand its nature. Before we try to give an answer, we must know what the question is. If the problem is known, then even if the solution is difficult it can be found. Generally, people pay less attention to problems because their minds are seething with solutions. This is not the way to do planning. First, we must know clearly what the problems are. It is necessary to see the picture of the whole country clearly. Ultimately, there are a number of things that need to be done. But broadly speaking, our first priority is to increase our national wealth because India is a poor country. Then we have to ensure that the wealth is properly distributed among the people of the

country. So production of wealth and its equitable distribution are two broad necessities.

Now how are we to go about doing them? One is by the hard work. Wealth does not mean borrowing from someone else on interest. That is not production of wealth but merely money-lending. Increase in production of wealth means producing something new from land or industries, handicrafts, cottage industries, etc. Planning involves a proper understanding of the country's problems and not building castles in the air. Generally, it is the habit of political parties to build castles in the air without going into details.

We made a start with the First Five Year Plan and worked very hard to draw it up carefully. But we did not have sufficient resources. Even so, as you know, our First Plan was extremely successful. We were able to achieve most of the targets we had set before us and in many cases exceeded them. This resolution mentions the fact that the per capita income has gone up by eighteen per cent during the last five years. Now eighteen per cent may not be very much. But it is a very good step and believe me it is not a mean achievement. We have had to work very hard to increase it to this level. You must remember that the population is also increasing. So more wealth has to be produced if the growing population is to be provided for. You can see the list of our other achievements also. The biggest achievement was on the food front. Do you remember what the situation in the country was three or four years ago? I think four years ago we had to import forty-two lakh tonnes of wheat from outside. One tonne is twenty-eight maunds. It was an enormous quantity and we had to pay for it in precious foreign exchange. You can imagine what a dangerous situation it was. If there were food shortages in a fundamentally agricultural country like India, on what basis could we progress? How could we hope to establish industries or anything else? But we could not let the people starve. So we had to go in for imports.

Now what is the position four years later? We have brought the situation under control. I do not say that we are completely out of the woods. We must remain vigilant and keep trying to increase our food production. Last year there were floods in the Punjab and crops were badly damaged not only in the Punjab, but in parts of Uttar Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Pepsu, Assam, Bihar, parts of Bengal. Almost half of India was affected by the floods and there was great damage to the crops.³ In the South, there was a cyclone which uprooted

3. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 30, p. 189.

entire villages and destroyed crops. In spite of all these setbacks, the food situation remained under control which is a big thing.

This great victory of the people of India has had an impact on us as well as the world, for people outside did not think that we would progress so quickly in this matter. I remember when I was in London two and a half years ago and mentioned that we are getting a grip over the food problem, they did not believe me.⁴ They felt that in spite of our desire, it would not be easy to bring the food situation under control so quickly. But when they saw it actually happening, they were amazed. So this is a big victory for us. I want you to bear this in mind because often in political debates, we forget the bigger things. Our increasing the food production in India within the last four years is a bigger victory than any victory in war.⁵

There are also other things. But I am not going into details. We have undertaken big projects. Bhakra-Nangal, which is 150 miles away from here, is the biggest dam of its kind in the world today. It is possible that mistakes may have been made in the project. But what you must see is that we have put up a grand thing by our own hard work and ability. It has become an example for the world. There are other projects all over India—the Damodar Valley Project, the Sindri Fertilizer Factory, the factories in Bangalore for building aeroplanes, railway engines are being made in Chittaranjan and steamships are being built in Vishakhapatnam. Big national science laboratories have been established all over India, which are the foundations for our scientific progress. Europe and the United States and the Soviet Union have advanced only through scientific progress.

It is indeed a long list. But I want to draw your attention to one thing in particular. Our schemes for rural development like the Community Projects and National Extension Service are not a copy of any other nation. We have learnt things from other nations. But this is something which is our own and particularly suited to our conditions. So far as I can remember, these schemes have spread to nearly 125,000 villages, i.e., almost one-fourth of the total number of our villages. I do not say that they have been one hundred per cent successful. There have been ups and downs. But anyone who is familiar with rural India is amazed at the effect the scheme has had. You must remember that however

4. Nehru was in London in May-June 1953 to attend the coronation of Queen Elizabeth II and to attend the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference. For Nehru's remarks on the food problem at a press conference, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 22, pp. 174-175.
5. The increase in food production was 20 per cent.

much we may progress in the big cities, the real problem will always be the villages of India where seventy-five per cent or eighty per cent of the population lives. As long as they are not shaken up, any progress that India makes will remain to some extent superficial. Therefore, the work that is going on in the village has great significance. The most important aspect is the impact it has made on the minds of the villagers and the atmosphere that has been created. In the earlier days, their minds were stagnant and they followed the age-old practices and put their faith in fate. A nation cannot grow so long as its people's thinking is stagnant. What is happening today in India is that a new wave of enthusiasm and courage is spreading, which is giving people the confidence to work for their own betterment. The National Extension Service and the Community Projects are generating a new life wherever they have reached. This new confidence and self-reliance can lead to big things. Revolutionary things cannot be done by government orders unless they are backed by an appropriate climate of self-confidence and enthusiasm on the part of the people.

One way of gauging the success of the First Five Year Plan is to see how much self-confidence there is in the country and to what extent the country's daring and ability to work have increased. I can tell you quite confidently that having seen the Community Projects and the National Extension Service working during the last three or four years, they are undoubtedly revolutionary schemes. I use the word revolutionary in its real sense, and not in the sense of violent change. Thousands of Indian villages are getting transformed which is a big thing.

The First Plan is coming to an end in six weeks or so. As I told you, the five year plans will be the new landmarks and chapters of our life and at the end of each, we must pause a little and look back before we go ahead. We must look at it in two ways. One, what we have achieved during the First Plan, what were the shortcomings and what we have learnt. Second, we must chalk out what we have to do in the next five years. We are meeting at this Congress at the confluence of two plans. So we have to do some special thinking, looking to the past and future. For the last year or two, the Planning Commission has been deliberating on the Second Plan. So are our state governments. We have learnt a great deal in the past five years. We have collected a large amount of statistics, though it is not enough, and we are making arrangements to collect more. In short, we are in a better position day by day to understand the problems of India. They are extremely complicated and perhaps we may never be able to comprehend them fully because it is not easy to understand the problems of millions of people. But we are getting better trained mentally. We must guard

against complacency, for the moment we begin to think we have understood everything, we will fail to understand anything. We will start slipping. So, we must keep an open mind and make efforts to understand the problems before us. The moment we shut our minds, we will be no good.

We are drawing up the five year plans by using our knowledge as also a certain amount of guesswork. But it is not something that we can do once and then forget all about it. We have to make changes as often as they are necessary. If you look at it from another angle, five years is not very long. We must always strive to bear in mind where we are going and what our long term goals are. Where will we be in fifteen or twenty years? I do not mean that we should know the details but a broad picture must be before us. The Congress and practically the whole country has accepted that we will have a socialist pattern of society. This has already been decided upon, and even the few who had some doubts about it have now come round to our way of thinking. Very few are opposed to it.

So we have kept a socialist pattern of society as our ultimate goal. But we have deliberately not outlined the details because we should be free to make our decisions and to build the new edifice as we like. Keeping a broad picture before us we will give it shape through our experience. Each step will make the path clearer. It is not necessary to draw a rigid line for the future. In fact it would be dangerous to do so. Many of our socialist and communist brethren believe in such rigid dogmas and they imprison their minds behind barriers of their own making. As you know if you draw a line on the ground with a piece of chalk and try to make poultry walk over it, it will hesitate because the line creates some fear in it. We do not want to draw rigid lines for ourselves. It is hard to understand why human beings should try to create mental blocks by drawing rigid lines.

We live in a strange world today and ours is an extraordinary country. How can we understand it if we retreat behind mental barriers? I agree that we should have a clear idea of our principles and goals as otherwise we shall drift. We must have an idea of our destination. But the moment we tie ourselves down, it obstructs clear thinking and we shall lag behind while the world goes ahead. I do not wish to criticize anyone. There is no doubt about the courage and spirit of sacrifice of our old revolutionaries who used to throw bombs, etc. But India moved away from that path and succeeded by other methods. Though they called themselves revolutionaries, they were not really so in practice. Similarly, as I said, our communist colleagues call themselves revolutionaries. But they behave in exactly the opposite way. Instead of working towards changing the society and leading the country towards progress, they talk big

and are actually imprisoned behind all sorts of mental stereotypes. They keep repeating their old slogans and do not understand their country at all. This is no way of bringing about a social revolution. On the contrary, they often do things which have the opposite reaction. I call them reactionaries though I do not mean it as an abuse. Nowadays people seem to think that slogan-mongering or brandishing weapons means a revolution. I want you to understand that this is not so. We have to bring about a big revolution in the country, a social and economic revolution. In fact we are already doing it. Great things have already happened in the country and that too peacefully which in other countries had involved violent bloodshed. So there is already a revolution taking place in the country. India is setting a new kind of example before the world today. It is a big thing that we are steadily travelling towards socialism in a peaceful way. So we must participate in it and even if everyone does not hold exactly similar views, we should try to cooperate.

Let me give you another example. Our communist and socialist colleagues talk of class conflict and class struggle. What they say is true to some extent but not absolutely so. There is no doubt about it that there is class conflict in the world today. We cannot turn a blind eye to it. One class pulls in one direction and another class pulls in yet another. What benefits one harms the other. So I agree that there is class conflict, and it is not right to perpetuate it and increase tensions. Having accepted that there is class conflict in the world today, I would say that the way to solve it is not by fomenting it. There are other ways of solving it, especially in a democratic country.

Our way in the Congress is different. Our communist and socialist brethren lay constant stress on the history of Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. I should not go into what was right or proper for Europe fifty or hundred years ago. Bigger men than I have expressed their views on the subject. But it does not seem very wise to me to try to apply all that to the Indian conditions today. We can learn from the European experience for it is equally wrong to think that we know everything. We can learn a great deal from Europe, the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan and China. But, ultimately we have to decide what we must do by understanding the conditions in our own country. It is my belief that we can solve even the biggest of our problems peacefully, by mutual agreement and cooperation. We cannot do so by following the path suggested by the communists or socialists, though their slogans are often attractive. In fact they will only succeed in creating chaos. If there is chaos in the country, there can be no progress but only destruction and bitterness, lack of trust, etc., which are far more dangerous emotions. Everything will come to a standstill.

I feel that the path chosen by the Congress and by Parliament and the country is the only one by which we can reach our goal. It is a difficult path but then there is no easy path to progress. You can take the example of any country you like, whether it is communist, socialist or capitalist. Ultimately nations progress only through hard work, not by slogan-mongering. In some ways the method that India has adopted is not new. We have to establish industries and advance in the field of science and technology. We want to bring about an industrial revolution in the country. Two types of industrial revolution have taken place in the world. One is the kind that you saw in England, France, Germany and the United States. In those countries the Industrial Revolution took place over a couple of centuries ago and gradually they have accumulated wealth. Big industries were set up. They were helped in all this by their colonies from where they could get raw material. But apart from the fact that it took them one hundred and fifty years or so to reach where they are, they had to face innumerable problems too on the way. The second type of industrial revolution took place in the Soviet Union which was extremely backward thirty to forty years ago. Russia was defeated in the First World War and they had to face tremendous problems which ultimately resulted in a revolution. They decided to industrialize their country. They were no doubt more advanced than us and yet they faced great difficulties. They industrialized their country rapidly but they had to pay a terrible price for it in terms of human lives and the misery that they had to endure. There is no democracy in the Soviet Union but an authoritarian, autocratic government which could do all this.

I am not criticising or praising any country. I am merely trying to analyse the problem scientifically and to point out that each country must evolve its own path. What right do I have to say that what any one of these countries has done is wrong? Each country must do what it thinks is proper. India must choose her own path.

So, as I was saying, there are two ways of industrialization. One is spread over a long period of time as happened in England, and Germany, France and the United States. The other is the method adopted by the Soviet Union who did it in twenty or twenty-five years but had to pay a terrible price for it. They could do it only through tremendous pressure from government. Now which path are we to choose? We do not have a couple of centuries to reach our destination. So we cannot do as France or England or the United States did. Generations will pass and there will be chaos. So we cannot wait that long. Problems are surrounding us from all directions and we have to solve them fast. On the other hand, you must remember that what happened in the Soviet Union was as a result of the First World War. The people were groaning under

the weight of their misery. Apart from that there was a civil war in Russia as well as external aggression. A combination of all these circumstances resulted in the Russian Revolution. We have not had to face ruin and destruction as a result of war as they did. There the government had collapsed completely due to the war. So the example of the Soviet Union is not relevant to us apart from the fact that there is a difference in the forms of government in the two countries. It is obvious that they do not have democracy as we do. I will repeat once again that I am not criticising the Soviet Union. I am only pointing out a fact. We have a parliamentary system of government. The people elect representatives to panchayats and district boards and municipalities as well as the government in the states and at the Centre. The people choose them and have the right to remove them also which is not so in the Soviet Union. It is possible that their system is functioning well. But it is different.

We want to achieve things quickly too but in our own democratic way. That makes a big difference. It has not been done by any country in the world so far. Therefore, what is happening in India today is a kind of test, and the outcome is important not only for India but for the world too. We will demonstrate to the world how a country can progress rapidly by peaceful, democratic methods and that there is no compulsion to shed blood in order to progress. That is foolish. Therefore, our planning is very significant for the world. It is significant for us too because the eyes of the world are upon us to see how we fare.

Now when we are planning towards bringing about an industrial revolution, we must see what the basic requirements are. The British advanced because they had vast resources of iron and coal and by utilizing them, they became very powerful. We too have iron and coal, but we have not made full use of them. Therefore, it is not enough to import some machinery from Germany and England, and put up an industry in Amritsar. That is child's play. We must produce machinery in our own country so that we do not have to depend upon other countries. We must not be open to any outside pressures. So the first thing to do is to produce enough steel and coal and cement in the country. We must also produce machines and set up machine-building industries. This is the basic requirement. Once this is done, you will see how quickly the industries spread because we will be self-sufficient in the basic necessities and not have to depend on the United States or Germany for them.

In the First Five Year Plan, we laid more stress on increasing food production. We also took up big projects like the Bhakra-Nangal, Hirakud, Damodar Valley, etc. Now that the food problem is under control though we shall continue to pay attention to it, but we will lay more stress on industries.

Our aim will be to bring about an industrial revolution in the country. We are putting up three new steel plants apart from the already existing ones. The new plants will be in the public sector and benefit the people directly.

Now we have decided that all the basic industries should be in the public sector. We are putting up an electrical goods plant. Then there are many other things. In the next five years, we have to do two things specially. One is to lay the firm foundations of machine-building industries. Secondly, we must do extensive search for our underground resources. We do not have a proper idea about them so far. There is no doubt about it that we are very rich in mineral resources. We spend a great deal of foreign exchange on importing petroleum, kerosene and oil which are essential. Now we hope that we will find some sources in our own country. We are trying to locate them and have had some success. We are going to step up our efforts to mine minerals and oil all over the country. Our geologists are engaged in the task of locating the hidden sources of wealth in the earth.

Thirdly, as I said, we must spread the Community Projects and the National Extension Service rapidly so that they may reach every village in India in the next five years, or if that is not possible, at least 90 per cent or 95 per cent of the villages in order to bring about a revolution in the rural areas. These are the big tasks before us.

As far as the rest of the matters are concerned, they are mentioned in the resolution. You must read the draft of the Planning Commission which has just been published. Though it runs into nearly two hundred pages, it is called a pamphlet. I want you to try to understand the economic policy of India and the five year plans. They show us a new direction. The goal that we have chosen is a difficult one but it is well within our reach. We are not trying to build castles in the air. If we are able to implement them fully, as I am convinced we will, it will be a great victory for the nation. We shall break down a great barrier to progress in the poor, underdeveloped countries. How can they hope to progress without the necessary resources? If we try to borrow capital from other countries, it imposes a great burden. Once we start moving in the direction of progress, that barrier is broken. Then every year that passes makes more progress possible. All of us will no doubt benefit by the five year plans but the real benefits will be hidden for the time being. We are laying the foundations of future progress. If we look for immediate benefits there may be no lasting results. I told you that our per capita income has gone up by 18 per cent during the last five years. Now we must make an effort to see that it increases by 25 per cent in the next five years. So, we will have to redouble our efforts. I have no doubt about it that we shall succeed if all of us work together.

I have drawn your attention to some of the main points in this resolution. I want you to look at this Five Year Plan carefully and in the larger context of the direction in which we are going. Only then will you understand what a great task we have taken upon ourselves. It is a grand task to lift up the millions in the country. It is a great revolution and in such circumstances it is absurd to indulge in internal feuds and waste our energy. Provincialism, communalism, language—these are the issues which agitate the people.

They have some importance but when it is a question of bigger tasks, they take a second place. The fact is that most of the points of dispute that arise are those of the middle-class and of a more or less poor nation. Gradually, as the wealth of the nation increases, these problems will also disappear. Therefore, the Five Year Plan and the Economic Policy Resolution are significant not only for the country but will also help in solving the petty problems among the people and divert their attention towards something more constructive. So I present this resolution for your approval.

(ii) Other Matters

1. Rights and Responsibilities of Labour¹

Mr Chairman, brothers and sisters,

You have been sitting here for the last two hours listening to the speeches of some prominent leaders. I was not present, and so I do not know what advice they have given you. I am afraid that I may say something opposite. But the basic thing is to understand the times that we are living in, in India and the world. Unless we understand the entire picture, we cannot perceive what our own role in it is.

People working in mills and factories form trade unions in order to protect their rights and further their interests. The trade union movement started in England about one hundred and twenty-five years ago. It faced great difficulties in the beginning because it was illegal. People formed trade unions secretly. The law in England those days prohibited the assemblage of more than five workers together. Innumerable workers were sentenced for having been caught holding meetings. Many people received life sentences or were deported to Australia. The workers in those days had to bear great hardships. But gradually their strength and organization grew and they got the right to form trade unions. Then the movement spread to other countries of Europe and the condition of workers improved. These countries were also becoming economically strong. England and other countries were producing vast amount of wealth and part of it found its way into the pockets of workers.

Well, this is an old story. So long as there are tensions between the owners of factories and the workers, and there is a conflict of interests, the interest of the workers lies in being united and organized. In the developed world, these tensions have gradually disappeared. But in a society where such conflicts have not been resolved the workers must organize themselves in order to protect their interests. But if in the process they do something which harms the nation and consequently themselves, it would be wrong. The biggest weapon in the hands of workers has been the right to strike work peacefully. It added greatly to their power. But misuse of this right has also weakened them in some ways.

1. Speech at a meeting of workers under the auspices of INTUC, Amritsar, 13 February 1956. AIR tapes, NMML. Original in Hindi.

Gandhiji used to say that workers must be united. You must remember that he started his work in India on a small scale on behalf of the peasants of Bihar and the mill-workers of Ahmedabad and helped them to get their demands. Gandhiji believed in the workers' right to strike. But he also believed that this right should not be used until all other means had failed.

As you know, we have adopted the five year plans in India for the country's progress. The Congress has recently passed a long resolution about this.² The Second Plan document has been published. I want you and the people of your unions to read if not the whole document at least the pamphlets which have been published. Everyone in India must try to understand what is happening in the country and what is envisaged for the future, and our role in it. As I said, there is great tension between the mill-owners and the workers because there is a basic conflict of interests. But the important thing is that all of us are shareholders in whatever is produced in the country. If the production of wealth is not sufficient, people will have to do without things. The wealthy nations have a great deal to distribute as wages and salaries. As for us though we want equitable distribution, we must first have something to distribute. In a poor country there is nothing but poverty to distribute. The affluent nations have wealth to distribute.

So there are two issues. One is to increase production of wealth and two, the equitable distribution of that wealth among the people so that it does not remain in the hands of a few. But first of all, we must produce enough to distribute. So in a sense, in India and other countries similarly situated, the crucial thing is to increase production of essential consumer goods through various methods, from land, from factories, through village and cottage industries, etc. Then there will be something to distribute as wages and salaries. If we give all our attention to distribution and none to production, then there will be little to distribute. It cannot come from outside. The wealth of a nation is proportionate to its production of goods. We cannot hope to get wealth from the Soviet Union or the United States. The United States is enormously wealthy because it produces enormous quantities of goods. You must remember this.

So in such circumstances, when our first priority has to be to increase production from land and industries and then to ensure the equitable distribution of that wealth among the people, if there are strikes and lockouts, the immediate result is that the production of wealth becomes less and consequently there is

2. For Nehru's speech on the resolution on economic policy and five year plan, see *ante*, pp. 240-251.

less to distribute. Through intelligent planning, the tensions among the workers must be eradicated so that there is no cause for strikes and lockouts. It is true that it is not always possible to do the sensible thing, particularly when one party insists on being pig-headed. But we must try to find a way by which disputes can be settled peacefully and justice done without affecting the work. If the wealth of the nation diminishes, it affects the whole country. I want you to understand this. The fact is that the relations at present obtaining between owner and worker do not seem right. The situation should be changed. Then the conflict of interest will be resolved automatically. There may be difficulties in doing this immediately. If we try to do it quickly, it could affect production in the country which would bring our plans to a halt. Therefore, we have to change things gradually.

As you know, we have said quite clearly that our goal is a socialist pattern of society. I shall not go into all its meanings. But I shall only say that we cannot have a socialist society if we continue to be poor. It is only when there is some progress that we can move in that direction. There is no sense in distributing poverty. First, we have to lay the foundations for the production of wealth which means increasing food production as well as setting up industries, big, medium and small, in order to produce essential consumer goods for everyone's needs. This is our goal. It is difficult to say when we will reach it because it is not enough to pass laws. We will move in that direction gradually. A nation cannot bring its progress to a halt. Each new step paves the way for the next. We cannot stop once we have reached a goal.

We implemented the First Five Year Plan and then went on to the Second. The Third will follow. The progress of a nation has to be a continuous process. Progress implies raising the standard of living of the masses and reducing the disparity between the rich and the poor. It is difficult for everyone to be exactly alike because there are bound to be differences in ability and skill. But everyone must get equal opportunities, which is not the case today. There must be equality and equal opportunities to get the basic necessities of life like food, clothes, houses to live in, health care, education, etc., and most important of all, the means of earning a livelihood. What an individual does depends on his ability and training. Once there are equal opportunities for all, each individual can progress according to his skill and ability. The more trained and skilled an individual is, the greater will be the responsibility entrusted to him. One individual may become a great engineer while another may not go beyond being a foreman. The main thing is that everyone should get equal opportunities for education and training. This is the principle we must follow.

India is a vast country with thirty-six crore human beings living here. So it is difficult to lead them in any particular direction or organize them easily. Any task that we take up becomes difficult because of the vastness of the country and society. But if everyone helps, we can go ahead. We have drawn up the five year plans to lay the foundations gradually for future progress. Agriculture is the most urgent priority in India because nearly 80 per cent of the people depend on land for their livelihood. We have to become self-sufficient in food. But now we are leaning towards industrialisation so that more and more people may get jobs and the wealth of the nation may increase.

Industries are certainly essential. But we need machines to set up industries. Therefore we have to think of setting up machine-making industries so that we do not have to depend on other countries for machines. Once we start making machines ourselves, we will not have to look to anyone. We would have laid the firm foundations of progress. So attention is being paid to this. Now machines are of various kinds, heavy machinery as well as small machines for domestic use. We want to give a push to heavy industries as well as small cottage industries in order to increase production and provide jobs for people.

So the question of the ownership of these industries comes up. In my opinion, the heavy industries must remain in the public sector. It has been mentioned in the resolution too that workers must have greater participation in the management of industries. Thought has to be given to this and a suitable method found. We can adopt two or three methods after experimentation. What I mean is that the owner-worker relationship is not a proper one today. The relationship should be one of community of workers. Everyone stands to gain by doing the work well. So long as there is an apprehension that the fruits of their labour will be enjoyed by others, there can be no real worker participation. It is only when the workers feel that they are partners that they will work together for the common good and benefit from one another's experience. The fact is that every Indian no matter what profession he is engaged in should think of himself as a partner in the vast factory of India with its thirty-six crore human beings. We have to work together for the good of everyone. Even on a smaller scale, we must try to create an atmosphere in which there is unity and cooperation among the people and the ability to benefit from one another's experience and ideas. We must get rid of the divisive forces.

As I said in the beginning, the right to go on strike has always been a great weapon in the hands of the trade unions. They would have found it extremely difficult to make any headway without that. At the same time, this weapon must be used responsibly. An attempt must be made to solve the disputes that arise by other means before going on strike and to avoid causing inconvenience to society. All this requires a gradual change in society.

There are various kinds of trade unions in India. The INTUC—the Indian National Trade Union Congress³ is a huge organisation. Then there is the Hind Mazdoor Sabha.⁴ The socialists and the communists have organizations of their own. It is not a good thing that there should be constant tensions among the various workers' organizations. I would like that there is greater cooperation which is possible only when there is unity of purpose. The communist trade unions believe in violence and chaos to achieve progress and in fomenting class struggles in order that the workers may come out with flying colours in the end.

These are arguments which may have been relevant a century ago. It is true that the workers have made headway only by fighting for their rights. But the question is what would be relevant today. In my opinion, the method of violence and chaos have become outdated. I do not say that the workers must not have the right to strike. They must use it when they are forced to. But fomenting tensions as a means of progress has become outdated in my opinion.

That is one thing. Secondly, it is not the proper method for us to follow in India. I have no right to advise others. Everyone is welcome to do what they want. But I do feel that it is no longer right in the present times and particularly for our country. At a time when we are trying to bring about progress in India, anything that creates dissensions is harmful. That is particularly true in the field of production. Thirdly, whether the government is good or useless, it has been our constant endeavour to improve the condition of the working classes and the masses and to ensure justice for them. We make an effort. Sometimes we may make mistakes. The trade unions must take advantage of the Government's efforts instead of wasting their energies and resources in futile things.

I want that all the trade unions must work together towards a common goal. If they work at cross purposes, it makes it very difficult. The problem with the communist unions is that they believe in violence and chaos. I cannot be a party to that. As far as I know there is no fundamental difference between

3. INTUC was founded in 1947 and has been closely linked to the Congress Party since its inception.
4. Hind Mazdoor Sabha, a central organisation of trade unions, was founded in December 1948 as a result of an amalgamation of Hind Mazdoor Panchayat and Indian Federation of Labour. Its object was to ensure complete freedom of trade unions from Government, employers and political parties, and to train workers in the development of industries.

the method of working of the socialist Hind Mazdoor Sabha and us. There may be superficial differences. So I would like to cooperate with them for it would strengthen both sides. Let us join hands for the next ten or fifteen years to change the present conditions and lift the country out of the mire of poverty. Once we achieve a certain level of progress, we can think again.

So in the next few years, let us set aside all internal disputes, whether it is over the question of language or province, or trade unions, and work together to build a new India. In the process, we shall be helping ourselves. We must not allow dissensions to surface. There should be cooperation among the workers' unions, which is possible only when we believe in similar methods. If some people believe in violence it would be extremely harmful to everyone. That is why it is so difficult to work with the communists because they cannot think of anything else except creating dissensions. There are good people among them and I do not wish to criticize everyone. But I do not think that their method is suited to the present times particularly for India. There are other unions like the Hind Mazdoor Sabha and I would like greater cooperation among them.

I want you to remember that we have embarked upon a great task in India. The five year plan aims at uplifting the thirty-six crore human beings in the country. There are bound to be difficulties in the beginning. Later on there will be greater momentum. It is difficult to give an initial push when countries have been poor and stagnant for centuries. In the last five years, we have paved the way for giving a push. If we are able to achieve the targets that we have set for ourselves during the next five years, development will gather momentum and our task will become easier. I want to remove all obstacles from the path of progress and ensure greater cooperation among the people. The workers' unions must understand their role in all this. It is obvious that they have an important role to play. They will have to play an increasingly more important role in an expanding industrial economy in which the number of workers will continue to increase. Therefore, it is important for them to lay the firm foundations of progress instead of wasting their energies in futile squabbles. They must understand that they are shareholders in this great factory that is India and their role gains importance day by day.

I want you to think about all this in the broad national perspective. You must also remember that communalism has done great harm to the country in the past. Everyone is welcome to follow his own religion. But it is wrong to bring religion into politics. The only consequence of that is to divide the nation. If the workers' unions get divided into communalist organizations, that will be the end of trade unionism. There will be no national party left which will weaken the nation. We have the right to follow our religion. But we must

ensure complete cooperation in other areas. Only then can we be strong. The workers' unions in particular must bear this in mind for they cannot make any headway without that.

I want you to think about these things for yourselves. I do not want you to believe them because I say so but look at the broad national perspective for yourselves and understand where we are going and the difficulties and complications we face. We cannot solve our problems without your cooperation. It is not a question of passing laws from Delhi or somewhere else. We must understand what our role is and fulfil our duties with determination. *Jai Hind!*

2. Democratic Planning¹

We have come here almost immediately after the Amritsar session of the Congress. Many of you may have been present there and participated not only in the session but in the other developments in Amritsar at that time. Naturally during the Congress session, some important questions were discussed and we passed resolutions. In effect, the Congress has, you might say, three major subjects before it at every session. One is international affairs; the second is economic policy; and the third is the Congress organisation itself. It is a very difficult matter, to have a democratic organisation, or have at the same time, a disciplined organisation, a living organisation, a vital organisation. Any organisation, however big, should not lose that vital touch even if it is acting rightly. It must be alive and decisive. I objected at the Congress session to the term "high command" being used.² I objected to it because of two things: one, it has a certain military significance. I do not like that. Secondly, I do not want the Congress or the country to give up thinking and to wait patiently for guidance or directions from the top. We must have a living organisation. Therefore, the organisational aspect is important. The problem is how to combine the two; that is how to combine the vitality of an organisation with the discipline? Too much vitality without discipline is anarchy. Everybody does what he likes. Too much authority without inner vitality is just not democracy. It is not a question of rules and regulations; it is a question of the entire functioning of an organisation.

We have grown up—or at any rate those among you who are senior enough in age have grown up in the twenties and the thirties—under peculiar conditions, that is, conditions of a struggle when quite inevitably we had to hold together to fight against the power we were up against. We had to have discipline. There was the compulsion of events to force us to be disciplined, apart from

1. Address to the Members of the Congress Parliamentary Party, New Delhi, 15 February 1956. AICC Parliamentary Meetings. Tape M-15/C(i), NMML. Extracts.
2. During passing of the resolution on the reorganisation of states on 12 February, Nehru said: "It is not a question of high command or low command. It is a wrong phrase. I don't like it. It is a wrong mentality." This was in response to several top leaders and the media using the phrase "Congress high command" during the Amritsar session of the Congress.

what we have learnt from our leaders Gandhiji and others. It was a voluntary discipline. There was no punishment outside the organisation itself. That compulsion of events has largely gone. There is a tendency to become a little lax and feeble, which is harmful. On the other hand, a party cannot subsist on discipline only with no inner vitality. To balance these two is always a problem. It has been a problem not since Independence, but even before Independence. I remember we used to have discussions in the AICC, in our Pradesh Congress Committee, etc., in the thirties. In the twenties, we were perhaps too busy, but in the thirties we had to think more and more about these problems. So the question of organisation—of how to have a vital organisation, how to have a disciplined organisation and how to have an organisation maintaining high standard and integrity, has always been before the Congress. It is not an easy matter; and it becomes more difficult when political power is attached to it. When there is no political power, there is an automatic check of suffering this, that and other. One has to face this problem day to day. There is no final solution, except to keep wide awake, except to come down firmly upon any wrong tendencies, anything that lowers its standards of integrity. The Congress, if I may say so, has to be judged by a higher standard than other parties, partly because we are in authority and they are in the opposition. We have the responsibility and it is right that we should be judged by higher standards. Secondly, because we started off with high standards, others did not start off with any such high standards. Under Gandhiji we started off on a high standard and naturally one is judged by what one was or what one is supposed to be. If you come down, you deteriorate.

The whole question of candidates being chosen on behalf of the Congress party for the next elections, has been considered repeatedly by the Congress Working Committee—not individual cases, but the basic approach and certain tests and standards have been laid down. You know very well, how difficult these matters are. All kinds of personal and other equations come up. One great danger, the Congress has had to face and has suffered because of that, is the tendency in local areas, for some little group to fall out of step and to prevent normal democratic growth. The result is that the party loses vitality there, and you see the repercussions in the election.

Apart from this organisational matters, the two major subjects that normally come up for the Congress are international affairs and economic policies. International affairs by and large—a question on which there is very little argument in India. Minor matters there might be about Goa, or something else, but largely speaking, the international policy pursued by the Government and approved by the Congress might well be said to be national in the broadest sense of the word, and there is no way to enlarge it except for minor matters.

The real question that the Congress has to consider is the economic policy. It is a basic question and it covers almost every activity. There is the Second Five Year Plan. Well, it doesn't mention every activity, but it practically affects every activity on which our future depends. We are at that critical stage in our development, having crossed some small hurdles, we have got a major hurdle to cross, the hurdle which an underdeveloped economy has to cross in order to become a developed economy. There is no hard and fast line anywhere. Development is a gradual process. But there is a kind of barrier which comes in the way of an underdeveloped country trying to develop. First of all its resources are so limited. You have a vicious circle. In order to get more resources, you put too great burdens on a people already suffering burdens; it is difficult not to put burdens on them because they are poor—because that means you can't develop. That is the basic dilemma of an underdeveloped country. On the one hand our desire is to remove the burdens of the people—very legitimate one—on the other, our desire is to go ahead, and that inevitably involves burdens on the people. So what are you going to do? A country like America, which is very highly developed in the industrial sense, has enormous production. It can go even through a big war and yet have surpluses left. In the Soviet Union, where the pace of development is now fast, the living conditions are not obviously up to the American standard, they are far below, yet the surpluses for investment are very considerable.

We have arrived at a big hurdle. If in these next five years, we achieve what we have in the Second Plan, then the subsequent progress will become easier and faster. It is in that sense that I said that we are facing a critical period. We appeal to everybody in the country to join in the effort. It is not a party matter, it is a national matter. Inevitably, the burden must fall largely on the Congress organisation. Unfortunately, so far as other parties and groups are concerned, because they are in the opposition, they get into an embarrassing position. They feel that if they help in the success of the Five Year Plan, they are indirectly helping the Government and the Congress Government. So they don't want to do that. Yet some of them want to help in the Plan. This split-thinking makes it difficult for them to throw all their weight on the side of the Plan. Also to some extent, if I may say so with all respect to them, some of them indulge in what I would call, pure leftism. They shout some kind of leftist slogans without working it out, like the slogan "nationalise everything." Whether we should nationalise something or not, let us consider. But just tossing up a slogan "nationalise everything" has no particular meaning. We have arrived at a stage when we have to come to grips with each problem. We are taking a very big step in nationalising the insurance business. It is a far bigger step than your nationalising any odd industry or anything. It involves a

very considerable burden. Organisationally it is a very complicated affair. Yet we are taking this big step without too much shouting. I have no doubt that this will work out satisfactorily. What I mean to say is that one has to think of things practically how to do them, when to do them—and not in a vague way.

So the burden of working out the Second Five Year Plan chiefly must rest with the Congress organisation, not because we consider this a party matter—we shall always appeal to everybody, to every party—but simply because of the nature of things. The future of the country and of the party largely depends on the measure of success that we attain in the Second Plan, and, it involves our going in a big way to our people and discussing with them, making them understand, making them plan-conscious, making them realise the difficulties, making them realise that for every step that they want, they have to pay in some way or other; they have to carry the burden. It is not some kind of Aladdin's Lamp that they wave about and everything comes. They have to work hard for it and the burden ultimately falls on them, the people.

Now, many of you may say something to the effect, "Why not tax the rich more", or some such thing. Now we could certainly tax the rich to the utmost limit, that is feasible. But the first thing to remember is that it doesn't matter how you tax them – you may tax them 100 per cent and take everything away from them; even then, the burden will fall on the others. All you get from the rich is not enough. There are not really very many rich people here. There may be no doubt a certain sentimental satisfaction in squeezing the rich more and more. I have no objection to that provided always that process does not come in the way of your work itself. After all, the main thing we have to see is how to increase the production of this and that. It does not matter if in the process some things which are not very desirable happen. I mean to say, we cannot prophesy equality all over India suddenly; that is a long process. The main thing is production on a big scale. We must ensure that more accumulations take place. We must see that no monopolies are created, and that the newly created wealth is either spread out or going to the reserves of efficient business. These are, as I said, rather academic leftists' approaches. I have no objection to leftism, but I do not think that this academic approach helps in dealing with practical problems. We have taken some pretty big steps recently. Let us stabilise these things and go ahead.

So I would appeal to you, for a variety of reasons, to carry this message of the Second Plan far and deep into the countryside. You have no idea how the world's attention is concentrated on what we do here. Even previously it was so, but the Second Plan coming in has, and will in future, bring much more attention to us. In essence, it will become not only a test for us, but a kind of

test of democratic planning itself. If you fail in this, then obviously people will begin to think that democratic planning is not good enough. Either we should have no plan or authoritarian plan; and we don't wish to have to face that choice. We want democracy and we want rapid progress in planning.

Another great advantage in our taking this Plan to the people is to make them think realistically and practically about our problems. It will be public education in the biggest way. It will divert people's attention from the smaller problems and conflicts and arguments and controversies which from the all-India point of view are parochial and provincial.

In these last few weeks, high passions have been aroused and conflicts, violence and tremendous excitement created in connection with reorganisation of states. One can understand people feeling strongly about a matter and pressing their claim forward strongly but when they adopt the kind of methods that some of our friends adopted, it really is a sign of political immaturity, of a lack of the democratic sense. After all democracy subsists on accepting something even though you may disagree with it and trying to change it peacefully. Nobody need give up his inner faith in any matter, but he should try to achieve it through certain peaceful, democratic processes. If you go out into the streets and badger people's heads, that is not a democratic process whatever the provocation may be. Once you do that on some issues then that method will be applied also to other matters. You may consider one matter justified, another person will consider another matter justified. In other words the whole democratic process goes to pieces. Therefore, this has been very unfortunate from the wider point of view. I am not criticising anybody. But it shows how easy it is for us to get caught up in these disruptive tendencies. It is my belief that the caste system has made us narrow-minded. Unless we get over that tendency it will come in our way at every step.

II. COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA

1. To Sampurnanand¹

Camp: Amritsar
12 February 1956

My dear Sampurnanand,

Your letter of February 5th about the activities of the Communist Party.

There can be little doubt that the Communist Party of India will continue to be troublesome, more especially in the labour front and among students. The principal changes that have taken place recently on account of my visit to Russia² and Bulganin and Khrushchev's visit to India³ are that they have toned down their general opposition to our Government and, more especially, to our foreign policy. Also it has produced some confusion in their ranks. They do not quite know what policy to pursue and there are at least three sections in the Party pulling in the three different ways. Ajoy Ghosh has recently gone to Moscow.⁴

I discussed quite frankly the activities of the Communist Party of India with the Soviet leaders.⁵ They told me that they had no knowledge of it and these people had a way of making out that they were in contact with important persons in Moscow which was not true. In fact, Khrushchev said that he had not met a single important Communist from India.

I told them of the money that seemed to come to the Communist Party, the way they exploited other organisations, including the Peace Council, etc., and how they behaved objectionably in many ways. I pointed out that I was not worried about their behaviour very much as we could easily deal with them. They were neither strong nor very intelligent. My concern was that their behaviour inevitably had some effect on India's relations with Russia. Khrushchev said that he agreed with me that nothing should be allowed to

1. JN Collection.

2. For Nehru's visit to the USSR in June 1955, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 29, pp. 201-232.

3. Bulganin and Khrushchev visited India from 18 to 30 November and again from 7 to 14 December 1955. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 31, pp. 299-368.

4. Ghosh, CPI General Secretary, visited Moscow in August-September 1955. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 31, p. 339 and p. 549.

5. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 31, pp. 360-361.

interfere with our relations and he would like the Communist Party of India not to attack our Government at all. Naturally, he said that he sympathised with Communism and the Communists, if they were genuine, but he was opposed to all interference here.

I think my talk produced some effect on them, though what they will do about it I cannot say. But, in any event, Communists will continue making trouble in labour unions and among the students and we should be prepared for that.

I have no doubt that the students federation⁶ is practically a Communist organisation and should not be encouraged in any way. I am sorry to learn that Dr Radhakrishnan, Maulana Azad and Rajkumari sent messages of goodwill to them. I do not know how to control such messages which apparently go out automatically. However, I shall try to stop them if possible.

About the labour union matter, it is a little more difficult to deal with it. The rule is that the largest union is recognised. If you like, you can write to Khandubhai Desai⁷ directly on this subject.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. It refers to All India Student's Federation. For Nehru's views on it see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 29, p. 72.

7. Khandubhai K. Desai was Union Minister for Labour.

2. Foreigners at the CPI Congress¹

With reference to the attached piece of information² to the effect that the Communist Party of India is inviting representatives from various Communist Parties of other countries to their Fourth Congress, I take it that the coming of foreign visitors will not be encouraged.³

1. Note, 12 March 1956. File No.15/15/56-F.I., MHA.
2. The Intelligence Bureau, Government of India, had sent a report on 9 March 1956 on CPI's request to the Communist Parties of Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, West Germany, Italy, Bulgaria, France, Austria and Ceylon, and also to the Rumanian Workers' Party, the Polish United Workers' Party, and the Socialist Unity Party (Berlin) of East Germany to send fraternal delegates or messages to the Fourth Congress of the CPI scheduled to be held at Palghat from 19 to 29 April 1956. The CPI had already received a message from the Communist Party of Australia.
3. The Home Secretary, A.V. Pai noted on the above on 15 March that the Government was not encouraging foreign visitors to attend the CPI Congress and MEA was requested to send a circular to all Indian Missions abroad advising them accordingly.

PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS

1. Presence of Ministers During Debate on the President's Address¹

The debate on the President's Address has begun today in the Lok Sabha and will begin in the Rajya Sabha tomorrow. I think it is essential that some Ministers should be present throughout during these debates. That does not mean that the same Minister should be present throughout. It is necessary that a Cabinet Minister should always be present and that several Deputy Ministers should be there. Indeed all Deputy Ministers, as far as possible, should be present during these debates, either in the Lok Sabha or the Rajya Sabha. We have had many complaints about the Ministerial benches being empty when this discussion is taking place.

2. Parliamentary Secretaries should be asked to be there to take notes for their Ministers.

3. I suggest that you might circulate this note of mine to all Ministers, Deputy Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries and make some arrangement in consultation with the Ministers about their presence in the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha during these debates.

1. Note to Satya Narayan Sinha, Union Minister of Parliamentary Affairs, 20 February 1956. JN Collection.

2. Parliamentary Democracy¹

Mr Vice-President,² Excellencies and Friends,

I am glad to be here because I think this move to have a seminar to discuss the Parliamentary and democratic forms of government is a very good step. But I find it rather difficult to say anything special on this subject to you.

Democracy, as a speaker just said, is some kind of a means to an end. What is the end? I do not know if everybody will agree, but presumably the end is, the good life for every individual. People may argue about what the good life may be. Certainly the good life must include a certain satisfaction of his essential economic needs which will release him from continuous anxiety about how to meet those physical needs and thus give him a chance to develop his creative faculties and thereby advance not only himself, but the community and humanity as a whole.

Now, parliamentary democracy, about which we talk so much, is the growth of the last hundred and fifty or two hundred years. We might remember that in England, and in other countries, franchise was very limited till quite recent times, till about twenty, thirty years ago. A relatively small number of people had the vote. Even now in quite advanced countries half the population consisting of women do not have the vote. Democracy in those countries is presumably thought of in terms of male democracy, not female. In the nineteenth century, democracy was limited very strictly to certain classes. It was after great struggles that franchise grew wider and wider. It was a relatively slow process. It is only in the last thirty years or so, more or less, that adult franchise has come into being in a number of so-called democratic countries. That period is not long enough really to tell us what the ultimate effects of this are likely to be in solving problems. Because the ultimate test how far this system of government will solve the problems which a country has to face and the people have to face. Any purely theoretical approach to this question, good as it may be, does not take you very far if the best of theory fails to solve the problems that that country has to face. The problems are solved not merely by having a

1. Speech while inaugurating the first All-India Seminar on Parliamentary Democracy, Parliament House, New Delhi, 25 February 1956. AIR tapes, NMML. The two-day seminar was organized by the Indian Bureau of Parliamentary Studies.
2. The Vice-President Dr S.Radhakrishnan presided over the Seminar.

good structure of government, but by many other things—by the quality of human beings, by their training, by their education, by their character, and a number of other things. All that the machine can do is to remove any element of suppression and actually encourage those qualities to develop.

Political democracy rests on every person having a vote. It is a substantial idea. But it becomes obvious that a vote by itself does not mean very much to a person who is down and out, a person, let us say, who is starving or hungry and who has no resources. He is much more interested in getting food to eat than in the vote. Therefore, political democracy by itself is not enough except that it may be used to obtain a gradually increasing measure of economic democracy, which involves spread of the good things of life to all and the removal of gross inequalities. That process has been in progress for some time in the countries where there is a political democracy and brought about a lessening of differences and internal tensions, though not completely eradicating them.

One of the basic revolutions of the world has been the Industrial Revolution, which has changed the texture of human life in the countries affected by it, and, to some extent, the rest of the world. The change has taken place not so much because of professors and experts wanting to change life in a particular way, but because of advances in the methods of production.

It has always seemed to me rather extraordinary how people's minds lag behind events. It is true that the mind itself may be the cause of the events, yet it lags behind. People's minds are terribly conservative. Oddly enough sometimes, the person who considers himself most revolutionary is often very conservative, and holds on to something regardless of changing conditions.

I look back to the French Revolution, which took place a hundred and sixty or seventy years ago. The French Revolution came with a mighty bang. It frightened Europe, and created innumerable waves of thought, which affected Europe for the next hundred years. Again and again in the rest of Europe there were waves. In 1848 there was a sort of an attempt all over Europe to revive the ideals of the French Revolution. They were petty revolutions which were mostly crushed. And yet the French Revolution when it actually happened was, if I may say so, already rather out of date. Something bigger was happening behind it, that was the Industrial Revolution. The leaders of the French Revolution were hardly conscious of the Industrial Revolution that was beginning. They were thinking on political terms. For a considerable time after the French Revolution, while this mighty change due to the Industrial Revolution was taking place, the thinking of people was governed by the slogans and ideas of the French Revolution. It was only gradually that the thinking

began to be affected by something which had happened years and years before. This is an example of how the mind lags behind events.

Similarly, we may be thinking today of many problems which are important in themselves but which might also be rather out of date at the beginning of the atomic age. Something big has happened in the structure of human life because of this atomic energy. The atomic or hydrogen bomb is the final consummation of the industrial age. It represents an enormous concentration of power. It forces you to decide how you are going to use this mighty power—rightly or wrongly, in conflict or in cooperation? It really should force us to think on entirely new lines.

I take it that all of us in the main believe in democracy. Why do we believe in it? Speaking for myself, I believe in it first of all, because I think it is an essentially peaceful means to settle problems and secondly, because it is free from the pressures which other forms of government may exercise on the individual. I do not say that all pressures are removed. But it does replace the discipline which is imposed by authority largely by self-discipline. Instead of an autocratic king imposing a tax or anything. The community lays down rules and laws which the people are expected to obey. As I said, democracy to me essentially means an attempt at the solution of problems by peaceful methods. If it is not peaceful, then it is not, to my mind, democracy. It is something else. Secondly, it provides an opportunity for the individual to develop. Now, that opportunity cannot mean a chaotic or anarchic state, with every individual doing anything he likes. Society, any social organisation, must have some kind of glue to hold it together, some disciplines. Those disciplines may be imposed by outside, by an autocratic king or an authoritarian form of government, with the help of the army or police. In a democracy the discipline is self-imposed. Discipline there has to be. There will be no democracy if there is no discipline.

If the people cannot observe that discipline and are rather anarchic then the democratic structure tends to crack up. Then something else will take its place and enforce discipline. This sometimes takes the form of a military dictatorship. Society cannot exist if a vacuum is created. The vacuum has to be filled. The vacuum may be filled by some external authority. Or some internal authority grows to fill it. All these possibilities arise. Some merely theoretical enunciation of a constitution will not solve the problem. The constitution itself may be an excellent one. But it is only in the measure that that constitution reflects the thinking and the character of the people that it is likely to be a successful constitution. We have seen some very excellent constitutions going to pieces after a few years because the people did not act up to their own constitution or the constitution did not solve the problems they had to face.

As regards parliamentary government, I regret to say that my knowledge is largely confined to English books on the subject and a few American books and a very few French books. These classics deal mainly with its development in the nineteenth century. Very interesting reading. But somehow they do not fit in with today's problems.

Take the British Parliament. In the nineteenth-century the whole approach to government was, well, to govern as little as possible, to legislate as little as possible. The social reform attitude of government, which is such an important feature of today, was largely absent there. The result was that in the British Parliament the private member had a large field to function in. It was the private member who brought in, whether it was some measure of social reform or any other kind of reform or improvement or advance. The private member, therefore, played an important part in the House of Commons in the British Parliament right throughout the nineteenth century. But under pressure of circumstances this part became narrower and narrower, till now in every Parliament, wherever you may go, the poor private member is very private, indeed, and he has very few chances of doing much. Parliaments get pressed all round by having to do so many things in a short time that government business becomes enormous and the private member is rather squeezed out. Also, the problems which a government has to face have grown so enormously that sometimes one begins to doubt if the normal parliamentary procedures are adequate to deal with all of them.

I remember even twenty or thirty years ago, reading discussions about this progressive difficulty experienced by the British Parliament in finding time to deal with these problems in detail. They did not have this time. And all kinds of suggestions have been made from time to time for powers to be transferred to committees of Parliament, to deal with legislation with the principles being laid down by Parliament, and the rest dealt with by some committee and finalised. I do not know if any satisfactory solution has yet been found.

Parliaments have to work hard nowadays, much harder than they used to. Members of Parliament get vast numbers of papers to study, which they can hardly read and they have to sit for late hours simply grappling with these problems. And if the average member has to carry this great burden of printed paper and sit late hours and also attend select committees and all kinds of other committees, you can well imagine what burden the poor members of the government have to carry—all that the private members get and many papers which are part of the day-to-day government of the country which do not come up before Parliament. The business of government and parliament becomes more and more complicated. It becomes a little doubtful how far a parliamentary

democracy can in the old way carry on its work and solve these problems. Some kind of devolution of authority may become necessary, if one has to go on. Otherwise there is the difficulty of problems remaining unsolved, not only because of their volume but because of lack of time. And an unsolved problem is a dangerous thing. The nature of government has progressively changed everywhere. It has changed regardless of whether the structure of society in that country is capitalist or socialist or something in-between. Even in countries which are supposed to be intensively capitalist today, their governments perform social functions to an enormous extent, functions which used to be relegated to private individuals or private enterprise. In the other countries which deliberately aim at government dealing with this sector, of course, it has grown even more. So whatever the basic policies pursued by any country, it becomes inevitable for the governmental structure to become involved in social problems ever increasingly. The old idea of government as only a Police State—I am not using it in a bad sense, but in the sense that a government's chief functions were giving security to the country from external invasion and internal disorder and collecting taxes to fulfil these purposes—no longer prevails. Innumerable other functions have come in. Now, the question how far can parliamentary democracy be adapted to meet these new burdens and new functions of government satisfactorily, effectively, and in time?

Of course, the easiest way of dealing with the problem is to have an autocratic king or dictator. He will deal with them immediately, rightly or wrongly. Whether the problem is solved or not, that is an approach which is not compatible with democratic thinking. It is bad for the growth of the people. It will not allow them to develop their creative energy, their spirit, their sense of freedom, which are considered so essential. But remember that that creative energy and sense of freedom do not develop by merely giving a person a vote. There are other economic conditions that have also to develop.

Parliamentary democracy is inevitably going in the direction everywhere, more or less, of what might be called economic democracy. It may take different forms. In the measure that it solves the economic problems of the day, it succeeds even in the political field. If it does not, then the political structure tends to weaken and will crack up. Ultimately all these problems concern human beings and their mutual relations. Their relation depends on the character of the human beings. The same type of governmental machinery or constitution might be totally unsuited to people with different backgrounds, although certain basic principles may be common.

Now, we in India owing to a fairly long period of contact with England and the British parliamentary institutions were made to think of wanting them in India. When the chance came, in a large measure we reproduced those parliamentary structures and institutions here, not only because we had long thought in those terms but also because we thought they would be right and they would fit in with our general structure of life. I think by and large, we have succeeded. The question that I have put before you—how far this parliamentary structure is competent to deal with the enormous problems that come one after the other at this beginning of the atomic age, do not relate merely to India, but to every country.

There is another aspect. We talk about the spread of political power. You spread it out in the sense that everybody has a vote. But other methods of influencing people in the right or in the wrong direction have arisen—methods of propaganda, which may excite people, and bring them up to a high temper and create war conditions in their minds. These tremendous machines of propaganda may be exploited by democracy or may break democracy. All these new problems have arisen because we live in an extraordinarily dynamic age of change. Every old yardstick is too short to measure this present age.

Then there is one aspect which perhaps affects us in India more than elsewhere. In Western Europe, say in England, they developed their parliamentary system in the course of two or three hundred years or more. Occasionally there were big conflicts. Occasionally there was danger of a crack up. But somehow they managed to get over it and took a fresh step forward. Now, they have this long period of relatively measured advance, without too great strains. In Asia, the background of every country is not the same as others', apart from their national character. In India we had certain advantages. In the course of the last thirty or forty years, when we waged our struggle for freedom, we built up a movement which was an unusual type of movement. By and large it was a peaceful movement; nevertheless, it was a revolutionary movement. That produced a certain type of reaction in the people's minds. It actually changed the character of the people in the course of a generation. We did not, if I may say so, suddenly get freedom. It was not thrown into our laps. We struggled for it. We conditioned ourselves for it. We went through great strain and trouble over it, a great deal of suffering over it, which is the ultimate factor in conditioning a people. Mere thinking in the air does not condition one much. It is the experiences of a race that condition a people. We have gone all through that. And then we had to face a period of constructive activity. Now, because we were conditioned to function peacefully,

the change-over was far less difficult than in some other countries I can think of. That trail of bitterness and conflict did not pursue us and we could adapt ourselves mentally and physically to the changed conditions.

At the same time, since our whole training had been in opposition, in struggle, it was not easy, taking the people as a whole, to get them out of that habit of thinking that they must function in the opposition. It is a natural thing, which has happened in every country. Even in countries which have had major revolutions, there have been counter-revolutions. When you shake up a country in a big way, all kinds of consequences flow and it is no good thinking like an academic professor and saying that this thing should happen next and this should not happen. If you have millions of people in ferment, on the move, excited, conditioned in a particular way, one has to deal with that situation. The bigger the country the more difficult the problem. But the fact that our methods had been peaceful and that in the course of our struggle we had developed a great measure of self-discipline, although not as much as one would have liked, saved us and put us in a position to utilize the strength we had gathered in the course of our struggle to right purposes. Otherwise that very strength, as has often happened in revolutionary struggles, might have turned against us and might have done us a great deal of injury, and resulted in internal quarrels and the rest. Naturally, in a violent revolution the crack-up is much greater and the reactions too are violent. To compare the effects after a revolution to some kind of automatic changes taking place at the higher levels of the political structure is not to understand the nature of a revolutionary situation. I do not wish to mention the names of countries, but you can see many countries in Asia which have also come out of these revolutionary crises, struggles, violent or peaceful or mixed, and they have to struggle with those problems still. And you can see other countries where some changes have been made which are in the nature of not growing out of the struggle of a country, but taking place otherwise.

So, all our parliamentary institutions and whatever we may have are ultimately the projections of a people's character, thinking, ideals etc. They must fit in with the people's character and thinking, they are to be strong and lasting. Otherwise they tend to crack up.

I should like to go back to what I said right at the beginning—that we have come to a stage which, briefly, might be called the atomic age, when all our previous thinking becomes somewhat out of date. Take war and military science. By and large all military textbooks are out of date today. Some experts may know a little, but even they do not know much. It requires entirely new

thinking on an uncertain ground. Take economics. Even they are going to be vastly changed, because of these new developments of power. Take our social living. Everything is changing. And if everything is changing, undoubtedly the texture of government, the systems of government also must be affected by all these mighty changes. So it is in this spirit of inquiry that I approach these questions. I do not want to break up anything that is good, but we must realise that it has to be adapted to the changing conditions of life and society. Thank you.

1. To C.D. Deshmukh¹

New Delhi
19 February 1956

My dear Deshmukh,

Your letter of February 18² about defence expenditure. I am quite clear that we cannot increase our expenditure as suggested,³ though some increase will probably be considered necessary. There can be no question of competition in this matter or an arms race.⁴ The Defence people have a tendency to be over-cautious and to think of every possible provision.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Deshmukh's letter dealt with the issue of projected requirement of Rs. 1262 crore expenditure for the armed forces for the period 1958-61, as suggested by the Service Chiefs in a composite plan prepared at the behest of Defence Committee of the Cabinet.
3. Deshmukh pointed out that if the Service Chiefs' proposal of enhancement in financial allocations was accepted, commitments to Defence annually would work out to more than Rs. 400 crore, including the foreign exchange components. The allocations to Defence for 1955 was Rs.225 crore.
4. The Finance Minister wrote that the Second Five Year Plan had assumed Rs. 80 crores requirement for the armed forces in excess of the current expenditure levels. He felt that additional resources sought by the armed forces, "cannot be made available without seriously crippling our development plans". Deshmukh concluded that the projected requirement "whether in competition with the plan or not, expenditure of the order envisaged is beyond our capacity." He also suggested that India should desist from any competition with Pakistan in an arms build-up, as there was no guarantee that US would not further step up military aid to Pakistan.

2. True Meaning of Defence¹

Jawaharlal Nehru: My colleague, the honourable Minister of Defence will, no doubt, deal with the broad issues raised in this debate and with the criticism and suggestions made. I have intervened to draw the attention of the House to certain broad and basic principles of the line of defence and more especially, the problems that we have to face.

I have noticed in the course of the debate today, a certain anxiety, a certain concern about recent events, amounting almost to an apprehension, a fear lest India might be attacked by our neighbouring country and we might not be ready for it. The number of recent border incidents² and more especially the fact that a great foreign country is giving military aid has led, no doubt, to this apprehension. It is perfectly true that the situation today in regard to the defence of India has been very much affected by this factor of military aid coming in from a great country and we have to view this situation, therefore, in this new light.

The honourable Member who spoke just before me³ asked us to give the latest equipment, best training and all that. What exactly does that mean? In nothing, I think, has there been such a rapid, such a great improvement in technology as in defence or in attack in war equipment. Of course, the latest example of that—the final example—is nuclear weapons, atomic bomb or hydrogen bomb. That is the final culmination of this process up till now. If you judge from that, it simply means this, that no country in the world, practically speaking, excepting the two great powers, adequately defended, because only

1. Interventions during a debate on demands for grants for defence in the Lok Sabha, 21 March 1956. *Lok Sabha Debates*, Vol. II, Part II, cols. 3270-3278.
2. Starting early in 1956, there were a series of border violations by Pakistan forces, both on the eastern and western borders. The most serious of them occurred near the Hussainiwala Headworks on the Punjab border in March, in which military personnel casualty occurred on both sides. Apart from this, incidents took place in Chhad Bet (Rann of Kutch), Surma river (Tripura), Rohiwal, Aimanpur, Khemkaran and Muthianwala.
3. D.C. Sharma had said: "Give our soldiers first-rate equipment; first-rate training. Our country will have an army which, without fighting with any country, which, without embarking on any adventure of aggression will be an army of which the whole world will be proud."

they have enough of these nuclear weapons. One or two others have a little, but comparatively less, and others have not got it at all. How, then, does one judge of this adequacy of defence of a country?

Obviously, if some power which has nuclear weapons at its disposal chose to attack India fully, from the purely military point of view, we have little defence. It may be that from other points of view, we may yet be able to meet this menace of the atomic bomb, because a people that has vitality, that has strength and unity and a people that will not surrender whatever happens can never be defeated. I have often said, therefore, that the real answer to the atomic bomb lies in other spheres. I mention this because in the final analysis what counts is not your soldier or your military weapon, but the spirit of unity of the people, the will of the people to survive in spite of every difficulty and every menace, and it is well that we should remember that when we are considering other problems, whether it is states reorganisation or any other problem. When we quarrel about petty matters, when some of us come into conflict with some others, it is well to remember some of these basic propositions, to remember the kind of world we are living in today. It is a dangerous world. It is a world full of menace. It is a world which may well trip us up and push us down if we are not careful, if we are not vigilant, if we are not as prepared as we can well be. That is the background.

If I am confident about India, that confidence depends more on the spirit and unity of our people than on other factors. If that is weak, for me it just does not matter how many tanks you may put in somewhere, or how many aircrafts. But, let us consider this matter from another point of view.

As I said, technology has developed so rapidly that if, unfortunately there is a great war in the future, probably every book that has been written in the past about warfare, every weapon that was used during the last war and previously would be out of date. Judged from that point of view, we in India and nearly all the countries of the world excepting very, very few are completely out of date and there is no help for it in the present. We may gradually go forward. What is the equation of defence? In what lies the strength of a people for defence? Well, one thinks immediately about defence forces, army, navy, air force. Perfectly right. They are the spear points of defence. They have to bear the brunt of any attack. How do they exist?—the army and navy. What are they based on? The more technical you get, as armies and navies and air forces are getting, the base is the industrial and technological development of the country. You may import a machine or an aircraft or some other highly technical weapon and you may even teach somebody to use it, but that is a very

superficial type of defence because you have not got the technological background for it. If spare parts go wrong, your whole machine is useless. If you cannot get it, if somebody from whom you bought it refuses to supply a part of it, it becomes useless, so that in spite of your independence you become dependent on others, and very greatly so, and that is what is happening today. From that point of view probably there are very few countries in the wide world that are really independent—that is to say, from the point of view of being able to stand on their own feet against the military strength of others or from the point of view of technological advance. Therefore, apart from the army, navy, etc., that you may have, you want an industrial and technological background in the country. Next comes, to support all this, the economy of the country. Because if the country's economy is not sound, if the country, in fact, is not a relatively prosperous country so far its economy and people are concerned, it is a weak country. I can give many examples to this House of countries which for the moment may have a good armies but it really is a superficial strength that they have because the army depends on outside factors, outside machines, outside economy, outside help, and therefore essentially it is a dependent country from that point of view though it may be called independent. Then lastly, or fourthly, you depend on the spirit of the people. So, the equation of defence is your defence forces plus your industrial and technological background—I am not talking of equipment produced from abroad but the background which produces the equipment; thirdly, the economy of the country, and fourthly, the spirit of the people.

Looking at the countries of the world, there are only two at the present moment which may be termed to be, from the military point of view, absolutely in the front rank. There are many other countries in between. Where do we come into the picture? Here we are relatively backward technologically and industrially and yet, except for one country, except for Japan, probably more industrialised at the present moment than any country in Asia. I am leaving out the Soviet territories, and even in regard to China which is making great progress, I think it may well be said that at the present moment we are somewhat in advance in some ways, not in all ways, industrially considered. Certainly not in a military way. They have a huge army. We have a relatively small army. But I am talking about industrial development, not of other matters. We are, therefore, of the so-called underdeveloped countries, relatively more advanced in some matters. Take atomic energy. Probably we are in the first half a dozen countries of the world or somewhere near that—I do not exactly

know; it is difficult to say. We are certainly leaving out the first three or four. We are in the next rank. These things are basic for laying the foundation of future strength and growth.

An honourable Member, I am told, said here: "What is the good of your five year plans? You must concentrate on defence." That is a grave statement to make. But the five year plan is the defence plan of the country. What else is it? Because, defence does not consist of people going about marching up and down the road with guns and other weapons. Defence consists today in a country which is industrially prepared for defence, which can produce the goods, the equipment. Otherwise, you simply depend upon other countries, buy some goods which goods become totally useless to you if some little bit, a little spare part is lacking and you cannot get it.

Therefore, the right approach to defence is—well, one obvious approach, of course, is friendly relations with other countries, to avoid having unfriendly relations which might lead to conflict. And therefore, some honourable Members in this House, not many, who talk in rather aggressive terms of neighbouring countries and want to take brave action, sword in hand, serve no cause—certainly not the cause of this country apart from any larger cause of the world. It is one thing for us to be perfectly prepared, or prepared in so far as we can be for defence if somebody attacks, because, whatever our policy may be, however peaceful our policy may be, no one can take—no responsible Government can take—the risk of an emergency arising which it cannot face. That is true. But any kind of blustering attitude is neither becoming to a dignified nation, nor is it safe, nor is it appreciated by anybody in the world. It is a sign of weakness, not strength. Therefore, we must cultivate friendly relations, and we must cultivate and spread the feeling that no subject, no quarrel, is big enough for war to be required to settle it, or, to put it differently, that war today is and ought to be out of the question. Of course, by our saying it, we do not make war out of the question, because the other party may not look that way.

But what I mean is that all these national questions are rather tied up with international issues. If internationally it becomes more and more difficult for war to take place, well, the national question is affected by it. That is the broad approach. And it is our broad approach, therefore, in foreign policy or in defence policy—and the two are intimately allied—to have friendly relations with every country.

Then, we come to the second item and that is that the real strength of the country develops by industrial development, by the capacity to make, if you like, weapons of war, whether it is for the Army, the Navy or the Air Force. That means general industrial development. And you cannot develop just a particular isolated industry without a background of industrial development. You cannot say, well, we shall have, let us say, a factory producing tanks without any other industrial development of the country, or a factory producing aircraft, because you require a large background of technically trained people. It is only then that that can take place. Therefore, our immediate object should be, both from the point of view of economic development and that of defence, to build up industry, and to build up heavy industry, which produces machines.

Now, it does not matter how keen you are, and how hard you work. That takes time. It may be, and the criticism may be justified if you like, that we ought to have started thinking in these terms even earlier. But the point is here we are today, and we are trying to think in these terms of building up heavy industry, iron and steel, machine-making plant, or exploiting and producing oil.

Take this business of oil. Most of your machines will simply become completely useless without oil to run them. If oil is stopped, if we have not got enough oil in this country, well, there you are, you put your big machines, and tie them up, because there is nothing to move them about.

These are the factors. People seem to consider that defence is just training a man to walk up and down in a step with a gun in his hand. That is a very out of date conception of it.

Now, we come up against a grave difficulty. Let us admit for the moment that we are proceeding along right lines—we may speed up the process—those right lines being the industrialisation of the country, which is good from the economic point of view as well as from the defence. But industrialisation takes some time.

All the time, we have to think of two aspects. One is that the speed of industrialisation means a burden that we have to carry, the people have to carry, all of us. How far can we carry the burden? Either we slow down the speed or we increase the burden. That is one aspect of the problem which applies to all our five year plans and the rest. The other aspect is that it is all very well that you are going along the right lines, you may be ready for this, let us say, ten years later. But what happens in between the ten years? You may be knocked down in the course of the ten years. And all your saying that 'We

are not ready for an attack' will not prevent an enemy from attacking you, and waiting till you are ready for it. That is obvious. That is the difficult problem that every country has to face, to balance immediate danger with considerations of better security later on.

If you think too much in terms of immediate danger and concentrate on that, the result is that you are never getting strong enough tomorrow and the day after, because your resources are being spent not in productive ways, not in the growth of real strength, but in temporary strength which you borrow from others, which you buy from others. You get a machine from outside, or something. You get it, you use it, it does give you some temporary assurance, although it is not very great. But as I told you, if some part goes wrong, or somebody fails to supply you, there again you are helpless. That is the real difficulty.

And this difficulty has become even more real for us because of these recent developments, more especially the military aid that has come in fairly considerable quantity to our neighbour country. I do not myself think that there is any marked likelihood of war. In fact, I would very much doubt if any such war is at all likely to take place. And I am trying to think objectively, not merely because I wish it so, because one has to take a realistic view of these matters. Nevertheless, having said so, one cannot ignore the possibility of some emergency arising. And we are put in a very great difficulty. And I want to take the House into confidence.

The difficulty is this, that if we lay too much stress on present-day assurance, which ultimately means the purchase of big machines of various types from abroad in adequate quantity, well, we undermine the economic progress that we envisage. It is a terrible problem for us to face, and for this House to face.

It is quite easy for some honourable Member to say, push away your five year plan and do this. But that is almost a counsel of despair. We cannot sell tomorrow and the day after, because of our fears of today. At the same time, we have to provide for today. That is the problem. I do not pretend to give an answer to this problem here in this House, because it is not a problem—I do not mind—which arises today at this minute; the problem is there in its broad context, which we shall have to face from day to day, month to month. It has been thrust upon us. To a slight extent, the problem is always there with every country. But the problem has been thrust upon us rather forcibly and rather urgently by these developments of pacts and military aid and the rest.

I do not wish the House to think that we are unduly anxious about this problem, but naturally we are a little anxious, and we certainly are not

complacent about it. I think we would be anxious undoubtedly, if we did not have the feeling of the spirit of the country, the unity of the country, and the assurance that, whatever our petty views might be in many fields, over these large questions there can be no difference, and we all have to pull together.

So this, in the final analysis, is the major problem: how far to ensure safety today we are to sacrifice and delay tomorrow's developments? This House will be considering sometime later during this session the Second Five Year Plan. In considering that, it will have to bear in mind this particular problem because if the advice of some honourable Members is adopted in regard to our defence, we shall have to throw overboard the Second Five Year Plan, if not completely, a good bit of it. So, it is not such an easy matter for us to decide in this way, seeing only one part of the picture and not the other.

It is largely for these reasons—and if they apply to our country, presumably they apply to other countries also—that we have deprecated this business of military pacts and alliances and military aid being given. We would welcome civil aid for development of the country, which really strengthens the country ultimately much more than the other and which has no other implications to other countries concerned. But the way things have developed in Asia and elsewhere has been rather unfortunate and has brought this atmosphere of tension and fear in the train.

I have endeavoured to be perfectly frank to the House because this problem is troubling us, and it is not a problem to be dealt with in a small way here and there; it is a problem which extends itself not to a few days and few months but it goes on. We will have to face it from day to day, for the next year and the year after that. We hope that whatever decisions we arrive at from time to time we shall naturally communicate to this House, because other matters will be affected by those decisions; whether it is the five year plan, whether it is some other scheme of development, they might well be affected. Therefore, we cannot proceed in this business without the fullest understanding, sympathy and support of the House.

3. To K.N. Katju¹

New Delhi
21 March 1956

My dear Kailas Nath,

I have just seen your letter of today's date.²

I am surprised at your attaching importance to what Kamath says.³ He is probably the most irresponsible member of Parliament. We have had ever so much trouble with him in the past, when he was a member of the Congress Party. On at least two occasions, we took some disciplinary action against him. Later, he joined the Praja Socialist Party and has been a headache to them. I have known him for a number of years and I appointed him as an Assistant Secretary of the old National Planning Committee. He was so much lacking in intelligence that I had to get rid of him.

He is not a member of our Party and is in the Opposition. I cannot, therefore, take any action against him, however irresponsible and foolish he might be. But, why should you bother about such silly remarks? Please forget them.

I am glad that another member of the Opposition took strong exception to Kamath's remarks.⁴

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

1. JN Collection.
2. Katju sent his letter of resignation to Nehru over the remarks of PSP MP, H. V. Kamath, doubting Katju's capabilities as the Defence Minister. Katju wrote: "I do not want to be a source of weakness to your Cabinet. I want to serve with honour to myself ... and not become an impediment to the administration of the country."
3. Katju's letter of resignation was in response to Kamath's remarks in the Lok Sabha the same day, after Nehru had made his intervention on the defence budget (see the preceding item). Kamath said that Katju had "little quality" for the post of Defence Minister. He also pointed to Katju's "physical handicap." Katju said that he should be given another portfolio in the Cabinet or made a Governor.
4. Girraj Saran Singh, an independent member from Bharatpur-Sawai Madhopur, later on during the defence debate said he "regretted" sitting on the same side of Parliament as Kamath. "His unprovoked, if not funny, personal attack on the Defence Minister, was if I am allowed to say so in bad taste." Singh went on to say that Kamath's own handicaps "are only too apparent to us."

4. Cable to Anthony Eden¹

I thank you for your message² about arms supplies which was conveyed to me by your High Commissioner³ on the 16th March. I had full and frank talks with him and Lord Mountbatten and explained to them the very difficult situation which we had to face here. There has been a steady flow of American military aid to Pakistan and already Pakistan has much superior equipment to ours.⁴ The flow of this equipment is continuous and rapid and within one year's time, according to our information, Pakistan's military position will in many ways be superior to India's, more especially in armour and aircraft. India's commitments are widespread and we have to guard a very long frontier not only with Pakistan but also with other countries.

2. We wish well to Pakistan and consider that Pakistan's economic progress will be beneficial to us also. But Pakistan thinks almost entirely in military terms. Her economic condition is a difficult one. We have a heavy and constant flow of migrants from East Pakistan to India. There were fifty thousand last month. This is a terrible strain on us and is upsetting West Bengal's economy which has already suffered so much from Partition and millions of migrants.

3. In Pakistan there is constant talk of war and jihad against India. I have never seen such virulent writing as in the Pakistan press against India. Responsible leaders there also indulge in attacks on India and make utterly baseless charges.⁵ During the past few weeks there have been a large number of border incidents involving considerable casualties on both sides.

1. New Delhi, 23 March 1956. JN Collection.

2. Anthony Eden, in his message of 15 March 1956 to Nehru, said the UK would speed up the delivery of Canberra aircraft to India. He added that UK "went a very long way" to meet India's needs. Eden wanted a "firm assurance" from India that it would not buy Russian aircraft, as any such acquisition would affect the close defence cooperation between India and the UK.

3. Malcolm MacDonald.

4. US Military aid to Pakistan provided for equipping the latter's army with four infantry divisions and 1 ½ armoured divisions and approximately 10 squadrons for the Air Force. The cost of this commitment to the US from 1955 through 1958 was around \$ 430 million.

5. For instance, the Pakistan Prime Minister Mohammad Ali told the Pakistan National Assembly on 30 March 1956 that Nehru's statements on Kashmir, left no prospects for direct negotiations. He said: "We are committed to a fair and impartial plebiscite in Kashmir and we will fight for it." Ali also said that Nehru's claims regarding Kashmir were "fallacious" and his arguments "untenable."

4. On top of this has come the recent SEATO meeting in Karachi and the military pacts. All this has produced very strong reactions in India which have been expressed in Parliament and elsewhere. Because of this developing military situation and the steps we have necessarily to take in order to meet it, we have to carry heavy additional burdens. Our Second Five Year Plan which is being finalised now, is endangered and our economic progress imperilled.

5. It has become imperative for us to add to our defensive strength. We have tried hard to get tanks and aircrafts from the United Kingdom and I am very grateful to you for the steps you propose to take to help us in this matter, even at some inconvenience to yourself.⁶

6. It was in this connection that we thought of buying the Russian IL-28. This appeared to us to be particularly suited to our requirements and was easily available.⁷ The price was relatively moderate. For us, this was a purely commercial transaction. We did not intend keeping any Russian technicians here. We were prepared, in addition, to take the fullest security precautions.

7. However, in view of what you have written to me on this subject and my talks with Lord Mountbatten, we have reconsidered this matter and the Government of India have decided to buy Canberras and not to buy IL-28s. We have no intention at present of buying military aircraft or other arms from Russia or Russia's allies.

8. You will appreciate that the Government of India cannot give an undertaking for the future. But I can assure you that if at some future date we should wish to reconsider this matter, we will give the United Kingdom Government adequate warning and will consult with you with every desire to reach an agreement with you on the subject. We shall only take a decision after these consultations.

9. I need not assure you of our desire to cooperate in as many ways as possible with the United Kingdom. I hope you will appreciate that we have endeavoured to go as far as we could to meet your wishes in this matter.

6. Eden in his letter of 15 March contended that the supply of Canberra bombers would mean closing down one of five RAF Canberra Squadrons and delay equipping of NATO with the same aircraft by one year. Eden said that avionics and radars for the RAF would also be delayed and said that the overall package "does mean serious sacrifice to the RAF and our NATO allies." He also pointed out that the price offered for the aircraft was itself a concession.

7. For a discussion on this, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol.30, pp.351-353.

1. To Vishnu Sahay¹

New Delhi

1 March 1956

My dear Vishnu Sahay,

I met five or six persons from Kashmir this evening.² After I had seen them, I received a note from Mridula Sarabhai about them. I enclose this.³

2. I have also received a letter from Bakhshi Saheb which I enclose.⁴

3. These people were with me for about an hour. For 45 minutes two or three of them talked of their misfortunes and sufferings. I must say that they gave a ghastly account of the treatment accorded to them and their families and others. I have little doubt that this was considerably exaggerated. Nevertheless, I did not like it at all.

4. Their main argument was that their sole guilt lay in the fact that they had always believed in Shaikh Saheb⁵ and did not wish to desert him. They were strongly opposed to Pakistan and were attached to India. At the same time many people in Kashmir were wondering why India was a silent observer, if not a party, to the horrors that were taking place in Kashmir. When, in the old days, in 1942 Quit Kashmir agitation, and in 1947 when Kashmir was threatened, India came to her rescue. Now conditions were so bad that nothing was done and even the Indian Press blacked out all news about Kashmir.

1. File No. KS-31/55, MHA. Also available in JN Collection.
2. All six were National Conference workers who had come to seek Shaikh Abdullah's release. Nehru consulted Vishnu Sahay before meeting these people and was informed that two of the persons were pro-Pakistani. Sahay added that others had behaved well up to 1953, but since then had changed.
3. Mridula Sarabhai profiled the career of the six National Conference workers and associates of Shaikh Abdullah, noting their pro-India feelings and sentiments—Khwaja Mohammad Amin; Mohammed Abdullah Lone; Pir Mohammad Afzal Maqdomi; Mohammad Sibrandas (Sikander); Syed Ahmed Indrabi and Haji Mohammad Ishaq. In the Mridula Sarabhai note the name of Khwaja A.R. Ved is provided, but is not in Nehru's letter of 15 February to Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad, Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir. The name of Mohammad Ishaq comes in place of Ved.
4. Bakhshi in his reply to Nehru on 25 February 1956 wrote that all the people seeking an interview with JN were "undoubtedly against the government", adding that "two of them have been definitely indulging in pro-Pakistan activities ever since 1947."
5. S.M. Abdullah was in jail since 9 August 1953.

5. They said that Bakhshi Saheb and his colleagues were encouraging well-known Pakistanis. They mentioned some names. At the same time these people who came to see me, who were opposed to Pakistan, were being hounded and crushed.

6. This was the main burden of their argument and I listened to it in patience for about three quarters of an hour. I then spoke for a few minutes. I said that nothing had pained me during the last two or three years so much as the developments in Kashmir. Shaikh Saheb was an old friend and colleague whom I respected even though I disagreed with him. But sometimes events took a wrong turn and personal considerations have to be set aside before larger issues. I did not like this state of affairs to continue in Kashmir. But it seemed to me that the activities of some people in Kashmir were chiefly responsible for this continuance. They had said that they were against Pakistan, and yet the Plebiscite Front⁶ was obviously helping Pakistan. There were others too who worked against not only the interests but the dignity of India. No great country could tolerate this kind of behaviour. India would certainly not submit to this agitation of the Plebiscite Front. It was not much good their saying that this was the work of some irresponsible people when Mr Beg himself was a leading light of this Front. Mr Beg came to Delhi and was here for some time but carefully avoided seeing me. Subsequently he wrote a letter to me asking for an interview, but even this letter was not properly worded.

7. I could not say anything about individual instances that they had mentioned, but there seemed to me a good deal of exaggeration. Personally I did not like any violence or ill-treatment of human beings and I would regret it if this occurred in Kashmir or anywhere else. But, quite apart from this, I had to consider these issues in the wider context.

8. They tried to explain this Plebiscite Front by saying that although it was wrong, it was a result of long frustration. Beg too had remained quiet for a long time before he took to this line.

6. On 9 August 1955, a "Plebiscite Front" was organised by seven members of the J & K Legislative Assembly with Mohammad Afzal Beg as President. It espoused the cause of self-determination of the Kashmiris through a plebiscite under the auspices of the UN, the withdrawal of the forces of the two nations from Kashmir; and restoration of civil liberties and free elections. Some other political parties within the state lent their support to the Plebiscite Front including the Kashmiri Political Conference, the Kashmir Democratic Union and the Kashmir branch of the Praja Socialist Party.

9. Finally I told these people to see you chiefly about their individual complaints. I suggest that you see them and listen to them.

10. These people told me that they had received messages from the Kashmir authorities which indicated that the Kashmir Government knew about their attempt to see me and had stated that it was for the Kashmir Government to decide whether this interview should be given or not. Threats were added that if they did not behave, they would be properly attended to on their return to Kashmir.

11. I do not consider the persons who came to see me as very upright or straightforward. But I must say that what they told me left a bad taste in my mouth.

12. You should see them and listen to them. I do hope that if and when they go to Kashmir, they will not be punished for seeing me.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Reply to Balraj Madhok¹

Please send the following reply to Shri Balraj Madhok,² President, Bharatiya Jana Sangh, Delhi State.

“Dear Sir,

The Prime Minister has received your letter of the 28th March in which you refer to the refusal by the Ministry of Defence to issue a permit to Shri Kedar Nath Sahni³ to go to Jammu in connection with certain elections there.⁴

I am desired by the Prime Minister to inform you that he does not consider anything objectionable or undemocratic in this refusal to issue a permit. The Jammu and Kashmir State is undoubtedly a part of India, but it is rather a special part with special provisions relating to it. What is more important is that the State has been the scene of military operations in the recent past and even now there are armed forces on either side of the ceasefire line and United Nations Observers. Further, that the problem concerning the State has become an international one.

In these circumstances, it is perfectly justifiable for the Jammu and Kashmir Government to control entry by some permit system in order to avoid the entry of persons who might either be undesirable or whose presence might

1. Note to Private Secretary, 30 March 1956. JN Collection.
2. (b.1920); Head of History Department, D.A.V. College, Srinagar, 1944-47; Editor, *Organiser*, 1948; Lecturer in History, Punjab Camp College, New Delhi, 1950-58; Head of History Department, D.A.V. College, Delhi University; member, Lok Sabha, 1961-62, 1967-70; Founder Member and Secretary, Bharatiya Jana Sangh, 1961-65; President, Delhi State Jana Sangh, 1954-63 and Bharatiya Jana Sangh, 1966-68.
3. (b.1926); Alderman, Delhi Municipal Corporation, 1958-62; Deputy Mayor, Delhi, 1959-60; Mayor, 1972-February 1975; Chief Executive Councillor, Delhi Administration, 1977.
4. The issue of refusal of permit to Kedar Nath Sahni also figured in the Lok Sabha on 20 March 1956, when the Defence Minister K.N. Katju was asked if he was aware that permission was refused to Sahni to visit Jammu to do electioneering work on behalf of the Jana Sangh in connection with the municipal elections in Kashmir.

lead to undesirable consequences. The safety of the State is the primary consideration for the functioning of democratic processes.

In regard to the particular instance that you have mentioned, it is for the State authorities to exercise their discretion and judgement as they are responsible not only for the good governance of the State, but also for the prevention of any communal and like situations from arising. The entry of outsiders in a local election campaign might well be objected to by others and create an undesirable situation. There has been a good deal of evidence in the past about communal elements in Jammu creating such situations which have done injury to the State and to India.

The Prime Minister is surprised that your organisation should insist on doing something which is patently undesirable.⁵

Yours faithfully,”

2. Send copies of your letter to the Defence Ministry, Shri Vishnu Sahay and to the Prime Minister of J & K State.

5. Nehru told a public meeting in New Delhi on 12 April 1956 that in spite of not getting permits, the Jana Sangh leaders had reached Jammu ‘secretly.’ “You can imagine if this is becoming”, he said.

3. To Tek Chand¹

New Delhi
3 April 1956

My dear Tek Chand,²

Sometime ago, I think it was on the 16th March, there was a general discussion on the Budget in the Lok Sabha. S.S. More³ spoke in the House and referred to Shaikh Abdullah, asking for his release. Thereupon, you are reported to have interjected: "Send him to Pakistan".

I think this was a very unfortunate remark you made, and it might have consequences not to our liking. We are having a difficult time in some ways in Kashmir and have to be wary about our words. Shaikh Abdullah cannot remain permanently in prison. Sometime or other, he will come out. It is not wise on our part to say anything which angers him and those who stand by him, and thus drives him further away.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Tek Chand (1903-1996); advocate Punjab High Court, 1928 and subsequently Judge, Punjab High Court; Lecturer, University Law College, Lahore, 1933-1942; Member, Lok Sabha, 1952-56; publications include *Commentaries on Punjab Acts* and *Child Marriage Restraint Act*.
3. Member, Lok Sabha.

4. To Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad¹

New Delhi
18 April 1956

My dear Bakhshi,

Some time ago I received your letter. Forgive me for not answering it earlier. As a matter of fact, somehow I had an idea that you were coming to Delhi about the middle of this month. However, I suppose you will be coming here at the beginning of May for the National Development Council, and I shall see you then.

My recent statements and speeches in regard to Kashmir have at least pulled this question out of the old groove.² It was about time that it came out of it. But obviously all our troubles are not over. There is little doubt that Pakistan will take this question up to the United Nations fairly soon. When, I cannot say. Anyhow, we have to be prepared for this. We are already conferring about it.³

I see that the statement I have made on the Kashmir question has been condemned by the Jana Sangh, Hindu Mahasabha and RSS.⁴ I do not mind

1. JN Collection.
2. Nehru, while participating in the discussion on the Demands for Grants relating to the MEA on 29 March in Lok Sabha, said that in regard to Kashmir there was no question of arbitration or a plebiscite in view of the developments that had taken place on both sides of the ceasefire line during the past eight and a half years (see also *post*, p. 532). At a press conference in New Delhi on 2 April (see *post*, pp. 532-536.) he spoke on Kashmir issue. On 13 April while addressing a public meeting in Delhi (not printed) he disclosed that he had suggested to the Pakistan leaders: "...I am willing to accept the question of the part of Kashmir which is under you should be settled by demarcating the border on the basis of the present ceasefire line. We had no desire to take it by force." He also condemned the communal policies of the Praja Parishad in Jammu and said that it was "treachery" to the country and that the tone adopted by the Parishad only succeeded in fostering the Muslim League's Two-nation theory.
3. In the first week of April 1956, press reports suggested that Pakistan was referring the Kashmir question to the UN Security Council. This led Nehru to agree to the setting up of the Kashmir Unit headed by a Joint Secretary. The idea was mooted by M.J. Desai on 12 April 1956. On 7 April 1956, Nehru also suggested the preparation of a documented booklet on Kashmir for publicity purposes. Pakistan formally raised the issue with the Security Council on 2 January 1957.
4. The Jana Sangh and the Hindu Mahasabha opposed the proposal of partition on the ceasefire line and wanted the Government to recover Pakistan-held Kashmir, by force if necessary. These two parties also stood for complete integration of Kashmir and India.

that, and it was to be expected. Nevertheless, I feel that we should not allow one-sided propaganda to be carried on by the Jana Sangh or the Praja Parishad in Jammu or elsewhere. It appears that there are three places now in India where the Jana Sangh functions. One is, of course, Jammu. The other is Delhi. The third is Madhya Bharat or, rather, a few parts of it. In Delhi they have put up big posters denouncing my statement on Kashmir.

You will have noticed, of course, my strong denunciation of the Praja Parishad of Jammu and of the Jana Sangh. I think that you should arrange for some intelligent propaganda and publicity in Jammu. In this, Mauli Chandra Sharma⁵ can be of considerable help. Mauli Chandra used to be a big leader of the Jana Sangh previously, but about two years ago he fell out with them and later left it and joined the Congress. In regard to these questions, he is wholeheartedly with us and he is a good speaker. I think that his speeches in Jammu and round about will have a considerable effect on your Praja Parishad crowd and others.

The main thing after all is the kind of internal development work that is done in Kashmir. It is the improvement in the administration and development that counts. I suppose that during this coming season you will have vast numbers of visitors. Let them see the development work and the administrative machine functioning quietly and efficiently.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. General Secretary, Bharatiya Jana Sangh, 1951-53 and its President, 1953; resigned from the Jana Sangh and joined the Congress 1956.

5. To Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

New Delhi
28 April 1956

Nan dear,

I am writing to you after a long time. Perhaps some idea of what we are going through in India has reached you. This states reorganisation business has given us any amount of trouble. Bombay, of course, is the crux of the matter and the Maharashtrians have not functioned well at all. The Bill has now been referred to the Select Committee. But the trouble remains.²

Deshmukh has again behaved in an extraordinary manner and for the fifth or sixth time sent his resignation. I really do not mind much if he resigns or not and I am certainly not making any request to him. But a resignation on this Bombay issue will add to the difficulties of the situation.³ At present he is just sulking at home....

Malcolm MacDonald⁴ saw me this morning. He is leaving for England tomorrow and will be there for three weeks. As he was going away, he asked me about Kashmir and enquired if it could be worthwhile having any talks about Kashmir at the time of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference. I told him that I did not propose to have any such talks. In case any approach is made to you on this subject, you might make it perfectly clear that I am not going to discuss Kashmir matter with the Pakistan Prime Minister or with him and Eden. Whatever I had to say, I have said and the response from Pakistan has been offensive and insulting and full of threats.⁵ In any event I am not going to sit down with Eden and Mohammad Ali to discuss this matter, nor will I approve at all of any reference being made to it in the Commonwealth

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. See *ante*, p. 214.

3. See *ante*, pp. 216-217.

4. High Commissioner of the UK in India.

5. Pakistan accused Nehru of trying to 'wriggle out' of international commitments and said they would 'fight' for a plebiscite in Kashmir. Prime Minister Mohammad Ali told the National Assembly that Nehru's claims regarding Kashmir were "fallacious" and his arguments were "untenable."

Prime Ministers' Conference.⁶ Of course, if Eden or any other Ministers there mentioned it separately, I shall tell them what I feel.

In any event I would have taken up this attitude. But in view of new developments, such as reference to Kashmir in the SEATO and Baghdad Pact meetings,⁷ this kind of discussion has become completely out of place.

I see that Suhrawardy is in London talking about Kashmir.⁸ He can do so to his heart's content. That will make no difference to my attitude. I am told that he has been adequately rewarded by the Portuguese Government for the propaganda he is doing on their behalf for Goa.⁹

With love from
Jawahar

6. At the July 1956 meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, the Pakistan Prime Minister unsuccessfully tried to raise the issue, both in the course of the Conference and informally outside the Conference. He later met Nehru and had a talk on Indo-Pakistan disputes including Kashmir, but nothing came out of the talk.
7. The Second Council Meeting of SEATO, held in Karachi in March 1956, went on record agreeing to support Pakistan in "securing a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute in accordance with the UN Resolutions."
8. H.S. Suhrawardy, leader of the Opposition in Pakistan's National Assembly, had been sent on a visit to Europe to propagate Pakistan's stand on the Kashmir dispute, in April-May 1956.
9. Suhrawardy visited Goa and Lisbon as a State guest of Portugal in October 1955 and April 1956. For the former visit see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol.30, p.387.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

I. PAKISTAN

1. Assistance to Prabartak Samgha¹

Mrs Nellie Sen Gupta² and Shri Birendralal Chaudhury³ saw me here and asked for help for the Prabartak Samgha,⁴ Chittagong. They had previously written to me on this subject. They have asked for a capital sum of rupees two lakhs eighty thousand, and rupees two thousand five hundred a month as a recurring contribution.

2. Previously, in 1953, we gave them rupees twenty-five thousand. Early last year, they were paid rupees five thousand. These payments were, I think, made in Calcutta.

3. The sum asked for is large and we can certainly take no responsibility for a monthly contribution.

4. From all accounts, the Prabartak Samgha has been doing good work and has helped in keeping the morale of the minority community in Chittagong. Hindu girls there have no chance of education, and the Prabartak Samgha offers this to them. This helps to some extent in keeping Hindus in Chittagong.

5. I am inclined, therefore, to help them, provided Dr B.C. Roy advises us to do so, but I fear we may not be able to help to the extent demanded. Perhaps, we might be able to give them rupees one hundred thousand now.

1. Note, 6 February 1956. JN Collection.

2. Nellie Sen Gupta, member of the East Pakistan Legislature and a former President of the Indian National Congress, was actively involved in the social service activities of the Prabartak Samgha, Chittagong.

3. He was Secretary, Prabartak Samgha, Chittagong. Chaudhury was killed along with some other functionaries of the Samgha during an attack on Chittagong by the Pakistan military in 1971.

4. Established in French Chandernagore in 1914 by Matilal Roy, a follower of Sri Aurobindo, the Samgha served as a front for the revolutionaries of Bengal till 1929 when Roy converted it into an organisation for constructive activities all over Bengal. Its branch at Chittagong was a meeting place of Hindus and Muslims for participation in social welfare activities. The Pakistan Government did not like its popularity among the poor people of East Pakistan.

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2. To Lord Mountbatten¹

New Delhi

21 February 1956

My dear Dickie,

...When Edwina was here, I showed her a number of press cuttings from Pakistan about your proposed visit to Karachi.² Edwina was much troubled about it and so no doubt must you be. The Pakistan Press continues to be full of articles on this subject stating repeatedly that "no guest can be more unwelcome and unwanted".³ It might interest you to know that a few days ago the Joint Secretary in the Pakistan Foreign Ministry, one Major Hassan, took a Press Conference. He was asked whether Lord Mountbatten was coming to Karachi at the invitation of the Government of Pakistan. Before answering this, he went to the adjoining room to consult his Foreign Secretary Baig⁴ and then gave the reply. He said that invitations were of two kinds, namely, voluntary and manoeuvred. The invitation to Mountbatten was of the latter kind. Hassan then added off-the-record, "Left to myself, I would never allow this man to set his foot on Pakistan".

This Press Conference took place on the 12th February. It is largely because of this hint thrown out by the Pakistan Foreign Office that the Pakistan Press has been writing repeatedly on this subject.

It is really amazing to what depths these Pakistani people can sink.⁵

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. Britain's First Sea Lord, Mountbatten, was scheduled to visit Karachi in the first week of March as a member of the British delegation to the SEATO Council meeting.
3. The Supreme Council of the Quaid-i-Azam Memorial National Reconstruction Movement was reported to have stated this on 12 February.
4. M.S.A. Baig.
5. Great indignation was expressed by public leaders, numerous organisations and the press in Pakistan on the proposed visit of Mountbatten to Karachi before the visit was called off on 2 March. Mountbatten was held responsible for helping to carve India up to the disadvantage of Pakistan; for the large-scale butchery of Muslims in East Punjab and abduction of Muslim women at the time of Partition; and for reportedly opposing the inclusion of Pakistan in the SEATO and Baghdad Pact and the supply of arms to Pakistan.

3. Migrations from East Pakistan¹

I am afraid that our High Commissioner has not understood our policy in this matter.² Nor does he realise the terrible burden that India and, more especially, West Bengal, has to shoulder because of this migration.³ I am quite clear that we should in no way encourage this migration. Indeed, we should discourage it in every way we can. I myself had the impression that our Deputy High Commissioner⁴ in Dacca tends to encourage it, and I have often said previously that he should be asked not to do so. This policy of ours is to continue whatever developments may take place in Pakistan. It is completely wrong for us even to think of encouraging this migration and taking over a few millions more. Please make this clear to our High Commissioner.

1. Note to M.J. Desai, Commonwealth Secretary, MEA, 21 February 1956. JN Collection.
2. C.C. Desai, High Commissioner of India in Pakistan, in his letter of 16 February to M.J. Desai, expressed fear that, with the coming into force of the new Constitution, the non-Muslims in Pakistan were bound to feel frustrated and demoralised because of its reactionary nature and would have no alternative but to migrate to India. He thought that the Hindus of East Bengal, being a fine human material, would be an asset to India and that India should not shut her doors to them.
3. M.J. Desai noted on 21 February that while in Kolkata the previous week he had been told by the Chief Minister, the Rehabilitation Minister, and Chief Secretary of West Bengal that they desired that the Government of India should take some action to regulate the flow of migrants, so that large numbers did not come away suddenly and create administrative complications. Nearly three and a half million Hindus had come away since 1947 and there were still about eight million Hindus in East Pakistan.
4. N.K. Ray Chaudhuri.

4. Chhad Bet and Border Security¹

I agree generally that we should examine the position created by Pakistan's incursions² and become more vigilant. You can discuss these matters with the Ministries concerned.

2. I have not met the Chief Commissioner of Kutch,³ but his behaviour on this occasion appeared to me very casual. I think he should be told so.

3. The auctioning of the Chhad Bet area must be discontinued for the present at least.

4. While communications should certainly be improved, it is not clear to me how we can lay roads leading to Chhad Bet when most of that area is under water for many months.

5. Your suggestion that artillery should be spread out all over the border does not seem to be a feasible one. It is always a bad policy to disperse your strength and we have not too much to disperse. Personally I would take the risk of not having an Artillery in a particular place provided I have a good reserve somewhere from which this could be sent if necessity arose. Anyhow this is a matter for our Army Headquarters to consider and decide.

6. I am not inclined to make a special statement in Parliament. The Press has given adequate publicity to our taking Chhad Bet. I could add nothing to it. The other question will relate to Pakistan's complaints and legal issues, etc. I imagine, however, that there would be further questions in Parliament on this issue and I shall certainly answer them. Therefore a brief note should be prepared.

7. I told you this morning about some agreement arrived at after long discussion and argument between the old Sind Government and Kutch, probably in 1924. The border was demarcated by this agreement. Please have this matter investigated by our Historical Section.⁴

1. Note to Commonwealth Secretary, MEA, 27 February 1956. JN Collection.

2. Shots were exchanged on 19 February between armed Pakistani police and Indian troops at Chhad Bet—an uninhabited, periodically submerged islet used as grazing ground in the Rann of Kutch, on the border of Kutch and West Pakistan. On the approach of an Indian force on 25 February the Pakistani police withdrew from the area.

3. S.A. Ghatge.

4. Refuting the Pakistan Government's claim that Chhad Bet was situated in the former Sind province and formed part of West Pakistan, Nehru maintained in a statement in the Lok Sabha on 3 March that Chhad Bet was situated some miles south of the boundary between Kutch and Sind, which had been finally settled in 1923-24, and that by occupying the area Pakistani police had violated Indian territory. In a note on 9 May 1955, the Government of India had rejected attempts by the Government of Pakistan to claim the area.

5. To Eugene R. Black¹

New Delhi
1 March 1956

Dear Mr Black,²

Thank you for your letter of the 13th February, 1956, with which you have forwarded a note by Mr Iliff³ regarding repairs to the damage caused to certain portions of the Firozpur Headworks by the floods in October, 1955.⁴

We have been anxious to repair this damage⁵ as rapidly as possible and, in fact, have made repeated attempts to do so since December last. To our surprise and regret, the Pakistan authorities, who stand most to gain by these repairs, have come in the way of work being done. Because of this interference, a situation has been created which might endanger the supply of water from the Firozpur Headworks to the Dipalpur Canal, which supplies water to cultivators in Pakistan. I am enclosing a note⁶ with plans to explain the situation.

In accordance with the Radcliffe Award, which demarcated the boundary between India and Pakistan, Bela⁷ and nearby land is clearly in Indian territory. Unfortunately Pakistan authorities have progressively encroached on the Indian territory in the region of the Firozpur Headworks. Even so, Bela was not under their occupation. But when earth was being removed by our engineers from Bela for this repair work,⁸ Pakistan authorities interfered.

You will appreciate that the Government of India cannot admit the right of any foreign power to interfere with their sovereignty over any part of the

1. JN Collection.
2. President, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
3. W.A.F. Iliff was representing President, IBRD, in the discussions with the Indian and Pakistan delegations in Washington on the Indus waters question.
4. In identical letters to the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan, Black appealed that Governments of both the countries should endeavour to arrive at a mutually satisfactory understanding on the points at issue in order that the necessary repairs might proceed without delay.
5. During the unprecedented floods in October 1955, the Right Upstream Divide Wall and the upstream floor in the Right Pocket of the Firozpur Headworks were badly damaged. Maintenance of the Headworks was the responsibility of the Government of India.
6. Not printed.
7. The reference is to the embankment adjoining the Right Guide Bund, upstream of the Headworks on the western bank of the Sutlej.
8. The Bela was the nearest source of the required earth.

territory of India. The difficulty that has arisen is none of our seeking. We do not want to raise any question in this indirect way. All we want is to carry out the necessary repairs to the Ferozpur Headworks so as not to cause any hardship to the Pakistan cultivators who receive water from the Dipalpur Canal. I would have thought that the Pakistan authorities would cooperate with us in this matter in every way.

We have undertaken repairs to the floor of the right pocket, despite the greater labour and heavier cost involved in bringing earth on boats from long distances. While these repairs will ensure reasonable supply to the Dipalpur Canal, there is still a serious risk of the supplies being affected by our inability, owing to Pakistan's interference, to carry out repairs to the Right Divide Wall.

Though valuable time has been lost, we are, even at this late stage, prepared to carry out these repairs provided there is no further interference. We are in fact issuing instructions for the work to be carried out.

I am enclosing in this connection copy of a telegram dated 25th February⁹ received by us from the Pakistan Government and our reply¹⁰ to this telegram. The solution of a purely technical problem of repairs, which are vital to the welfare and well-being of Pakistan cultivators, has been unnecessarily complicated by the Pakistan Government making unjustified political claims to Indian territory and interfering through their military pickets with the repair work being done. I can assure you, however, that we shall continue to take all measures that are possible to see that supplies of water to Pakistan cultivators who depend upon the Dipalpur Canal are not unduly affected.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

9. On 11 January 1956, the Government of India requested the Pakistan Government to issue immediate instructions to the military and other authorities to allow work on the bund to proceed without any interference. In their reply dated 25 February, the Government of Pakistan, while agreeing to allow the removal of earth up to one million cubic feet from portions of the Bela, said that the balance should be found by India from places in Indian control.
10. Expressing surprise that Pakistan military should have interfered and any conditions should have been imposed for removal of earth from Indian territory, the Government of India stated in their reply on 1 March that they were nevertheless issuing instructions for work to be started. They further said that if, in spite of their best efforts, adequate supplies of water could still not be passed in the Dipalpur canal at any stage due to incomplete repairs, the responsibility would be entirely that of Pakistan.

6. Pakistani Incursions¹

I think we should send an answer to this telegram² from Karachi soon, preferably tomorrow. The answer should not be a long one. In fact, the briefer, the better. In this answer, after replying to the particular charge they have made and dealing with the charge regarding Chhad Bet incident, we should refer to the repeated incursions and aggression of the Pakistan Government of Indian territory and more particularly to the Nekowal incident³ which was held by the UN Observers to be aggression on the part of Pakistan⁴ resulting in the death of Indian nationals. In spite of assurances given that adequate punishment will be given to those who are guilty, the Pakistan Government has taken no steps in this matter. Our letters and reminders about the Nekowal incident should be mentioned.

1. Note to Secretary General, Foreign Secretary, and Commonwealth Secretary, MEA, 8 March 1956. JN Collection.
2. The Foreign Office, Karachi, telegraphed to New Delhi on 7 March that the Government of India, instead of responding to the Pakistan Government's appeal for creating the necessary atmosphere for an amicable settlement of the dispute over Chhad Bet by withdrawing their forces from the area, were sending reinforcements there.
3. On 7 May 1955, twelve Indian Army personnel including one officer were killed in an attack by the Pakistan border police on a working party of the Central Tractor Organisation in Nekowal in Jammu district.
4. For Nehru's comment on the UN Observers' report on the Nekowal incident, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol.29, pp. 189-192 and Vol.30, pp. 396-400.

7. Functions in Honour of the Mountbattens: Invitation to the Pakistan High Commissioner¹

So far as the invitations to the functions in honour of Lord and Lady Mountbatten² are concerned, it is true that, sometimes, different sets of people are invited to particular functions.³ It is, however, also true that it was felt that it might not be appropriate to invite the High Commissioner of Pakistan to the banquet in honour of Lord and Lady Mountbatten, in view of the virulent attacks on Lord Mountbatten in Pakistan.⁴ As a matter of fact, as their aircraft was proceeding to India, they actually got a message that the aircraft must not overfly any part of Pakistan territory. Because of this, it had to take a fairly long detour. In view of all this, it was thought that it would not be appropriate for the High Commissioner to be invited to some of these special functions. So far as the civic reception was concerned, this was the business of the Municipality.

2. There was no personal question in this matter and certainly it was not an expression of personal displeasure against the High Commissioner. But he will no doubt appreciate that his Government had acted very strangely and discourteously to Lord and Lady Mountbatten.

3. I think you should inform him of this when an occasion arises.

SG and FS to see also.

1. Note to Commonwealth Secretary, MEA, 16 March 1956. JN Collection.
2. The Mountbattens visited India from 14 to 21 March.
3. At a meeting with M.J. Desai on 16 March, Ghazanfar Ali Khan, the High Commissioner of Pakistan, mentioned that he had not been invited to any of the functions arranged by the Indian Government in connection with the Mountbattens' visit, although he was being invited by the UK High Commissioner to a dinner in their honour. Desai told him that he could not say how the invitations were issued and added that the invitations were probably well distributed between all the functions so that everyone got a chance to meet the visitors.
4. See *ante*, p. 308 for the widespread protest in Pakistan against the proposed visit of Lord Mountbatten.

8. Border Incidents at Husainiwala¹

At about 10.30 tonight, I had a telephone message from the Governor² of the Punjab. He informed me that on the 17th March the Pakistan people pushed our labour force working at Husainiwala in Ferozpur District and took possession of the right bund.³ This morning there were talks between the officers from both sides and some kind of agreement was arrived at. Work began again.

This evening at about 9.30 pm, the Pakistan Army attacked our force using Sten guns, mortars, etc.⁴ Our force replied in kind. Firing was continuing.

I asked the Governor to arrange that we were fully kept informed and that, in particular, tomorrow morning his Chief Secretary might inform EA about the position.

Later I telephoned to the Defence Secretary.⁵ The information he gave me confirmed what the Governor had said. He told me that our forces were present there in considerable strength and therefore there is no need for anxiety. Also the Army Commander was flying there tomorrow morning.

1. Note to Secretary General, Foreign Secretary, and Commonwealth Secretary, MEA, 18 March 1956. JN Collection.
2. C. P. N. Singh.
3. In order to repair flood damage to the Ferozpur Headworks, Indian workmen began early in March to remove earth from a mound on the right bank of the Sutlej.
4. The Pakistan Army units suddenly attacked an Indian sentinel and opened fire on Indian Army personnel protecting the workmen and the area. The Indian troops returned fire and in the exchange which continued till the next day, ten Pakistani and four Indian soldiers were killed.
5. M.K. Vellodi.

9. To Mehr Chand Khanna¹

New Delhi
18 March 1956

My dear Mehr Chand,

You will be going to Pakistan as our special envoy on the occasion of their declaring a Republic.² We have just heard of another conflict at Husainiwala in Firozpur district, where the Pakistani forces attacked our forces. This conflict is apparently proceeding and is on a slightly bigger scale than the previous ones. There is nothing to be alarmed at about it but, obviously, conditions on the border are getting worse.

This evening, I received a message from the Prime Minister of Pakistan³ suggesting that both Pakistan and India should make a declaration to abstain from the use of force on our border areas and that the status quo before these recent incidents⁴ should be maintained. Further, that some kind of an effort should be made at ministerial level to settle the boundaries. We shall consider this matter and send a reply⁵ soon. This does not fit in with the aggressive tactics of Pakistan.

Before you go to Karachi, I think we should discuss these matters so that you may be posted up to date.

The Soviet Government is sending one of their leading and most important personalities to Karachi on this occasion. His name is Mikoyan.⁶ He is likely to come to Delhi from Karachi.⁷ I should like you to meet him and tell him that we are looking forward to his visit to India as our guest.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. On 23 March 1956, the Dominion of Pakistan was proclaimed the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
3. Chaudhuri Mohammad Ali, Prime Minister of Pakistan, August 1955-September 1956.
4. A series of incidents, involving shooting, had occurred in quick succession along the Indo-Pakistan border in the following places: Chhad Bet, Surma River, Firozpur Bet, Rohiwal, Nagar Aimanpur, Khem Karan and Muthianwala.
5. See the next item.
6. Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan (1895-1978); Soviet politician; joined the Communist Party in 1915; member, Supreme Soviet since 1937; Deputy Chairman, Council of Peoples' Commissars, 1937-46; Minister of Foreign Trade, 1946-49; member, Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Soviet Union, 1952-66; Minister of Trade, 1953; First Vice-Chairman, Council of Ministers, USSR, 1955-64; Chairman, Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, 1964-65.
7. Mikoyan visited Delhi for four days from 26 March.

10. To Chaudhuri Mohammad Ali¹

New Delhi
21 March 1956

My dear Prime Minister,

Thank you for your message regarding border incidents, which I received, through your High Commissioner, late on the night of the 18th March.

2. I have since read reports of the statement made by you in your Parliament on the 19th March. Yesterday I made a statement² in our Parliament and referred to your letter to me as well as to your speech in Parliament. I am asking our High Commissioner in Karachi to give relevant extracts from my statement to your Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations.

3. It has been our misfortune to have these border incidents from time to time and I have been greatly distressed about them. During the past few weeks, however, the frequency of these incidents has increased, involving tragic loss of human life and, I have no doubt, much distress and apprehension both in India and Pakistan. I know that in India there has been great concern and repeated expression to it has been given in our Parliament. Inevitably these incidents on the Indo-Pakistani border impose a severe strain on the relations between India and Pakistan. Since your message was received by me, a fresh clash has occurred this time at Firozpur Bet and this appears to have been a serious one.

4. I agree with you that none of these incidents need have taken place. I cannot imagine how, even from the narrowest point of view, either Pakistan or India can profit by such clashes. Only a very foolish or mischievous person can welcome them. It is obvious that neither of our countries is going to be frightened by petty border affrays or to give up any principle or policy because of them. It is our misfortune that there are controversies and unsolved problems between India and Pakistan. Let us, by all means, try to solve them. In any event, our countries should function with decency and propriety even though we may disagree.

5. This state of tension on our border produces, I suppose, a state of nerves when guns go off at the slightest provocation. This is obviously bad for both sides. I am not, for the present, referring to the merits of any such border clash.

1. JN Collection. Also available in File No.KS-17/54, MHA.

2. See *post*, pp. 505-513.

According to our thinking, such clashes have been largely due to aggressive behaviour from the Pakistan side. You have said in public that India is responsible for them. From all the evidence we have had, your statement is not based on facts. But, however that might be, these clashes are patently bad and we should cooperate fully in putting a stop to them completely. They solve no problem.

6. I agree with you, therefore, that the first step we should take is to make every effort to prevent a recurrence of such incidents and, further, to punish any subordinate authority of either country for a violation of our instructions. I think it is necessary that these minor officials should clearly understand that their Government will look with strong disfavour at a breach of the peace on the border and will take stern action against the guilty party.

7. You have suggested that where clashes have occurred, the position existing before the clashes should be restored, in order to enable negotiations for a peaceful settlement to be held in a calm and friendly atmosphere. In most areas where clashes have taken place, agreements have been reached between the local authorities concerned, providing for the steps to be taken by each side, pending a settlement of the dispute by peaceful methods and by a detailed demarcation of the international boundary. Such local agreements must necessarily remain till some variation is considered necessary after enquiry. Even in regard to other areas, which may not be covered by such agreements, the only feasible course is to accept the present status quo. Any other course would involve an argument and an agreement between the two countries.

8. In paragraph 4 of your message to me, you have referred to the decisions of the Joint Steering Committee of the 11th and 12th March 1955.³ The question of avoiding border incidents was subsequently dealt with in the discussions between your Home Minister and our Home Minister in May 1955, and they arrived at an agreement referred to as the Pant-Mirza Agreement.⁴ Your

3. Mohammad Ali wrote that the Indo-Pakistan boundary in the West Pakistan sector had remained undemarcated in spite of the decision of the Joint Steering Committee meeting of 11 and 12 March 1955 where it was agreed that demarcation should be taken up with despatch and completed within one year.
4. At their talks in New Delhi in May 1955, G.B. Pant, Home Minister of India, and Iskander Mirza, the then Minister of the Interior of Pakistan, agreed that demarcation of the Indo-Pakistan boundary should be finalised as soon as possible. Pending final demarcation, certain arrangements were also agreed upon with a view to avoiding possibilities of disputes and the danger of clashes between the armed forces on both sides.

Government took no action to ratify this Agreement till the end of December 1955 and then suggested certain amendments to the agreement which, in effect, largely modified it. I would suggest that we should immediately, and without further delay, proceed to implement this Pant-Mirza Agreement in regard to the demarcation of the border. This process of demarcation should proceed and cover ultimately the entire frontier.

9. You have suggested that a Boundary Delimitation Commission composed of high powered technical experts of both Governments should be appointed for this purpose. We may give any name to such a Commission. The most practical approach appears to me to be to ask the Surveyors-General of the two countries to meet and work out a programme of demarcation. Naturally they will be assisted by their technical experts.

10. It is possible that in some cases the two Surveyors-General might not agree, but it is highly likely that there will be no dispute at all in regard to a very great portion of the border. The Surveyors-General should immediately start actual demarcation of the agreed area without waiting for any further reference. At the same time they should refer to their respective Governments those particular areas in regard to which they have failed to agree. The two Governments will take these matters in dispute and deal with them at Governmental level and, where necessary, at Ministerial level, and arrive at early decisions.

11. What I have said above appears to me in full consonance with what you have yourself proposed. We are, therefore, immediately asking our Surveyor-General⁵ to keep in readiness for this work and I hope that you will do likewise. As soon as I hear from you, we shall go ahead with this matter.

12. I suggest that both our Governments should issue immediate instructions to all concerned to avoid any kind of clash or conflict on the border. In these instructions it should be made clear that Government views such conflicts with extreme disfavour and considers them harmful. Further that persons responsible for taking the initiative in any such conflict will have to be punished. Even without waiting for your reply, we are issuing general instructions to this effect on our side. Naturally this cannot be a one-sided affair and peace on the border can only be maintained by joint effort on both sides.

13. You have suggested in the statement made by you in your Parliament on the 19th March that India and Pakistan should declare that they will never go to war with each other. I warmly welcome this proposal. You are no doubt aware that I made a similar proposal over six years ago,⁶ as early as the beginning of 1950, and there was some correspondence with your predecessors in regard to it. Our views were given very fully at the time in my letters.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. A "No-War" proposal was first put forward by Nehru in a speech in August 1949. After Liaquat Ali Khan, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, complained that no formal approach in this regard had been made by India, a proposal was sent to Pakistan through diplomatic channels in December 1949. This was followed by a draft declaration, handed over to the Pakistan High Commissioner in New Delhi on 22 December 1949, to the effect that the two countries would in no case go to war to settle any disputes between them.

11. To M.J. Desai¹

New Delhi
21 March 1956

My dear M.J.,

I enclose the letter for the Prime Minister of Pakistan, also a copy which you will read and then pass on to C.C. Desai for his record.²

You will see that I have mentioned in this letter that we are asking our Surveyor-General to get ready and also asking our people on the border to avoid all conflict. Naturally, this means that they must on no account be responsible for such a conflict. If the other side attacks, then they have to defend.

I shall ask SG³ and FS⁴ to take steps on these lines.

If, in the course of conversations in Karachi, they talk about this no-war declaration and arbitration⁵ (there is something in the evening paper about it), then you should repeat some of the arguments that I advanced in 1950, that is, that with all the goodwill in the world, no independent country can commit itself to arbitration about political issues, known or unknown. We do not know of any such instance.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. M.J. Desai was leaving for Karachi on 22 March to participate in Pakistan's Republic Day celebrations.
3. N.R. Pillai.
4. Subimal Dutt.
5. A spokesman of the Pakistan Foreign Office was reported to have said that while announcing India's willingness for a "No-War" declaration with Pakistan in the Lok Sabha on 20 March, Nehru had not referred to the suggestion regarding arbitration made by Mohammad Ali in his speech in the Pakistan Constituent Assembly the previous day. The Pakistan Prime Minister had said that both Governments should have a No-War declaration and settle all their disputes by negotiation and mediation, and failing these by arbitration. The spokesman said that Pakistan attached "great importance to this clause."

12. Instructions for Avoidance of Border Clashes¹

Please read my letter to the Prime Minister of Pakistan. The original is being taken by M.J. Desai.

2. I should like our Surveyor-General to be informed of what I have written and to prepare himself for this work. He will, naturally, require technical assistance. As soon as the Pakistan Government informs us that it agrees with our proposal,² we should take steps to give effect to it.

3. We should inform (i) our Army authorities and (ii) the Punjab Government and, through them, their police, that the Pakistan Prime Minister has suggested that we must stop a recurrence of border clashes. We have agreed, and we are likely to begin demarcation of the border through the Surveyors-General of the two countries. Meanwhile we want to lay special stress that every effort should be made to avoid border clashes. Naturally, if we are attacked, we have to defend, but we on our part should function defensively only and not take the initiative anywhere on the border.

4. We should clear up our thinking completely with Defence and the Punjab Government. The Governor of the Punjab is coming here in a few days' time, and I intend discussing this matter with him.

1. Note to Secretary General, MEA, and Foreign Secretary, 21 March 1956. JN Collection.

2. Pakistan conveyed its acceptance on 29 March 1956.

13. Message to the Prime Minister of Pakistan¹

Thank you for your message conveyed through your High Commissioner² on the 29th March in reply to my letter of the 21st March.

2. I am glad to learn that you have issued instructions in terms of the suggestions in paragraph 12 of my letter of 21st March.

3. I had not suggested that only a part of the boundary should be demarcated.³ What I had said was that a beginning might be made on the lines suggested in the "Pant-Mirza Agreement". I entirely agree with you that the work of demarcation should cover the entire frontier between West Pakistan and India. As this frontier is a very long one, work will naturally have to be undertaken to begin with on a selected sector. I suggest that the frontier of West Pakistan with Punjab (India) should be first dealt with.⁴ The Radcliffe Award will naturally be the basis of this demarcation but adjustments might be made, by agreement of the two Governments, so as to avoid as far as possible the international frontier being unnatural and arbitrary, such as when a village might be divided. It is desirable in the interest of both countries that their frontier should be as firm and natural as possible. Any such minor variation would necessarily be by agreement of the two countries.

1. New Delhi, 3 April 1956. JN Collection. Also available in File No.4(49)-Pak-III/56, MEA. The message was sent through the Indian High Commissioner in Karachi.

2. Ghazanfar Ali Khan.

3. Emphasising the need for taking up demarcation of the whole boundary, Mohammad Ali wrote that he was "unable to understand why demarcation proceedings should be limited to land boundary whereas in our view and as recent incidents have demonstrated demarcation of riverian boundary is equally urgent."

4. M.J. Desai noted on 2 April that, on the most optimistic estimate, the work of demarcation on the entire 1,503 miles of West Pakistan-India border would take 4 ½ to 6 years, and the 345 miles of West Pakistan-Punjab (India) boundary would itself take about 1 ½ to 2 years. He further wrote that it would have to be made clear to Pakistan that the exchange of territories in accordance with the demarcation could only take place after the demarcation was completed. Nehru, however, stated in his note of 2 April that it was not necessary to mention this in the message. He added, "This matter can be separately dealt with. If the demarcation takes years, as you indicate, it may not be feasible to wait till the end of that period to make such changes as we may consider necessary from time to time."

4. I am anxious, as you are, that this work of demarcation should be taken up as a matter of the utmost urgency. I doubt, however, if we can fix a rigid timetable for it as I understand that it is a complicated business which will involve preliminary triangulation work to bring control points nearer the border on each side so that the final demarcation can later be fixed by a traverse with reference to those control points. The Directors of Land Records of the State Governments concerned will also have to undertake, with reference to their revenue records and maps, the fixing of the boundary and putting up of boundary pillars.

5. I suggest that a preliminary meeting of the Surveyors-General of India and Pakistan or their representatives should take place at an early date to settle all these preliminaries and prepare the programme of demarcation. If it is convenient to you, we can have this meeting on 11th April in Delhi. Our Surveyor-General will be represented at this meeting by Colonel Gambhir Singh, Deputy Surveyor-General, assisted by his technical staff and an Under Secretary from our External Affairs Ministry. We would like to have the earliest possible intimation whether the date and place of meeting are acceptable to you and also the composition of your Surveyor-General's party. They will, of course, be our guests during this meeting in Delhi.

6. You have referred in paragraphs 2 and 4 of your message to some of the border incidents and to the question of the status quo.⁵ It would serve little purpose for us to continue a controversy over a question when obviously we hold contrary opinions. Thus, the Chhad Bet incident to which you refer was in our view a clear violation of our border by Pakistani forces. According to us, Chhad Bet has always been Indian territory and there was not even a border dispute in relation to it. I agree with you, therefore, that it is better for us not to argue about the past but to look to the future and see how best to prevent such regrettable incidents from recurring.

7. As regards the proposal for a "No-War declaration"⁶ our views were given fully in the correspondence I referred in paragraph 13 of my letter of the 21st March.

8. I shall await your reply in regard to the time and place of the Surveyors' meeting.

5. Mohammad Ali disagreed with Nehru's suggestion contained in his letter of 21 March (see *ante*, pp. 317-320) that the only feasible course, in respect of the border areas where clashes had occurred, was to accept the "present status quo," and said that this would mean that the Indian forces would "continue to remain in occupation, for instance, of Chhad Bet."
6. Mohammad Ali reminded Nehru about the provision for negotiation, mediation and arbitration for settlement of disputes in his "No-War" proposal, and asked for Nehru's further views on the proposal.

14. Message to Chaudhuri Mohammad Ali¹

Thank you for your message sent to me through your High Commissioner on 8th April. I was on tour then and saw your message on my return to Delhi some days later. I have also since learnt about the results of discussions at the Surveyors-General's meeting on the 11th April.

2. The Surveyors-General's meeting has settled the general procedure, and we accept this. Each side will now take necessary preparatory action to start actual demarcation after the monsoon season from 1st October.

3. I do not understand why the Surveyors-General asked for fresh instructions regarding the Ferozpur District-Bahawalpur State boundary. We have agreed to demarcate the entire West Pakistan-India boundary. As however we have been asked, I hope you will agree that they should be told that demarcation of the Bahawalpur State-Ferozpur District boundary is included in their terms of reference. There should be no difficulty in this demarcation as the Surveyors-General and the local Revenue officials will be familiar with previous maps and records of demarcation of the Bahawalpur State boundary.

4. We have instructed our Surveyor-General that he should, in consultation with the Government of Punjab (India), work out details of assistance required from Revenue and other Departments to deal with demarcation work, and we have also requested the Punjab (India) Government to deal with provision of staff for demarcation of boundary as a priority matter. I hope your Government is issuing similar instructions so that boundary demarcation work can proceed as quickly as possible.

5. You have referred in your message to the Steering Committee's decision for dealing with differences which may arise in the course of demarcation. I have no objection to this procedure, should it become necessary, but probably most of these points of difference will be settled in a simpler way by a reference to the two Governments. You had agreed to this procedure in paragraph 5 of your message of the 29th March. If any disputes still remain unresolved, we can then consider a reference to an impartial tribunal in terms of the Steering Committee's decision.

1. New Delhi, 16 April 1956. JN Collection. The message was sent through the Indian High Commissioner in Karachi.

6. I agree to your suggestion that any exchange of territory that may become necessary consequent on demarcation on the ground, should take place on an agreed date after the entire boundary with West Pakistan has been demarcated.

7. We received your Government's letter with regard to Chhad Bet on the 11th April.² This is being examined, and we will send a separate reply. As regards status quo arrangements pending final demarcation, I would refer to paragraph 7 of my letter of 21st March³ and paragraph 6 of my message⁴ which reached you through our High Commissioner on the 5th April. I suggest that, as stated by you, we do not argue about the past but look to the future and concentrate on completing demarcation of the frontier as expeditiously as possible.

2. Mohammad Ali maintained that Chhad Bet was and had been "a part of Tharparkar district of Sindh and thus part of Pakistan territory" and urged that here as also elsewhere the status quo existing prior to the incident be restored pending a decision in the matter. Mohammad Ali also wrote that a letter had been sent by his Government to the Indian High Commissioner regarding Chhad Bet.

3. See *ante*, pp. 317-320.

4. Dated 3 April 1956. See *ante*, p. 324.

15. Telegram to Chaudhuri Mohammad Ali¹

Thank you for your telegram 1966 of 15th April.² We agree to the meeting at Dacca on 5th and 6th May to discuss the problem of exodus of minorities from East Pakistan. Our Rehabilitation Minister, Mehr Chand Khanna, will attend this meeting. I shall let you know the composition of the rest of the delegation later.

2. I would like to mention in this connection that Dr B.C. Roy, Chief Minister of West Bengal, wrote to Mr Abu Hussain Sarkar,³ Chief Minister of East Pakistan, in connection with this question of exodus and made certain suggestions which, according to him, would have helped greatly in reducing the present tension and lessening the exodus. The suggestions were such as could be given effect to without much difficulty. He has however received no reply or even acknowledgement of his letter.⁴

1. New Delhi, 17 April 1956. JN Collection.
2. Mohammad Ali stated that the meeting between the representatives of the Governments of India and Pakistan to discuss the problem of exodus of minorities from East Pakistan, proposed by Mehr Chand Khanna during his recent visit to Karachi, might be held at Dhaka on 5 and 6 May.
3. (1894-1969); participated in the Swadeshi movement in Bengal as a student, 1911, and in the national movement as a Congressman, and imprisoned several times; joined Fazlul Huq's Krishak Praja Party, 1935; elected to Bengal Legislative Assembly in 1936 and was Secretary of the Party in the Bengal Assembly for several years till 1947; joined East Pakistan politics after Partition; arrested under the Defence of Pakistan Regulations in 1950; became Minister in the Government of Pakistan for a short period in 1955; elected to the East Pakistan legislature as a candidate of the United Front of Huq, Suhrawardy and Bhashani, 1954; Chief Minister of East Pakistan, 1956; leader of the National Democratic Front, 1967.
4. B.C. Roy told Nehru on 15 April that if the East Pakistan Government were not prepared to act on his suggestions, then there was no point in sending a delegation. Roy was also disconcerted by the Pakistan Foreign Minister, Hamid-ul-Huq Chowdhury's suggestion to C.C. Desai for the inclusion in the Indian delegation of Prafulla Chandra Ghosh, a former Chief Minister of West Bengal and at this time a strong opponent of the State Government. Desai had been asked to ascertain the Pakistan Government's reaction to a proposed visit to Pakistan by a non-official delegation from India to discuss the problem of minorities in pursuance of certain suggestions made by Humayun Kabir, Union Education Secretary, in his letter of 30 March to Nehru to stem migrations.

16. To Chaudhuri Mohammad Ali¹

New Delhi
28 April 1956

My dear Prime Minister,

Please refer to your D.O.No.9(2)-Sec/55 dated the 14th April, 1956, regarding the Nekowal incident.² This occurred on 9th May 1955. The UN Military Observers Group gave their findings on 14th May 1955. Though almost a year has passed since the date of the incident and we have exchanged several letters, it is regrettable that it has not been possible for the Government of Pakistan to carry out the assurances given by your predecessor³ and General Iskander Mirza⁴ during their visit to Delhi in May 1955 that if, on the receipt of the UN Observers' report, it was found that anyone in Pakistan was guilty, the severest possible action will be taken against such person.

In para 2 of your letter you have mentioned that there is no question of your not accepting the UN Observers' report on this incident, but the rest of the letter contains arguments, the sole purpose of which appears to be to discredit the UN Observers' findings. I do not at this late stage intend to go into the details of the reasons given by you for your inability to take action against those responsible for this serious incident involving the killing of 12 Indian personnel. I am, however, referring below to some of the points mentioned in your letter.

You have emphasised that under the agreement, dated the 30th April 1954, the Indian patrols could not enter Nekowal village, which, in your view, included not only the built-up area of the village but also the lands belonging to it. In the

1. JN Collection. Also available in File No.KS-42/55, MHA.
2. Mohammad Ali's letter was in reply to Nehru's letter of 30 September 1955, in which a hope had been expressed that those responsible for the Nekowal incident would be punished and India's claim for compensation had been justified (see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol.30, pp.396-400). In a long and argumentative reply, Mohammad Ali said that some kind of action had been taken and the concerned unit of the Border Police had been reprimanded and transferred from Nekowal in spite of their guilt not being established. Mohammad Ali further said that there was no question of compensation.
3. Mohammad Ali Bogra.
4. President of the newly proclaimed Islamic Republic of Pakistan. He was Minister of the Interior, Government of Pakistan, when he visited India in May 1955.

agreement it has been laid down that "the Indians would patrol this area, right up to the border, to points within approximately 300 yards of Nekowal. Patrols would not enter Nekowal Village". This way of putting it clearly shows that the intention was that "village" stands for the built-up area only. It is for this reason that it was emphasised that even though patrols might go within a distance of about 300 yards and therefore even less than 300 yards, they would under no circumstances enter Nekowal village. On the following ruling of the UN Observers on this point you have said that this interpretation had been given after the incident:

"Inform Commander with my compliments and regards that my interpretation of meaning of Nekowal on this context is village itself, that is to say, the built-up area. My decision based on understanding of Observer present at meeting on 30th April 1954 and common military parlance and customs when briefing patrols using one inch ordnance maps. Have never regarded it in any other way."

It may be noted that the above view is based "on understanding of Observer present at meeting on 30th April 1954". Our patrols have, in fact, on several occasions prior to this incident gone within about 500 yards of the Nekowal village. On the day of the incident also they were within about 500 yards of the village. It is, therefore, inconceivable for me to think of any other interpretation of "Nekowal Village".

While on the subject of the 1954 agreement, I should like to invite your attention to the following extract from this agreement:

"The Pak Area Commander undertook to instruct the Pak Border Police not to interfere with these (Indian) patrols in any way."

You have suggested that provocation for the shooting was provided by a Pakistani girl having been shot by the Indian soldiers. This was also the basis of the Pakistan Border Police case before the UN Observers. In the UN Observers' report, however, there is nothing to show that the girl was shot in the beginning of the incident or that this was in any way the provocation for the incident.

As regards the evidence produced by Pakistan before the UN Observers, the following extracts from the Chief Military Observers' report are relevant.

"The first Pak witness is an important one because he was the only Border Policeman left at the tractors according to the Pakistani evidence, the other two with him having been killed by earlier shots. He was an unreliable witness.... Either this witness or the patrol commander lied concerning their movements and the recovery of the two BPs that were lying dead near the witness. According to the witness' story, he went back to the patrol commander,

but the patrol commander said he went up to the witness in the hole. The story of the seventh Pak witness (BP wounded near Jindar) regarding 15 trucks on the Indian side is completely discounted by UN Observers in the area."

"The evidence of Pak witnesses could not be taken before the second day of the investigation and the Pak representatives had knowledge of the Indian evidence, and were in a position to brief their witnesses. All Pak witnesses in the vicinity had the same story about the argument and they mentioned words of conversation irrespective of their position at the time and over the noise of the diesel tractors with engines running."

"All Pak witnesses in the area saw the girl shot. The first Pak witness said that the girl was shot, then they shouted to the Indians not to cross the border, and it was not until they were alleged to have done so and shot the 2 BP while they were standing that the Pak Border Police opened fire. The evidence from Pak hospital states that the two BPs were shot in the head. The whole story appears unreasonable."

After considering the evidence produced by both sides, the Chief Military Observer came to certain conclusions. One of these conclusions was –

"The state of the killing area, as subsequently observed, in which the Indians were caught; its tactical disadvantage to them; and the damage to the tractors indicates preconceived design in which preparation by the Pakistan Border Police was an essential preliminary to a plan."

From this conclusion it is obvious that the firing by Pakistan Border Police was a part of a "preconceived design in which preparation by the Pakistan Border Police was an essential preliminary to a plan". To my mind it is a clear verdict and is not capable of "a different interpretation."

You have mentioned in paragraphs 18 and 19 of your letter that no compensation has ever been paid by either Government in respect of any losses inflicted by them along any part of the Indo-Pakistan border and that the Government of Pakistan had not agreed to the proposition put forward by the Government of India that they would be prepared to pay compensation for established incidents of a similar serious character on the Pakistan side of the border in which Indian nationals were concerned.⁵ The fact that on previous

5. Nehru stated in a note to Commonwealth Secretary, MEA, on 25 April, "In your draft you have said nothing about the question of compensation. Of course there is no chance of our getting compensation. But I do not think that it would be right for us to give up this point.... The payment of compensation would be a salutary check on such border incidents in future."

occasions, no compensation was paid by either party is no ground for persisting in a wrong practice. There are international conventions on this question of compensation which both our Governments should follow. We on our part are prepared to pay compensation if we are adjudged the guilty party in any incident of this type. The payment of such compensation would be a salutary check on such border incidents in future.

This Nekowal incident has naturally, as you must be aware, attracted a great deal of anxious interest in India. Frequent questions have been put to me in Parliament. I would suggest, therefore, that our correspondence on this subject should be published or placed on the table of Parliament here. This publication could take place on an agreed date in Delhi and Karachi. If you agree, we might do so on Monday, 7th May 1956.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

II. UNITED KINGDOM

1. Talk with the UK High Commissioner¹

The UK High Commissioner² came to see me this morning. He spoke to me about the Baghdad Pact and the situation in Western Asia and about Vietnam. He gave me a note on Vietnam and Laos which I attach.

2. In a sense, this talk was preparatory to the talks we are likely to have with Mr Selwyn Lloyd³ when he comes here early next month. No reply to the note, therefore, is called for.

3. So far as Vietnam is concerned, what the High Commissioner said to me is stated in the note he subsequently gave me and I need not repeat it.⁴ I told him that we had not been anxious to have a conference of the Geneva Powers to consider the Indo-China situation because such a conference, without preparing the ground for it fully, would not be useful. But the position in Vietnam and, to some extent, in Laos⁵ had become increasingly difficult for the International Commissions and ultimately there would be no way out except to go to the Geneva Powers. However, practically speaking, little could be done in the course of the next three or four weeks at the end of which there were going to be elections in South Vietnam.

4. Mr MacDonald said that the UK and the USA were trying their best to induce Mr Diem to become more cooperative with the Commission.

1. Note to V.K. Krishna Menon, and Secretary General, Foreign Secretary and Commonwealth Secretary, MEA, 14 February 1956. JN Collection.
2. Malcolm MacDonald.
3. British Foreign Secretary.
4. The note stated that the South Vietnam Government was of the view that to embark on consultations with North Vietnam with the prospect of eventual nationwide elections would alarm public opinion in the South to such a degree as to prejudice further attempts at internal consolidation in the South and thus make the prospects of consultation between North and South even more remote. The British Government believed that until there was a Government which had received a popular mandate in the elections scheduled for March 1956, Diem Ngo Dinh, President of South Vietnam, would be most unlikely to move from this position and that no useful purpose would be served by reconvening the Geneva Conference.
5. Referring to the International Supervisory Commission's resolution of 7 January, which had drawn attention to the rights of the Royal Lao Government throughout its territory and to "an entirely unsatisfactory reply" of 25 January from the Pathet Lao to the Commission, the British Government, in the note given by MacDonald, held the view that no steps should be taken which would appear to result in the formalisation of the partition of the country.

5. The High Commissioner spoke at some length about the Baghdad Pact and the situation in Western Asia. There was nothing new in what he said. He said they realised that there were differences of opinion in regard to these matters between India and the UK. Nevertheless, they hoped that these differences would not come in the way of their cooperation and perhaps they might be reduced. He hoped that Mr Selwyn Lloyd who would be visiting Egypt and the other Arab countries before he came to India would give a first-hand appraisal of the situation. The UK Government was anxious to bring Egypt and Iraq nearer and to lessen the gulf between Israel and the Arab countries.

6. One of the objects of the UK joining the Baghdad Pact was to check some of these Arab countries from adopting rash policies. Also to pay more attention to economic help and development. What the UK Government was anxious about was to avoid India and the UK working at cross purposes in the Middle East.

7. In regard to Pakistan he said that the UK Government's opinion was that the military aid given to Pakistan or that was likely to be given in the near future had made no appreciable difference between the relative military strength of Pakistan and India. Pakistan was in a position of great inferiority and was likely to remain so for some years. The UK Government would be upset if this relative military position changed to any marked extent.

8. I replied briefly and said that it was perfectly true that there was difference of opinion between India and the UK in regard to the Baghdad and like pacts. We had no desire to exaggerate these differences or to work at cross purposes in so far as we could. But, to some extent, because these basic approaches had been different, our policy was also different. We should, however, try to understand each other fully and frankly and even where the differences persisted, to cooperate wherever possible in the main objective of preserving peace in Western Asia. The basic difficulty was that of Israel and the Arab countries. We were friendly with the Arab countries and we were not unfriendly to Israel, though our contacts with it were fewer. We would be happy if a way was found which would lead even to a temporary settlement of the problem of Israel.

9. I explained our basic approach to these pacts and how they did not lead to the security which they were meant to ensure.

10. I said I looked forward to meeting Mr Selwyn Lloyd and I would be happy if he stayed with me in my house. That would give us opportunities of meeting each other a little more during his brief stay here. Anyhow, Rashtrapati Bhavan would be full of Governors and Rajpramukhs.⁶

6. The annual Conference of Governors and Rajpramukhs was held at New Delhi on 2 and 3 March 1956.

2. To V.K. Krishna Menon¹

New Delhi
8 March 1956

My dear Krishna,

...Selwyn Lloyd was here and I had fairly long and frank talks with him.² In the course of these talks we discussed the Baghdad Pact, of course, Israel and Egypt and China and the Far East. He mentioned Kashmir with some hesitation, and I spoke to him about the position in regard to Kashmir and Pakistan. I also mentioned to him that, in addition to our purchase of aircraft, etc., from the UK, we were thinking of getting some aircraft from the Soviet Union purely as a commercial transaction. I assured him that we would take every care to preserve the secrets of the British aircraft supplied to us.

About the last matter he said the only thing they were concerned about was the security aspect of it and he would like to report this to his colleagues. It is evident, however, that he does not like this at all. On the other hand, it seems to me that we have gone too far to rule this out completely. That will have a bad effect all round.

About SEATO and the Baghdad Pact, he said what is being repeated so often, that the economic aspect will be stressed. I spoke to him quite clearly and firmly about these pacts and their consequences to us.

Regarding Kashmir he said that this matter should not be brought up at the Karachi meeting of SEATO.

He asked me many questions about my impressions of the Soviet Union and my reactions to the recent changes of Soviet policy.³ While he was here,

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML. Extracts. Also available in JN Collection. Krishna Menon, Minister without portfolio in the Union Government, was also the Representative of India at the UN.
2. Selwyn Lloyd, British Foreign Secretary, visited New Delhi from 3 to 4 March. For Nehru's talks with him, see *post*, pp. 368-374.
3. Some new policies amounting to de-Stalinization were announced at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of Soviet Union held in Moscow in February 1956. Speaking at a closed session, Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Party, strongly criticised the more dictatorial aspects of Stalin's rule after 1934; signalled that coercion would not be applied again in the political arena; spoke of alternative roads to socialism, and espoused peaceful coexistence, arguing that war was no longer inevitable, with the USSR becoming a nuclear power. Some structures of Stalinism such as: Communist Party monopoly of power, including control of the media, education and culture; and centrally planned economy based on collectivization were, however, retained.

Glubb Pasha⁴ was dismissed from the Jordan Army,⁵ and Pineau,⁶ the French Foreign Minister, made a strong statement against the Baghdad Pact and, to some extent, critical of the Western policy⁷ in regard to Germany even. These no doubt shook Selwyn Lloyd to some extent. In fact, he appears to be altogether greatly worried and afraid of saying anything in public which might be objected to. My talks with him were quite friendly and frank.

This morning's papers brought the news of the SEATO meeting in Karachi having said something about Kashmir⁸ as also the Durand Line.⁹ We have no official intimation yet, but, it appears that Pakistan, aided by Dulles, has had her way. This has naturally produced rather strong reactions here. Dulles is arriving tomorrow in as bad an atmosphere as possible. Both Goa and Kashmir will be standing up constantly against him, and our talks¹⁰ are likely to encounter

4. John Bagot Glubb, known as Glubb Pasha (1897-1986); British Army Officer who, in 1930, went to British-mandated Jordan, organised the Arab Legion, and served as its Commander-in-Chief, 1939-56; author of several books including *The Story of the Arab Legion* (1948) and *A Soldier with the Arabs* (1957).
5. After a series of anti-Western riots in Jordan, King Hussein ordered, on 2 March 1956, Glubb's immediate dismissal from the Jordan Army. Jordan's premier, Samir-el-Ritai, later said that Glubb was dismissed because an impression had been created that he was the "real ruler" of Jordan. After becoming independent in 1946, Jordan had signed with Britain in 1948 an agreement whereby she was guaranteed an annual military subsidy by Britain.
6. Christian Paul Francis Pineau (1904-1995); French politician; Minister for, Food, 1945, Public Works, 1948-49, Finance, 1948; Chairman, National Defence Credits Control Commission, 1951-55; designated Premier, February 1955; Conseiller General, Canton de Grand-Luce, 1955-79; Minister for Foreign Affairs, February 1956-June 1957.
7. Christian Pineau said that while the allies were putting the stress on security problems, the Soviets were speaking of peace and economic problems. He added, "If we do not modify our approach, we shall be submerged including the USA."
8. The SEATO Council was reported to have unanimously agreed on 7 March on the need for an early settlement of the Kashmir dispute in accordance with the UN resolution. Reports published from Karachi on 6 March spoke of efforts by Pakistan to canvass support among members of SEATO for an early plebiscite in Kashmir.
9. The SEATO members declared that their Governments recognised that the sovereignty of Pakistan extended up to the Durand Line, which they regarded as the international boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan. This followed Pakistan's request to them on 6 March to back her rejection of the Afghan demand for the establishment of a separate Pushtu-speaking State in North-West Pakistan.
10. For Nehru's talks with John Foster Dulles, US Secretary of State, see *post*, pp. 375-386.

heavy weather. Indeed, we have had to take special precautions to prevent demonstrations against Dulles.

There is a widespread feeling here that the US arms aid to Pakistan is producing big results and Pakistan might be in a position to challenge us before long. The result is that in speeches in Parliament demands are made from the non-official benches for greater expenditure on the Defence Services.

During the day and a half that Dulles is here, I shall speak to him, of course, not only about these pacts, Kashmir and Goa, but also about China. Chou En-lai has sent me a message which is practically meant for Dulles.¹¹ There is nothing very new in it except a repetition of the Chinese position which you know well.

I doubt very much indeed if there is the slightest chance of the Foreign Ministers of the US and China meeting. Apart from other reasons, the American elections will come in the way.

You must know that the visit of Sihanouk of Cambodia to Peking has produced some positive results¹² in that Sihanouk has become rather cold towards the US much to the annoyance of the latter. Whatever Dulles may, in his wisdom, think of doing in India and round about here, he has succeeded in angering almost everybody in India by his references to Goa¹³ and Kashmir. As for the British, the recent dismissal of Glubb has come as a great shock, and I think they have realised that their position in Western Asia is not as strong as they thought.

This is a hurried letter.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

11. For Chou En-lai's message see *post*, p. 377.

12. A concrete result of Prime Minister Norodom Sihanouk's visit to Beijing from 13 to 21 February 1956 was the signing of a Sino-Cambodian declaration of friendship, which reaffirmed Cambodian neutrality, and their mutual agreement for basing relations on the Five Principles of peaceful coexistence.

13. Criticising the statements made by Bulganin and Khrushchev during their visit to India wherein they had questioned the continued existence of Portuguese colonialism in Goa, Dulles and Cunha, Foreign Minister of Portugal, in a joint statement on 2 December 1955 accused the Soviet leaders of attempting to "foment hatred between the East and West." For details see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 31, pp. 423-434. Asked at a press conference on 6 December 1955 whether he considered Goa a province of Portugal, Dulles replied that "all the world regards it as a Portuguese province. It has been Portuguese for about 400 years."

3. Message to Anthony Eden¹

Thank you for your message which reached me through your High Commission last night. I shall certainly discuss this matter with Lord Mountbatten when he comes here, and I hope to reply to you more fully later.

Meanwhile, fresh developments have taken place which have come as a painful surprise to us and are compelling us to consider the entire situation afresh. The decisions of the SEATO Conference at Karachi, and more particularly, their reference to Kashmir,² indicate an attitude to India which verges on hostility and which is likely to lead to the gravest consequences. They have confirmed all our apprehensions about SEATO and like military alliances, which, far from bringing security, are disruptive factors leading to conflict. In particular, India is now threatened on both sides by these alliances which, though said to be defensive in character, have an obvious aggressive implication to India. Mr Selwyn Lloyd assured me that Kashmir had nothing to do with SEATO. I feel sure that that was his view, but evidently he was overruled by others. In the result, a partisan attitude has been taken up by the SEATO Powers which completely ignores India's sovereign rights and can only be considered by us as a grave affront to our freedom.

We have definite information about the military aid which has already reached Pakistan from the United States in large quantities and is likely to come even in larger quantities in the near future. In Pakistan it is almost openly stated that this is going to be utilised against India. The whole atmosphere in Pakistan is full of threats to India. These have now been both directly and indirectly supported by the SEATO decisions. You can well appreciate our grave anxiety of these developments.

1. New Delhi, 9 March 1956. JN Collection. Sending a draft for this message to Secretary General, MEA, on 9 March, Nehru recorded: "I have changed my mind and feel that some brief reply should go to Sir Anthony Eden (British Prime Minister) immediately. I suggest the following reply.... You can discuss this matter with me before finalising it."
2. The final communique issued by the SEATO Council meeting in Karachi on 8 March 1956 stated: "In so far as their statements concerned Kashmir, the members of the Council, noting that the UN resolutions remain in force, affirmed the need for an early settlement of the Kashmir question through the UN or direct negotiations."

It has become even more clear to us than before that these military alliances in South East Asia and the Middle East are harmful to the cause of peace and are particularly dangerous to India. The way they are being extended to other areas is significant. It is particularly distressing to me to find that these alliances, in effect, are being used against a Commonwealth country. Their effect on the general situation in Asia has been bad.

I am venturing to express to you my immediate reactions which are shared all over India. In view of these grave developments, we shall naturally have to give the fullest consideration to these matters and consider our entire policy in this new context. I shall, of course, keep you informed.

III. USSR

1. Cable to K.P. S. Menon¹

Your telegram 56 February 28th.² Recent session of Communist Congress undoubtedly important. Changes in policy are of significance not only for Soviet Union but for other countries.

2. It would, however, be very unusual for me to send any message on occasion of Party Congress, however important the Party might be. This is likely to be misunderstood. You may informally, when occasion arises, mention that we have appreciated new direction of policy and more particularly affirmation of five principles.³

1. New Delhi, 29 February 1956. JN Collection.
2. Menon, Ambassador of India in USSR, suggested that in view of the far-reaching importance of the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of Soviet Union, held in Moscow from 14 to 25 February 1956, Nehru might send a personal message to Bulganin or Khrushchev conveying his congratulations on the success of the Party Congress. He added that there "is no one whose good opinion they value more."
3. For the new policies announced at the Party Congress, see *ante*, p. 334.

2. To Shriman Narayan¹

New Delhi
11 March 1956

My dear Shriman,²

Your letter of March 11 with its enclosures.³

This matter has been referred to me by quite a number of people independently. Among them are Rajaji, Rameshwari Nehru,⁴ Bharatan Kumarappa,⁵ Chaman Lall,⁶ Anup Singh⁷ and perhaps one or two others. My reply to all of them, except to Rajaji, was that while we did not attach any particular value to this conference, as it was rather a limited and small affair, if they chose to go, I would have no objection. Rajaji's going was anyhow not practical because I did not think the cold climate there would suit him at this time of the year. Also he was far too important a person to go in this casual way. Rajaji thereupon sent a long telegram in reply at my instance. In this he regretted his inability to go because of the climate and also because he did not usually associate himself with organisations of this kind. But he had been devoting himself fully to the cause of disarmament and more especially to the banning of atomic weapons. He indicated in it that it might be possible for him to go to Moscow independently when the climate was suitable.

The Conference that is being held in Moscow is somewhat different from the previous conferences. It is relatively small and a number of fairly important people from other countries are attending. They say that they will treat it as a private conference with no press reporting, etc.

When Ilya Ehrenburg⁸ was here, he mentioned this conference or something like it to me and we discussed this whole question rather fully. I told him my

1. JN Collection. This letter is also printed in Shriman Narayan, *Letters from Gandhi Nehru Vinoba* (Bombay, 1968), pp.70-71.
2. General Secretary, AICC.
3. About a peace conference in Moscow.
4. She was actively engaged in the rehabilitation of women; attended the Communist organised Peace Congress for relaxation of international tension held at Stockholm in June 1954.
5. A Gandhian economist, associated with the All-India Village Industries Association.
6. Member of Rajya Sabha.
7. Member of Rajya Sabha.
8. (1891-1967); Soviet writer; political émigré in France, 1909-17; returned to the Soviet Union, 1917, but continued to live abroad, mostly in Paris, until 1940; Deputy of the Supreme Soviet; Member Bureau of World Peace Council; wrote about eighty novels. Ehrenburg visited India in January 1956.

objections to this kind of propagandist activity.⁹ He agreed that in the past it had been rather propagandist, but they were anxious to change this character. I rather doubt if any great change will take place. Nevertheless, in view of the very considerable change in Soviet policy which has recently occurred and various other circumstances, I did not think it desirable to prevent people from going if they wanted to go. I felt also, although I did not say so, that there might be some slight advantage of some people going from here who could put across our own point of view clearly and even to some extent Gandhiji's point of view.

I take it that these people are going. I think that in the circumstances one or two others who wish to go might also be permitted to do so.

Your papers are returned.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

9. The AICC directive of 12 February 1954 forbade Congressmen from attending conferences organised by certain peace organisations.

3. Soviet Representation in Nepal¹

The Soviet Ambassador² came to see me today. He discussed Mr Mikoyan's³ visit to India and said that he wanted to spend about three days here. He would reach Delhi, spend some time here, then possibly go to Bhilai where the Russian iron & steel plant is going to be put up and then to Calcutta, from there to Rangoon. How all this is going to be done in three days' time, was not clear to me. I told the Ambassador that Mr Mikoyan should spend at least six days here, three clear days in Delhi. I have also sent a brief telegram to K.P.S. Menon, which you may have seen.

Mr Mikoyan is due to arrive here on the 25th March from Karachi, probably in the forenoon.

The Ambassador then said that he wanted my advice in regard to a delicate matter. The Soviet Union was anxious to develop friendly relations with as many Governments as possible. In this connection they had been thinking of Nepal. He wanted my advice.

I told him that it was a good thing to develop these relations, but I could not say what the reaction of the Nepal Government might be, as they were a little shy about adding to their diplomatic contacts with countries. They were a little afraid that one step led to another and other countries would crowd in. There was a new Cabinet in Kathmandu and I could not say what their reaction would be. I suggested that if they liked, we could informally find out. He did not say anything in reply to this.

Anyhow, it would be desirable for you to write to our Ambassador in Kathmandu⁴ and ask him to find out what the Nepal Government might think of it. The Soviet Ambassador's idea was not to open a Mission in Kathmandu. But like the Americans and the Chinese, he thought that the Soviet Ambassador in Delhi could also include Kathmandu in his beat and go there once or twice a year.

1. Note to Secretary General, MEA, and Foreign Secretary, 19 March 1956. JN Collection.

2. Mikhail Menshikov.

3. A.I. Mikoyan, First Vice-Chairman, Council of Ministers of USSR, visited New Delhi for four days from 26 March. For notes of his conversations with Nehru see *post*, pp. 397-407.

4. Bhagwan Sahay.

4. To U Nu¹

New Delhi

6 April 1956

My dear U Nu,²

...I have not written to you for some time. Meanwhile much has happened. The most notable recent event has been the basic changes in the policy of the Soviet Union as indicated in the 20th Congress of their Communist Party. I have no doubt that this is a very important development. It was not really a new development. Ever since Stalin's death, the Soviet leaders have been moving in this direction. When I was in the Soviet Union, I noticed these trends myself and wrote a note about them.³ The only surprising feature has been the strong denunciation of Stalin.⁴ This surprised me as it involves necessarily a condemnation of the present leaders who were so closely associated with Stalin. I suppose that some of them were bottled up for so long that they had to burst into this kind of denunciation. Also perhaps this is the way in which the Communist Party works and some shock treatment has to be given.

3. In any event, some of the basic decisions made are definitely in the right direction and indicate, I think, an increasing return to normality. The revolution, like all revolutions, has now settled down and is losing its aggressive character. This would help in the lowering of world tensions. The American contention that this is due to fear and weakness appears to me to be manifestly wrong. The other contention that it is just tactics and nothing more also seems to me to be incorrect, although of course there is always a measure of tactics in such changes.

4. I think it is fundamentally a response to the needs of the situation, both internal and external. It represents the new urges of the Russian people. I

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. Prime Minister of Myanmar.

3. Nehru visited the Soviet Union in June 1955. For his notes on the tour see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol.29, pp.264-283 and 296-311.

4. At a secret session of the Soviet Communist Party Congress on 25 February 1956, Khrushchev charged Stalin with having abused his powers as party leader to make himself supreme; permitted the execution and imprisonment on false charges of loyal Communists who had opposed his policies relating to agriculture; failed to prepare adequately for the German invasion; and promoted the break with Yugoslavia in 1948.

should not be surprised if the Cominform was liquidated in the near future. It is likely that Communist Parties in non-Communist countries will be left in future largely to their own resources and not helped and encouraged from Moscow. At present these Communist Parties are in a state of great complexity and even of some frustration.

5. I had very interesting talks with Mikoyan when he was here and I suppose that you must have had good talks with him also.

6. It seems to me that just as there is a tendency in the Soviet Union to tone down, there is also a tendency in the United States of America to lessen the gap between the two. This is not represented by the present State Department or by Dulles. But there is, I think, a good deal of thinking in the United States in this direction.

7. More particularly, there is a belief in the US of the failure of their Asian policy and a desire to change it. How and in what manner, I cannot say. I doubt however if any marked change will take place before the Presidential election. They are beginning to feel that, in the long run, their establishing bases all over the world does not add to their popularity. Also that the bases have ceased to be as important as they were two or three years ago. With the development of guided missiles which can go to far distances, nearby bases become less necessary.

8. It seems to me that perhaps the position in regard to disarmament is also a little better, though even now there is a big gap between the two major approaches....

With all good wishes,

Yours very sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. Talk with the Soviet Ambassador¹

The Soviet Ambassador saw me this afternoon. He spoke to me about the Soviet Union having diplomatic relations with Nepal. Once, previously, he had mentioned this matter to me.² I asked him if he had spoken about it to the Nepalese Ambassador.³ He said he had, rather unofficially, mentioned it. At that time, he had not received official instructions from his Government. Now, these instructions had come and he would like us to help them to approach the Nepalese Government through our Ambassador. The idea was that the Soviet Ambassador in India should also represent his Government at Kathmandu.

2. I told him that if he so wished, we could mention this matter to our Ambassador in Kathmandu, and they could informally sound the Nepalese Government. He agreed to this. I pointed out to him that everybody at Kathmandu was terribly busy with the Coronation.⁴ It was only after the Coronation that any other subject was likely to be considered.

3. He also mentioned the Soviet Government's desire to have relations with Cambodia. He had spoken about this to the Cambodian Minister here.

4. Also that in view of some statement by the new Prime Minister of Ceylon,⁵ the Soviet Government would like to pursue the question of opening diplomatic relations with Ceylon.

5. I think we might inform our Ambassador at Kathmandu about the Soviet Government's request and tell him that he should mention this matter to the King or to the Ministers and find out their reactions. He need not do this till the Coronation festivities are over.

1. Note to Secretary General, Foreign Secretary and Commonwealth Secretary, MEA, 27 April 1956. JN Collection.
2. See *ante*, p. 342.
3. Daman Shamsher Jang Bahadur Rana.
4. Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah Deva was crowned in Kathmandu on 2 May 1956.
5. Addressing his first press conference as the new Prime Minister on 25 April 1956, S.W.R.D. Bandarnaike welcomed the dissolution of Cominform and expressed the hope that "this marked a new and desirable trend of Soviet policy." On 8 April, before the formation of the new Government, Bandarnaike said that he favoured establishing diplomatic missions in China and the Soviet Union, but his Government would steer clear of blocs.

IV. THE ALGERIAN QUESTION

1. Cable to Ali Yavar Jung¹

I have had long talks with Dulles and also with Pineau, French Foreign Minister....

4. My talks with Pineau² were much more satisfactory. He produced a good impression upon me and his general appraisal of the international situation was not far different from ours. You know that he is opposed to the Baghdad Pact. He was rather foolishly drawn into this Kashmir reference by SEATO because he knows little about it. He was very much concerned at the situation in Algeria.³ He told me categorically that France did not wish to have any colony. Fortunately, they had come to satisfactory settlements in Morocco and Tunisia. In Algeria, the situation was different and very difficult. Although, technically, Algeria was a department of France, this could be done away with, but still problems remained. There were the settlers of French descent, about twelve hundred thousand and there were nine million Arabs on the verge of civil war. The settlers had been there for many generations and have no roots elsewhere. They could not be driven into the sea. The Arabs of Algeria had no prominent leaders with whom one could deal. The French Government will gladly have elections so that leaders could be thrown up, but it was impossible to have fair elections in a state of disorder and insurrection.

5. I said that I was not in a position to give advice about the manner of dealing with this difficult situation except to say that France should take a brave step to establish freedom in Algeria, with adequate safeguards for the French settlers. Possibly, some kind of regional device comprising limited regional freedom within the same State (something like autonomous provinces in India) might be worth thinking of. Anyhow, delay in dealing with this question had already made it much worse and it was likely to deteriorate with further delay.

6. Pineau is going to Cairo on Wednesday and spending a day there. He wants to meet Nasser. I am glad he is doing so, and I hope that Nasser will talk frankly to him. I have found Pineau by far the most satisfactory of the three Foreign Ministers I have met during the past ten days.

1. New Delhi, 12 March 1956. JN Collection. Extracts. Ali Yavar Jung was the Ambassador of India in Cairo.

2. Christian Pineau, the French Foreign Minister, came to New Delhi on 11 March for two days.

3. See *post*, pp. 390-391.

2. Cable to H.S. Malik¹

I have just returned to Delhi and seen your two telegrams 25, 26 dated April 4th and 5th.²

2. I am sorry that there has been misunderstanding both about what Mollet³ said in his article⁴ and about what I said at Allahabad.⁵ I spoke in Allahabad, as usual, in Hindi. I used the word 'Azadi' and not independence in connection with Algeria. This means freedom which may of course include independence.

3. I have not seen text of reports sent by Reuter or Agence France Presse of my speech.

4. At the end of a long speech dealing with internal problems, I referred briefly to Guy Mollet's statement about India agreeing to French policy in

1. New Delhi, 6 April 1956. JN Collection. Extracts. H.S. Malik was the Indian Ambassador in Paris.
2. At a meeting with Malik on 5 April, Pineau had drawn his attention to Reuter and AFP reports of Nehru's speech at Allahabad on 4 April in which Nehru was reported to have said that during his conversations with Pineau at New Delhi, he (Pineau) had agreed that "independence" should be conceded to Algeria as it had been to Morocco and Tunisia. Pineau denied having made such a statement to Nehru and told Malik that he was forced either to contradict it or to give a full account of his conversation with Nehru, for if he left the statement unchallenged, the consequences of it both in Algeria and in France would be most serious for him and his Government.
3. Guy Mollet (1905-1975); French politician; taught English in various lycées between 1936 and 1944; served with the French army, 1939-40; prisoner of war, 1940-42; joined the Resistance; appointed Secretary-General, Socialist Party, 1946; Minister of State, 1946, 1950-51 and 1958-59; Prime Minister, January 1956-May 1957; author of several books including *Creation of Phonetic Method of Learning English* and *The Chances of Socialism*.
4. In an interview published in the *US News and World Report*, Mollet was stated to have said that Nehru had declared that he was favourable to the policies of the French Government in North Africa. "But that means he is now more favourable than before. He was never unfavourable," Mollet was also reported to have said. A spokesman of the MEA, in a statement in New Delhi on 4 April, corrected Mollet's reported remarks about Nehru's being favourable to French policies in North Africa. Later the same day Pineau told Malik that neither he nor Mollet had ever said that Nehru approved of French Government's policy in Algeria.
5. The reference is to Nehru's speech at a public meeting held at K.P. College, Allahabad, on 4 April 1956. The speech is not printed.

Algeria. This was not correct. I had said that I was happy to meet Pineau and discuss various subjects with him. I was glad to find a good deal of common thinking about various world problems. I was particularly happy that freedom had been achieved by Morocco and Tunisia. About Algeria I had apparently been misunderstood. We were naturally in favour of Algeria achieving her freedom. Pineau had pointed out to me that French Government were in favour of this but the question of large numbers of people of French and European descent amounting to one and a quarter of million settled in Algeria for several generations made Algerian problem quite different from that of Morocco and Tunisia. I said that I appreciated this difficulty and difference. But the longer the solution was delayed the more the difficulty. I thought that the rights of people of French descent in Algeria might well be protected in any settlement granting freedom to Algeria. It was important that there should be an early and peaceful settlement on basis of freedom.

5. This is brief summary of what I said. I am sorry if I have misreported Pineau and caused him and his Government embarrassment. He is of course free to make any statement to clear his Government's position. In doing so I hope that he will state my position correctly.

6. Apart from what I said, our position is that while recognising France's special problems in Algeria, we earnestly hope that peaceful solution will be found ensuring freedom to Algeria within the scope of which French settlers would find a proper place. Obviously, they cannot dominate over Algeria, politically or economically, but their legitimate interests can be safeguarded. Above all, we deeply regret the violence that is going on in Algeria on both sides which can only make situation worse....

V. INDO-CHINA

1. Cambodia-North Vietnam Relations¹

I agree generally. But our approach might be a little different. We might inform our Legation in Phnom Penh that we are by no means sure that Sihanouk² will accept such an invitation to go to Hanoi at this stage. To invite him therefore would be to embarrass him and possibly embarrass ourselves too. Sihanouk has clearly stated that Cambodia cannot recognise any of the divided countries till a political settlement has taken place.

In regard to the question of trade and economic dealings, it would be desirable for some contacts to be established. This would be a first step which might later be followed by other steps. These contacts can be made through our Consul General³ in Hanoi and our Legation in Phnom Penh.

I do not think there will be any harm in DRVN sending some small trade delegation to Phnom Penh to discuss these matters. Even if this is approved of by DRVN, the permission of the Cambodian Government should be taken.

Perhaps, therefore, the first step should be for DRVN to communicate through our representatives with the Cambodian Government and express their wish to discuss these trade or economic matters. They may suggest further that now or later some representatives of their Government could go to Phnom Penh to discuss this.

Sihanouk's answer can either be to accept the delegation straightaway or carry on these discussions through our representatives to begin with.

1. Note to Commonwealth Secretary, MEA, 8 March 1956. JN Collection.
2. Norodom Sihanouk, Prime Minister of Cambodia. He resigned on 30 March 1956.
3. M.P. Mathur, Consul General of India in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam).

2. Conversations with John Foster Dulles¹

In the course of our conversations, Mr Dulles referred to Vietnam.² He said that the US had given vast quantities of munitions and equipment to the French for the war in Indo-China. Some of it had arrived after the war was over. Some was brought back from the fronts. At present, there was a large quantity, worth about five hundred million dollars, lying mostly in Saigon. The French had left it there.

2. The United States intends to get this back. It is deteriorating very rapidly. All this is legally the property of the United States. The French had apparently stolen a good deal of this equipment and sent it to North Africa. This was contrary to the agreement.

3. The US Government would like to send about three hundred men in civilian dress, to catalogue and make lists of this equipment and arrange for its return to the US or wherever the US Government wants to send it to.

4. The French had apparently turned over this equipment to the Vietnam Government. They had no business to do so as it belonged to the US. The Vietnam Government did not even know how to use much of it.

5. What Mr Dulles was concerned about was that this sending of three hundred men in civilian dress should not be considered a violation of the armistice. These people were not a military force and would stay there only temporarily.

6. I told Mr Dulles that I did not know anything about this matter and I would consult my advisers on the subject.

7. Mr Dulles said further that he hoped that the International Commission will stay on. Its influence was for peace. In view of the departure of the French, he intended talking to Diem³ and suggesting to him to have a small French unit to stay on to give protection to the Commission or, alternatively, to give this de facto protection himself even though he does not accept the Geneva Agreement.⁴

1. Note to N.R. Pillai, Secretary General, MEA, 10 March 1956. JN Collection. Also available in File No.1(5)-IC/56, Vol. I, MEA, and Subimal Dutt Papers, NMML.

2. Dulles visited New Delhi on 9 and 10 March 1956.

3. Ngo Dinh Diem, President of South Vietnam.

4. On 20 July 1955, the first anniversary of the signing of the Geneva Agreement on Indo-China, the hotels occupied by the members of the International Commission in Saigon were stormed and their belongings looted by supporters of the South Vietnam Government. Diem had continuously denied and flouted the Geneva Agreement.

8. The likelihood of any free election in Vietnam was very remote. Nevertheless, he was suggesting to Diem at least to give "lip service" to this idea of free election.

9. I told Mr Dulles that our position and the position of the International Commission in Vietnam had been and was becoming increasingly most embarrassing. We functioned there under the terms of the Geneva Agreement. If the Geneva Agreement was repudiated, the Commission had no justification for continuing. Mr Dulles said that there was no question of repudiation as Diem had not accepted it at any time. I said that may be so but Diem's Government was a successor Government⁵ and he must accept not only the benefits but the obligations of the Agreement. He had accepted the benefits.

10. Anyhow, I said that the position was becoming extraordinarily difficult for the Commission and it cannot be expected to function in this way for long. The matter had, therefore, been referred to the two Co-Chairmen⁶ and we shall await their advice.

5. After the deposition of Bao Dai from the position of Chief of State on 26 October 1955, South Vietnam was proclaimed a republic with Diem as its President.

6. For references made by the Government of India to Harold Macmillan, Foreign Secretary of UK, and V.M. Molotov, Foreign Minister of USSR, Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference, in September 1955, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol.30, pp.434-436.

3. Cambodia and Sihanouk¹

No question arises of sending an answer or an acknowledgement to this letter. There is some truth in what Son Ngoc Thanh² says, but I think his analysis is very much exaggerated.³ He is, of course, opposed to Prince Sihanouk. There are obvious dangers to Cambodia from the South and the North. I should imagine, however, that whatever Sihanouk may be ignorant of, he is certainly alive to these dangers from abroad. He is a very wideawake person and has grown in stature during the last year or more. The London *Times* had a recent article on him.⁴

2. But, there is another aspect, and that is the internal aspect which is not at all satisfactory. In spite of Sihanouk's professions about democracy, his idea of democracy is odd. However, there is nothing to be done about it by us.

1. Note to Commonwealth Secretary, MEA, 16 March 1956. File No.3(3)-IC/56, Vol. I, MEA.
2. (1908-1976); Khmer nationalist leader; co-founder of *Nokor Wat*, the first Khmer-language newspaper, 1936; participated in an coup attempt against the French authorities, 1942; collaborated with the Japanese occupation forces; head of government of occupied Cambodia 1945; jailed by the returning French forces, 1945-51; spent the next twenty years in clandestine anti-Sihanouk activity as leader of the Khmer Serei, a nationalist movement supported by US intelligence; Prime Minister in Lon Nol's Khmer Republic for a few months in 1971.
3. Son Ngoc Thanh, in a letter addressed to Nehru, observed that Sihanouk was hardly alive to the seriousness of Cambodia's internal situation or to the external dangers and that he must reorientate his diplomacy in order to contain Vietnam's expansion, both from the North and South; take measures to improve the precarious internal political and economic situation; and establish friendly relations with Thailand. Thanh also said that India should take interest in this matter as Cambodia represented Indian civilization in Indo-China and there was a serious risk of Cambodia and her civilization being submerged by the Annamite tide.
4. Sihanouk's rise in political stature since his abdication in 1954 was traced in an editorial in *The Times* on 13 March.

4. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon¹

Your telegram March 21st.² I discussed Indo-China issue with Selwyn Lloyd, Dulles and Pineau....

3. Selwyn Lloyd agreed to meeting of two Co-Chairmen as early as possible and said he was taking steps to that end. He was not sure of the possible date. He promised to speak to Dulles in Karachi about Diem's attitude and arrangements to be made at Saigon when French forces were due to leave.

4. Dulles had met Selwyn Lloyd at Karachi when he came here. I told him about urgency of two Co-Chairmen meeting and difficulty about our position there in view of Diem's attitude. He said he would talk to Diem about this and suggested French leaving some token force at Saigon to afford protection to International Commission.

5. Pineau was critical of American attitude in Indo-China and said that French forces would be leaving by middle April. When I mentioned to him about Dulles proposal of token force being left there, he said that request must come from South Vietnam Government for them to consider it.

6. I think it will be advisable for you to meet Selwyn Lloyd and Eden and possibly also Pearson³ on your way back. Your going to Moscow for this purpose will probably lead to all manner of speculations and might therefore be inadvisable.

7. I think Selwyn Lloyd has already approached Molotov suggesting a meeting.

1. New Delhi, 22 March 1956. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. Krishna Menon enquired about the outcome of Nehru's recent talks with Selwyn Lloyd, Dulles and Pineau in respect of the deadlock on Indo-China, and suggested his having direct talks with the principal parties concerned if assurances of an early meeting of the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference or some joint decision by them on the position of the International Commission had not already been obtained.

3. Lester Pearson, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs.

5. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon¹

Your telegram 822 April 5th.²

2. Desai has already communicated to you latest message from Parthasarathi. From this it appears that Diem is not adhering to previous statement and is not dependable. British and American Ambassadors³ are apparently playing important part in advising Diem and are in search of some formula which might prove acceptable, but what is wanted is not formula but insistence that conditions must be created for Commission to function properly. The least that is necessary is that South Vietnam must accept legal obligations. Merely accepting the status quo is not enough.

3. North Vietnam appears to be anxious to avoid break as is indicated in Desai's message to you.⁴ Their attitude appears to me reasonable.

4. You should make it clear to Lloyd that minimum condition for Commission to function is acceptance of obligations by South Vietnam.

5. French attitude is that if request comes from South Vietnam, they would agree to act as its agents on joint Commission, but they will not agree to

1. New Delhi, 6 April 1956. File No.1(5)-IC/56, Vol. I, MEA. Also available in JN Collection. Extracts. Krishna Menon was in London at this time.

2. Krishna Menon suggested that it might be ascertained from G. Parthasarathi, Chairman, International Commission for Supervision and Control, Vietnam, whether the position reportedly taken by Diem in a declaration proposed to be issued by South Vietnam was definite and dependable. South Vietnam was understood to have prepared a declaration which would refer to the proposed withdrawal of French Expeditionary Corps, dissolution of French High Command and to the assumption of full sovereignty by South Vietnam. The declaration reportedly would not amount to a legal acceptance of the Ceasefire Agreement; however, South Vietnam would respect the demarcation line, would not enter into military alliances, agree to the check on entry of war materiel and for these purposes cooperate with the Commission.

3. Hugh Stephenson and G. Frederick Reinhardt were respectively the Ambassadors of UK and US in Saigon.

4. Parthasarathi had informed New Delhi that North Vietnam wanted acceptance by the South of the obligations of the Ceasefire Agreement. On all-Vietnam elections Hanoi would agree to a postponement provided Saigon declared that it was willing to have the position reviewed at the end of twelve months.

perpetuate the present arrangement whereby they are legally responsible for Geneva Agreement.

6. You are best judge about your date of return. You should certainly see Reading.⁵ I think it would be desirable for you to spend a day in Paris and see Pineau⁶

5. Gerald Rufus Isaacs, Second Marquess of Reading (1889-1960); British Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1951-53; Minister for State for Foreign Affairs, 1953-57. He was deputising for Selwyn Lloyd as Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference.
6. While in New York, Krishna Menon had received a message from Pineau asking him to stop in Paris on his way to London and see him.

VI. OTHER COUNTRIES

1. To John Kotelawala¹

New Delhi

5 February 1956

My dear Prime Minister,²

I am writing to you in answer to your letter of December 20th, 1955³ which was an answer to my letter to you of August 11th.⁴ I have already briefly acknowledged your letter on the 8th January.⁵ Since then, I have received your letter of the 20th January communicating your intention to publish the correspondence between us on this subject in a Government White Paper and not by release to the press.

I would like to apologise to you for this delay in answering your letter, although perhaps I might plead some justification as you took four months to reply to my letter of August 11th. But I put forward no such excuse. All I can say is that I have been terribly occupied with difficult problems. As Prime Minister, you will appreciate what the lot of another Prime Minister is.

I agree with your suggestion that the correspondence and the notes exchanged between us, including this letter and the note attached to it, should be published as a Government White Paper. We can do this simultaneously in Colombo and New Delhi, if you will be good enough to suggest a date for this purpose. I might, however, mention here that a fairly detailed account of the contents of your letter of December 20, 1955, appeared in the Colombo press on the 22nd December, many days before that letter reached me.

I have naturally read your letter with care and attention and have asked my colleagues to examine afresh the various questions raised in it. I have no liking

1. JN Collection.
2. Prime Minister of Sri Lanka.
3. In his letter of 20 December 1955, Kotelawala emphasised that Sri Lanka was not to be blamed if a deadlock had arisen between the two countries on the question of persons of Indian origin in Sri Lanka. While expressing his disappointment that the India-Sri Lanka agreement of January 1954 had proved unworkable, Kotelawala asked for suggestions to resolve the impasse.
4. For Nehru's letter of 11 August 1955, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol.29, pp.330-334.
5. Nehru wrote on 8 January that he would "like to give very careful consideration" to the content of Kotelawala's letter, but being heavily preoccupied at the time he would reply to the letter in due course.

for carrying on a controversy on this subject. But in order to complete the record, I am attaching a note⁶ to this letter.

Over two years have passed since you were good enough to come to Delhi and we signed the Indo-Ceylon Agreement of January, 1954.⁷ We had hoped then that we had given a new direction to our thinking in regard to this old problem and were setting in motion certain activities which would gradually lead to its solution. As we all know to our cost, the problem is a stubborn one and has given your Government and mine a good deal of trouble. Apart from Governments, there are a large number of people involved and thus it is essentially a human problem.

The hopes raised by our Agreement of January 1954 unfortunately were not justified and doubts arose about interpretations and the like. We met again and tried to resolve the deadlock. Again, our efforts did not meet with the success that we hoped for. Apart from the inherent difficulties of the problem, we have got stuck up even in interpreting our own words and the real meaning of the Agreement we arrived at.

It can serve little purpose for us to argue in a legalistic way as to what the proper interpretation of our Agreement is. The normal course, where there is difference of opinion, is for the matter to be referred to any competent authority, agreed to by the two parties, for its decision. I would suggest to you, therefore, that, in so far as the interpretation of the Indo-Ceylon Agreement of January 1954 is concerned, this might be referred to any eminent person or authority agreed to by both our Governments and that we should abide by his decision in regard to this interpretation. I hope you will agree to this proposal which is a fair way of disposing of this particular matter.

I do not suggest that this solves the entire problem but it removes at least one matter of controversy between us and clears the way for further consideration of this problem in a friendly and cooperative way.

I am very anxious that the relations between India and Ceylon should be friendly and cooperative and every problem that arises between us should be solved in a spirit of cooperation. Both our countries have to face difficult internal and external problems. Both have to play some part in the international

6. Not available.

7. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 24, p. 615.

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sphere. It would be unfortunate indeed for us not to be able to solve this problem which has come in the way of our relations and which affects a large number of human beings.

With all good wishes to you,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. To Bhagwan Sahay¹

New Delhi
13 March 1956

My dear Bhagwan Sahay,²

I have naturally been reading with interest the various telegrams you have been sending. These have been chiefly about certain demands made by the Nepal Government for equipment as well as technical and administrative personnel.

We are naturally anxious to help the Nepal Government to the best of our ability in these matters. But I should like you to remember the great strains and stresses under which we are functioning. We are stretching ourselves to the utmost to meet the most urgent demands in our own country and in fact are unable to meet them. Many foreign countries, chiefly in Africa, also make demands upon us and we want to meet them. But the main thing is that there is a big gap between our wish to help and our capacity to do so. We have no idea yet of how to fill this gap and we are therefore laying great stress on austerity, economy, etc., in our own country. It is no easy matter for us both in terms of equipment and personnel to meet large demands upon us. The future is likely to be very difficult indeed.

In view of international developments, the burden on us is likely to be all the greater and the sources of supply might well dry up. For these reasons, it may well be wholly beyond our capacity to give the help to Nepal that we would want to. There appears to be a tendency on the part of the Nepal Government to treat the Government of India as a kind of supply agency for it to which they can send orders for immediate execution. Even practically speaking, this is often difficult.

Apart from our own difficulties, it is not desirable for the Nepal Government to get into this habit and to expect a continuous flow of supplies from us on demand. This will lead to grave difficulties in the future and even to ill will in case we are unable to meet their wishes. We have therefore to be very careful and to make the Nepal Government realise our own difficulties which are great.

From the Nepal Government's point of view also it is not a good thing for them to imagine that they have these easy sources of supply. No country goes ahead in this easy manner. They do not take any trouble to tap their own resources and rely on others.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Ambassador of India in Nepal.

3. To Lord Mountbatten¹

New Delhi
18 March 1956

My dear Dickie,

You left with me a letter from Prince Peter of Greece.² In this letter he expressed a wish to go to East Nepal to climb some mountains there and wants permission to do so.

I did not read this letter till after your departure. If I had read it while you were here, I would have been able to tell you of our difficulties in this matter. Primarily this has nothing to do with us. It is for the Nepal Government to give or not to give permission. I remember that the Nepal Government some time ago informed us that they were not prepared to give this permission.

As a matter of fact, since then a number of developments have taken place in East Nepal and near the Nepal-Tibet border,³ which make it still more difficult for the Nepal Government to revise their previous decision. Some people to whom they had given permission to go to these mountains actually crossed over into Tibet and were arrested by the Tibetan authorities.⁴ This led to some kind of an enquiry into this matter and the Nepal Government was much upset by the whole incident. What the result of the actual enquiry was, I do not remember. The crossing over into Tibetan territory might have been purely accidental, as there are no marked boundaries in those mountains. But, apart from the merits, the fact is that the Nepal Government was much embarrassed and there was some agitation in the newspapers there and among the public to stop all foreigners from going to East Nepal on mountaineering expeditions.⁵

1. JN Collection.

2. Prince Peter of Greece and Denmark lived in Kalimpong for a long time. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol.23, pp.221-222.

3. The Tibetan authorities were reported to have disputed the frontier separating the Nepalese District East No. 2 from the south-eastern province of Tibet. The District Officer had suggested to the Nepalese Government that the Tibetans would have to be pushed back by 1,000 yards.

4. The Nepalese Foreign Office strongly protested to the British Embassy in February 1956 against the "misconduct" of two members of the Welsh expedition to Saipal and Api Namba in 1955. The two climbers had "illegally" entered Tibetan territory causing embarrassment to the Nepal Government.

5. In the first week of March 1956, the Nepal Government was reported to have enforced certain conditions for permitting any expedition to the Himalayas. Members of all expeditions would henceforth be required to submit reports on their scientific research work on mountaineering to the Nepal Government before they left the country. The members of the Lhotse expedition of 1955 were alleged to have taken obscene photographs of Sherpa womenfolk.

East Nepal, as you know, is almost completely cut off from Kathmandu and communications are non-existent.

In view of all this, the present tendency of the Nepal Government is wholly against encouraging any visits to East Nepal. For us to ask the Nepal Government to relax their rules would be odd and would be an unnecessary interference which they would not like.

I have myself been unable to understand the anxiety of a number of mountaineers to go to East Nepal, which is a border area with Tibet. There are plenty of mountains elsewhere to be climbed.

Anyhow, you will appreciate that it would be exceedingly embarrassing and, I think, wrong for us to interfere in this matter with the Nepal Government.

I am returning to you Prince Peter's letter.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. To Fenner Brockway¹

New Delhi
21 March 1956

Dear Fenner,²

Thank you for your letter of the 2nd March.

I am naturally greatly interested in the subject of racial equality and liberty in South Africa. This is a matter of the most intimate concern to us in India, apart from its wider implications. I am glad to learn that the Movement for Colonial Freedom has spread and has now a large number of affiliated members.

But, my difficulty is that, as Prime Minister, I do not normally send messages to such organisations, however much sympathy I might have for them. You have my good wishes, of course.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. British politician, Member of Parliament for several years, and Chairman, the Movement for Colonial Freedom (later "Liberation"), 1954-67.

5. To A.P. Jain¹

New Delhi
30 March 1956

My dear Ajit,²

Your letter of March 30th about the purchase of Burma rice.³ I am sending a message to U Nu, copy of which is enclosed.

You refer to other offers of rice to you from various countries in Africa or Asia. The only country you mention, apart from Burma, is Thailand.⁴ I think that we should always prefer Burma to Thailand in this or any other deal. This is both politically and from other points of view, a wise policy. Burma is a near neighbour and it is cheaper and simpler (cheaper from the point of view of transport) to deal with Burma than with a country further away. The price factor, of course, is always to be considered. We can build up also other trade relations with Burma, which may be of an enduring character.

So far as Thailand is concerned, politically speaking, it is not in a category of those countries with which we need have special relations. That does not mean that we should not deal with Thailand but that it is not one of the countries to be preferred. On the political level as well as, I think, on the long term economic level, Burma is far more important to us than almost any other country.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. Union Minister for Food and Agriculture.

3. Nehru had asked for A.P. Jain's views on U Nu's request for a long-term rice contract between Myanmar and India. Jain replied that U Nu might be informed of India's decision to buy some rice from Myanmar during 1956 and of her preparedness "to enter into a three years' contract for one million tons or so of rice provided a suitable price comparable to our internal prices is agreed upon."

4. Drawing Nehru's attention to Thailand's expectation of India purchasing some rice from her, Jain expressed the opinion that "while we should give considerable preference to Burma, yet we might not lay all eggs in one basket. We might have some deal with others as well."

6. To Josip Broz Tito¹

New Delhi

3 April 1956

My dear Marshal Tito,²

Your letter dated March 1 was telegraphed to me in full by our Ambassador³ in Belgrade. Many days afterwards I received the original letter.⁴ I need not tell you how grateful I was for your letter and how much I appreciated your appraisal of the various important developments that had taken place. This appraisal was particularly helpful to me at the time, as, soon after, I met the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, the United States and France. Later I met Mikoyan.

2. It is a matter of deep pleasure to me and my colleagues that our views about recent developments coincide with yours. This indicates that our approach and the policies we pursue are broadly similar and that we can cooperate fully in the furtherance of these policies. We live in changing times and important developments take place frequently. It is desirable therefore that we should maintain close touch with each other and I shall always welcome your appraisals and advice.

3. I had long talks with the three Foreign Ministers and Mikoyan and we discussed a variety of subjects. We were naturally much concerned with the SEATO and Baghdad Pacts and I expressed myself strongly against them. Apart from our objection in principle to such pacts, we feel that they threaten and encircle India to some extent. I have no doubt that neither the UK nor the USA look upon these pacts as being against India. But they are so entangled in their

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. President of Yugoslavia.

3. Rajeshwar Dayal.

4. Tito wrote that certain corrections in the views and methods of the Soviet Communist Party were obviously expected, nevertheless the "far-reaching changes" announced at the 20th Congress of the Party, "both in regard to the renaissance of theory and to the realistic standpoints in the questions of foreign policy", had come as a pleasant surprise. He also praised the leading group at the Congress for taking a courageous stand on the question of different roads of socialist development in various countries. According to Tito, one of the most significant events of the Congress was the drastic condemnation of certain mistakes of Stalin, for "without the destruction of the cult of personality, it would not be possible to carry out successfully all what the Soviet leaders want to carry out today."

system of alliances that they are pushed in various directions by some of their allies. This was the case at the recent SEATO meeting in Karachi when Pakistan brought in Kashmir and Afghanistan.

4. I was also greatly concerned at developments in Indo-China where South Vietnam is taking up an intransigent attitude in regard to the Geneva Agreement. This is very embarrassing for the International Commission of which India is Chairman. We have made it clear that we cannot function in the Commission if the South Vietnam Government does not undertake the obligations under the Geneva Agreement.

5. You will have observed that Cambodia has had to suffer from a great deal of pressure both from South Vietnam and Thailand. I have little doubt that the United States encouraged this pressure, probably because they did not like Cambodia's independent policy of non-alignment and the visit of its Prime Minister to Peking.

6. I found the French Foreign Minister much nearer to our way of thinking. Both Dulles and Selwyn Lloyd were anxious to find out what we thought about the 20th Congress in Moscow. My own viewpoint was similar to yours and I explained it to them.⁵ Dulles was inclined to agree that the changes in the Soviet Union were in the right direction. But it would take a long time before they take effect. He is firmly convinced that these changes are due to fear of the Western countries. I told him that I did not agree at all and the Soviet Union was both strong and confident. Dulles thinks far too much in military terms and cannot understand that other powerful forces are shaping events in Asia and elsewhere. I did not of course convince him, but I think I did produce some impression on his mind....

9. I had long talks with Mikoyan about recent developments in the Soviet Union. Since you wrote to me, Stalin has been violently attacked and the process of denigrating him has proceeded with vigour. While we entirely understand and appreciate these great changes in Soviet policy, I do not quite understand the necessity for these violent attacks on Stalin, because in attacking him, the present leadership condemn themselves also. The attacks on Stalin are largely justified. But there is no adequate explanation as to why Stalin was tolerated for so long. To say that it was fear does not appear to be a sufficient explanation. I asked Mikoyan especially why Russia had broken with

5. See the succeeding sub-section.

Yugoslavia. His answer was that this was a caprice of Stalin's and one of those unfortunate things which Stalin often did without consultation.⁶

10. I entirely agree with you that this change of policy in the Soviet Union is of basic and historical importance not only to the USSR but to the world at large. It marks a turning point in the history of the Russian Revolution. It supports a new process of gradual return to normality. We should welcome it. China, I think, is still in its revolutionary phase and the cult of personality is encouraged there. The new Soviet policy should certainly help the cause of peace and disarmament. Difficulties are more likely to come from the other side.

11. I have watched with interest the reactions of the Communist Parties in some of the non-Communist countries. They have been rather upset by these unexpected developments and find it difficult to adapt themselves fully to them. But I have no doubt that they will fall in line. But, as you say, there are people both in the Soviet Union and elsewhere who are not pleased at these changes.⁷

12. I was glad to read what you have written about the Emperor of Ethiopia. My own information about him is wholly in line with your judgement. He has now decided to come to India next autumn⁸ and we shall be happy to meet him and discuss matters frankly with him.

13. I am very glad that you had occasion to have frank talks with Colonel Nasser⁹ in Egypt. He has enormous difficulties to face. But he is a brave man and does not want war.

14. You have enquired in your letter why a second session of the Asian-African Conference was postponed. We were rather apprehensive that if this Conference was held, it would not be possible to maintain a common front which we had adopted at Bandung. There would be fierce controversies which would tend to split up the countries represented there. Also, in view of the Israel-Egypt crisis, it was undesirable to hold the Conference at Cairo at that

6. Tito wrote that the changes in the Soviet policy represented "an all-out departure from those Stalinist dogmatic views because of which we were condemned in 1948." He added that the previous state of affairs was obviously terminated at the Party Congress, while Yugoslavia had still been approaching the normalisation and improvement of relations with the Soviet Union "with a certain reserve."

7. Tito felt that it was very important to support the Soviet leaders in their endeavours to carry out the decisions adopted at the Party Congress despite the fact that those who were opposed to them were in a great minority in the Soviet Union.

8. Haile Selassie visited India from 25 to 27 October 1956.

9. Gamal Abdel Nasser, Prime Minister of Egypt.

time. I was given to understand that Nasser was not anxious to have the Conference just then. Both the Prime Ministers of Burma and Indonesia were not keen on it then. Such a Conference would require a good deal of preparation and we had no time for it. I feel, however, that this Conference should be held some time or other in the near future, perhaps early next year.

15. We are having a good deal of trouble with Pakistan. Ever since the American military aid has come there in large quantities, the attitude of Pakistan has become more and more aggressive and we have had numerous border incidents. Politically and economically Pakistan is in a bad condition. It relies more and more on American help, both civil and military and thus becomes wholly dependent. The help for civil development largely goes in the maintenance of experts and technicians that come from the United States. Much of the rest goes to some top circles in Pakistan. The people generally profit little by it. This, as you know, is the state of affairs in most of the countries of Western Asia.

16. We live in stirring times and a heavy responsibility rests upon all of us. It is a great comfort to me when in facing those difficult problems in a changing world, we have so much in common in our thinking and action with you.

Indira joins me in sending you and Madame Broz¹⁰ our warm regards and good wishes.

Yours very sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

10. Jovanka Broz Tito.

VII. MEETINGS WITH VISITING STATESMEN

1. Conversation with Selwyn Lloyd—I¹

Selwyn Lloyd began by referring to the present situation in Indo-China in relation to the working of the Geneva Agreement and said that the Commission might not be able to function effectively once the French High Command pulled out. He thought that the elections envisaged in the Geneva Agreement in July were not practicable.

2. The Prime Minister stated that so long as the Commission continued to function in Indo-China, that by itself would have a restraining effect on Diem. If the Commission ceased to function, there was a risk that military operations would start. From any point of view the present position was unsatisfactory. India has suggested that the two Co-Chairmen should meet. According to the impression of the Government of India, Molotov is having a restraining influence on North Vietnam. The very fact that the Co-Chairmen would be meeting would have a pacifying effect, even if ultimately there were to be no satisfactory solution. Immediately tension would be relieved to some extent. Diem is taking advantage of those clauses in the Agreement which are favourable to him. It was an extraordinary situation—he was not recognising any obligation under the Geneva Agreement and at the same time wanted to benefit from it. Whatever else might or might not be done, the Prime Minister said, a meeting of the Co-Chairmen was desirable.

3. Mr Selwyn Lloyd enquired whether there was still any reaction from Moscow. The Prime Minister added that he was not sure how far the Russians were keen on a big conference. In fact, Mr Bulganin and Mr Khrushchev asked for his advice on this point during their visit to Delhi.

4. Mr Selwyn Lloyd said that in any case it would be extremely difficult for the two Co-Chairmen to meet before the Russian leaders' forthcoming visit

1. Summary record of talk with Selwyn Lloyd, British Foreign Secretary, New Delhi, 4 March 1956, New Delhi. File No. HC(S)-37/56, MEA. Also available in S. Dutt Papers, NMML. Also present at the talks were Vijayalakshmi Pandit, High Commissioner for India in UK; N.R. Pillai, Secretary-General; S. Dutt, Foreign Secretary; M.J. Desai, Commonwealth Secretary; Malcolm John MacDonald, High Commissioner for UK in India; Harold Caccia, Deputy Under-Secretary of State, UK; and W.D. Allen, Assistant Under-Secretary of State, UK. Remarks by Selwyn Lloyd and others have been summarized.



WITH JOHN FOSTER DULLES, US SECRETARY OF STATE,
NEW DELHI, 9 MARCH 1956



PLAYING HOLI WITH A.I. MIKOYAN, FIRST VICE-CHAIRMAN, COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF USSR (ON RIGHT), AND MIKHAIL MENSHIKOV, SOVIET AMBASSADOR (CENTRE), NEW DELHI, 27 MARCH 1956

to London. The Prime Minister repeated that if it was known that the Co-Chairmen were going to meet, that would have a pacifying influence.

5-7. Allen said that when the French High Command withdrew from Indo-China by the end of March nobody would be there to take its place. Diem had agreed not to take troops to the demilitarized zone. Lloyd said that he would request Dulles to influence Diem to accept the de facto obligations under the Agreement. Desai said that if arrangements for practical cooperation between the two zones were permitted by the South Vietnam Government, North Vietnam Government might be prepared to wait for formal elections.

8. Discussion then turned on Laos. In the Prime Minister's view whatever happened in Vietnam would affect the situation in North Laos. Control of the Royal Laotian Government over North Laos and political settlement between them and Pathet Lao would have to go together.

9. It was agreed that the situation in Cambodia was satisfactory.

10. Lloyd said that Eisenhower was as inflexible as Dulles on the question of recognition of China but was more flexible about trade relations with China. The British wanted to keep up the pressure on the United States. On the question of the offshore islands, Americans were not happy but Chiang Kai-shek was just inflexible.

11. The entire position was unreal, said the Prime Minister, and it flowed from non-recognition of China. This was coming in the way of a proper solution of the other problems. Mr Lloyd replied that according to the President if the US Government decided to recognise China, the Congress would immediately pass a resolution asking not only for the withdrawal of the US from the United Nations but also for the withdrawal of the United Nations from America.

12. The Prime Minister said that if the present situation continued, Formosa would collapse of itself. It had an aging army and, according to our information, the people of Formosa were themselves getting tired of the present situation.

13. Lloyd said that his impression was that the United States were not expecting an immediate attack on the offshore islands. Eisenhower's reasons for not recognising China were: the Chinese presence in Korea, American prisoners in China, and a recent statement of Chou En-lai that they would attack Formosa. Besides, he thought that the Americans would not take any new step in an election year.

14. ...The Prime Minister felt that the Chinese were very keen on Foreign Ministers' meeting and from the American point of view meeting in an election year should not be a sign of weakness.

15-18. Lloyd and MacDonald stated the British policy on Malaya and expressed fears about the Singapore Chinese community. The Foreign Secretary spoke about the possibilities of a federation of Singapore and Malaya and its union with Indonesia.

On disarmament, Lloyd said that the question of nuclear weapons must be studied further and the British, having made the nuclear bombs, were keen on testing them experimentally. He said that any control plan would have to combine Eisenhower's proposal of an "open sky" and Bulganin's proposal of "control from fixed points."

19. Asked about his talks with the Shah of Iran during his visit to India, the Prime Minister said that he had had only a broad discussion with the Shah. The latter spoke of the Russian menace etc. The Baghdad Pact was not discussed....

20. On Cyprus, Lloyd said that they could reach an agreement immediately if Makarios'² Prime Ministership for fifteen years was guaranteed.³ It was not, however, possible to give any such guarantee.

21-27. Asked by the Prime Minister whether there was any danger of a clash between the Israelis and the Arabs, Mr Selwyn Lloyd said that the British did not think that there was a serious danger of Israel attacking immediately and in the event of a clash it would be extraordinarily difficult to decide which party would start the attack. He also spoke on Glubb Pasha's dismissal, armament of the Middle East area, and land link between Egypt and Jordan.

28. The Prime Minister said that solution of all the major problems depended in the final analysis on the relations between major powers. In his view, the present circumstances seemed favourable to an understanding among these powers. If the background of conflict was removed, other problems would fall in their places.

29. Mr Selwyn Lloyd said that they were all upset by the arms deal between Egypt and Czechoslovakia. The Prime Minister said that one could expect this if the process of undermining each other went on among the big powers.

2. Archbishop Makarios III (1913-1977); Archbishop and Ethnarch in Cyprus; supported revolutionary armed struggle for self-determination led by National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters, lasting 1955-59; exiled in 1956; returned to Cyprus, March 1959; elected President of Cyprus in 1959 and took up official duties when Cyprus became a Republic in 1960; reelected, 1968, 1973.

3. For details on Cyprus problem, see *post*, p. 439.

30. Lloyd said that the communist countries were coming in increasing measure into Africa and trying to spread their influence in Addis Ababa and Libya.

31. The Prime Minister thought that, broadly speaking, geography was in favour of the USSR. It was a game of moving in a bigger place. The basic fact was that nobody wanted a big war. The new forces set in by atomic bombs, etc., had to be met in a different way. This involved some adjustment among the powers themselves. Asked whether the Russians believed in non-interference, the Prime Minister said that he would not give any guarantee on behalf of the Russians, but there was an advantage in tying them to their statements in their countries and in other countries. There was a widespread desire everywhere for the avoidance of large-scale conflict. Meantime China was getting industrially strong and if she acquired the strength with a background of conflict, it would be a very serious thing. The Korean war helped the Chinese to organise and consolidate themselves more than anything else. The surprising thing was that the Chinese themselves were not worried about their population increase.

32. Lloyd said that the general feeling of relaxation and hopes at the summit conference in June were dashed in October when the Russian leaders were entirely negative in their discussion on Germany.

33. The discussion then turned on the Russian leaders' visit to India.⁴ The Prime Minister told the British Foreign Secretary how he had discussions with them frankly about the activities of the Communist party in India. Mr Selwyn Lloyd said that the British were worried about the Russian interference in Sudan. The Prime Minister said that in India the Government could meet the communists on their own ground because they were able to show results and were in touch with the people. The difference between India and Pakistan was that the people in power in Pakistan had no touch with the masses. In fact most of them were opposed to the freedom movement in the old days. On the other hand, Burma was able to meet the communists because U Nu and others had the support of the people.

4. For Bulganin's and Khrushchev's visit to India in November and December 1955 see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 31, pp. 299-365.

2. Conversation with Selwyn Lloyd—II¹

I had about an hour and a quarter's talk with Selwyn Lloyd after dinner tonight. We discussed SEATO and the Baghdad Pact at some length, and I explained to him how these pacts had done very little good and a lot of harm. I need not repeat my reasons. He said that so far as SEATO was concerned, they were practically driven into it by the US and a chain of circumstances, and they went there with the object of toning it down and keeping Chiang Kai-shek out of it.

2. I pointed out to him the obvious consequences of the Baghdad Pact which had been unfortunate from the UK point of view. It had brought no security or strength in that region. Instead, it had given an excuse to the Soviet Government to interfere.

3. In this connection, I went on to talk about Pakistan's connection with these pacts, as this was of particular interest to us. I discussed the US military aid to Pakistan also and the fact that there had been ever growing supplies and equipment coming in during the last few months. This was a matter of grave concern to us. Having regard to the unstable conditions in Pakistan, no one could say what developments might take place there and who might be in charge, and even if those in charge were peaceful, they might be pushed into some adventure. In fact, fairly responsible people talked with some glee of what they would do about a year hence when they could speak to us from strength.

4. I referred to the exodus from East Bengal, the Nekowal incident, the Chhad Bet incident and the frequent border incidents.

5. He asked me rather hesitantly about Kashmir. I gave him a brief account of happenings during the last two or three years since I saw Mohammad Ali and Iskander Mirza.² I told him of the offer I had made to these people, that is, of recognising the status quo with such minor modifications as might be agreed to. There the matter stood. It was obvious that the old line of approach to this problem had failed and was not likely to succeed in the future. Meanwhile, all kinds of developments had taken place, and positions had become stabilised.

1. Note to Secretary General, MEA, New Delhi, 4 March 1956. File No. HC(s)-37/56, MEA. Also available in JN Collection.

2. For minutes of Nehru's talks with Mohammad Ali and Iskandar Mirza on 17 May 1955, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 28, pp. 260-263.

Any major change might result in upsets and upheavals and large numbers of refugees in India and in Pakistan. That itself would create grave trouble and actually worsen our relations with Pakistan. He asked me if we could not deal with this question of Kashmir after the fashion of Trieste, where repeated attempts were made and ultimately succeeded. That was a remarkable and unexpected success. I said that the Trieste problem was solved by some kind of a partition.³ That is exactly what I had suggested myself.

6. I referred to Goa and to the Portuguese intransigence and the difficulties of our situation in view of strong feelings in our people. I mentioned Dulles's statement, and drew attention particularly to the state of Indian prisoners there and to the report of the Egyptian Second Secretary who had visited Goa.

7. I then talked about the Gnat and the Canberra and the possibility of our buying the Soviet IL 28. I gave him a brief account of how this question came up before us after our Air Marshal⁴ visited the Soviet Union at Marshal Zhukov's⁵ invitation, and how we discussed this matter with Malcolm MacDonald. As a result of that, some improvements had been made in the Canberra. The Gnat contract was on the point of being finalised. Nevertheless, we felt that we should get some of the IL 28s, probably a squadron. They were liked by our Air people. There was quick delivery and the price was relatively reasonable. The quick delivery particularly was important. I said that I realised the desire of the British to preserve their secrets of the new devices, etc., and of the Gnat. There was no reason why any Russian technicians should have access to them, and we would see to it that they do not. These technicians would only come, to begin with, with the aircraft and probably after three or four weeks' stay here, return. All this would happen long before the Canberras came here. There was, thus, no reason to be concerned about the security aspect. For us, this was a purely commercial transaction, and we had gone some distance in this matter, though nothing had been finalised yet. We wanted, therefore, to finalise the Gnat contract, to buy a number of Canberras and also a squadron of IL 28s.

8. Selwyn Lloyd only expressed some concern about the security aspect and asked me if it would be possible to keep away the Russians from the Gnat and the Canberra. I told him that this appeared to me to be quite possible and,

3. For details on Trieste, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 27, p. 43.

4. Subrato Mukerji.

5. G.K. Zhukov was the Minister for Defence, USSR.

indeed, we can make sure of that. He then asked me if he could report this matter to his colleagues in London. I said, of course he could do so.

9. I then referred to the delivery of Centurian tanks. He said that, in December 1954, as Minister of Supplies, he had come to an arrangement to supply two hundred Centurian tanks to us. What had happened to them? I said I did not know anything about these two hundred. I imagined that they had not come at all. At the present moment, we are interested in a much smaller number coming soon, and the maximum number I had heard of was fifty. He said that he was seeing our Secretary General tomorrow and, perhaps, he could give him further information about these tanks.

10. Please, therefore, find out the facts about these tanks so that you might inform Mr Selwyn Lloyd about them. In case the question arises, you can assure him about our security arrangements in regard to the Gnat and the Canberra.

11. Please inform the Defence Secretary⁶ of this talk.

12. Generally speaking, our talk was friendly and frank, and one had the impression, (which he confirmed), that in spite of our differences of opinion in regard to some matters, our basic approaches were not far apart and there was much in common. We can at least talk in the frankest manner with each other.

6. M.K. Vellodi.

3. Conversations with J.F. Dulles¹

I have sent separately a brief note about Vietnam.²

2. Our conversations lasted in all for over five and a half hours in the course of two days, March 9th and 10th. This was apart from our meeting in company and at meals. The conversations were held with no one else present.

3. These conversations covered a very large field and many subjects.¹ Much of the talk tended to be rather theoretical, that is, the basic approach to world problems generally and, more especially, in relation to communist countries. The two or three points I had specially in mind were: the recent SEATO Council Meeting in Karachi where a reference was made to Kashmir, the US military aid to Pakistan, and the question of Goa with special reference to Mr Dulles's. I have little doubt that Mr Dulles also had these matters in mind and knew how much importance we attach to them. Nevertheless, no reference was made to these problems till the end of the first day's conversations. On the second day, they were dealt with more fully.

4. Mr Dulles started by a reference to the Near East and to the Baghdad Pact and recent developments in Israel, Egypt³, Jordan, etc. His main thesis was that the communist countries were out to create trouble and, secondly, that the United Kingdom had made a very bad mess there. He assured me repeatedly that he did not like the idea of the Baghdad Pact at all and, in fact, had advised the UK Government against any such moves. It was true that the USA believed in regional pacts for defence against Soviet aggression and having several tiers

1. Note on talks with Dulles, New Delhi, 10 March 1956. JN Collection. Also available in S. Dutt Papers, NMML.
2. For the note on Vietnam, see *ante*, pp. 350-351.
3. Egypt had been acquiring arms from Czechoslovakia since September 1955 after her negotiations with the West for the same had failed as they wanted Egypt to join the military pacts. A new Constitution was promulgated on 16 January 1956 providing for a presidential republican system. It also contained two new notions—that Egypt was an Arab nation, and that the State was committed to economic planning and social welfare. For Aswan Dam, a loan of \$ 56 million from the US and \$ 14 million from Britain was announced in December 1955. World Bank also signed an agreement with Egypt for \$ 200 million in January 1956, carrying the usual stipulation of Bank's supervision of the budget of the recipient country.

of defence. But it had not been in favour of the particular lines of action that the UK Government had adopted in the Near East and which had landed them into a hopeless muddle. He drew a very dark picture of the difficulties facing the UK Government. The United Kingdom depended for its very life on the oil resources, foreign exchange and many other matters, of the Near East. If they were deprived of this, their whole structure would collapse and they would become a second or third rate power. The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom was, therefore, begging the USA to come to their help and support the Baghdad Pact fully and, thus, possibly retrieve this position somewhat. The USA Government was put in an embarrassing position but, in the final analysis, they could not allow the UK to go to pieces and, therefore, they would have to come to their help in some form or other.

5. Mr Dulles also referred to French policy in North Africa and various other places, notably Indo-China, as thoroughly misconceived. This had created enormous difficulties for France and, again, the burden fell on the USA to help them out. In fact, Mr Dulles took up the position of a weary Titan trying to do good to the world but being let down by his own allies and having to go to their rescue repeatedly. He pointed out that the USA was opposed to colonialism and stood in favour of freedom and democracy. But they had to stand by their allies and it was not easy to solve any difficult problem by enunciation of principles only. Privately, the USA often gave strong advice to their allies but publicly they had to support them.

6. He referred to Israel and Egypt and the very dangerous and explosive situation that existed there. This was far the most dangerous situation at present in the world, and there was a possibility of war. The communists' supply of arms to Egypt had reversed the balance as between Egypt and Israel. Egypt was fairly strong now and could challenge Israel, and after some time is likely to go stronger still. Israel was alarmed at this prospect and, therefore, there was the urge on the part of Israel to have a war soon. Later, Egypt would be so strong as to crush Israel within a few days. The USA was much concerned about this situation, and there was a strong feeling in America in favour of the Jews. All this trouble had arisen principally because of communist interference and partly by British mismanagement of the situation.

7. In the Far East, the question of Taiwan and the off-shore islands was also a difficult and dangerous one, but he did not himself think that this was as explosive as the Near East situation. I gave him a copy of the message we had

received from Premier Chou En-lai,⁴ and we discussed the position in the Far East for some little time. I pointed out that the real difficulty arose from the totally unrealistic attitude of the USA in not recognising the People's Government of China. The danger chiefly arose from the occupation of Quemoy and Matsu by Chiang Kai-shek, supported by the USA. If Quemoy and Matsu became part of the mainland, then the Taiwan issue, though continuing to be important, would not raise any immediate problem of magnitude. It could be dealt with at some leisure. But it was impossible for any Government to tolerate the existence of strong and hostile forces within ten miles of the mainland, and continuous bombardment going on.

8. He mentioned the talks going on between the Ambassadors in Geneva and various proposals for a declaration of renunciation of force. Such an absolute declaration was difficult. In this connection, he casually mentioned the difficulty we would have in renouncing force completely in the case of Goa.

9. We discussed this Far Eastern situation for some time, but I need not go into any details here. I referred, in this connection, to the favourable atmosphere after the Indo-China agreements at Geneva, to our meeting at Bandung and the general attitude of Premier Chou En-lai. Now the starting of the SEATO had vitiated this good atmosphere, without doing any good to anything.

10. Mr Dulles asked me for my appraisal of the new line taken by the Twentieth Communist Congress. I gave him rather a full answer in the course of which I referred to my visits to the Soviet Union,⁵ to China,⁶ and the visit of

4. On 2 March 1956, Chou En-lai sent a message through the Indian Ambassador in China, to Nehru stating Chinese views on some current international questions. With regard to Sino-American talks Chou En-lai said that there were two questions: (a) implementation of agreement on nationals where "her sincerity about sending Chinese nationals back is doubtful"; and (b) declaration of peaceful settlement of disputes for which discussion had been going on since October 1955. Chou En-lai elaborated on these points and said: "This question will have important bearing on Far East situation this year and on developments from now onwards. India has been most helpful and we appreciate her good offices for improving relations between China and USA. I would like Prime Minister Nehru to know real state of Chinese views when he meets Lloyd and Dulles."
5. For Nehru's visit to the USSR in June 1955, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 29, pp. 201-232.
6. For Nehru's visit to China in October 1954, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 27, p. 393.

Chou En-lai⁷ and the Soviet leaders to India. The impression I had got in the Soviet Union was definitely that a change had come over there and conditions were becoming gradually normal. In fact, this process would have started earlier but for Stalin. Also, that the visit of Bulganin and Khrushchev to India and to China⁸ had produced a considerable effect on them. This was practically the first time they had come out of the Communist circle of countries. They had seen a country and a people which were different from them and yet friendly to them and wanted to work out their own destiny. To some extent, I thought that this also was a factor in influencing a change in Communist policy. I attached importance to the decisions of the Twentieth Congress. The Communists were attached a great deal to ideological and theoretical expressions of policy. Any person who did not agree with their thesis, was supposed to be a heretic or an enemy. It was, therefore, a very important development that they had given up this narrow dogmatic attitude and had accepted various changes which would have been unthinkable previously.

11. Mr Dulles said that he agreed with me broadly about the new trends in the Communist countries but he imagined that it would take sometime, possibly a generation, before they could have full effect. I replied that the tempo of everything now was much faster and, given the chance, I had no doubt that these changes in Russia would be swift and would lead to far-reaching consequences. It must be remembered that Russia had had for many years the feeling of being surrounded by enemies and in a state of siege. This produced certain reactions there. Mr Dulles said that at the Four Powers Summit Conference⁹ a friendly approach was made and it appeared to have good consequences, but the Russians went back on it later. In America, there was much criticism of President Eisenhower, and it was said that he had gone too far in making the Communists appear "respectable". I said that, surely, the mere fact that you treat others in the right way and presume respectability, itself produced respectable behaviour on the other side. Mr Dulles said that there was much in that.

7. For Chou En-lai's visit to India in June 1954, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 26, pp. 365-415.

8. Bulganin, Khrushchev and Mikoyan visited China from 29 September to 11 October 1954.

9. A Four Powers Summit Conference of Heads of Governments was held at Geneva from 18 and 23 July 1955 to discuss German unification, European security, disarmament and East-West contacts.

12. So, we discussed at length the broad approaches to world problems and I put forward my views in regard to them. Mr Dulles did not repudiate all that I said, but brought in the time element and also the need for maintaining strength to meet the wiles of the communist countries. I said that every country had to maintain its strength but, in view of the new situation when war was practically ruled out, it had become essential to try peaceful approaches and to recognise facts as they were.

13. I laid considerable stress on the harm done by regional pacts and pointed out that, to my knowledge, SEATO had done good to nobody and had not even strengthened the defences against communism, if that was the aim. The real strength lay in the United States. That was not increased by these odd attachments and pacts. The only result was frightening the opposite party and encouraging it to create trouble. Anyhow, it had surprised us exceedingly how SEATO could extend itself to Kashmir or to Afghanistan. This was clearly ultra vires even of the declared purposes of SEATO.

14. Mr Dulles said that Pakistan really should have no place in SEATO, geographically and otherwise. But other people wanted it there. So, he had agreed. In regard to Kashmir, he said that he did not bring this forward at the Karachi meeting. In fact, he was the last to speak, when others had supported it, and all he said was really to repeat the US attitude in regard to Kashmir.

15. I dealt with the Kashmir question briefly and told him how difficult Pakistan had been. The law was on our side, and also facts. Nevertheless, we had tried to settle this peacefully. Our attempts failed. Yet, we were continuing these attempts when the question of military aid to Pakistan came in. That changed the situation completely and encouraged Pakistan to become more and more aggressive and intransigent. Years had passed since the Kashmir trouble began. We could not hang on and do nothing. So, we had gone ahead with the election of the Constituent Assembly there which had framed the Constitution and enacted land laws and the like, and made tremendous improvements in Kashmir. On the other side, there was chaos and misery. We were bound up with Kashmir by Constitutional provisions which we could not set aside without the consent of the Kashmir Constituent Assembly.

16. At this stage came this open association of the SEATO Council with Pakistan. In other words, a military alliance now supported Pakistan. This had given us a great shock and we cannot possibly accept this position or submit to it.

17. In connection with US military aid to Pakistan, I told Mr Dulles that we had been put in a very difficult position. We had, in the past few years, tried to

reduce our army and had done so to some extent. Our armour was old and not adequate and now the Pakistan army was being enlarged and provided with the latest type of armour in large quantities and plenty of new aircraft were coming. All this made tremendous difference in our relative strength. We had received full details of the supplies to Pakistan. In Mr Dulles' opinion, this might not be much because America thought in terms of millions and billions. But, from our point of view, this was a very large addition to Pakistan's military strength.

18. In the context of the Kashmir resolution of the SEATO Council, all this meant that a powerful military alliance was at the back of Pakistan in regard to Kashmir. This may not be the purpose of the SEATO or of the US, but that was the obvious result. We were compelled to think in terms of adding to our defence strength. This was going to be a great burden on us. So far as our people were concerned, they had reacted very strongly to these developments.

19. Mr Dulles assured me that the US never thought of doing any harm to India and they had taken expressive guarantees from Pakistan. I replied that I did not doubt the motives of the US Government or people, but I did not think that any guarantees would have the slightest effect on Pakistan. We had enough experience of their behaviour and we were constantly having incidents on the border. I mentioned the Nekowal incident.

20. I told Mr Dulles also about the continuing migrations from East Bengal to India which not only indicated what policy the Pakistan Government and officers were pursuing, but cast a very great burden on us. This kind of thing was continuing and we might well have to accept additional millions from Pakistan. The Pakistan Government, apart from being very narrow-minded and liable to be pushed about by bigoted elements, was very irresponsible. They could think only in military terms and hardly in terms of political and economic advance. We could not take the risk of being unprepared for any aggressive action by Pakistan.

21. Mr Dulles had little to say except to assure me that the US would never permit any attack on India.

22. In this connection, I mentioned to Mr Dulles that we had thought of purchasing aircraft IL 28 from Russia. I gave him the background of this. I told him that this was a pure business transaction for us and involved no commitment or attention of Soviet technicians here. I could understand the security aspect of it and we would take care of it. Mr Dulles replied that he could not prevent us from exercising our discretion in this matter. But undoubtedly any purchase by us of Soviet aircraft would create a strong and adverse reaction in the US.

23. I mentioned Goa and gave him a very brief background of our attempts to deal with the Portuguese and how we had restrained our people at the height of excitement and thus taken an unpopular step which few governments would have dared to take. Meanwhile, the Portuguese continued to behave in a most indecent manner. I mentioned the prisoners they had and the conditions of the prisoners. Goa was a matter in regard to which there was intense feeling in India and it was in this context that Mr Dulles made his joint statement with the Foreign Minister of Portugal.¹⁰ He could well appreciate the reaction in India.

24. Mr Dulles assured me that his chief anxiety was not to say anything which might hurt us. What the Foreign Minister of Portugal had suggested was something very much worse which was turned down repeatedly. He mentioned also that he took care to consult his advisers. In particular, he mentioned Mr Allen¹¹ who had dealt with this matter, and finally passed the statement he made¹². I pointed out that this indicated how poor was the advice he got in regard to India, because anyone knowing the least bit about India would have known the consequences of such a statement. It was clear to me that the Portuguese could not remain in Goa. Mr Dulles broadly agreed. Mr Dulles then asked me what he could do. I said that the least he could do was to make it clear to the Portuguese that they had to get out of Goa. If the Portuguese were told by the leading powers that they could not stay on in India, it would be much easier for us to deal with them.

25. I spoke also of the state of slavery and enforced labour in the Portuguese colony of Angola and pointed out that it was difficult to deal with a people whose outlook belonged to the middle ages and to the time of papal bulls.

26. This is rather a brief account of the long talks we had. Of course, much was said which I have not mentioned here.

10. For Dulles-Cunha joint statement on 2 December 1955 on Goa and India's reaction to it, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 31, pp. 423-434.

11. George V. Allen, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs.

12. In a communication to the US Ambassador Cooper on 19 December 1955, Dulles wrote: "I did, however, feel that we could properly criticize the campaign to promote hatred which was being waged by the Soviet rulers in India and Burma.... I asked Livic Merchant and George Allen to work out the communique with Cunha and I wanted to take nothing that George Allen did not approve of.... The communique, of course, made no criticism...of India, nor did it take any position.... The same can hardly be said of the joint communique which Nehru published with Bulganin and Khrushchev...as to the merits of the Goa controversy.... We try to give India 'most favored nation' treatment. But we cannot have all our foreign relations in effect dictated by the Government of India."

4. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon¹

I have had very long talks with Dulles over a large variety of subjects. He began with the situation in Near East, especially Israel and Egypt, and considered it the most dangerous and explosive situation in the world today. He criticised British policy which had landed them in this mess, and of course the communist countries for interfering by sending arms. He said that while he was certainly in favour of regional defence organisations, he was opposed to the Baghdad Pact and had advised against it. Unfortunately the British followed a different course. He drew a very dark picture of the United Kingdom's dire plight now and said that they were pleading with him to come to their help by supporting the Baghdad Pact fully. Although he did not agree with their policy, he could not desert a friend and ally.

2. He asked me for my reactions to recent Twentieth Congress of Communist Party and to my general impressions of the Soviet Union after my tour. I told him that I was much impressed by what I saw in the Soviet Union and I believed that Bulganin and Khrushchev were much impressed by India. I had no doubt in my mind that there had been a marked change in policy in the Soviet Union and, given the chance, they would develop along more normal lines. But they were frightened of the countries hostile to them and, therefore, could not relax as they otherwise might. Dulles agreed about the significance of changes and trends in the Soviet Union and the gradual approach to normality. But he said that he disagreed with me about the pace of change and this might well take a generation.²

3. We discussed China, Taiwan and Indo-China. I explained to him our viewpoints fully and he explained his difficulties.

4. I spoke strongly about SEATO and more particularly its recent reference to Kashmir, and US military aid to Pakistan. Also about Goa and Dulles' statement. He tried to explain all this in his usual way, but he realised strength

1. New Delhi, 10 March 1956. JN Collection.

2. Nehru telegraphed to Krishna Menon on 11 March that he told Dulles about the probable purchase of aircrafts from the USSR which was to be purely a business transaction and would not involve presence of any Soviet technicians here. Nehru wrote: "This shook him greatly. While not denying our right to make these purchases, he pleaded with me not to take this step as this would upset people in United States."

of feeling here on these issues. Indeed he told me later that he had no idea that there was so much fear in India about the arming of Pakistan.

5. This is a brief account of long and frank conversations.³

6. Dulles brought with him a letter from Eisenhower inviting me to visit him for a few days informally just to talk to him quietly away from Washington with no other engagements.⁴ He suggested my going there about the time of Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference. I feel that it is difficult to refuse this invitation in the manner it is put. I think it will be better for me to go to him immediately after Commonwealth Conference for three or four days. I have not yet given a formal answer, but have indicated that I shall try to meet the President's wishes in this matter.⁵

3. Nehru also wrote to Padmaja Naidu on 10 March: "Yesterday and today I spent five and a half hours in no-silent commune with Mr Dulles. There was no one else with us. This is apart from the time we have spent at dinners, etc. I found this extraordinarily fatiguing. He is leaving tonight. The most that we can expect out of his visit here is that he has got some idea into his rather closed head, as to what we feel about various things."
4. Eisenhower wrote on 1 March 1956 that he would like to discuss with Nehru "a number of matters of importance to our countries, and, I believe, to the world situation."
5. Nehru accepted the invitation on 17 March to visit USA from 6 to 11 July after the conclusion of the Commonwealth Conference. Eisenhower, in a message received by Nehru on 20 March, offered to make his Presidential plane available for Nehru.

5. On Conversation with J.F. Dulles—I¹

In the course of my conversation with Mr Dulles this morning, I told him that I would have to make a statement in Parliament within a few days.² This would deal more particularly with the recent SEATO Council meeting in Karachi and their reference to Kashmir and the joint statement issued by Mr Dulles and Portuguese Foreign Minister on Goa. I had previously practically given an assurance that I would place the correspondence which I had had with the State Department on the table of the House. I had delayed doing so in view of Mr Dulles' coming here. I would, therefore, like now to place that correspondence before Parliament.

2. Mr Dulles said that he thought it was perhaps inevitable that this should be done, although it would not produce a good effect. Anyhow, he would mention this to or consult Ambassador Cooper.³

3. This evening, at the Garden Party at the American Embassy, Mr Dulles mentioned to me that he had not realised previously that India had really some fear about Pakistan's military strength growing and being used against her. Evidently, partly my talks and partly the questions at the Press Conference⁴ might have made him realise to some extent.⁵

1. Note to Secretary General, Foreign Secretary and Commonwealth Secretary, MEA, New Delhi, 10 March 1956. JN Collection.
2. For Nehru's statement in Parliament, see *post*, pp. 505-513.
3. John Sherman Cooper, US Ambassador in India.
4. At a press conference at Rashtrapati Bhavan on 10 March 1956, Dulles was asked questions on the implications of the SEATO statement in regard to Kashmir, possibility of an arms race in the region, steps to check improper use of the US arms supplied to Pakistan which was still in a "ceasefire" state with India, whether atomic weapons were supplied to the SEATO countries, US policy of arming Pakistan which might compel India to go the "Egyptian way" for security concerns, and increase in border raids by Pakistan since the arms supply. Frank Moraes, eminent journalist, in a private interview after the press conference, told Dulles that by supplying arms to Pakistan, the US Government had compelled India to step up her own military equipment and power when she needed every rupee for economic development.
5. Dulles' response was: "I do not see any reason why it should lead to an arms race...the United States has taken every precaution to see that it will not lead to such a threat...under our mutual security legislation, we are not allowed to give arms to any country except on the basis of sound, formal assurance that those arms will not be used for any aggressive purposes. That principle is worked out in our agreement...." Regarding border raids, he said: "I have no idea, that fact has not been brought to my attention in any official way."



WITH SELWYN LLOYD, FOREIGN SECRETARY OF UK,
NEW DELHI, 3 MARCH 1956



WITH CHRISTIAN PINEAU, FOREIGN MINISTER OF FRANCE,
NEW DELHI, 11 MARCH 1956

4. He asked me about the possibility of my accepting President Eisenhower's invitation to go to the States. He said it would be a good thing if I could go there for three or four days.

5. The manner of President Eisenhower's invitation, that is that I could pay a brief informal visit chiefly for talks with him and for no other purpose, makes it a little difficult for me not to accept it. I think, therefore, that I shall have to accept this. I have not given my answer yet and I have told Mr Dulles that I shall send this answer fairly soon.

6. Obviously, the only time I can go to the United States is in connection with the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting in June-July. I can go there either before the meeting or immediately after. I am inclined to think that it will perhaps be better if I went immediately after and spent three to four days in the United States. If I do this, I would have to postpone my visit to Bonn etc., by about three days. I should like to mention this to some of my colleagues in the Cabinet also and then we can send a formal answer.

7. I enclose a copy of President Eisenhower's letter to me.⁶

6. See the preceding item.

6. On Conversation with J.F. Dulles—II¹

As I have told you, I mentioned to Mr Dulles that I have to make a statement in Parliament. In this connection, I said that I would be expected to lay copies of our correspondence on Goa on the table of the House. Mr Dulles was not very happy about this matter, but he said that, perhaps, it could not be helped. He added that he would consult or speak to Ambassador Cooper. After that, he said nothing to me before his departure. You might, perhaps, ask Ambassador Cooper about this matter. You can tell him that sometime back, I had indicated in Parliament that I would place this correspondence before them. That is the usual course. It would be embarrassing for me not to do so now. We had postponed this with some difficulty because Mr Dulles was coming here. Now, there is no further reason for postponement.

2. As you know, I gave a copy of Mr Chou En-lai's message to Dulles.² As he was leaving my house yesterday morning, he was on the point of giving me a paper which, I think, was some kind of a reply or note on Chou En-lai's message. I did not see it myself. Mr Dulles was rather hesitant to give it to me then, although it was meant for me, because he said that he had not read it himself. I suggested to him that he might read it and give it to me later in the afternoon. No such paper was given to me later. Was it given to you?

1. Note to Secretary General and Foreign Secretary, New Delhi, 11 March 1956. JN Collection.

2. See *ante*, p. 377.

7. Conversation with Christian Paul Francis Pineau¹

M. Pineau extended an invitation to the Prime Minister on behalf of his Government to visit France. Nehru thanked him but said that he did not know when he could pay the visit since he would be extremely busy during the next few months.

2. The Prime Minister told M. Pineau that he had read his (M. Pineau's) speeches at Karachi and elsewhere with much interest. The Prime Minister appreciated the tone of M. Pineau's approach to the problems. This appeared to be quite flexible. In the Prime Minister's view there could be no security in the world under the shadow of the hydrogen bomb. The only possible security could come from good relations between the countries and lack of tension. It was now generally recognised that war in the present age would be a disastrous thing for all and must be avoided. If war must be avoided, everything that led to tension in the world must also be avoided. Cold war had no meaning if it could not be followed by a hot war. It was true that every country had to be vigilant but the best protection for a country lay in good relations with other countries. The Prime Minister, therefore, thought that the general approach suggested by M. Pineau was the right approach. There was, he said, a conflict between the Eastern powers and the Western Powers. There was great ferment all over Asia. This was exercising a good deal of influence on the course of world events. An impartial appraisal of the new and the old forces was necessary and an attempt had to be made to give the right direction to these forces. Such right direction could be two fold. In the first place tension had to be relaxed. It was true that some problems were very difficult but they had to be solved. China was a new force which was developing in the world. This fact has to be recognised and a policy that was based on non-recognition of this fact was unsound. Looking quite objectively at the situation one might dislike a particular thing but if one was not strong enough to push it away it was childish to make faces at it. If it were said that there should be no war, countries should cease to make faces at each other.

1. Record of conversation with Christian Pineau, the French Foreign Minister, New Delhi, 11 March 1956. S. Dutt Papers, NMML. Also present at the meeting were Stanislas Ostrorog, French Ambassador in India; Jean-Henri Daridan, Chief of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat; and S. Dutt, Foreign Secretary, Government of India. Pineau's remarks have been summarized.

3. The Prime Minister then referred to his tour of China and Soviet Russia and to the visit of Mr Bulganin and Mr Khrushchev to India and Burma. His visit to Russia helped the Prime Minister to understand a little more of the Soviet problem. He had no doubt that Bulganin and Khrushchev also understood more of the problems of India and Burma as a result of their visit to these two countries. What they saw in India had impressed them greatly. They had seen the developments in India in the economic and other fields. They also noticed that we were reacting kindly to friendship. They were good enough to admit that they had been misled in the past about India and had now had to revise their opinion. Prime Minister's own impression of the USSR was that (1) there was desire for peace among the peoples and the leaders, and (2) there was desire to settle down and lead a normal existence. The Prime Minister told Mr Bulganin and Mr Khrushchev that India was now more friendly with the UK and France because problems with them had been settled. India disliked many things in the Colonies but did not shout about them publicly. "We speak to them privately", Prime Minister said, "because we do not want to irritate them". On the last day of his visit to India Mr Khrushchev said, "We want to be friendly with you but not to separate you from your other friends. We want to be friends with your friends". "Friendly approach always paid", said the Prime Minister. One has to be strong but friendly approach embarrasses the opponent and produces in him a friendly response. When a war is considered impossible, a half-war approach was foolish. Fear might be allayed by friendly intercourse and curb on one's language.

4. The Prime Minister was asked by Mr Dulles about his reaction to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR. The Prime Minister thought that the Soviet leaders' opinion that changes could be brought about by peaceful means and parliamentary methods was bound to have a good effect. There appeared to be a desire in the USSR to return to normal and to relax the present tension and the USSR would respond to every friendly gesture. The Prime Minister then mentioned the similarity between the US and the USSR: both worship technology; both were very hospitable and emotional. In fact, speaking quite personally, the Prime Minister said that he was afraid at the distant prospect of the United States and USSR coming to an agreement and sitting on the rest of the world!

5. The discussion then turned on different forms of socialism and the conflict between centralisation and individual freedom. The Prime Minister pointed out that a large number of people in USSR had now become literate. Although literature in Russia was slightly regimented, the people read the old classics. It was bound to make some difference when the people had become literary-minded

even though most of them were technically-minded too. The majority of the people now in the USSR had grown up under the post-revolutionary influence. They knew no other system except their own regime. There was some criticism of the lack of freedom and lack of consumer goods. The Prime Minister felt that progressively there would be more individual freedom. The more there was tension in Europe the more the USSR would insist on control over Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and other neighbouring countries. "If you want to improve conditions in the USSR", the Prime Minister said, "you must reduce tension".

The Prime Minister said that Mr Dulles had agreed with him about the general approach to normalisation in the USSR but this process, according to Mr Dulles, was a long-term one and some short-term solution had therefore to be found. M. Pineau said that he found more reticence in Selwyn Lloyd than in Dulles in approach to the Russians.

Draft Treaty

6. Discussion then turned on the draft treaty received from the French Government on the *de jure* transfer of sovereignty over the former French establishments in India.² The Prime Minister said that he did not anticipate any difficulty although some verbal changes of a minor character might be necessary in the French draft. If the draft could be agreed on informally at this stage Parliamentary processes could be gone through later. M. Pineau pointed out the importance of a decision on the equivalence of the French degrees to the corresponding Indian degrees and diplomas.³ He mentioned that this question had been discussed in the Commission set up for the purpose but no agreement could be reached during the last eighteen months. The French have now submitted a new draft. The French Ambassador intervened at this stage to say that there would be no point in the French maintaining a college in Pondicherry if the degrees given by this college were not to be recognised by the Government of India. The French Government would therefore appreciate

2. A treaty formally ceding to India the former French settlements of Pondicherry, Karaikal, Mahe and Yanam was signed in New Delhi on 28 May 1956 by Nehru and Ostrorog. This treaty superseded the *de facto* agreement of 21 October 1954. Chandernagore had already been transferred *de facto* to India in 1952.
3. Under the treaty it was decided that the equivalence of French diplomas and degrees would be recognised by the Indian Government for admission to higher studies and administrative careers in India.

a more definite commitment about the acceptance of the equivalence recommended by the Commission than was contained in the draft. The Prime Minister remarked that if something had to be done it should be done gracefully and adequately. It was agreed that this question would be gone through further at the official level.

Supplies for the Defence Ministry

7. The Prime Minister read out a note from the Indian Defence Ministry about the supply of 18 Mystere aircraft from France. He requested that as on a former occasion these aircraft might be transported in a French aircraft carrier. M. Pineau promised to do whatever was possible.

Algeria and the French North Africa

8-14. Pineau discussed French policy towards Algeria and the French North-Africa in details and said that the French Government did not want to continue in Algeria but the solutions applicable to Tunisia and Morocco were not suitable for Algeria because of the absence of any parties or leaders truly representative of the people with whom the French Government could deal; and also due to economic, religious and other differences between the two ethnic communities of Europeans and Muslims. On Nehru's suggestion to work out a solution on the lines of India, Pineau commented that unlike India, there were two armed camps and 1.2 million Europeans in Algeria. The only way open to the French Government was restoration of public law and order, followed by free elections and negotiations with those elected.

15. The Prime Minister said that he could quite understand that the situation in Algeria was quite different from that in Tunisia and Morocco. No solution he admitted would be equitable if as a result a large population had to be pushed out. He also recognised that there were no real leaders among the Algerian Muslim population. Possibly free elections might throw up real leaders, but under present conditions, elections would not be free. The Muslims and the Europeans fear each other. Owing however to developments in Egypt and Morocco the Muslims were feeling strongly that they had been left out of the stream of freedom. The Prime Minister had no solution for the problem of Algeria. He would only say that delaying matters would make solution more difficult. There was a time element in this and the background of a nationalist urge could not be ignored. For the French Government it was a difficult situation. The best solution of course was a free and independent Algeria in which no

one section would control the other. Some sort of a regional solution might be admitted. The regions would be more or less independent. They would have common finance but a region would have autonomy in regard to certain subjects. The Prime Minister's point was that if there was no clearly defined objective, negotiations would become difficult. He referred in this connection to the national movement in India and how the British had made attempts to weaken the influence of this movement by encouraging communal elements, mainly Muslim. Ultimately, the British declared that they would not remain in the country beyond June 1948. That placed the burden of decision about the future of the country on the people of India. Even at that stage it might have been possible to avoid partition but the difficulties created by the British officials and to some extent by the then Viceroy Lord Wavell and the Indian States left no choice but to agree to Partition.

The people in Algeria were in touch with Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco. The Muslims in these countries encourage the Algerian Muslims. If some broad objective was laid down these countries might help in toning down the agitation.

Kashmir

16. Pineau confessed that he did not know enough about the Kashmir problem and said that he declined to discuss it in Karachi. However, since one of the parties to the SEATO insisted on raising the issue, it could not be completely ignored. He said that the French delegation had used its influence to see that the SEATO resolution emphasised economic matters. He felt that SEATO would not interfere in the Kashmir dispute against India and noticed that Dulles was also of the same view.

The Prime Minister pointed out that whatever the intentions, the reference to Kashmir against the background of Pakistan's general attitude and behaviour towards India and of US military assistance to Pakistan, could only cause deep resentment and grave concern in India. PM also pointed out the impropriety of any resolution on, or reference in one to, Kashmir when only one of the parties to the dispute, namely, Pakistan was present.

SEATO and Baghdad Pact

17. Pineau generally agreed with the Prime Minister's views on the international situation and particularly the adverse effects of these pacts on the international situation.

18. The Prime Minister said that while serious situation existed in various parts of the world, e.g., Israel, Indo-China, Taiwan, etc., he felt that following

the "summit conference" in Geneva last year, there had been a lessening of general tension in the world, even though the conference had decided nothing. For example, he had noticed a change in Soviet thinking. The present was, therefore, the time to take advantage of this trend and to push it. He felt that regional military pacts such as SEATO and the Baghdad Pact were a step back. The individual problems he had mentioned were all connected and they would become less dangerous if advantage was taken of the lessening of general tension.

19. India advocated the "Five Principles" to which a number of countries had given their adherence. Neither this nor the lessening of world tension meant that countries could afford to be less vigilant: India had a 2,000 mile frontier with China and had to maintain checkpoints along this. However, because, the two countries had accepted the Five Principles, it would be more difficult for either to go against them; an atmosphere conducive to right action and unfavourable to wrong had been created. The Prime Minister pointed out that India had communists, and as the USSR subscribed to the Five Principles, he told Mr Bulganin that the Communist Party of India carried out the orders of the USSR. Bulganin had, of course, denied this, but he knew that the Communist Party of India had been warned to behave better.

20. The Prime Minister felt that one must deliberately follow peaceful methods. There was no half way house between world peace and world conflict and a "cold war" had no meaning unless there was a prospect of a "hot war". Stress on military pacts was positively harmful, and he saw no good coming out of it. There was too much thinking in military terms which prevented the solution of even simple problems, such as the release of a few Americans from China and the repatriation from the USA of Chinese willing to return. Interminable talks had been going on in Geneva between representatives of the USA and China, but no settlement could be reached because the language used was one of threats.

21. The "cold war" approach made matters difficult, particularly as the big powers had what might be termed proteges. No one, for example, could conceive of Chiang Kai-shek's regime continuing for very long, even in Formosa, and Dulles had conceded this, but the USA was committed to Chiang. The Peking regime, on the other hand, was not going to be upset and would continue to gain in economic strength through Soviet assistance. It could not, and no Government could, tolerate two islands a few miles from its shores being controlled by hostile elements. A year and a half ago the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference had unanimously agreed that Quemoy and

Matsu should be evacuated.⁴ Nothing, however, could be done. Because the USA had certain ties, the British could say or do little.

22. There had been too much thinking along military lines. In the last five years, the history of USA diplomacy was not really one of success. The USA was powerful and strong and had had its way, but it had irritated the weak without any real gain. Not only had military thinking made US diplomacy less successful, but the USA and UK unfortunately backed the reactionary elements in Asia, e.g., Nuri Pasha in Iraq who had never moved out of the 19th century. This ignoring of the people was wrong and harmful and helped subversive elements in these countries. The USSR where too military thinking had played a great part had been much cleverer in the last year, and in many cases, e.g., Yugoslavia and Austria, had employed peaceful methods with success. Vis-à-vis the USA there was a general impression that it thought only in military terms.

Regional pacts such as SEATO, etc., were of little value from the military point of view, as indeed was military assistance. For example, what purpose was served by US military assistance to Pakistan? Did anyone believe that Pakistan was in danger of Soviet aggression? If war came, it would be fought in Europe or China.

Pineau expressed his general agreement; and volunteered that Afghanistan had perforce been made to turn towards the USSR.

The Prime Minister explained that there had been an economic blockade of Afghanistan by Pakistan, and Afghanistan which was a poor but not a communist country had been forced to get goods from the USSR.⁵

23. The Prime Minister then explained the dangers of military aid to Pakistan and its repercussions on India.

Indian independence was the result of a revolutionary but peaceful mass movement. The leaders of Pakistan did not grow from the mass movement. They had stressed the religious aspect. In fact, the people in power in Pakistan

4. The reference is to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference held from 31 January to 8 February 1955.

5. Being a landlocked country, Afghanistan had to depend on Pakistan for her trade with India. But Pakistan's differences with India, and with Afghanistan on Pakhtoonistan issue proved an obstacle. The closure of transit facilities through Pakistan increased the cost of transportation and necessitated diversion to other markets. The Soviet Union's share in the Afghan trade went up from 14% in 1950 to 30% in 1956, while despite the 1950 Treaty between India and Afghanistan, trade between them declined considerably.

today were those who had opposed freedom and the Pakistan Government was almost purely a "Service" Government. Furthermore, the Pakistan Government did not have a political or economic purpose or background, but was moved by a mentality which was adventurous and military, and even for internal government reliance was placed on the military. It had taken them nine years to produce a Constitution which had been so framed that the minorities felt they were relegated to a second class category of citizenship. This combined with economic stagnation, was driving nearly a thousand people of the minority community into India every day. Since Partition, out of a 12 million minority population in East Bengal, three million had come to India. If the present trend continued, the remaining nine million might come with grave problems for India to solve.

24. At the time of Partition the services in India had been divided roughly on the basis of 3 to 1 between India and Pakistan respectively. The Indian army then numbered about 4,50,000 and to divert funds for economic development, this had been reduced by 50,000 and it had been planned to reduce it by another 50,000. This, however, had not been possible. India had a long frontier to guard and the Pakistan army was growing. Mr Dulles had told the Prime Minister that it would soon be the same size as the Indian army. The Prime Minister pointed out that there would be one big difference between the two forces: the Indian army had old and outmoded equipment, while the Pakistan army was being equipped with the latest guns, aircraft, etc., and being made into a highly mechanised and mobile army.

25. Against whom was this army going to be used? Certainly, Pakistan had no reason to fear aggression from the USSR. While the Pakistan people were quite friendly, it was not unusual to hear the comment: "Wait till we are armed and then we will settle with you". Given the adventurous mentality prevalent in Pakistan and the fact that the people could be aroused on religious issues, US military assistance was dangerous and made difficult the solution of outstanding problems. In fact, the Prime Minister continued, had it not been for promises of such military aid, which encouraged the belligerent attitude of Pakistan, the Kashmir issue would have been solved long ago.

26. Apart from the grave concern aroused in India, such military growth in Pakistan inevitably meant that in India funds earmarked for economic development might have to be diverted, and this was against our main objective. India wanted peace with Pakistan and wished her prosperity. If the USA had given economic assistance to Pakistan that would have been of advantage not only to Pakistan but also to India. As it was, the military assistance given to Pakistan rendered, more or less, nugatory the \$ 50,000,000 assistance India

had received from the USA. It had had to be noted that this aid had never been asked for and accepted only because it had no strings attached to it.

Pineau asked whether PM thought that US military assistance would continue if Pakistan gave evidence of aggressive designs against India.

The Prime Minister pointed out that having once armed Pakistan, the USA would be able to do nothing if aggression did occur. Experience with Syngman Rhee had shown that once aggression occurred, post-mortem of it did not help.

Israel

27. Pineau said that the situation there was extremely difficult and dangerous. Both in the USA and in France powerful Jewish groups were pressurising the Government to give military assistance to Israel. The French position was all the more difficult because of some traditional friendships and responsibilities. Pineau, however, hoped that Nasser who was interested in the economic development of his country, would be a restraining influence upon the Arabs. He asked the Prime Minister whether Nasser whom he would see in Cairo would talk frankly to him, particularly about Algeria.

The Prime Minister said that Nasser was an honest and straightforward man, who would speak more frankly than most. He emphasised Egypt's importance as prime amongst the Arab countries and expressed his pleasure that M. Pineau was going there.

Vietnam

28. The Prime Minister explained India's position in Indo-China under the Geneva agreement and pointed out the difficulty that would arise in South Vietnam if French forces were completely withdrawn, as they had been responsible for the protection of the International Commission. South Vietnam refused to accept the responsibilities devolving upon them as the successor to the French Government, which had signed the Geneva Agreement, although it was only too happy to accept the benefits. At the same time, South Vietnam wanted the International Commission to continue. This created a very difficult position. Dulles too did not want the French to continue because the French did not approve of the head of the South Vietnam Government, but he wanted the French to leave a unit to protect the Commission.

Pineau said that the French had not been requested by Diem to leave any troops behind. The American materiel had been handed over to the national army in accordance with an agreement between General Collins and General

Ely.⁶ The balance they would hand over to the USA. He said that France was interested in the unification of Vietnam, and would soon be sending an Economic and Cultural Mission to Vietminh—they could not, of course, send a diplomatic mission. He hoped that this might be helpful.

The Prime Minister said that much of the American materiel must have been taken by various groups, thus making for disorder. Dulles had asked him whether sending about 300 people to make an inventory of materiel supplied by them would be a violation of the Geneva Agreement.⁷ The Prime Minister said he had not given a reply.

29. Pineau thanked the Prime Minister for India's intervention last December in the UN, which had helped the French Government.⁸

6. In December 1954, General Paul H.R. Ely, the then French High Commissioner in Indo-China, and General J. Lawton Collins, Eisenhower's personal emissary, reached an agreement in regard to the training, equipment, and armament of the young Vietnamese army.

7. See *ante*, pp. 350-351.

8. Following removal of the Algerian question from the agenda of the ongoing session of the UN General Assembly by a formula devised by Krishna Menon without implying any change in the attitudes of the parties concerned, the French delegation returned to the Assembly on 29 November 1955 after two months' absence.

8. Conversation with A.I. Mikoyan—I'

1-6. Mikoyan in the beginning discussed about the question of establishment of a direct Air Service between Moscow and Delhi via Kabul and then about his visit to Karachi before arriving in Delhi. Mikoyan said that during his talks with Pakistan authorities in Karachi, they wanted Soviet Government to say that they had made a mistake in making the declaration they made on Kashmir. He told them that no mistake had been made and he fully confirmed the statements on Kashmir made by Bulganin and Khrushchev. He also told them that Pakistan's disputes with India and Afghanistan should be settled by the parties themselves lest imperialistic powers took advantage of the situation. Mikoyan also spoke about his discussions with the Pakistan authorities on the Pakhtoonistan issue, Pakistan's position as a member of SEATO and the Baghdad Pact, steps to improve relations of the USSR with Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and appointment of an Ambassador of Pakistan to Moscow where the Pakistan Embassy had been looked after for some years by a Charge d'Affaires.

7. The Prime Minister said he was glad that Mr Mikoyan had paid a visit to Karachi.² India's relations with Pakistan were somewhat peculiar. There was the bond of past associations between the two countries, and many families had been divided between India and Pakistan, with the close relatives of persons in one country living in the other. But, between the leaders of the two countries, there was a fundamental difference arising from their early background and experience. Today, Pakistan was being ruled by officials and ex-officials. Not that the politicians who were previously in control had taken any part in the long struggle for freedom in undivided India; on the contrary, they had worked against the national movement and given their support to the continuance of the British regime. Immediately after Independence, many of the British officers,

1. Note on conversation with A.I. Mikoyan, First Vice-Chairman, Council of Ministers of USSR in the Prime Minister's House, New Delhi, 26 March 1956. JN Collection. Extracts. Also present were S.R. Rashidov, Vice-President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR; M.A. Menshikov, Ambassador of the USSR in India; and a Soviet interpreter; and N.R. Pillai and Rishi, the Indian interpreter. Extracts.
2. Mikoyan attended the ceremony in Karachi on 23 March 1956 when Pakistan was proclaimed the world's first Islamic Republic. He arrived in Delhi from Pakistan on 26 March on a four-day visit.

civil and military, whose services were dispensed with by India, were given employment in Pakistan. These officers were bitter towards India, and caused much trouble between the two countries in the early years after Partition. But for these men, whose dislike of India coloured all their outlook, many of the problems between India and Pakistan could have been settled. Many of these British officers had since retired, but large numbers of Americans were now employed in Pakistan as expert advisers, technicians and so on. British influence was thus being driven out by US influence in Pakistan, as in many countries of Western Asia. The British did not, of course, like this, but retired British officials continued to do propaganda against India and in favour of Pakistan, more because of their dislike of India than of any fondness for Pakistan. Those of them who lived in Africa were now in the habit of describing India as an imperialistic country.

8. Turning to the Pakhtoonistan issue,³ the Prime Minister said that India was friendly with, and sympathetic to, Afghanistan, because Afghanistan had been for many years under pressure from the UK, the US and Pakistan. Upto now, however, India had only expressed her broad sympathy with Afghanistan. In the days of the Indian national struggle, the leaders of the popular movement promised a large measure of freedom to the Pakhtoos. But now the Government of India refrained from making any public statement about this though one of India's national leaders had been a Pakhtoon, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, who spent many years in British jails and was later imprisoned for as long as six years by Pakistan. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan only desired autonomy for Pakhtoonistan, not independence. The North West Frontier state had, however, recently been merged in West Pakistan and its individuality destroyed. Pakistan was continually accusing India of fomenting trouble and of giving arms and money to the Pakhtoos. There was no truth in this whatever. The

3. The area of Pakhtoonistan, a region inhabited by Pathans—Pushto speakers—on the borders of Pakistan and Afghanistan has never been defined exactly but its claim to autonomy has been put forward since the end of the World War II by various Pakhtoon leaders and backed by the Afghan Government. The international boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the Durand Line demarcated in 1893 by the British was never accepted by Afghanistan which persistently called for the region to be united with Afghanistan or to become independent State of Pakhtoonistan. The Pakhtoonistan Movement was espoused by Abdul Ghaffar Khan and other Pathan leaders in 1940s. In 1949 after Pakistan Air Force accidentally bombed a village on the Afghan side of the frontier, Pakistan's offer of compensation was rejected, the Afghan ruler referred in his speech to the "freedom-loving aspirations of the trans-Durand Afghans" and the Kabul Radio broadcast propaganda in favour of Pakhtoonistan. The diplomatic relations between the two countries were broken off from 1955 to 1957.

loan of Rs one crore given to Afghanistan some years ago had no connection with this at all. Mr Mikoyan intervened to say that the President of Pakistan had made no such accusation. The Prime Minister pointed out that the Pakistan press was constantly making these charges against India. He went on to say that the people of India and Pakistan were essentially the same people, with common friends and memories. There was a wide difference between West Pakistan and East Pakistan. West Pakistan was in no way different from the adjoining States in India, but presented a striking contrast in essential respects to East Pakistan. It was to be remembered, too, that there were forty million Muslims in India, a larger number than the total population of West Pakistan. The conflict that existed between the two countries was at the top, and not at the peoples' level, though it was true, of course, that the people could be excited. Mr Mikoyan said that the President of Pakistan had assured him of his Government's intention to give equal rights to all, irrespective of the religion they professed. The Prime Minister pointed out that large numbers of people were still coming away from East Pakistan, as many as 50,000 having migrated to India, last month alone. It was obvious that these people were being squeezed out, and, whatever the intentions of the leaders at the top, it was clear that their instructions were not being carried out by officials in authority. The position of Muslims in India presented a striking contrast, as evidenced by the statements made by the King of Saudi Arabia⁴ and the Shah of Iran. The Prime Minister went on to say that the issues between the two countries were political, not religious and that these problems were only aggravated by the intervention of outsiders. With this Mr Mikoyan fully agreed.

9. Analysing the situation further, the Prime Minister said that Pakistan was slightly frightened of India because of the progress India had made and of her own backwardness. In order to divert the attention of their people, the Pakistan authorities, who continued to have the British civil service mentality, had been putting out that their country was in danger from India. With regard to SEATO and the Baghdad Pact, the United States and the United Kingdom had always said that these military pacts were intended for defence against the Soviet Union. Mr Mikoyan interjected to say that he had mentioned this to the Pakistan authorities, also that American Generals had blurted out that countries which had joined these pacts would provide the US with bases against the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union could not obviously ignore this. The Prime

4. King Saud said in Bombay on 10 December 1955: "...the fate of Indian Moslems is in safe hands.... In my capacity as guardian of the Moslem Holy Places, I desire to express my gratitude...to Mr Nehru and all those through whom he executes this policy of equality and equity."

Minister confirmed this, and said that neither Mr Dulles nor Mr Selwyn Lloyd saw any danger from India to Pakistan, but feared that there might be from some other countries, meaning the Soviet Union. The bases that had been acquired, for instance the Gilgit base,⁵ were obviously meant to be used against the Soviet Union. Mr Mikoyan said that it would be correct to conclude that these pacts were directed both against the Soviet Union and India. In regard to India, they were intended as a threat and warning to her for continuing in her present policy. The Prime Minister referred to the US military aid to Pakistan from which this threat to India proceeded. On Partition, the Defence Services were divided between India and Pakistan in the proportion of 3:1. Because of the military aid, Pakistan was now getting stronger and this proportion had been completely upset. The Prime Minister was in possession of reliable information about the military supplies which had reached Pakistan, and he had received substantial corroboration of this information from Mr Dulles, who agreed in his talks with the Prime Minister that aid given to Pakistan would make the Pakistan forces nearly equal to India's in size. In addition, the Pakistan forces would have better and more modern weapons, which would give them a further advantage. Pakistan troops were just as good as Indian troops, but their officers were probably not so good as India's, though it was to be noted that hundreds, perhaps thousands, of them were receiving training in the United States.

10. Mr Mikoyan said that he had witnessed the military parade in Karachi and noticed that the armaments were old and obsolete. It was possible however that they deliberately did not put on show the best that their army had. The Prime Minister pointed out that it took time to bring modern weapons into use.

11. The Prime Minister then turned to the question of Kashmir. He said that he had himself not spoken about Kashmir to Mr Bulganin and Mr Khrushchev, preferring them to find out the facts for themselves when they visited Kashmir. They had long talks with the Prime Minister of Kashmir and other leading persons in the State and came to their own conclusion.⁶ This conclusion, in the Prime Minister's opinion, was legally, constitutionally and practically the correct one. By virtue of its accession, Kashmir came to India in the correct constitutional manner. It was true that India had made a unilateral declaration to the people of Kashmir that they could decide their own future. But this was not an undertaking given to Pakistan.

5. Under the Mutual Defence Agreement of 19 May 1954, Pakistan was to provide facilities to use her bases to the US.

6. For the Soviet leaders' visit to Kashmir, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 31, pp.291.

12. Mr Mikoyan said that the Prime Minister of Pakistan had told him that this problem should be decided by the decision of the UN, that is to say, by plebiscite. Pakistan was unable to accept the verdict of the Kashmir Assembly. Mr Mikoyan had thereupon pointed out to the Prime Minister of Pakistan that this was the only decision to be taken into consideration.

13. The Prime Minister, tracing the history of the Kashmir dispute, said that Pakistan committed aggression and that was the reason why India made an approach to the United Nations. Pakistan still held one-third of the Kashmir State territory. In her anxiety to settle this problem, India had agreed to the holding of a plebiscite under certain conditions. One of the conditions was that Pakistan should withdraw from the territory occupied by her. For her part India had agreed to remove the bulk of her army. Pakistan had however not yet withdrawn from the part of Kashmir held by her, and the question of the further steps to be taken did not therefore arise. India had repeatedly discussed with Pakistan the question of fulfilling the conditions precedent to a plebiscite. But Pakistan would not comply with the condition requiring her withdrawal from the occupied portion of Kashmir, and no progress could be made. As time passed, the Kashmir Government felt compelled to elect a Constituent Assembly and this Assembly had given its own decision. Many years had passed, and conditions had changed. It was now difficult to uproot people. For the first time there was no unemployment in Kashmir. As many as 50,000 tourists visited Kashmir last year. There was evidence throughout the state of marked economic development. In the Pakistan-held territory, however, economic conditions were in a bad way. Many people in that area wished to come over to India, which showed the wide difference in economic conditions on the two sides. In Kashmir, they were now finalising their new Constitution, and in a year or two elections would take place on the Indian side of Kashmir in accordance with the new Constitution. In spite of Pakistan's aggression and her continued occupation of a part of Kashmir the Prime Minister had suggested last year to the Prime Minister of Pakistan and to Mr Iskander Mirza, now President of Pakistan, that the only practical solution was to accept the present partition of Kashmir, with minor boundary changes. They however would not agree. The Prime Minister could not see what more India could do....⁷

7. In a conversation with Nehru on 27 March 1956 (not printed), Mikoyan spoke about the proceedings of the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of Soviet Union including the report submitted by Khrushchev on behalf of the Central Committee to the Congress, a critical analysis of the events which took place between the death of Lenin and the death of Stalin. He also spoke on patterns of socialism, differences between Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, behaviour of communist parties in the non-communist countries, and future of Cominform.

9. Conversation with A.I. Mikoyan—II¹

Mr Mikoyan asked whether the Prime Minister could give him some account of his talks with the three Foreign Ministers who had recently been to Delhi. The Prime Minister said he would gladly do so, and spoke first about the visit of Mr Selwyn Lloyd who came to Delhi immediately before the SEATO Council meeting at Karachi. The situation in Western Asia, more particularly the progressive deterioration of relations between Israel and the Arab countries, and the dismissal of Glubb Pasha by the King of Jordan, news of which he had received on his way to India, seemed to have upset Mr Selwyn Lloyd. With him as well as with Mr Dulles and M. Pineau who visited Delhi after the SEATO Council meeting, the Prime Minister discussed in detail the situation in Western Asia and other major international problems. Naturally the Prime Minister spoke at length to all the three Foreign Ministers about SEATO and the Baghdad Pact, expressing India's objection to these military pacts and pointing out the great harm they had done. Apart from the objections of principle which India had to these pacts, the pacts were open to the further criticism that they had increased tension and brought about conditions of instability and disunity in the Arab world. More particularly, these pacts affected India closely, encircling her from the east and from the west. They had worsened relations between India and Pakistan. Mr Selwyn Lloyd and Mr Dulles said that these pacts were defensive pacts and were not directed against India and that India need not be apprehensive about them. The Prime Minister maintained that the pacts did affect India, and pointed out how as a result of the aid being received by her, Pakistan was getting more and more aggressive towards India. Whatever might be the motives of the US, aid given by it to Pakistan could be used against India. In any event, such pacts led away from the paths of peace.

2. The Prime Minister then asked Mr Mikoyan whether he understood him to say the previous day that the Pakistan leaders had told him that they expected no trouble from the Soviet Union, but did so from India. Mr Mikoyan replied that both the President and the Prime Minister of Pakistan had said to him that

1. Note on conversation with A.I. Mikoyan, in Parliament House, New Delhi, 28 March 1956. JN Collection. Extracts. Also present were S.R. Rashidov, M.A. Menshikov, and a Soviet interpreter; and N.R. Pillai, and Rishi, the Indian interpreter.

India was a threat to Pakistan and that these pacts were necessary for defence against India. Later on they mentioned Afghanistan. They said that Pakistan bases and Pakistan armed forces would never be used against the Soviet Union. Mr Mikoyan pointed out to them, however, that Pakistan had already entered into commitments and that these might be invoked by the other parties to these pacts. The Prime Minister recalled that as against this, Mr Dulles had made it clear that the Baghdad Pact was intended against the Soviet Union. Mr Mikoyan said that this was perfectly correct but that, as the US was acting jointly with Pakistan, which was against India, the pact had a double purpose.... The principal aim of the US was against the Soviet Union, but the US gave in to Pakistan on these issues in order thereby to increase its hold on Pakistan.

3. The Prime Minister inquired whether he might say in Parliament in general terms, without mentioning Mr Mikoyan's name, that Pakistan had been saying that she had no quarrel with the Soviet Union and looked upon SEATO and the Baghdad Pact as being of help to them against India and Afghanistan. Mr Mikoyan replied that his talks with Pakistan leaders were confidential and they might well refuse to admit the correctness of the version he had given....

4. Continuing his narrative, the Prime Minister said that Mr Dulles had asked him for his impressions of his visit to the Soviet Union and of the visit to India of Mr Bulganin and Mr Khrushchev as well as his impressions of the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR. The Prime Minister told him that he was much impressed by his visit to the Soviet Union and thought that Mr Bulganin and Mr Khrushchev had been impressed by their visit to India and that this exchange of visits had promoted mutual understanding. He also told Mr Dulles that in his opinion the Government and the people of the USSR desired peace and that the Congress also desired peace and was considering methods of promoting international peace. Mr Dulles agreed that the new trends were in the right direction but felt that these trends would take a much longer time than the Prime Minister thought to show visible effects. On a long-term view the new trends might be satisfactory, but he (Mr Dulles) was concerned with the short-term position, and anything might happen in that period. The Prime Minister went on to say that there was a difference in the reactions of Mr Dulles and Mr Selwyn Lloyd. The latter, though he had certain doubts, said he was glad to hear the Prime Minister's reactions and hoped that they would prove correct. Mr Selwyn Lloyd also welcomed the forthcoming visit to the UK of Mr Bulganin and Mr Khrushchev, which, he hoped, would produce good results. Mr Dulles was more rigid; he admitted the tendencies, but feared that they would be slow.

5. The Prime Minister also discussed the question of disarmament with both Mr Selwyn Lloyd and Mr Dulles, and told them that, in his opinion, the time was favourable for taking effective steps towards disarmament and atomic control. Mr Selwyn Lloyd said that the UK welcomed the steps already taken, but Mr Dulles appeared doubtful of the possibility of substantial progress being made. The Prime Minister pointed out that SEATO and the Baghdad Pact came in the way of disarmament. Neither Mr Selwyn Lloyd nor Mr Dulles agreed with this.

6. Mr Mikoyan said that, while in Karachi, he received a telegram from Moscow to say that the US had put forward new proposals at the London meeting.² They had raised the limit for land forces for the "big" countries (China, the Soviet Union and the US) from 1.5 millions to 2.5 millions. The Prime Minister asked whether these were connected with proposals in regard to atomic energy and atomic weapons. Mr Mikoyan said no; the US probably wanted to keep the military use of atomic energy as a separate question. They had given up all previous proposals, and suggested control of everything but without disarmament. The Prime Minister said control must necessarily involve the acceptance of some limit; otherwise it would have no meaning. Mr Mikoyan agreed, and said that a French newspaper man had used a vivid phrase, "no control without disarmament, no disarmament without control".³

7. The Prime Minister then referred to his talks with Mr Dulles about China, Taiwan, the coastal islands and the talks going on in Geneva between China and the US at Ambassador level. He had told Mr Dulles clearly that the present trouble was mainly due to China being kept out of the UN. No Government could tolerate the presence of hostile forces on islands as close to the mainland as were the Matsu and Quemoy. In regard to the Geneva talks, the

2. The UN Disarmament Sub-committee met in London from 19 March to 4 May 1956, where Harold Stassen, Special Adviser to Eisenhower on disarmament problems, presented the American proposals. It was suggested, that the five Powers represented in the UN Sub-committee should take a number of preliminary steps, as specified in the detailed proposals, towards disarmament; and that on completion of this first stage, an Armament Regulation Organisation would be set up to work for all-round disarmament both of conventional and nuclear weapons. It was also suggested to put into operation a control and inspection plan combining Eisenhower's "open skies" proposals and Bulganin's "ground keypoints control" proposals.
3. In fact, the French representative Jules Moch said on 23 November 1955 at a meeting of the Disarmament Commission that the UN should be guided by the following three principles: (1) no control without disarmament; (2) no disarmament without control; but (3) progressively, all disarmament that could be currently controlled.

Prime Minister expressed the hope that these talks would lead to some agreement and later to a meeting between the two Foreign Ministers. It was of course unrealistic to expect spectacular results, but the Prime Minister nevertheless hoped that a step forward would result. It was obvious, however, that because of the US elections this year the US Government would be reluctant to take any important step for fear of its effect on their own prospects at the elections.

8. The Prime Minister also discussed with Mr Dulles the question of Indo-China, especially the situation in South Vietnam. He told Mr Dulles that the position of the International Commission in Vietnam was becoming impossible. The Commission could not function unless the South Vietnam Government assumed the responsibilities under the Geneva Agreement, especially as the French were leaving. The Prime Minister mentioned also that India had referred the matter to the two Co-Chairmen and that Mr Selwyn Lloyd had told him that he hoped to meet Mr Molotov for discussions. Mr Dulles had said that he would meet Mr Diem in Saigon, and expressed the hope that some way could be found out of the difficulty. He wished the Commission to remain in Vietnam and stressed the need for finding suitable means for making this possible. The latest news from Saigon, the Prime Minister said, was somewhat hopeful. India's Representative on the Commission had met Mr Diem, who for the first time appeared to be somewhat amenable and gave the impression that he might in practice assume the obligations hitherto discharged by the French.

9. The Prime Minister added that he had spoken at much length to Mr Dulles about the declaration on Kashmir made by the SEATO Council and the statement on Goa made jointly by Mr Dulles and the Foreign Minister of Portugal. The Prime Minister had taken exception to both.

10. In his talks with M. Pineau, the French Foreign Minister, the Prime Minister said he covered much the same ground. From his point of view, M. Pineau appeared more reasonable than the other two Foreign Ministers. M. Pineau admitted the Indian criticism of the Kashmir declaration and frankly said that he did not know much about the problem himself. On many major international problems M. Pineau's position was different from that of the UK and the USA and showed greater understanding. In Algeria, the difficulty was caused by the presence of one and a half a million Frenchmen who had been resident there for four or five generations. It was impossible for France not to feel concerned for the future of these persons. The French Government wished therefore to obtain some assurance regarding their future, but there were no influential public leaders in Algeria with whom they could negotiate. It might be that elections might throw up responsible leadership, but in the present

disturbed conditions it was difficult to hold elections. The Prime Minister pointed out that delay would only aggravate the situation and that it was necessary therefore for France to take the initiative. Only thus could better security be assured for the French colonies.

11. The Prime Minister then referred to the invitation conveyed to him by Mr Dulles from President Eisenhower to pay a short visit to the United States. This was in continuation of certain previous invitations. The Prime Minister had accepted this invitation and intended to go to Washington for three or four days after the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting in London. He was going to Washington for the sole purpose of having talks with the President and was not accepting any other engagements.

12. Mr Mikoyan thanked the Prime Minister for the information given to him and asked about his talks with the Shah of Iran. The Prime Minister said that the Shah of Iran had been wanting to visit India for two or three years, but it was not until recently that a date for the visit could be fixed. Soon after that came the announcement of the Baghdad Pact, and the Shah feared that he might not receive a good welcome in India. The Government of India told him that, though India differed from Iran on the Baghdad Pact, the Shah could count on a proper welcome in India if he should come, and the Shah thereupon decided to come to India. He was given a cordial welcome, wherever he went during his three weeks' tour, and by all accounts he was much impressed with his visit. When he was in Delhi the Prime Minister explained to him why India objected to the Baghdad Pact. He did not, of course, suggest that Iran should leave the Pact, as the Shah was here as India's guest, but made it clear that the Pact was neither good nor effective from the point of view of ensuring security. The Shah said that Iran, being a small country which had lived in fear of Russia since before the revolution, was differently situated from India. It was because of that fear that Iran had entered the Pact. The Prime Minister told him that that fear could not be removed by Iran's joining the Pact. On the contrary, it would lessen the chances of security and stability, in the same way as it had produced disunity in the Arab world. The Prime Minister then spoke to the Shah about his visit to the Soviet Union. He told him that he knew something about Iran's history and about the Tsarist and British pressures on that country. But times had changed and the Shah must consider the situation in the light of present conditions. If war were to break out, the Pact would be of little help to Iran, and it was of no use either as an instrument for the maintenance of peace. The proper policy was to cultivate friendly relations with all countries. Pacts, on the contrary, only served to antagonise those against whom they were directed. India followed a policy of friendliness towards all,

though some countries had in some ways acted against her interests. The Prime Minister also expressed his pleasure at the Shah's forthcoming visit to the Soviet Union and hoped that opportunity would then be found for full and frank talks with the Soviet leaders in order to develop understanding and better relations.

13. The Prime Minister then said that he did not know exactly when the Shah signified his acceptance of the Soviet invitation. The Shah had told the Prime Minister that it would be a good thing for him to visit Moscow but that the Americans did not like it. Mr Mikoyan replied that there was an understanding last year about the Shah's visit to the Soviet Union. After the Baghdad Pact, however, the Soviet Government wondered whether they should withdraw the invitation, also put off the proposed visit of a Parliamentary Delegation from Iran. The Soviet Government decided finally to take these developments quietly and not to disturb the arrangements already entered into. The visit of the Parliamentary Delegation took place according to schedule, and this visit had done much good. So would, they hoped, the visit of the Shah. The Soviet Government would naturally be glad to have talks with him.

14. The Prime Minister said that his own impression of the Shah was that he was an earnest type of man and obviously wanted to do his best for his country. He liked the Shah as a man.

15. Referring back to his talks with Mr Dulles the Prime Minister said that Mr Dulles had told him that he (Mr Dulles) himself was not in favour of the Baghdad Pact and that it was concluded against his advice. He added, however, that he nevertheless had to stand by his allies. Mr Mikoyan said that this information had reached the Soviet Government also. The Baghdad Pact owed its existence to the initiative of the UK. The Prime Minister referred to the sequence of agreements—first Iraq and Turkey, then Pakistan, followed by the UK and later by Iran. Nuri el-Said, the Prime Minister of Iraq, was the principal figure behind these moves. Mr Mikoyan said that was also the Soviet Government's information. But for Nuri el-Said, Iraq would not have come into the Pact. The Egyptian envoy in Karachi had told him this.

16. The Prime Minister said Nuri el-Said visited India two years ago.⁴ He was no doubt an able man in his own way, but he had not yet entered the 20th century, and it was difficult therefore to follow the workings of his mind. Mr Mikoyan said "Let us wait and see. The Baghdad Pact may collapse before long, even legally". The Prime Minister said that the Pact was stillborn and there was little life in it.

4. For Prime Minister of Iraq, Nuri el-Said's visit to India in March 1954, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 25, pp. 500-502.

VIII. CONFERENCE OF HEADS OF INDIAN MISSIONS

1. The Shaping of India's Foreign Policy¹

First of all, I should like to welcome you all here. I think that even normally it is necessary and desirable for our Heads of Missions to meet people at Headquarters and meet each other from time to time, but in the context of things today in the world this has become even more necessary. The tempo of events is fast, not only the tempo of political events which gain headlines in newspapers, but many things which do not immediately receive publicity although they are ultimately more important than some dramatic events. Because of these rapid changes that are going on all over the world it becomes necessary for our minds, and later our activities, to keep pace with these changes. We, who live and are living through this period of change, may not perhaps fully appreciate the importance and the rapidity with which many things which we have always been accustomed to are changing.

This is a meeting of our representatives from Asia and Africa. Africa, as you know, is still very largely colonial Africa, but it is undergoing a fairly marked change. I should imagine that in a few years' time Africa would be different from what it is today. In considering the questions of Africa and Asia we cannot isolate them from the general world situation which governs almost every development in foreign affairs. Therefore, in effect, we consider the world situation and not the Asian or African situation, or we consider the world situation and then in the context of that larger picture, a particular situation in a particular country. There are some problems which might be called local problems although they are very important for us, e.g., the problem of the people

1. All items in this sub-section have been taken from *Prime Minister's Statements at the Conference of Heads of Missions (24 March - 3 April 1956)*, a collection of Nehru's observations at the conference of twenty-one Indian representatives in Asian and African countries held in New Delhi. A printed copy of this compilation, prepared by the Ministry of External Affairs, is available in JN Papers, NMML. Heads of Indian Missions representing India in the following countries participated in the conference: Afghanistan, Bhutan, Burma, Ceylon, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gold Coast, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Malaya, Mauritius, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sikkim, Singapore, Thailand, Tibet, and Turkey.

of Indian descent in Ceylon. This is exceedingly important for us but it has no real relationship with the world situation. Some of our problems in regard to Pakistan (evacuee property, canal waters and Kashmir) are strictly speaking local problems, but in effect these problems, particularly the Kashmir problem, are very much tied up with international developments.

You who represent us abroad deal with our basic policy and know, I suppose, what exactly it is. India's basic policy, which is sometimes wrongly called 'neutralism', is something not coming out of the head of any person or even of the joint heads of the Government of India or the External Affairs Ministry. No foreign policy takes shape in this way. It is a gradual growth which takes formal shape by events, very narrowly speaking but very correctly, of the country concerned. You might view the self-interest of the country in a narrow way or in a broad way. India's foreign policy has first of all its roots, apart from self-interest, in our thinking for so many years, at least in the last twenty-five years. It was only vague thinking because when you do not have to deal with a problem your thinking is theoretical, idealistic and vague. When, however, you have to deal with a problem you see how complicated it is and realise that some theoretical application of some formula is not good enough although the formula or the principle is very important for us to remember. Otherwise we become purely opportunist and there is no anchorage either for our thinking or actions. But inevitably that formula or principle has to be adapted to changing conditions and to reactions of other countries. Again foreign policy, although it may have a more or less integrated look about it, is really a collection of foreign policies with different countries. It is not just one single rule of thumb applicable to every country. Of course the broad approach is the same and has to be so. Therefore, it becomes a collection of foreign policies. What we do with Nepal has a special bearing but that need not necessarily apply to the USSR or the UK or the USA.

Let us, to begin with, consider very broadly some of the major changes that have taken place or are taking place. One of the biggest changes has been that brought about by the last war resulting in two colossuses; other countries however much they may talk about their positions are down in the scale.

Secondly, it has resulted in big changes in Asia. Take India, China, Indonesia, Burma and Pakistan. These are either new countries or are newly independent or have undergone a big change which, apart from even political changes, represents something deeper in Asia. Those deeper urges have not taken shape yet. In some of the Asian countries they are either suppressed or they are not strong enough to have their way. Thus a very big thing is happening in Asia,

not from the point of view of a military analysis of the situation, that is, how many army corps Asia commands, or how many armies can be put into the field, or how much armaments it has. From that point of view Asia is very weak; but Asia is strong even now negatively, that is, in the sense that it refuses more or less to be pulled or pushed about by European or other powers. In the past European powers and later America had got into the habit of dealing with Asian problems as if they were essentially their problems or for them to decide. Later they consulted Asian countries as a matter of grace and they sometimes call them to their conferences. But it is growing increasingly patent that Asian problems cannot be disposed of in this way by European or American countries.

The biggest factor is the coming of atomic energy as represented by the atom or the hydrogen bomb. This is a new force which upsets almost our thinking except possibly in the moral or religious domain. The political is obvious enough, but take even the economic. It is a point for us to remember that in effect the great changes that have come about the world in the last one hundred and fifty years or so are due to the development of technology. Politics have pursued these matters slowly. The nations that became powerful beginning with England and other Western countries and later America, became so because of the development of technology and not because of high courage or high morals. A nation's character is highly important and all the technology in the world will not make a nation strong if it is weak in character. But it is technology that has made these nations great and given them the opportunity to progress. Art, culture and all kinds of things have developed on account of various factors flowing from the development of technology and the wealth and the well-being that it brought.

We have now come up against a period when the process which affected Europe is affecting Asia. But it is affecting it at a time when we have not got that long period before us to solve our problems. We have to go fast or else we go under. So the problem in India or Pakistan or Indonesia or whatever the country may be is essentially a novel one of having to go through these processes of technological changes. There are many other changes too, but I am not referring to them now. I lay stress on the most important—the processes of industrialization at a rapid pace. It is unlike the problem that England or America faced, because they had one hundred or one hundred and fifty years to develop. It is unlike in the Soviet Union also. Although the latter brought about the changes rapidly, they did so, first of all, as a result of an extraordinary combination of circumstances after the first World War. Do not imagine that what has happened in Soviet Union during, say, the first ten years after the Revolution was carefully thought out by anybody, Lenin or anyone else. Events

overtook them. It is true that Lenin was a great man who could understand and shape the events that controlled them. I was speaking to Mr Khrushchev² about violence and non-violence and expressing my opinion that too much stress on the doctrine of force did not appeal to me and that I thought it would fail in the long run. He said, and I think there is some element of truth in what he said, that the Bolshevik Revolution was not essentially a violent one in a big way. They had hoped to settle down and to work out their destiny, but they were prevented from doing so by the wars of intervention. England, Japan, America, and France were hostile all round and so in self defence they took to these violent courses and then, of course, internal problems arose.

These changes have affected all our Asian countries. We have at the same time to face very serious internal problems. On the one hand, political consciousness has arisen and people do not put up with things as they are, and quite rightly. On the other hand, we have not got apparently the resources to satisfy them quickly enough. We try to go as fast as we can. At the same time we get entangled in international affairs. We cannot help it and I want you to be quite clear about this and to make it clear in the countries where you represent us that we really have no desire to play any important role in international affairs. We try to do so as effectively as possible keeping our main objective in view. Also no country can ignore what is happening in the international field because on that depends peace and war in the world. If there is war it affects us intimately and it is possible that it may end in the most terrible disaster that the world has ever seen. Here I would like you to realise this. You read about the atom and hydrogen bomb. It is not enough to read about them. It is not enough to be clever about it in your talks with others. I want you not only mentally and intellectually, but also emotionally, to realize what this thing is because this is something more important in its consequences than all the talk we indulge in at whatever plane—our pettifogging politics of the day, national or international—because it is an unknown power. We know definitely what it can do and that is terrible. We do not know yet many things that it might do. That is the unknown and uncertain element in it and we can only rely upon what the expert scientists tell us. They differ too in their views. But some eminent scientists think that its consequences are far more horrible than the ones we have yet thought of. These are horrible in the immediate sense and even more so in the long-term sense of

2. The Soviet leaders, Bulganin and Khrushchev, visited India in November-December 1955. For record of Nehru's talks with them, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 31, pp. 303-306 and 334-365.

affecting millions and millions of people all over the world so that they would die a slow death in ten or twelve years' time. Children born may be maimed or they may not be born at all. The genetic aspects have not been explored adequately but the most eminent scientists think that they will be powerfully affected by the hydrogen bomb. Now, distinguish between the atom and the hydrogen bomb. The atom bomb destroyed an area, the whole of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and killed some 300,000 or a million of people. But it is an area. The Hydrogen bomb is different in that it not only destroys an area but also spreads its evil effects, maybe over half of the world, because of radio-activity. Nobody knows how far it will spread. That depends on prevailing winds and many other factors. It may last for years. Nobody knows.

These are some new things which make one think hard. I think the coming of these new technological weapons has changed people's thinking, or rather, it should change it. Unfortunately it takes a long time to make a man think on lines different from what he is used to. It is just astonishing how we remain in our old ruts of thinking and repeat the same phrases and slogans regardless of what has happened all over the world. That of course applies also to what might be called the "religious" approach to political problems. I am not talking about character. But I may mention a thing like Marxism which is meant to be a logical and scientific approach and which was a very able approach. What Marx said was based on a close study of the early days of the Industrial Revolution in England. It was also applicable to a large extent to similar conditions in Europe and elsewhere, but became less and less applicable to countries where those conditions did not exist. I am not going to talk about Marxism now, but I wish to put to you that the original concepts of Marxism in the economic sense were only partly true. Marx never thought of the enormous development of technology which has taken place and which has resulted in such enormous abundance of production and wealth, say, in the United States, except among the unhappy Negroes. Marx thought always of dichotomy, of increasing production more and more wealth being produced but being concentrated in fewer and fewer hands; more proletariat and fewer people becoming richer and more powerful, politically and otherwise. But he did not foresee the general or material standards going up to terrific heights. The production apparatus has advanced so rapidly that it has rather upset all economic thinking of the past. Also Marx did not anticipate the processes that went to bring in Hitler.

So we must not be bound by any formula. Our approach, whether it is political or economic, should therefore be pragmatic while being naturally based on certain broad principles.

We are said to be specially committed to a policy of peace. All countries say so, and I have no doubt that all countries by and large mean it too except for small groups. Behind that remains the basic factor of the atom bomb, for war has become too difficult and dangerous.

Let us come to India's position. India's position now is governed by various factors, historical and others. A very important and unchanging factor is the geography of India. India is in the centre of South Asia and thereby connected inevitably throughout history with West Asia, Central Asia, East Asia and South East Asia. This is a fact which nothing can change. This fact was rather shrouded by the coming of European colonial powers to Asia. The old caravan routes and even the snow defiles were either not used or were barred. New sea routes came which brought us in contact with England, France and other Western countries and the Asian countries were practically cut off from their neighbouring countries in Asia. That has ceased now. These barriers are removed and so inevitably we gradually pick up threads which were broken two hundred or three hundred years ago. It is difficult to pick them up the same old way because conditions are different. Therefore, geography which had been rather suppressed for external reasons like European domination is again coming to the fore and playing an important part in Indian and also Asian politics. This is an important fact. The other day, Sir Anthony Eden, in a speech in Parliament, spoke with some warmth about attacks on Britain (not from India) and about the general situation in West Asia. He said that they would hold on to their position, come what may, because history and geography have given them that position. History may be all right, but the use of the word "geography" struck me as very odd. How geography could give them a position in Cyprus or anywhere else in the wide world or in Central Africa was very odd to me. But geography does come in so far as India and her neighbours are concerned.

In the past, we might say, there were three main routes connecting Europe which, you must remember, is a little offshoot of Asia geographically. But they were very important even in old days. There were the old caravan routes to India and to various parts of Asia. There were also the sea routes due to the monsoon winds and there was the great silk route going right through Central Asia from Europe to China by which Marco Polo went. Not many people went, but there was plenty of traffic. The Siberian railway has taken the place of the silk route, because it is going that way, and will be connected with the Chinese railways. But the other old caravan routes are being replaced by air, sea and other routes, and India is the meeting point. Rather India is on the highway. Another reason why so many important people come to India is, of course, the growing intrinsic importance, actual and potential, of India. Again some people

come to India because they cannot help coming to India, and because India is just on their way to Asia. Mr Mikoyan, for instance, going to China has to pass through India,³ and Marshal Ho Lung⁴ going to Karachi touches India. For these criss-cross ways India is the common point. People coming from Europe to Asia, or any part of Asia, have always to pass through this country unless they go via the Pacific which is a much longer route. You cannot help it because of geography. Geography not only makes us pick up old contacts with neighbouring countries but makes it a world highway today.

You know that perhaps at the present moment the most explosive situation is that between Israel and the Arab world. There is no doubt of the danger of war there. I do not personally think that war will take place because there has been so much talk of it, and some element of preparation to stop it on the part of Great Britain, America and others.

The situation in what is called the Middle East is an extraordinarily interesting one. Talking about the Middle East, Near East and Far East I should like to warn you against using terms which have either no significance for us, or have a very definite and wrong significance. For us to talk about the "iron curtain" is wrong. The mere use of this term means that we have adopted this and have got a picture and a philosophy in our minds which we have accepted. It is all wrong. Never talk about "iron curtain" or "bamboo curtain", or "satellite countries". We should not talk even about 'peace' in the context in which it is often used in Russia or China. We talk about peace, but the use of the word 'peace' in China and Russia has been one of the most aggressive things that I have seen. It is totally unlike my conception of peace. There are many other similar terms. I do not like the term 'peace-loving nations'. This has lately been used in such a context that it has developed another meaning. So please avoid all these words and phrases which have acquired a very definite significance and a certain philosophical approach to today's problems. Of course, there is no meaning in 'Middle East' or 'Near East' except of course that it is east of Europe. That is wrong so far as we are concerned because it is

3. After his visit to India from 26 to 29 March 1956 Mikoyan went to Myanmar for four days. Thereafter he proceeded to Beijing.
4. (b. 1896); Chinese military and government official; took part in the Northern Expedition of Chiang Kai-shek, 1926; joined the Communist Party, 1927; Commander in the Red Army; Deputy Prime Minister of the State Council of China, 1954-67. Ho Lung, led a group to Karachi in March 1956 to attend the inauguration of the Pakistani Islamic Republic, and en route home he stopped over in New Delhi.

to the west of us. Why should we think that Europe is the centre of the world and therefore judge what is to the east and what is to the west of Europe? Probably you know that in the Chinese books India was always referred to as the Western Land and quite rightly, because we are west of China. The other day some European correspondent asked me about East and West. He used terms like Western countries, Eastern countries and so on. I gave him a long answer attaching some other meaning and he was bewildered by what I was saying. These are confusing terms and we should avoid these phrases.

I was talking about the Arab countries and the Western Asian countries. Broadly speaking they are in a bad way politically and economically. You can define the countries of Asia today as countries which through some revolutionary process, violent or peaceful, have attained independence or a new political or economic structure. Some countries of Asia are still carrying on in the old way—it may be that there have been a few changes—and have not gone through that revolutionary process that India, Burma and Indonesia have gone through. Of course, in the case of Indo-China and others there were wars and revolutions. In the case of Pakistan, so far as the people are concerned, they certainly took a big part in the revolutionary movement in India, but the Pakistani leaders certainly did not take part in it. In fact they opposed that process. Pakistan became independent in the sweep of Indian Independence and not by its individual effort. That has been the difficulty in Pakistan. That is why there is some unreality about it. There is a certain lack of faith in their own strength among the leaders and a certain gap between the leaders and the people. Of course, the people are the same. They have the same strength or weakness as anybody in India has, but the leaders have never gone through that revolutionary process. They are of the civil service class which may be an excellent class as some of you are, but is normally not considered as a revolutionary class. It is this lack of faith in the people themselves and lack of faith in other things that is leading to reliance on external help—on American aid, this aid and that, this Pact or that Pact. It is this lack of faith that is leading her to taking refuge under slogans and under movements of hatred against India and fear of India to cover up her own problems.

In West Asia, the countries are still, by and large, feudal. At the moment I cannot think of any other country, barring of course Africa, which is so backward as the West Asian countries, politically and economically. They have been lucky in finding vast quantities of oil and that has helped them, but this has also become a matter of jeopardy for their future. These countries of West Asia have been definitely under what is called British influence for generation past. Czarist Russia came into Iran bringing its own influence, but largely it has

been in the British sphere of influence. That has been weakening and the British have been driven out of Egypt.

Now, you are seeing something major happening, that is, the liquidation of British influence and interest in the whole of West Asia. That would have been very important for West Asia if at the same time somebody else was not taking the place of the British there. If the British go out and if, let us say, some other power, whether it is Russia, America or some other, takes its place, then so far as these countries are concerned they are not better off. But from Britain's point of view this is of the highest importance. Britain's future even as a second-rate power depends upon it. Today Britain is struggling—a life and death struggle—for its existence as any kind of power, second or third rate. It is even more so in the case of France which has long ceased to be what she was and still presumes to be. One must see this in this context. The recent events in West Asia like Glubb Pasha's dismissal were perhaps a bigger blow to England psychologically than her leaving India. Their minds were gradually prepared for leaving India. But this thing, although it applies only to a little country like Jordan, has brought out the new situation which affects not only Britain but all Western Powers. The basic difficulty has been that Western countries and America find it very difficult to realise fully what has happened in Asia, or realising it, to accept it. Still it is frightfully difficult to accept a new order of things in which they cannot play the part they have always been playing. That applies, of course, more to China than to any other country. Here is a huge, vast and powerful country which has arisen. It is totally immaterial whether you like it or dislike it. It is one of the major facts of history and no problem in the Far East can be solved unless the major facts are understood. It will be no good threatening or talking in a high and mighty tone. The only place where wisdom was shown by the United Kingdom was in regard to India, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon, and you see what good it did them. It did them much good. It did us good too, but it did them a lot of good, by keeping up their high prestige. Economically also they benefited. Take North Africa where France has stuck on too long, and it is only now that wisdom is coming slowly.

At the present moment, owing to certain set of circumstances, Egypt has become the most important factor in the entire situation. One, of course, is their military resources. They have got the guns and they have got the aircraft, and they have got them in spite of the Americans and the British. Not only have they got these things, but they have shown to the whole of West Asia that any country which has the audacity to do what it likes, can do it, and that the Americans and the British cannot do anything to prevent it. Therefore, their prestige has risen greatly in that region, and naturally their attitude is much more important.

No power need have come into Egypt. You may criticise the Russians, but equally well they can criticise the British and the Americans. The latter are there as if it is their birthright, and say that nobody else should come in. Ultimately Russia would have come in. A power like that cannot permit the region adjoining it to be hostile towards it. But this has been expedited by various circumstances. Here I have got a map showing the British and American airfields and naval bases in the 'Middle Eastern region'. This is an American magazine. There are only some here. But I think there are actually many more. The policy of the USSR is not one of spreading communism except incidentally because spreading of communism in these countries will result in friendly relations with them. It is not communism they are after. They want to prevent the spread of hostility to them. Secondly, they help countries which are friendly to them because the best way of having a country friendly towards you is to have a subordinate country. Both the Americans and the Russians believe in this theory and both of them pursue that policy. Now, take East Germany and the East European countries. I have no doubt that Soviet Russia likes these countries to be communist. They want that those countries should not be hostile to them, and the best way to ensure that is to set up communist regimes and make them a barrier against other nations and the possibility of German rearmament. Twice in a major way they have suffered tremendously by German invasion. If they are afraid of anything obviously it is not the hydrogen bomb so much as German rearmament. They are not afraid of the army but of the German war machine.

Turkey and Iraq have signed the Baghdad Treaty because of their fear of Russia. I should imagine that in this the real lead came from Nuri el-Said.⁵ He is the person on whom the British relied thoroughly for many years past. He is the strongman who has stuck to them through thick and thin. Iran had been talking about it for months and months but joined it much later after much deliberate thinking. I have no doubt that they must have had discussions with the British and the Americans. There is no doubt that in spite of some common purposes, the Americans and the British pull in different directions everywhere. Even in little Ceylon the Americans are pushing out the British, and that is the case in Europe also. In West Asia too the British are being squeezed out, and because of the interest in oil, they are terribly frightened about their future. Of course, they could retain their oil on good terms by proper agreements. They

5. Prime Minister of Iraq.

always sought the help of some leading personalities like Nuri el-Said in Iraq and elsewhere, forgetting not only the reactions on other countries, but also the reactions on the people of that particular country. Even in Pakistan, the British are being squeezed out by the Americans. There are American technicians in every district there. They are adopting the American ways even in small matters.

We should not in the near future attempt to mediate in the Arab-Israeli dispute. Our approach at the Bandung Conference⁶ was that there should be no resolution on controversial subjects except a broad resolution against colonialism. On the first day we all met informally. Except Pakistan and Turkey who had not arrived, all the other Arab countries were there. I said that it would not be fitting to raise controversial matters and that Israel was not there. We talked for some time and then we broke up for tea. During the tea interval we talked with each one of the Arab delegates separately and they said that they saw the force in my argument and that they were prepared to agree but that they could not take the initiative because the moment one did so others were bound to pounce on him. Nevertheless, we ultimately agreed not to have the resolution which the Colombo Powers had passed on Israel. That night Pakistan and Turkey came. All the world knows that Turkey has no strong feelings about Israel. In fact it recognised Israel. But Turkey and Pakistan got excited: "First of all what business have you people, when we have not come, to decide anything"? We had decided nothing except agreeing informally to adopt a certain procedure and to put forward that procedure before the Conference, and it was for the Conference to approve or disapprove of it. But they went over to all the Arab delegates and incited them. The latter were afraid of each other before, and now they became afraid of Pakistan. That was how the matter came up and there was a discussion on it. And, as Mr Ali Yavar Jung,⁷ has said, in this matter probably Colonel Nasser is not quite so extremely excitable as most others. He takes quite a reasonable view but he is inhibited, or limited by circumstances. He told me: "If I take this view I will be assassinated tomorrow".

My point at Bandung was that so many countries which were bravely declaring for a resolution against Israel, were completely under the thumb of America or Great Britain. My point was: "If you think strongly why do you not go to your bosses, America and others, and make them take any action whatever

6. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 28, pp. 97-158.

7. Ambassador of India in Egypt and Libya.

it is. They created Israel". In the Arab-Israeli conflict all our sympathies are with the Arabs but we have no enmity towards Israel. Israel may go wrong here and there. We want, as far as possible, a settlement of this question. We do not want, and in fact, it is not feasible to liquidate Israel as an entity and our efforts therefore have been privately to help promote a settlement if we can. Publicly we say very little about it.

I think, Africa is going to be a very tough problem in the next few years. Among the hopeful aspects of Africa, one is, of course, what is happening in the Gold Coast; and it is possible that the Gold Coast may, in the course of this year, become an independent dominion. That will have fairly far-reaching results psychologically all over Africa, because thus far the independent countries of Africa were Ethiopia, Libya, Liberia, Morocco and Tunisia which are half Arab and half African. The Gold Coast is a cent per cent African country and any major change there has a powerful effect on the whole of the African population in Africa psychologically. Secondly, the Gold Coast, if it becomes an independent dominion, will have powerful effect on the Commonwealth. I think that very probably the Commonwealth will be split on this issue because South Africa will not tolerate the Gold Coast coming in there. It is painful enough for them to tolerate us and Pakistan there and it would become completely intolerable to have some six-foot tall black men from the Gold Coast sitting next to them. England, whatever she may feel in her heart, will have to support the Gold Coast coming into the Commonwealth. England agrees to it because it cannot help it. But, oddly enough, Canada is very anxious and keen that this must be done. Canada, on the whole, is a conservative country, but it is a very decent country. It does not talk tall. It is an earnest country and does not wish to get into trouble or get other people into trouble. It is really a peaceful country. I have considerable admiration for the Prime Minister of Canada, Mr St. Laurent. Canada is naturally tied up with America in many ways, but it does not allow itself to be pulled about too much. So this year, 1956, or the next may see rather big developments in the Commonwealth and this may affect naturally the whole of the world situation. There is a very great feeling, I believe, in England against South Africa, against their racial policy of segregation. Rameshwar Rao⁸ has recently been hobnobbing with Queen Elizabeth. She

8. J. Rameshwar Rao (1923-1998); associated with the socialist wing of the Indian National Congress; First Secretary, Indian Commission in Nairobi, 1950-52; Commissioner for Government of India in East Africa, 1950-51; Commissioner for Government of India in the Gold Coast and Nigeria, 1953-56; Member, Lok Sabha, 1957-80.

went to the Gold Coast⁹ and in the course of her talk with him she expressed her extreme dislike and almost horror of how the South African Government was functioning.

So there are all these changes taking place all over the world and we really are more concerned about our internal development than any world problem because it is ultimately on the internal conditions in a country that its part in international affairs depends. I repeat again that we would rather play a part which is much below our actual strength than above it and I want you always to make that clear because apart from it being a fact, I do not want that other countries in Asia should become jealous that India is becoming more important. For us the most important thing is what happens in India and, to put it in a nutshell, what happens, let us say, to our Second Five Year Plan, Third Five Year Plan, and so on. Fortunately we have largely succeeded in the First Five Year Plan. Apart from the actual figures which are fairly good there is the psychological impression of success in our country and outside. Now, the Second Plan is on a much bigger scale and I want all of you to understand the basic principles underlying that Plan and its broad features. You should read the draft of the Second Five Year Plan. I do not want you to know the details of it, but you must know the basis of it. We say it is socialistic, but basically it is a pragmatic—socialist approach, that is we want certain results. We do not arrive at certain ideological policies, and then try to find ways to implement it. But rather we want to achieve some things and try to find the best way for it. I am not referring to our internal problems like states reorganization. Its importance really lies in so far as it weakens India's unity and brings out our rather parochial ways of thinking. We are, as Rajaji says, tribal. All our caste system is cent per cent tribalism and nothing else.

Let us not put on airs about it. It is a relic of tribalism and it hits us in the eye at every step. The real conflict and contest in the future of India is against these tribal, parochial, and narrow tendencies. So, you must understand the Five Year Plan because that is the thing that has to be put across in other countries. In the Five Year Plan there are many things to be discussed. Community Projects are more important from the point of view of Asian countries than the big industries that we are putting up. But essentially we are in the process of fairly rapid industrialization. There is no other way to raise

9. In fact, Queen Elizabeth II and the Duke of Edinburgh paid a three-weeks' visit to Nigeria from 28 January to 15 February 1956.

the standards of our people and the strength of our country, except through large-scale industrialization. Industrialization means heavy industries and the machine-making industries. It does not matter how many textile mills you have in this country. That is not industrialisation. It does not matter how many odd factories you have. That is not industrialization. It is heavy industry that is the foundation and the basis on which you could build. Of course, we want cottage and small industries for obvious reasons, one among them being employment.

2. Indo-Pakistan Relations

In the final analysis, our relations with Pakistan are more important than our relations with any other country. Geographically, and in many other ways, Pakistan is our nearest neighbour, and we have been very intimately connected with it in the past. It is most important and for any one to think otherwise shows that he has no understanding of the true position at all. That position is so regardless of what might be said or done in Pakistan or regardless of even the possible conflicts between India and Pakistan. If there is a conflict we have to come back to face the same issues after the conflict. Therefore, what one should do is to face them even before the conflict because conflict would make their solution more difficult.

We feel very aggrieved, and rightly too, at the attitude of the Pakistan Government and press, but at any rate we should understand or try to understand their attitude even though it may be a wrong attitude, and try to remember that we are not always blameless and they are not always in the wrong. We, on our side, have also made mistakes, petty mistakes if you like, both on the Government and press sides and on our people's side. Our mistakes have been on a smaller scale than Pakistan's but the major difference is that at any rate on our side an attempt is made not to commit errors and not to worsen the situation, while on the Pakistan side the Government and press do things which increase tension. For instance, we have tried to check our press. Our press no doubt does not function as the *Dawn* or other papers function on the other side. It is true that our press, specially in Calcutta, is not always functioning as it should, and even a little exaggeration on the part of our press becomes the cause of much greater reaction on the other side.

Take these border disputes. Here the statement made by the Defence Minister¹ was not correct when he said that we do not possess an inch of Pakistani territory. The fact is that the Radcliffe Award was not a sensible award from the geographical and other points of view and it gave certain bits of territory on our side of the river to Pakistan and certain bits of territory on the other side to us. This is no doubt very inconvenient to both parties. The result has been that in actual practice we occupy some bits of territory on this

1. K.N. Katju.

side and they occupy some bits of territory on the other side and there is constant trouble. When they talk of bits of territory occupied by us they do not mention the fact that they also occupy some chunks of our territory. So, there is always a tendency on each side to make partial statements of facts and try to suppress other facts. In our Parliament numerous questions are raised about the border disputes and we put up sometimes long statements that there have been fifty, sixty or hundred incursions in the course of the last year or two years chiefly in Jammu and Kashmir across the ceasefire line. Of course, the ceasefire line is a fixed line. I think it is true that in the Kashmir area there have been quite a number of Pakistani incursions, petty ones chiefly, but there were also two or three major ones. All these statements create an exaggerated impression of what is happening. Very often in every international frontier criminals and others take advantage. They cross over, steal cows or some other things and

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Take the recent case of the Chhad Bet in the Kutch area.² We are talking of our area. Radcliffe did not define that area. What Radcliffe said was that Kutch was here and Sind was there. So the argument arises as to what the boundary was before Radcliffe came into the picture. So we go to the old papers. We see that in 1913 or thereabouts the Kutch-Sind boundary was defined. The discussion is about the previous boundary between Sind and Kutch. The area is all a sandy waste and a great part of it is covered with water some

cattle there. What I wanted to warn you about is not to take too one-sided a view of these matters and therefore not to exaggerate things.

I will give you another instance of how we go wrong. We are sometimes overcautious and in being overcautious we do not take quite a correct line. In this border demarcation we went on insisting on the demarcation of the land border leaving out the river border for the time being. I do not know how to distinguish between a land border and a river border. And what was the reason for this? Because some demarcation of the river border might be against our interest and so we wanted to delay that. It is not a very important matter whether it is a hundred yards this way or that way. Anyway we are likely to go ahead with this demarcation now, whether it is to our advantage or disadvantage. That, I think, would minimise or put an end to these border disputes. The disputes on the Jammu and Kashmir border will of course remain. There is only a ceasefire line there.

You know that I have been in some correspondence with the Pakistan Prime Minister about the demarcation of our borders, and we have practically agreed to begin the work soon. In the last message³ which was sent by us today we have invited them to send their Surveyor General or some other representatives here to Delhi next week to discuss with our Surveyor General and others in a line of action and the procedure to be followed. I do not know whether they will come next week, but if they cannot come here, we are prepared to send our Surveyor General to Karachi. We will attach to him some junior officer from our Ministry who knows the subject.

I do not mind judges being appointed for border demarcation, but the moment you appoint judges you spread out the whole thing and a task which should take six months would drag on for six years.

We are going to proceed on the basis of the Radcliffe Award. If, for valid reasons, a slight variation is desirable to have a better frontier, then with the consent of both parties that may be done. Suppose the border goes through a village, it is a nuisance. The village should be either on this or on that side, but this variation can only be made with the consent of both parties. Where there is disagreement they are to refer the matter to both the Governments.

3. See *ante*, pp. 323-324.

If you go back to the partition time and before, we had inherited a great deal of ill will against each other and then at the time of Partition, which was a very tragic and painful process, the people who were Thinking of the future thought that this arrangement would sow seeds of trouble in the future, that it would take us a long time to get rid of that, that the tendency would inevitably be for great differences to arise between the people of Pakistan and India and that people who started to be more or less the same, by and large, would take different turns culturally and otherwise. Partition took place and there were those horrible killings and the rest which again left a terrible memory behind. I think we have outlived that memory unless something happens which would arouse that memory. But normally speaking I think the people of Pakistan and the people of India have no great ill will towards each other except when they are roused by some fear or religious cry or something else.

Both because of our past policy and because of our present practical needs we try to follow a policy of peaceful adjustment. The people are more or less the same on either side. They get excited or not. We have people in India who function in their language and their writings practically as aggressively as anybody in Pakistan and who if they had their way—I am talking of communal groups in India—would do exactly the same thing as the bitterest communal writer on the other side. The only difference is that they cannot have their way here while in Pakistan they do have their way. They are a minority here. Others can check them and prevent the mischief. The mischief they do is to incite the people in Pakistan to greater efforts at mischief. Many things that you do not even read about in the newspapers here, like what somebody is saying in the Hindu Mahasabha, get big headlines in Pakistan and they say, this is what India is saying. It does not represent the majority thinking in India and certainly not the Government's policy. But it is there.

The whole conception of the Muslim League was one of disunity and spreading hatred, and the basic thing was the two-nation theory. The two nations might have been cooperating as friendly nations, but Pakistan adopted a negative policy. Politically, culturally and economically it was a negative policy and Pakistan has never got over that negative start that it has had in many things. It is a negative one of hatred and dislike, and of blaming India therefore for everything. India may often be to blame. I do not say it was not. This negative policy has simply undermined Pakistan's minds and citizens. So as a reaction to this inevitably they seek help abroad and take whatever aid is offered. It is not that the people in India or the people who are now in Pakistan are better or worse than the other. Our old policy, apart from Gandhiji and the rest, was

inevitably based on trying to win over the others because we wanted a united India. That was the obvious motive. We may not have always acted on that, but because of the national movement we had to prevent giving expression to communal passions. So, we were in a rather weak position vis-à-vis—I am speaking about pre-independence days—the Muslim League because they had a clear policy of cursing or saying something and because they wanted to create a feeling of disharmony. It is easy to create that feeling whether on a religious topic or on anything else. We, on the other hand, had by force of circumstances to be moderate and this was the right thing of course. Now, that pursues us still. Pakistan can take up a policy by and large which is purely a negative one and one of hatred against India. We cannot. When I say we, I am talking about the Government and those who represent the national movement still. Take the propaganda of Pakistan. They can curse as much as they like. We cannot and should not do so both because of our basic policy apart from the morals of it, and the practical good of it. It pays for the moment but in the long run it does not fit in with our entire approach. So we have to go slow. What we can do is to place the facts before the public there in restrained language because in the long run we can get over this conflict not by conflict or by creating the atmosphere of conflict, but by creating a different atmosphere of trying to get rid of conflict. That is the basic difficulty which is always facing a person who wants to look ahead and wants an atmosphere of cooperation in the future. But we must always remember that we are thinking in terms of long term prospects and of not just tomorrow or the day after.

Now, what are the questions before us? They are, Kashmir, canal waters, evacuee properties, exodus from East Bengal and the border problem. I have just referred to the border problem. In the canal waters issue I think we are, roughly speaking, ninety-five per cent in the right. In 1948 the Punjab Government technically acted rightly when they cut off water because it had not been paid for, for some time. A considerable sum was due and they gave them a warning too that it would be cut off if they did not pay and then they cut it off. But as soon as we learnt about it we made them open after ten to twelve days but it was three weeks before water started coming in. At that critical moment it caused loss to the people there. The peasantry did not get water for sowing and that had much greater effect in creating ill will there than anything we could have done; and it was done by the Punjab Government. That little false move has caused us enormous trouble subsequently over the canal water issue because it gave rise to a deep suspicion that we cut off the water just to strangle them. Immediately after that we held a meeting here at which

Mr Ghulam Mohammed who was then a Minister in the Pakistan Government. Zafrullah Khan⁴ and some Pakistan Punjab Ministers were also present.⁵

Some East Punjab Ministers and some technical personnel were also present. The meeting was held for a day or two and they reported to me that no agreement had been arrived at and that they were breaking up. Well, I said, "Hold on till tomorrow. I shall attend it". I attended the next morning and our talks took a different turn. We did not argue about legal niceties and quibbles. I said: "Let us bear in mind two or three broad facts. It is obvious that we want this water. If we do not get it there is no Bhakra project. But the whole project had been started long before Partition, and it has to be worked through. Otherwise the whole region will dry up and we cannot get any water from anywhere else. There is no other river handy. So there is no good arguing about it. It is perfectly obvious that you need the water too and if the water is cut off you suffer and we do not want you to suffer. And there is quite enough water for both of us. This may require some adjustments though we cannot do much about it. This requires some adjustments on your side, some canals or some other thing to get water from the other rivers. Therefore you must investigate all those possibilities. Our engineers and your engineers should meet and find out, for there is enough water in the rivers. More than ninety per cent of the waters of the Indus flow into the sea and we can utilise, whatever water we want. So you should recognise that we have a right to this water and we also recognise that we should not cut the supply without giving you full time for adjustments". So quite apart from going to the legal aspect of the thing, Pakistan recognised that we would not cut it off suddenly, but only gradually, allowing time for adjustments so that they may not suffer. This in broad outline is the agreement of 4 May 1948, signed by Ghulam Mohammed, Zafrullah, Daulatana, myself and others.⁶ Subsequently we sent our engineers but nothing much came out of it. I think the Pakistan Government took up a very unreasonable and narrow-minded attitude all this time.

4. Foreign Minister of Pakistan, 1947-54.

5. For Nehru's meeting with Ghulam Mohnammed, Finance Minister of Pakistan, on 3 May 1948, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 6, pp. 63-66.

6. The agreement was signed on behalf of India by Nehru, N.V. Gadgil, Minister for Works, Mines and Power, and Swaran Singh, Minister for Irrigation, East Punjab, and on behalf of Pakistan by Ghulam Mohammed, and Shaukat Hyat Khan and Mumtaz Daulatana, both ministers in the West Punjab Government.

Ultimately the International Bank came into the picture and we accepted their proposal. They wanted to mediate and help and this has now been going on for a few years. It has taken an enormous time with a big staff and engineers sitting in Washington for six or eight months, then coming here and then going back. Gradually and very slowly, we have come nearer settlement. The Bank people have suggested a kind of proposal which broadly speaking amounts to this: We should get water from these particular rivers and in course of time in Pakistan various engineering works should be undertaken to get water from other sources. India is to give Pakistan about Rs sixty to seventy crores to enable it to build these canals and make other adjustments. Ultimately we accepted this proposal. But at first, Pakistan hesitated and afterwards with some pressure they have in a way accepted it. I do not think they ever accepted it cent per cent, but they agreed to proceed on those lines to investigate, and in a sense, and inferentially, they have accepted it. They have agreed to work it out without accepting the basic points so as to see what the results will be. We have said that it is not right and that they must accept the basis of it as otherwise the whole thing would fall. Anyhow the World Bank said: "Let us not break off". And their and our engineers are working on these lines. I cannot tell the exact stage at which the matter is because there are so many slips. Yesterday or the day before we got another paper saying that we should extend by another three months from the end of March the stay of our deputation at Washington. They go on staying there for years, and we have agreed for another three months, that is to say, April, May and June. Anyhow it is probable some agreement will be arrived at, though one cannot be quite sure what might happen.

Now, we turn to the evacuee property. The broad fact is that according to any computation the evacuee property left in Pakistan by those who have come here is worth about four times as much as the evacuee property left in India by those who have gone over to Pakistan. I do not know the exact figures but for the sake of argument it may be taken that the property left here is worth about Rs two hundred crores whereas the property left over in Pakistan is about Rs seven hundred to Rs eight hundred crores. It is obvious that the properties left there continue to belong to the people who have come here although they were actually in the possession of the Custodian of Evacuee Property there. Years passed and the property went to rack and ruin. The Custodian cannot look after a hundred thousand petty houses and others. We have been trying to come to some agreement about these properties. I am not referring to movable property

about which some agreement has been arrived at.⁷ Pakistan's case is that you should allow private exchange of properties between the evacuee here and the evacuee there. We did not agree to it. And the evacuees here were completely opposed to it because private exchanges of property meant that a number of rich people on both sides would get the properties exchanged while the millions of smaller folk would get nothing at all. A man cannot exchange a small shop here in Chandni Chowk with another in Lahore. There is no means of doing it and the poor folk wanted a share in the big property. On our side—I do not know about the other side—evacuees, or rather the dispossessed persons, are very well organised. They have all kinds of organisations and they stoutly opposed this business of some rich people here having a deal with the rich on the other side. And we also agreed. It is not fair and so we did not agree to the repeated proposals of Pakistan to allow private exchanges of property. We said: "Let us discuss it on a governmental level and then you can give compensation to our evacuees out of the proceeds of the property there and we will do the same here". They did not agree to it and we have not been able to go ahead.

There was the question of land. Land has got to be cultivated. We settled the people first of all provisionally and later on, on a half-permanent basis and the thing went on. Ultimately in sheer despair we said: "We will sell this property because it is going to pieces. We cannot look after it. But even so we shall keep the money to Pakistan's account." We also said: "You do the same". That did not come off. So, it is with great reluctance that we started selling the properties here. We had to get something and so we took that step and a number of houses and properties have been sold and are being sold. Pakistan could have frankly confessed: "Your claim is much larger than ours. How are we going to give five or six hundred crores or four hundred crores? We have not got it and we do not propose to pay". We recognise that fact. Nobody could expect them to pay even in instalments. Mr Gopaldaswami Ayyangar,⁸ when he was dealing with this matter, said: "All right, let us agree to pay something". He suggested, I think, Rs one hundred and fifty crores and I think he even came down to a hundred crores and said: "I do not ask you to pay now. Let that be adjusted in the course of ten or twenty years". That too they did not

7. In January 1954, India and Pakistan (as a result of Nehru-Mohammad Ali talks in August 1953) announced the procedure for the restoration of personal and household properties of evacuees in one country lying in the other.

8. Indian Union Minister from 1947 to 1953.

agree to. So this evacuee property problem is, if you like, in a sense being solved by efflux of time. On their side my own impression is that the well-to-do evacuees have done very well indeed. They have got large properties and factories. The rich have grown richer and the poor have remained in a miserable condition. Many live in hovels round about Karachi and nothing has been done. There is a different social approach on both sides. We have tried as far as possible, to help the poorer among the evacuees. My opinion is that we have paid a little more to the rich than we ought to have, especially in regard to land. However, we have graded it.

I shall now take up the exodus from East Bengal. At the present moment I think it is from our point of view by far the most important problem between India and Pakistan, more important and more upsetting than Kashmir. Out of a population of forty-five millions in East Bengal, thirteen millions, or about thirty per cent, were Hindus. It is a fairly big population and comprised the middle classes, large number of professional people and some zamindars, but there was a higher percentage of the middle class people and the zamindari elements. The first effect of Partition was for a number of people especially the middle class people, to come away both because of the psychological bonds with Calcutta and probably because they had no particular future there. However, there was no big exodus as from West Pakistan. But it was a continuous stream. At the end of 1949 or the beginning of 1950 migrations between Pakistan and India became suddenly very big on both sides. A large number of Muslims started going from West Bengal to East Bengal and a large number of Hindus came over. On the Rajputana border in Khokhropar, hundred or two hundred Muslims went over at a time and sometimes illegally. They came to a railhead there and then walked a few miles across. Nobody stopped them here or on the other side, or the stoppage was not efficient. There were large numbers—hundreds and thousands—coming over from east to west and from west to east Bengal. It was then that I met Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan⁹ here and we came to some kind of an agreement which is called the Nehru-Liaquat Ali Agreement, in April 1950.¹⁰ In that we said that we would give them facilities to go back to their respective places. That had very good results. Large numbers of people returned both ways. Hindus who had come away from East Bengal returned and Muslims who had gone away returned. It certainly

9. Prime Minister of Pakistan, 1947-51.

10. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 14, Part I, pp. 155-182.

did have a stabilising effect on both sides and actually for eight months or a year the number of people coming back was much more than the number of people going out. Then gradually this process of Hindus coming out started at a fair pace though not an overwhelming pace. This has gone on for two or three years. It is bad but there it is. We drew attention to it repeatedly. There were many reasons for it. The zamindaris were being put an end to. Also large numbers of people working there were being pushed out. How much of it was due to the people at the top I cannot say. Actually it might be the functioning of the district officials and others, but there was also the element of insecurity. The economic conditions were deteriorating in the last two or three years. Suddenly in the last five or six months the numbers increased very considerably and a new type of person started coming in—the agriculturist. They were not moving in large numbers previously. It would not be easy because they have to leave their land to which they have been attached for generations and only extreme fear or pressure makes such a class move. They could not sell their lands because nobody would buy. Even if they sold them they could only sell them at a nominal price. This process is going on and 20,000 to 40,000 a month are coming and we are facing this problem now. This, I think, is the most important and urgent problem between India and Pakistan at present. I do not think the Pakistan Government or even the East Bengal Government like this at all, but they have been unable to do much and I think the local officers still continue to exercise their pressure. I am quite sure the whole inner economy of Pakistan will break up completely. Of course, people think in a very narrow-minded way. But if the essential elements of inner economy suddenly disappear it upsets the whole structure.

I said a good deal in the Lok Sabha yesterday about Kashmir¹¹ and there is no point in repeating all that. Nevertheless I shall repeat three or four major points in regard to Kashmir. One fact to be remembered always is aggression by Pakistan.¹² When we brought this matter before the Security Council and pointed out their aggression and asked them to stop it, Pakistan completely denied everything alleged against her. I cannot remember any such tissue of lies as that contained in the speech of Zafrullah Khan in the initial stages of this Kashmir dispute, though at a later stage they had to admit many things. In the

11. See *ante*, p. 301 and *post*, p. 532.

12. In October 1947, the Pakistan Government aided and abetted a massive tribal invasion of the state of Kashmir from its North West Frontier Province.

last eight or ten months people in Pakistan have come out with elaborate details about how they organised the raids, how they had been asked by the Government to organise them and how they demanded money. Somebody went to the court even. Actually the UN Commission itself found that the Pakistan Army was there. Apart from the gradual developments and apart from the fact that the UN Commission's first condition was the withdrawal of Pakistan forces from that area, which has never been fulfilled, other things happened. The major thing is this military help to Pakistan from the USA, which immediately stopped our conversations with the Pakistan Prime Minister.¹³ I do not say that we shall no longer talk, but I say that we can no longer talk on the old basis. We were discussing at that time the conditions necessary for a plebiscite before we could agree to a plebiscite and I said that the situation had changed now and that we had to consider this matter afresh.

Well, we did not meet after that except in April last year when Mohammad Ali of Bogra and Iskander Mirza came here.¹⁴ I said to them: "We differ about certain basic matters. We think you are completely in the wrong, although you may think that we are in the wrong. We had all kinds of talks for five years in trying to find how to fulfil the prerequisites of a plebiscite, but we failed. In fact we failed in the very first thing that we were discussing. That was in regard to the quantum of troops. There are many other very difficult matters which we never discussed and therein also we would have failed. I am prepared to go on with the talks. But it is patent that when we have not succeeded for six or seven years, we are not going to succeed when other things are happening. The military aid makes the problems much more difficult now than ever before, because the whole context of things has changed for us and all that previous argument about how many troops are to be kept there does not apply now". Now they have got the military backing of big powers and even if they keep a few troops a hundred miles behind the border they have far greater strength.

Now, I want you to realise how this military aid has completely changed the whole problem and created for us an entirely new situation. It changed the problem from the point of view of how much army we should keep in Kashmir,

13. The reference is to the talks held in 1953 between Nehru and Mohammad Ali, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, immediately followed by Pakistan's decision to accept military aid from the US. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 23, pp. 344-346.

14. For Nehru's talks with Mohammad Ali and Iskander Mirza, Pakistan Minister of Interior, in May 1955, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 28, pp. 246-263.

because now Pakistan has behind its enormous resources pouring in and our obligation to Kashmir became difficult to fulfil with the attenuated armies that we were prepared to keep there. This is a narrow result of this, but the broader results were much more far-reaching. Great powers were behind them and they were creating war bases. Thus the position in India became endangered regardless of even Kashmir and apart from this peril to Kashmir, we could not allow this peril to India. I shall not go into details, but many other factors came in. Meanwhile there were the constitutional developments. Kashmir has had her constitution and she has ratified her accession to India. So all that has made a tremendous difference. Therefore it is not a question of my saying that I will not do this or that with regard to the plebiscite, but recognising the facts I said: "I am not going into the legal aspects at all. You know our position and we hold it strongly". I also said that whatever happened in regard to Kashmir should produce a certain feeling of settling a problem and not of unsettling it. If we fail again then the result is that we have far more difficult problems to face than previously. What I was referring to was the talk about a plebiscite, and a plebiscite for the whole of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. And whichever way the plebiscite may decide, it will decide for the whole of the state. The result will be a large-scale migration, i.e., if the so-called 'Azad Kashmir' areas come to India there may be a large-scale migration from the 'Azad Kashmir' area to the other side. And if any area goes from here, there will be migration here. It does not seem to be very reasonable to expect anything to happen by discussing in the old way because during these four years all kinds of major developments have taken place in these countries. They have stabilised in their own way on either side. There are constitutional difficulties, practical difficulties too and if we take any step now which will upset all this it will mean migrations and exodus and not only upsets, but also the ruin of Kashmir and this may lead to great bitterness between India and Pakistan. We wish to avoid a conflict with Pakistan. So I said that there were all sorts of difficulties involved and that they must accept all that has happened. And there is no other way out. We cannot simply be talking and talking. Of course, I do not mind talking, but that will not give them any satisfaction and will not give me also any satisfaction. Therefore, I said: "Recognising things as they are, let us on that basis consider what the frontier should be, make some minor changes here and there according to the convenience of the parties and according to the local conditions there". We want a solution of the Kashmir problem which will not add to our difficulties with Pakistan. The other basic problems will remain and we want a friendly solution which does not upset the settled states of things in Kashmir. If it upsets them then it raises new problems in an

acute form which will lead to further trouble with Pakistan. They said: "We cannot of course agree to this and we have to consult our colleagues. Let us meet again, but let us not meet again in this official and formal way because that creates expectations. Let us deal with each other more privately". I was quite agreeable to that. Since then of course we have not met and no other effort was made for informal talks. That is the position. All these developments of the Baghdad Pact and SEATO have made it far more difficult. We are anxious of course for some kind of a reasonable settlement, but I do not think at the present moment there is much chance of Pakistan coming anywhere near accepting such a one.

I have naturally strong feelings about this Kashmir issue. I happen to be connected with it from the very first day when we received the news suddenly about this invasion. Then or a little before we were very angry with the Maharaja there for his misbehaviour. There is no doubt about this that the Maharaja by his folly or indecision in a sense brought about these various crises. We had nothing to do with the Maharaja. We were entirely opposed to him. When Lord Mountbatten went there a little before all this happened, he had not the slightest interest where Kashmir went, whether to Pakistan or to India. But he is a very methodical and orderly man and knows how things should be done or not done. He pushed all these rulers in the Indian States. I doubt very much if we could have brought about these changes here in regard to the Indian States but for Mountbatten. He hustled them, sent for them and talked to them, and caused others like Sardar Patel to hustle them. Sardar Patel or myself were enemies from the point of view of the Indian Princes; but Lord Mountbatten was the Crown Representative himself and so there was some difference. And they felt there was nobody to help them in the wide world. Therefore in a sense they agreed. And Mountbatten said he wanted to settle Kashmir and Hyderabad too before he went. He was very eager. Hyderabad of course is a different story. He invited the Nizam, but the Nizam would not come. And Mountbatten did not want to go to Hyderabad under those circumstances when the Nizam had refused to come. Sir Walter Monckton¹⁵ came and went to and fro. Mountbatten went to Kashmir and pressed them to do something. The first day he was received, he immediately wanted to talk about these matters. But the Maharaja said: "Yes, we will talk". But he went on postponing the thing. On the last day

15. Constitutional Adviser to the Nizam of Hyderabad.

he said he had a terrific colic. Though he never refused to see Mountbatten, the poor man had to come back and he was very much annoyed with the Maharaja. The Maharaja acted under the direct or indirect instance of others. On the one hand, there were the Dogras, his camp people. They misbehaved very badly in the Jammu area about the time of the troubles in the Punjab. There was no trouble in Kashmir proper. In fact Gandhiji publicly in his prayer meeting criticised the Maharaja very strongly saying that it was disgraceful how he behaved. But all this is now brought into the picture as if we were responsible for all that.

I remember those days. They were days of great strain. It was a very difficult decision to take to send our troops by air.¹⁶ We had no aircraft to send them in. We had no troops ready for this particular purpose. They were spread all over India. We took the decision at about 6 pm.¹⁷ Mountbatten was present. There was the Defence Committee and we issued orders and we stopped all the civilian aircrafts those came that night and used them. We sent about two hundred people there to begin with, Dakotas taking thirty or forty at a time. We did not know whether they would be able to land. It was doubtful in whose possession the airfield would be. In fact, if they had got there six hours later, the airfield would have gone also. The airfield would have gone anyhow if the raiders had not stopped two days at Baramula sacking the place. We know of course that Pakistan was aiding them. Otherwise they could not have come. But we did not know that Pakistan army was also aiding them. A few hundreds of our trained troops would have been able to deal with the raiders if there was no army. They pushed the raiders to the end of the valley and then they stayed there without pushing them. They wanted to relieve Mirpur and Poonch which were besieged. A very small force went to Poonch and the other force went after them, but ran short of petrol. This happened for two or three days and then they pushed on. Suddenly when they reached Uri they came up against a blank wall strongly defended by Pakistan troops with mountain batteries and all. The raiders were fleeing like anything. There were three stages. The first was the raiders stage with the aid of Pakistani troops who were in the background. The second stage was when Pakistan was functioning there not regularly, but the Pakistani troops were there. In theory they were supposed to

16. By 25 October 1947, the raiders from Pakistan had reached Baramula town, about 35 kms north-west of Srinagar. The Maharaja of Kashmir asked the Government of India for military aid.

17. On 26 October 1947.

be on leave and were enrolled as 'volunteers'. That was the explanation given. The third stage was when they were there fully and completely.

How many of you have read the little book¹⁸ which was written by Krishna Mehta? She is a very remarkable woman. She was in Muzaffarabad. Her husband¹⁹ was District Magistrate there, but was shot down by the raiders. She wandered for about three days with five children in the forest. Winter was coming in. She was captured and then she came back. She was there in Muzaffarabad as a kind of prisoner. She behaved with extreme courage, but it is interesting to see how she writes that when our troops were advancing—they were driving the raiders—the raiders expected them to come to Muzaffarabad every moment and were packing up and running away. We did not follow immediately because we followed strictly the tenets of war. We did not have rations and supplies for the next stage. If we had taken a few risks and had gone on probably we would have pushed these people out, but we did not. This enabled the Pakistani people to entrench themselves there. There was the Pakistani army and we got numerous material apart from weapons, soldiers' tunics and the pay-books giving all their particulars. They were shown in an exhibition here in Delhi.

We should take up in right earnest publicity on the East Bengal exodus and Kashmir issues. There is a strong tendency for the people in the Pakistani occupied area to come across here. The Kashmir Government stops them because we do not quite know what will happen if they allow thousands and thousands of people to come over. Some wrong people may come too, but the fact is that most of the people want to come over because conditions are better on this side. There have been, in 'Azad Kashmir' active revolts and fairly large-scale shootings sometime ago. The fact of the matter is that the Kashmiris proper are very dissatisfied in 'Azad Kashmir'. It is the Poonchis, and others who are fairly strong elements there, that are pro-Pakistani. Miss Jinnah²⁰ went to 'Azad Kashmir' last year I think. When she came back she was very angry with what she saw and she said, not publicly but semi-publicly, that if there was a plebiscite, everybody in 'Azad Kashmir' will vote for India simply because of dissatisfaction with the existing conditions.

18. *This Happened in Kashmir*.

19. Dunichand Mehta.

20. Fatima Jinnah, sister of Mohammed Ali Jinnah.

Now, probably this whole matter may go to the Security Council. If it does, well and good. I am afraid we are going to have a terrific lot of violent and vituperative language from Pakistan. There is no help for it. I do not want our Missions to indulge in that language or that approach, but rather to lay stress on the basic facts. Apart from the merits of the question, it will get entangled in power rivalries. Entirely different factors will come into consideration. Should the powers do some thing which will irritate and anger India very much or should they not do something and thereby irritate Pakistan? These are major considerations and are not the merits of the case. As a rule they—I mean England and America—have not behaved well in the past few years. They have always quietly supported the Pakistan side. The British people used to talk to us—either to our High Commissioner or somebody else—but not publicly; they are more cautious about that. There were some public statements in America. President Truman sent in 1949-50 a rather aggressive message to India and Pakistan to say that the Kashmir issue must be settled or else the consequences will be serious. To that we sent a strong reply.²¹ Ever since then they have been very cautious in making any approach. Lately, in the last two or three months, Lord Home, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, brought this subject up before our High Commissioner²² in a general way. Now, because of a number of factors, they cannot do that type of thing. It will be a hard decision for them what attitude to take and they will obviously refrain from irritating India beyond a certain limit. On the other hand, India's policy towards the Baghdad Pact is entirely opposed to theirs, but perhaps in the balance India counts in their eyes far more than Pakistan, not because of any affection for India in preference to Pakistan, but because India happens to be in a stronger position in various ways.

Then about the border raids. I really am surprised that Dr Khan Sahib²³ should go on saying that we are pouring money into Afghanistan. It is a completely wrong statement. We have been naturally very friendly with Afghanistan for various reasons, but we have been very very careful not to get entangled in this Pakhtoonistan matter, whatever our sympathies, because, even if we expressed an opinion on that, that would lead to Pakistan saying: "You see the whole thing is engineered from India; it is not a real and spontaneous movement". I do not think Pakistan's position is right either. That is a different

21. Harry S. Truman wrote to Nehru on 30 August 1949. For Nehru's reply sent on 8 September 1949, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 13, pp. 219-222.

22. Vijayalakshmi Pandit, High Commissioner of India in Britain.

23. Chief Minister of West Pakistan.

thing. Even Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan²⁴ does not accept Afghanistan's position. He wants the Pakhtoons to be autonomous. It is not clear to us. They leave it rather vague. However we have kept away from this controversy. In fact I have never said anything in public. It is not true that we have helped them with money and rice. Some four years back we gave them a loan of a crore of rupees when they were badly off on account of economic blockade. Later we wrote it off because we had no hope of recovery. It was a friendly gesture to a friendly country and had nothing to do with the Pakhtoonistan issue.

One thing I may point out is that Pakistan has developed what is known and often characterised as 'the Middle Eastern country' pattern. It is not a very complimentary phrase either to the 'Middle Eastern countries' or to Pakistan. That signifies social, economic and political backwardness with normally not popular governments, and aided politically and economically by foreign powers. It is undoubtedly a bad thing from Pakistan's point of view. I should like you to consider this aid by some of the Western nations. Where does this aid go? Very little reaches the people. It is lost in the upper ranks and goes to make the rich there richer. The people may get a road here or something there, but the whole system of government is such and the manner of giving help is such—first of all, it is military help—that it does not help the people at all. It is a strain on the people of the country. And, secondly, even the help given for developmental purposes does not trickle down to the people. The result is that they really do not make any progress politically or economically although they get a large amount of money.

24. The distinguished NWFP statesman, known in India as 'the Frontier Gandhi' for his unqualified faith in non-violence; detained from 1947 to 1955, by the Pakistan Government for demanding Pakhtoonistan.

3. Talks with Eminent Foreign Visitors

You wanted to know something about my talks with Selwyn Lloyd, Dulles and others. I had long talks with each of them for four to six hours. Selwyn Lloyd came here before the Karachi conference and so naturally he could not say anything about the Karachi Conference.¹ The episode of the Kashmir issue being mentioned there did not arise. Almost everyone of them started talking about the situation in West Asia. They looked worried about it. That naturally led to the Baghdad Pact. They said that it was for economic aid and that they did not attach too much value to the other aspects of it. Of course the security interests are also there.

When Selwyn Lloyd came here, he was in a rather jittery state partly because many things had been happening which had upset him. The Cyprus problem² was there. On the very night before he arrived here, there was a very small incident which had some effect on him. At Bahrain there was some demonstration against his party. In the evening some people threw stones against the car in which his party was travelling. He was delayed for about two or three hours. He waited till the evening to come away. Though it was a small incident, it was unexpected and irritating. He was rather upset by it. There was another incident—Glubb Pasha's dismissal in Jordan. That shocked him. He was by no means calm and collected.

We discussed these Pacts and Indo-China of course. He agreed that he must meet Molotov. He asked me about Kashmir. I gave him briefly what my idea was. I told him much more clearly than what I stated in the Lok Sabha yesterday³ of our talk with the Prime Minister of Pakistan last year and my offer to him. Selwyn Lloyd said: "Why cannot you settle this as Italy and Yugoslavia settled the question of Trieste?" I said, broadly speaking, "That is

1. The SEATO Council members met in Karachi from 6 to 8 March 1956.
2. While Turkey maintained that Cyprus should be restored to her as the British had taken it from her in 1878, in Greece there was a movement, supported by the Greek Government, for the union of Greece with Cyprus. The movement was intensified in February 1956. Archbishop Makarios, in a statement on 5 March 1956, called upon Greek Cypriots to "continue the struggle for self-determination until the British Government showed respect for our national aspirations."
3. 29 March 1956.

exactly what we have suggested.” Then he said, “That is not my particular concern”, meaning that that is the concern of Lord Home who is the Commonwealth Secretary. Of course, we discussed the new developments in Russia, my visit to Russia, Bulganin’s and Khrushchev’s visit here and the Twentieth Communist Party Congress there. It was all very interesting. Then he said that SEATO had nothing to do with our problems with Pakistan. It is perfectly true.

Some reference was made to strained Indo-British relations. This started because of Malcolm MacDonald.⁴ He came here from Singapore where he had been in a completely different atmosphere. And he found it difficult to adjust himself to the atmosphere and politics of Delhi. He will gradually do so. During this period also there was the Baghdad Pact and the SEATO coming up repeatedly, and so he was no doubt very much upset. Also Bulganin and Khrushchev came during this period. I told Selwyn Lloyd that the way I looked upon Indo-British relationships was not powerfully affected by these things. We have to come to an agreement, and if we fail then one goes one way and the other goes the other way, and the farther we go the more it puts a strain. We discuss and either they slow down their pace in a particular direction, or do some other thing.

Among the major countries, the USA, England and France, you find that no two countries have identically the same policies. There are different pulls. At the recent moment France is less anti-Soviet than either of the other two countries. And England is less anti-Soviet than America. There are gradations in these things. Both England and France are under deep obligations to the US financially and hope for future help. Dulles said that England was in such a bad way that on practical grounds there is need for American help. He did not say that exactly, but he meant that, and said: “We shall have to help them”. We are talking more on political than on financial terms. All these countries, which had been helped financially and by way of arms by the US, except Germany, are like this. Germany has in its own way made good remarkably. Although large sums of money have been obtained, essentially the quality of hard work has helped them. All these other countries made good, in a sense, in the first two or three years after the War, but later they became more and more dependent on the US financially. Because of the policy of rearmament, England

4. Malcolm MacDonald, the High Commissioner of UK in India was earlier British Commissioner General to South East Asia.

has to face a very difficult financial position and I do not see how she can meet her expenditure without reducing that on her armament programme. She wants to appear before the world as one of the top-most powers, and power is measured by armaments and by the hydrogen bomb. That is the reason why they go in for it. I do not think it makes any difference in the balance of power whether they have a hydrogen bomb or not because if America has hundred such bombs and England has one hundred or one hundred and one does not make much difference. But just for their prestige they have to have one.

Then came Dulles after the SEATO meeting in Karachi. My mind was filled with what they said in Karachi. I allowed him to take the lead in the conversation. And he talked first of all about the Israel situation about which he was greatly worried. Then about the Baghdad Pact he said: "It was against our advice that this has been entered into. We, the American Government, do not approve of it in that form and in that type". Not that they are against the principle. But the British Government went into it and brought in Turkey. Now they have landed themselves in mess. He pointed out how terribly important it was for the UK to have the oil of these regions and if they lost that, then they practically ceased to function as an important power and would lose foreign exchange. It meant a complete collapse for Great Britain. He also indicated that the British people had not been wise in the steps they had taken. "But they are our allies", he said, "and we cannot allow them to go to pieces. We have to help them some way or other".

Then he himself asked me what my views were about this Twentieth Communist Party Congress. I thought it was an important event and was completely in line with what I thought would happen there after my visit to Russia and after the Russian visit here. Not about the details, but broadly speaking, I saw these developments and trends. And broadly speaking it could be said that this was a much delayed process of normalization taking place, delayed because of other events like war. He said: "I agree with you about the general direction of these developments but I do not agree with you about their pace. That is to say, it may take a whole generation to take the full effect of it or more. And we have to deal with short-term policies and not what would happen twenty or thirty years later.

Well, then we talked naturally about the SEATO, about the meeting at Karachi and about the reference to Kashmir in that meeting. He said that he was not responsible for it. In fact he said that he did not think Pakistan had any real place in the SEATO. About Kashmir he said that Pakistan had insisted upon it and he was among the last persons to speak on the subject at the Karachi meeting. I said: "I do not think it was necessary to bring this matter before that

meeting.” He said that Pakistan, on the contrary, wanted something infinitely more than that. Of course, he assured me, and he said that in public too, that they would never permit Pakistan to use their arms or the help they got against India and that if, however, Pakistan did that, they would stop this aid. In this connection I must mention that Mikoyan, when he was speaking to me, said he had a brief talk with the Pakistan Prime Minister and President about this military aid. He was told: “We have no fear from Russia. We know that you cannot come, and we are not at all afraid of you. But, we are afraid of India. And that is why we are getting this aid From America.” I asked Mikoyan day before yesterday if I could say this in public without however mentioning Mikoyan. He said: “That will not be right because the talks in Pakistan were confidential”. I told him that I did not at all wish to embarrass him in any way and indeed I had no desire to embarrass him. Of course, there is plenty of evidence to that effect.

Then we talked about Indo-China and South Vietnam’s attitude. Dulles said, “I am going there and I do not want your Commission to leave Vietnam. I would, however speak to Diem about it”.

I discussed Goa with him at some length. He told me: “Whatever was said was said after the most careful thought and consultation with the State Department”. In fact, he said that it was a draft carefully prepared by the State Department experts and not something that he had said casually. And he also said: “These experts brought it to me and I thought it was all right because I could not examine it too thoroughly”. I have no doubt in this matter that Dulles told the truth.

About our defence positions, I gave him more or less the exact figures and about our own estimates of their aid to Pakistan. He admitted that our figures about it were more or less correct, but he said that their aid was not much. I said that it may not be very great according to American standards, but that it was a great deal from our standards. I said that our army was only 400,000. It was a little more but we had reduced it. About four or five years ago we decided to reduce it by 100,000. We actually reduced it by 50,000 in the course of a year. It is true that the reductions were effected by doing away with certain elements in it like States units which were not up to standard. But nevertheless, we reduced it. We wanted to reduce it by another 50,000 but our Army Headquarters began to be nervous. They did not want it to be reduced. For one thing what to do with the persons who had been disbanded? In Rajasthan quite a number of them joined the dacoit gangs. They preferred it to joining the Police which we offered to them because they thought it was much better. For these reasons we stopped that. We were always thinking in terms of economy.

Even big machines are not so costly as the running expenditure on a standing army. We said: "All right, reduce it by 10,000 a year". In the course of five or six years a reduction of 100,000 would have been effected in this way. They went on reducing at the rate of 10,000 for two years and in all 70,000 were reduced. Only last year they came to us and said: "You had better stop this reduction. It is not right or safe". So we stopped it.

I told Dulles that we had only an army of 400,000 for a country with a long border. Apart from the Pakistan border there is a two thousand-mile border on the Chinese and Tibetan side. We will have to keep checkposts. That of course impressed him much more. He said: "Yes, 400,000 is not big enough for India. It is rather small". I said that Pakistan is likely to come up to that level or something near it and added that it is not only likely to come up to that level, but what is more, it will have the latest weapons whereas we have only ancient weapons. He said that Pakistan is not likely to attack us. But I said: "I accept your views. I have no doubt that you do not want Pakistan to attack us. But you cannot guarantee and even the present Pakistan Government cannot guarantee what somebody else two years hence will or will not do". I added: "You know that Pakistan is neither politically nor economically stable".

We do not want to increase our army at all. It is solely a question of arms, aircraft and armour. We are trying to get more armour, not at the rate that Pakistan is likely to get, but anyhow to get more armour and more aircraft too. We have to strike some kind of balance between the needs of development and the needs of defence. The whole of the Second Five Year Plan looked at from the standpoint of future defence is also a defence plan. Defence is not what some of the West Asian countries are indulging in, i.e., buying a few tanks and a few aircraft and fighting a war. They might injure each other, but in a real war if the supplies are cut off how could you fight? For one thing they may not be competent to use the arms. I do not personally think that, for a considerable time to come, Pakistan will be technically competent to use the American aid fully. Not that they cannot run a tank or fly an aircraft, but if something goes wrong or if there is an accident, they cannot repair it. It is not merely a question of an individual being able to do it, but it is a question of the industrial and technological background of the country. There cannot be any real defence unless there is an industrial background in the country. Therefore, from that point of view, we will have to develop our industrial power but the difficulty is that while you are doing it the other party may knock you down or injure you. So it is a question of balancing these factors. Maybe it means not cutting out the Five Year Plan, but asking the people to bear additional burdens. Whatever the figure—Rs 200 or Rs 300 crores—you will have to raise it by taxation or loans. We are coming to decisions.

We are ordering arms that are necessary but merely ordering the thing is not enough. You may place your orders but you may not get them straightaway. Before, all these people were not very eager to give us the arms. Now they are over-eager to supply anything you want. We purchase it and pay for it. It is we who choose the goods. We are not getting anything from America. It is much too expensive. We will get some things from France. We have not gone into the financial or other side of the Soviet military offer, but we did consider somewhat the question of aircraft. For the present we are getting aircraft from England but it is true, that the fact that we might have got aircraft from the Soviet Union has cropped up in the newspapers to some extent, and has frightened them out of their wits. And they came down in price because if they were not going to supply, the other side would. But I think from the point of view of aircraft, probably Soviet aircraft would be helpful to us. The more modern and up-to-date the weapons, the less suited they are, in the final analysis, to a country like India at the present level of our industrial development. After all, these very up-to-date weapons are so complicated. It is all very well with an American or Russian or British background, but they are frightfully complicated and the result achieved by us would not be anywhere near that of theirs. You read about guided missiles. It is an amazing thing. They can send something from New York to Moscow, and more or less accurately aimed, they say. This whole conception of American forward bases is now rather out of date because they can send guided missiles from America. So why should they have all these forward bases when they can do it more easily and comfortably from their own home bases?

Then came Pineau, immediately after Dulles. Pineau's whole approach to the questions that we discussed was different from that of either Selwyn Lloyd or Dulles. He seems to be much shrewd in his thinking about the various matters, political or economic. In regard to the Karachi meeting, he apologized for the reference made to Kashmir. He of course publicly criticised the Baghdad Pact and other policies. He said that they were very worried about the situation in Algeria. So far as Morocco and Tunisia are concerned, there is no major problem left, as they had more or less come to a decision, and both countries were free and independent. But Algeria was a problem, and so far as the Government is concerned they are prepared to give complete freedom to Algeria to do what it liked, and they would have been prepared but for one factor. The fact that Algeria is constitutionally a part of France would not come in the way. But the main factor is there are many Frenchmen living there for generations. They have no roots in France. They have been living so long in Algeria that it is their home. They are well entrenched there. They are in business everywhere, and

they are very excitable and he would not allow them to be driven into the sea. In fact, no Government in France can really think of that. But if they were to leave them to their own resources there will be civil war. There are about nine million Arabs as against a million and a half of these French. The latter form one-eighth of the population and are also better armed. They are also more united and they live mostly in the cities. And so there will be terrible civil war and he said: "We cannot tolerate that. We are prepared to deal with the Algerians. In Morocco and Tunisia we could deal with some people who may be called the nationalist leaders, but in Algeria there is no outstanding man. If there is an election somebody may be thrown up and we could deal with him. I am prepared to have elections. But how can you have an election when there is shooting going on all over the place?" All that sounded reasonable. I said these difficulties came up because they delayed the settlement so long, and the greater the delay the more difficult the problem became. They had to take risks and do something with courage. I said: "It is not for me to give you advice especially as I do not know the internal conditions. But there may be ways and means of making Algeria independent or more or less independent with safeguards for the French population there". He said he was going to Egypt and so I said it was a good thing and that he should have a meeting with Colonel Nasser and discuss the matter with him. And he saw Colonel Nasser. The question of Pondicherry was also discussed. There was no difficulty. We have produced a draft treaty for the cession of Pondicherry. They suggested some minor changes and we have accepted them and so there is no difficulty about it.

Pineau evidently was rather pleased with his talks with me and when he went back to Paris something to that effect appeared in the Paris press.

Yesterday I was talking to Eric Johnston.⁵ He is a very important person in the scheme of things in America. He is one of the advisers to the President. His main job is that of Presidentship of the Motion Picture Society. He is also President of the National Development Advisory Council Board. He pointed out to me yesterday that American forward military bases are now unnecessary, and that they created ill will for the Americans in those places. Now they can

5. (1896-1963); President, United States Chamber of Commerce, 1942-46; President of the Motion Picture Association of America since 1945; served the US Government as chairman of the inter-American economic development commission and member of the economic stabilization board; special representative of the US President with the personal rank of Ambassador to the Middle East, 1963.

deal with military situations from America itself. About three days ago, in Bombay, he made a proposal of a bank to be started for Asian development with one billion dollars as capital and practically run by Asians themselves. Only the chairman would be an American. The bank will loan out money at low rates of interest—say, 2 to 3 ½ per cent—and long periods, thirty to forty years. This is to avoid gifts which are not good and give loans specifically for development purposes. This appeared to be a move against the proposal⁶ for SUNFED which America dislikes. In fact when he mentioned it to me I said: “We will never have enough money to pay for it”. He said: “Of course, if you and others in Asia do not like my proposal, we will drop it.” He said that this proposal was purely his personal one. He has not put it either to his National Advisory Board or to the President. He proposed doing so when he goes back to the USA and after a month or so send us more precise details about it and await our reaction. I told him that we are prepared to consider it carefully. He said that this idea struck him after he left Tokyo, that he mentioned it to two persons only—the Philippines President⁷ and Soekarno in Indonesia, and that both were favourably disposed to it.

Apart from his talk he seemed to me a very able man. He is one of the Johnston family of Israel. Among other things, he criticised American policy. He said: “We have been going wrong most of the time”. He also indicated that there would be a considerable change in their policy in so far as Asian countries are concerned but there would be no marked change so far as the Soviet Union was concerned. He also added that nothing is going to happen before the elections and after the elections, it might come about gradually. He said he was present throughout my speech in the Lok Sabha yesterday and added: “I agree there is much to be said in your speech today and I hope you have said all this to Dulles when he was here because there have been such wrong thinking in America and for the sake of some military advantage here and there we are losing the goodwill of countries in Asia”.⁸

6. See *post*, p. 479.

7. Ramon Magsaysay.

8. Johnston met Dulles on 14 April on his return to the US. Dulles recorded: “Mr Johnston said that Nehru had spoken very warmly of our talk together and had expressed high regard for me although he said there was no meeting of minds. Johnston said he had heard Nehru’s foreign policy and he was quite shocked at the way in which it presented everything favourable to the Soviets and everything unfavourable to the United States. Nehru said that he thought that US economic aid should be on a loan not on a grant basis.”

4. Changes in the Soviet Union

How do we judge the Soviet Revolution and all that has occurred? These are unusual things and the way we react colours our outlook completely afterwards. It is quite conceivable that you may start by approving them and then by a succession of events begin to dislike things, as you see it unravelling itself. That happens with many people.

When the Soviet Revolution took place, broadly speaking, the liberal elements in the world welcomed it as putting an end to the Czar's power and the Kerensky period. The conservative elements did not welcome it. We might say that labour in most countries was in favour and opposed the wars of intervention. After all, Soviet Russia survived against England, France, Japan, America. Why did they survive? Not that they were stronger than all these great Powers combined, but because in every one of these countries there was a strong element supporting the Soviet Revolution. I remember there was a big agitation for 'hands off Russia' by labour and trade union councils which started boycotting ships which were carrying arms. Because of all that, Churchill's hands were weakened.¹ Of course, if they had acted a little more vigorously they might have crushed the Revolution completely. But they just could not do that. They did whatever they could and got all the ill fame for it.

Then came the twenties. We did not know then much about what was happening in Russia. In the 1919 Congress which was held in Amritsar, and over which my father was presiding, he had a paragraph about Russia objecting to the intervention of other countries in Russia and not allowing the new Russia to settle down. And without knowing much facts we were opposed to this kind of interference. Ultimately they settled down and put an end to this foreign intervention. Of course there were civil wars and other internal troubles. One cannot expect things to settle down easily after a mighty and huge revolution. There is bound to be some trouble and there is bound to be repression. Then came the First Five Year Plan² and the conflict with Trotsky. But we took no sides except that we felt that we were on Trotsky's side simply because we had read some of Trotsky's books. Here I might mention what Mikoyan told me

1. Winston Churchill was Secretary for War and Air in Britain from 1918 to 1921 and was very active in supplying military equipment to the anti-Bolshevik forces.
2. The First Five Year Plan of the Soviet Union was started in 1929.

when I asked him about this background of the Twentieth Congress. He said that when Lenin died he was rather worried about his successor. The two outstanding men at that time were Trotsky and Stalin. Both had played an important part. Trotsky was very able but with a Menshevik background. And he was rather adventurous in outlook and therefore not a reliable leader. At the same time Lenin did not like Stalin at all because he considered him very crude, rough and offensive in his dealings with other people. He said that the leader of the Communist Party must behave properly. He must be polite and must try to win people. It was a responsible position and therefore he felt that putting Stalin as leader was a risky proposition. At that time they did not think so much of Stalin becoming an autocrat of all Russia. But he had that tendency and he was very crude and rude.

So ultimately they said, "Much as we dislike Stalin, between the two we choose Stalin". Trotsky was ideologically different and they thought they could not have him. And they got Stalin. But before they took Stalin they gave him a long talk that he must behave in future. He must not be so rude and offensive, and Stalin said, 'Yes, yes'. But then gradually he threw his weight about all over the place and pushed out everybody who disagreed with him.

My first reaction when the Revolution came was of excitement and welcome. That was the first Kerensky Revolution. In those days all of us got tied up with Gandhiji's movement. So we lost sight of the Russian Revolution except as something, broadly speaking, for the good of the world. And, secondly, there was a certain conceit in ourselves that we were doing things a little better in India in the sense that we were doing them on a higher moral level and peacefully. There was no question, therefore, in our minds of copying Russia. We thought that we were good enough and that once the British people were pushed out, we would start our social revolution and go ahead according to our own way, no doubt profiting by many things that Russia had done. Then came the Five Year Plan which attracted much attention. And more especially our attention was attracted by the reports we got of changes in Central Asia which was probably the most backward place in Asia at that time. And we got reports from there of all kinds of things. For instance, I read about Tadzhikistan—a list of the factories, the hospitals, the dental clinics, all kinds of schools and colleges and universities, all created out of nothing. Even though there may be exaggeration, it showed how quickly changes could come. So in the twenties it was a very favourable time for all these. Of course, in the background these people were committing too much violence. Yet they were getting things done.

In the early thirties began some of the major purges which can be excused because of the civil war. These were rather a shock to us. And throughout the

thirties we were shaken more and more by this continuance of the purges. Very important and well known men were decapitated from day to day. So that by the end of the thirties—I am describing to you my own reactions which were, I think, relatively common to others of my generation—we were much disillusioned about Russia. Not so much about the economic system which was brought in there, but about the methods adopted. Russia's pact with Hitler shocked us greatly. And then came the War. And after a year or so the Russians joined the Allies. I always made a distinction between the economic policies to be pursued, policies which had brought results and the methods, political and otherwise, which were terroristic and which we thought were very bad. It was possible to say that the economic policies they were pursuing could not have been pursued but for these methods. We thought that perhaps it might delay matters if peaceful methods were employed. Nevertheless, one could pursue a broadly socialistic policy a little more slowly and a little more objectively.

Then there are two things about the communists. I think I have mentioned to you yesterday that undoubtedly Marx was one of the major figures of any age but it is frightfully unfair to make Marx responsible for what happens a hundred years after his death or expect him to prophesy things which will happen hundreds of years later. Marx went wrong in the idea of violent change which of course became very powerful in the minds of the people. The French Revolution and the Russian Revolution, therefore, got tied up with physical violence.

And then there is the whole development of the Communist Party in Russia and outside. There was complete lack of moral standards as in the case of the old Jesuits. Many of the Jesuits were the finest people you can imagine, able, dedicated and devoted to their cause, but completely unscrupulous in their methods. They did not do it for their personal cause but for a religious cause. Although they did everything in the name of a religion yet they committed crimes. The leaders of the Communist Party are as near the Jesuit pattern as anybody else. So these are the two things that I have always disliked about the Communist Party.

The Communist Party in Russia was always in power and had therefore to face realities. Whether right or wrong, they had to suffer the consequences of their actions. The Communist parties in other countries were completely and absolutely irresponsible. They had no responsibility for the results of their actions. They went further off the track and they became not only irresponsible but completely unscrupulous. And you could never rely upon their words and their assurances. That is, they betrayed without the least compunction their colleagues and groups that were cooperating with them completely.

Now, all these things are to some extent associated with social and violent revolutions. These things occurred at the time of the French Revolution and the American revolution. Then came Napoleon and after that came other changes. Now, it depends very much on how your individual minds look upon these revolutionary upheavals because on that will depend the way you assess things. For example, my mind or my reading was full of the revolution in France and the revolution in America. But we have to look to something which is happening in India. Gandhiji's was an effective direction and yet a peaceful one. It was a peaceful solution of the problem.

What is happening in Russia now is, I think, of great significance. Whether they are honest about it or not is a secondary question. Forget the individuals. These are huge upheavals like earthquakes. And from this point of view whatever happened in the Twentieth Congress is of great significance because it gives the whole movement a new turn. It marks the culminating point in the post revolutionary era. I would go a step further and say that the change makes a slight giving up or ending of aggressive communism in Soviet Russia. This process has been delayed, but of course it has now come, while in China the revolutionary upsurge is still going strong. Russia is becoming normal while keeping the economic changes of the revolution. China is not changing still. The Americans think that all this is due to the weakness and fear of the Soviet Government. I read the other day a long interview given by a Russian émigré.³ He was in the Soviet Intelligence and left it a year or two ago. He was giving a long interview to an American magazine in which he said that this was the beginning of a big revolt in the Soviet Union against the present system. People there are fed up, not with the present rulers alone, but also with the whole system and that they are starving there. I cannot say that this is correct. I think the Soviet Union is strong. Secondly, in spite of many criticisms, conditions in the Soviet Union are far better than they have been in the past. No doubt the people there would like the conditions to be better and better still. There is plenty of money and it is only a question of supplying the goods.

But you have to judge these things in the context of other things and one of those things is the basic factor of the Soviets' tremendous technological and

3. Perhaps Nehru was referring to Nikolai Khokhlov of Soviet Intelligence who was trained to assassinate a prominent West German leader in 1954. Khokhlov instead defected to the CIA and on 20 April 1954 gave a sensational press conference in the US at which he revealed Soviet plans for the assassination of prominent leaders. For the next couple of years he gave lectures and interviews across the US on the ills of the Soviet system.

industrial progress. They are a military power too and they have got greater self-reliance and greater faith in themselves. And they can see that they can go ahead much faster in peace than in war. Why should they interfere in another country and why should they create trouble for themselves? There is no other objective left in their interfering in this country or that country except one, that is, to prevent any country from becoming the base of operation against them. They are much more frightened of this than of military power. They have used the productive apparatus of the Soviet Union for their military purposes and partly for their civil purposes. They will use it for civil purposes more! The result will be that their standards will go up. Of course, these cannot be compared with the American or the British ones, but they can be roughly compared with the French standards and in four or five years' time they will pass the French standards. This will have a much more powerful effect on European countries, apart from Asian countries, in regard to economic policies, than any other method. You read the French newspapers objectively. They give these figures, and they are frightened by these figures.

Do not mix up social and economic philosophy and communist methods. Also do not imagine that social and economic philosophy can be of only one pattern or type. It is bound to vary with environments. People have different historical, cultural and climatic backgrounds. They have difference in intellectual attainments. Maybe, when equal opportunities are given, these differences may be less, but nevertheless they persist. All these make a difference to society. Certainly methods have not much to do with the economic background. There are two things. In every society, a large element of compulsion is there. The compulsion is effected in a democratic society by the majority. In some other societies it is dictated by certain minorities or an individual. Parliament passes laws which the country will have to obey whether we like it or not. Take the income-tax that we have to pay. Every tax is expropriation of wealth. The communists make the expropriation in a grander way though conservative financiers will do it in a much gentler way. Another thing is that society has become highly complicated. In every society it has been found that free enterprise cannot any longer function in the old way. Even the USA is much more socialised than it was some thirty or forty years ago. In other words you see two processes working in two highly industrialised societies like the USA and the Soviet Union. The USA goes more and more in its own way towards, if not socialism, at least socialisation, controls and state organisation. I understand that in the USA every person out of six is state-employed. It is an enormous figure. State-employed means employed by the central and local governments and

municipalities. And this figure goes on increasing. On account of the force or the compulsion of circumstances, the State comes in more and more. It is true that the State in America is broadly speaking controlled by certain commercial and financial concerns with some checks from the people. In Russia, the movement is likely to be in the opposite direction slowly. That is, they start with complete control by the State of everything, but go towards decentralisation of power. They go towards more civil liberties so that the big gap is gradually becoming less and less. It will be of interest to you to know that one of the major criticisms that Mikoyan made about the way we are working is: "You do not give enough initiative to the general managers. You do not allow them to function in their own way. They will not succeed, if you go on giving orders all the time from Delhi." Imagine this coming from Mikoyan. He added: "We had been doing it in the past and we have suffered for it. Now we allow them full initiative." The point is that from actual experience they are decentralising power while keeping the ultimate power in the centre. It makes people responsible. It makes them go ahead and we can judge them by the results they achieve.

Our administrative system is one of our major problems. With the huge industrial undertakings that are coming into being the present system of recruitment may not be suitable, and we have to find a way out. Otherwise this tremendous process of bringing in the industrial revolution in this country will be checked and hampered at every stage. Another thing is that we had a very large number of advisers in the Planning Commission. Even now in Delhi there is a very eminent Professor from Harvard, another from Sorbonne and a top-ranking economist of Poland.⁴ He was a top-ranking economist before the government became communist. He became a communist and he is still a top-ranking economist in that country. We have Belgians and others discussing problems with our statisticians and spending months in delivering lectures. They have written numerous working papers on Indian problems. They do not agree among themselves, but it is surprising that there is a large measure of

4. The three persons mentioned by Nehru are John Kenneth Galbraith, renowned economist of Harvard University and Ambassador to India from 1961 to 1963; Prof. Charles Bettelheim of the Institute of Planning in Paris; and Dr. Oscar Lange of the Planning Institute at Warsaw. All foreign experts on the Planning Commission's Advisory Panel, came to the Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata at the invitation of Prof. P.C. Mahalanobis, and were invited by the Planning Commission to prepare working papers on various aspects of India's economic development.

agreement between the American and the Russian Professors. But all of them had come to one conclusion that India or for that matter any one country must not try to copy another country. We may learn from other countries' experience but we will have to do our own economic thinking and not merely take up the economic thinking of Russia or of America. The Americans say that and the Russians say that. An example of our finding our own way of tackling a problem is the Community Projects and NES. That is not a copy of any other. We had some ideas about it and some Americans have thrown in some ideas, but essentially it has been an Indian development and it has succeeded almost remarkably—of course not all over India. But broadly speaking it has succeeded so much that you cannot keep pace with the demand. That is an example of India evolving its own method of dealing with a particular problem. It is a difficult problem. It is not a question, mind you, in the old way of having a model village, as Sir John Darling⁵ said, and putting up some building and having some slogans. It is something else. It is really the revival of the spirit of the Indian people, and not imposing something upon them. In other respects too we have to do our own thinking, profiting, of course, by all the accumulated thinking of others. It is quite conceivable that our way would be our own way which may have some comparisons here and there, and yet it is different from Russian and from the American ways, not because we dislike the Americans or Russians, but because conditions are different and we have to deal with these conditions.

5. Perhaps Nehru was referring to Sir Malcolm (Lyal) Darling (1880-1969), who joined the Indian Civil Service in 1903, served in various capacities in the Punjab and retired as Chairman, Punjab Land Revenue Committee, in 1940. In 1953-54, he was a consultant to the ILO and the Government of Pakistan and was a Consultant to the Planning Commission, Government of India, in 1957. Amongst his several books on the life of the Punjab peasantry are: *The Punjab Peasantry in Prosperity and Debt* (1925); *Wisdom and Waste in the Punjab Village* (1934); *Rusticus Loquitor or the Old Light and the New in the Punjab Village* (1940); *At Freedom's Door* (1949); and *Apprentice to Power* (1966).

5. Forthcoming Visit to USA

Some four or six months ago, before he fell ill,¹ President Eisenhower sent me a message in which he vaguely suggested my going to the USA and spending some time there. I replied to him thanking him and saying that it was a privilege for me to meet him and discuss matters of mutual interest and that whatever my other engagements or preoccupations might be, I shall go for a short while there and see him. But it was difficult for me to find the time to go on a kind of tour to the USA, and spend much time. It was difficult for me to leave India when Parliament was in session and other things were happening. Normally I could leave India only round about June-July, when Parliament is not in session. I invited him to come here and I said, "I realise that you are terribly busy. Nevertheless at any time we would welcome your visit here".² He replied thanking me and saying that it was very difficult for him to go out of his country as there was almost a constitutional bar and he was Head of the State, Head of the Government and Head of a party. The American Ambassador here, Cooper,³ was very anxious that the President should come here and said, "Do not take his reply word for word. You press him again to come here". So I sent him another message appreciating the great responsibilities that he had and said: "I have told you that I am always prepared to see you and talk to you whenever necessary, for a short time. But the point of your coming to India is not to see me, but to meet the Indian people. I cannot transport the Indian people to the United States. To that he answered that he very much liked to be able to come there, but could not do so in the near future. Later he fell ill. And quite recently I got a message saying that he very much liked to have talks with me and as I was going to London for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference.⁴ I could perhaps go to USA just before or after that at least for a few days. He also said that we could perhaps go away to some quiet place away from Washington so that there would be no interference. To that I replied that I could go there and spend three or four days. I mentioned the date as 6 July.⁵

1. President Eisenhower suffered a heart attack in September 1955.
2. For Nehru's message of 28 July 1955 to Eisenhower, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 29, p. 379.
3. John Sherman Cooper.
4. Held from 28 June to 6 July 1956.
5. Nehru's proposed visit to the USA in July was postponed owing to Eisenhower's illness. It took place in December 1956.

6. Goa

About Goa we have now a proceeding in the International Court. The Portuguese Government have dragged us there. It is not in regard to Goa but in regard to Daman, Diu and Nagar Haveli on the ground that we do not allow Portuguese access to these places through parts of our territory. We are going to deal with this. This is going to be an expensive and troublous affair for us. We have decided that our Attorney General, Setalvad, will lead our side. We have also engaged a British Senior Counsel¹ who is used to appearing there many times but he will function under our Attorney General and one or two juniors too. There is very little of arguments. As a matter of fact, I am told, there are mostly long written statements and then, maybe, some questions are asked.

We were informed from the Hague that there will not be too much argument. Six months are given to Portuguese Government to submit their Memorial and six months for us to reply to it. Then they get time for a rejoinder if they wish to make one. Meanwhile we have to find out almost every little paper about Goa that we can lay our hands on from our libraries and Secretariats, and there are tens and thousands of them in various languages and scripts including some that very few people can read, e.g., Modi script.

You will remember that last August in Goa some people were shot.² And a woman by name Subhadra Bai was also involved.³ As people were being shot down, it required superhuman courage to walk straight with a flag in hand ahead of others. She was also shot at. She fell down but she got up again and walked another few steps. It was remarkable. She was taken to some wretched hospital in Belgaum. She was there for some weeks and was operated upon there. She came to me about a month or two ago and I put her in charge of our best surgeon here in hospital and he says that from a surgical point of view it is a very interesting case. Below the skin her forearm is completely cut off from the rest of the arm. Except for the skin there is nothing left. The muscles have dried up or something. The surgeon says it is a very difficult case and he is proposing to join the two portions.

1. Frank Soskice.

2. Thirty-one persons were killed and forty-four seriously wounded when the Portuguese police opened fire on satyagrahis from India who had entered Goa at various places in small batches on 15 August 1955 to demonstrate and extend support to Goan nationalists.

3. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 29, pp. 410-414.

The report of the Egyptian Second Secretary on conditions in Goa⁴ was a very fine document and he had taken great pains. He represents our interests in Portugal just as Brazil represents Portugal. As such, there was great difficulty to have the Portuguese Government to agree to that. He reported on every single case, on every prisoner. Of course he was not allowed to see those prisoners who are supposed to be of Goan nationality. He saw all the Indian nationals and sent a report on each of them.

Apart from other things, our people are there in prison, have been sentenced to twenty years imprisonment and are badly treated. Of course, hundreds of Goans have also been sentenced. When we stopped this movement one would have thought that good sense would have prevailed on them. Apparently they are not in favour of stopping this. I mentioned this to various people, among them the American Ambassador here when he was going to America some months ago. He said: "This is shocking. I shall certainly speak to the State Department." But nothing happened. Instead what happened was this statement of Dulles.⁵

4. See *post*, pp. 527-528.

5. For this statement of 2 December 1955 see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 31, pp. 423-424.

7. Relations with the Soviet Union

Trade with the Soviet Union means our buying not consumer goods but capital equipment or getting technical help and paying for it in our goods. We are starting some kind of a shipping concern half and half chiefly for the transport of our goods to Russia and the transport of machinery from there. Otherwise we are in the hands of foreign shipping interests who charge very heavily and are not available at the right time. In fact it has become more important for us to have more ships from that point of view. I suppose this trade with the Soviet Union will materialise. What is likely to happen is not getting odd machines but machines for specific projects. They make them for us. There is no doubt they can make very good machines. Last year, that is, before we had decided upon buying or taking from them a steel plant, we sent a delegation of our best steel experts.¹ There were some from Tata's and some from others. Everyone of them had been trained in America and had spent years in steel factories there. Some of them at least were rather sceptical about Russia supplying any first class plant but they were very greatly impressed by what they saw, and some of them presented to us a long report. They said in some ways the Russians were in advance of the Americans while in some others they were not. Their rate of production was terrific. American production is much greater, but the rate of increase in the Soviet Union is terrific, and in a factory which was producing about ten million tons of steel and pig iron the increase was going to be another two or three million tons this year.

On the last night of their stay² Bulganin and Khrushchev and myself were sitting in a car and were going to dinner, and quite casually Khrushchev said: "We were very much interested in seeing your farm." The farm they had gone to was the Terai farm in UP, which we have reclaimed from the Terai jungle, a farm of ten or fifteen thousand acres. He said: "We would like to send some agricultural machinery". I said: "Thank you. That farm belongs to the UP Government but I am sure they would like to have it sent to them". They said: "No, not for that farm but for a new farm". I said: "Thank you, but I am not

1. A delegation led by S.S. Khera, Secretary, Ministry of Production, toured the USSR in September-October 1955 to study the operation of steel works and works producing metallurgical equipment in that country.
2. In December 1955.

quite sure if we can properly utilise all the machines that you use in your farms because we have not mechanised that way. They said: "Yes, that is true but if you cannot use any machinery you need not use it". I said: "You better have a talk with our Food and Agriculture Ministry". Well, they had a talk and next day I was informed by the Food Ministry that after the talk they had made a list of various articles for the farms. They could not give the exact price but the list ran into a crore or two and represented complete outfit for a 20,000 acres farm. The thing is arriving. A part has arrived in the country. They are prepared to accept payment in any shape or form. Naturally if you pay them in pound sterling or dollars it will be a very welcome thing. If you pay them in roubles it is welcome too. They are prepared to accept payment in rupees and the rupees would remain here till they are liquidated by their purchase of goods in India. If we cannot produce goods, of course, it is our headache and they are prepared (at least so they say) to some extent to abide by our choice of goods, that is, what we can spare. Of course, we cannot dump down things which are totally unnecessary for them.

I spoke to Khrushchev and Bulganin at some length, and quite frankly, about the Communist Party in India and I said: "We are not worried about the Communist Party's activities very much partly because we are strong enough to deal with them and partly because they are not very intelligent. But their activities come in the way of our good relations with you. Naturally they associate their activities with you, get advice and help from you and that is why I am worried. I mentioned many things about the Communists here, of their getting advice from Moscow, that Moscow says this and that. Of course they say that privately. In fact I gave them the actual dates that the people from here went there in Stalin's time and after his death. Even after my visit to Russia last year the Secretary of the Communist Party³ went to Moscow to find out what was the position there after my visit there. They said that this made no great difference to their policy and they did not remember to have seen many Communists from here. Khrushchev denied completely any kind of financial help and he said he did not know a single person in the Indian Communist Party much less any leading Personality. "I have seen from a little distance some Communist from India there", he said. He probably meant Ghosh and he said: "He was a tallish man but I did not talk to him; maybe that he met someone else of the Party and it is quite possible. Anyway it is not our policy to interfere

3. Ajoy Kumar Ghosh.

with local communist parties. Naturally if they are communists there they are and we do not interfere with them at all. They may come to Moscow and it is quite possible they might pretend to have met big people and thus raise their own prestige. Certainly I have no knowledge of this and we are totally against interference. We certainly do not interfere with the business of the Communist Party here. We support your government and your Policy". They completely denied financial help too. I did not give instances. They have plenty of money. They have no apparent source of income. Obviously they get it from somewhere else. And most people think that it is from Russia. They have recently bought two properties, two estates, one near Nagpur and the other near Poona. It is a house with plenty of land as a sort of sanatorium for their workers. So I asked them, "Where is this money coming from? The people suspect that it comes from Russia." They denied it. I also mentioned the other ways, books, etc. Well, I did not expect them to admit all this. I even mentioned to them how their embassies here took care to employ members of the Communist Party in India. All this creates difficulties for us here in regard to our relations with the Soviet Union.

8. People of Indian Origin Overseas

There are certain problems which are common to all Indians abroad. Chiefly they are in South East Asia, Fiji, Mauritius and such like places. Some problems are rather special to particular places, and these have to be dealt with specially. But broadly speaking in countries like Burma and Malayas you come up against the inevitable desire of the local people not to encourage competition by outsiders. In Ceylon it takes a very acute form for various reasons. In Burma it is not so acute partly because our general relations are more friendly with the government and more especially because of the Prime Minister U Nu. But there can be no doubt that everywhere these problems will continue—problems of business people, landowners, moneylenders and the like. Everywhere there is social legislation being undertaken which hits our people. Sometimes that legislation may be on the lines of legislation in our own country and we can hardly take exception to any kind of social legislation merely on the ground that it hits our people so long as it does not discriminate. Even if it is discriminatory they say that the national of that country should be employed. It is rather difficult for us to take exception to that. We do that in our country. We encourage it.

Mr Saksena¹ said something about campaigning for Burmese citizenship for Indian national. I interrupted him. I do not think that we should carry on any kind of a campaign to that effect. It is one thing to tell the people that if they choose to become Burmese nationals or some other nationals we have no objection at all. They are welcome to do so. But I do not think it is right and proper asking people to give up their nationality and become the nationals of another country. There is another aspect of it. They can maintain their Indian nationality if they so choose. Nevertheless, they should make common cause in most matters, political and economic. If they do not do that they become more and more segregated and isolated and they have no place in the economy of the country. So, from the narrowest point of view they must associate themselves with the life of the country socially. Socially it is very difficult for Indians to mix. In this matter Indians and Jews are alike. We should therefore encourage them to fit in socially and generally with the new life that is arising

1. Ramji Ram Saksena, Ambassador of India in Myanmar.

there, i.e., the community spirit, and not to appear as if they were an obstruction or they were there to exploit that country in any way. And if they want to become the nationals of that country they will get certain advantages and they naturally lose certain rights in India. We do not mind that.

The Ministry sometimes used and expressed itself in stronger language than it should. I do not mind their becoming the nationals of that country. But do not make it appear that we want to push out our own people almost against their wishes.

In all the things that have been said the question of education of these people is probably the most important. We have to deal basically with their social backwardness. The type of people who have gone abroad usually is the labour type and the business type—the small shopkeepers, the small professional class and usurers. The business community is usually lacking completely in any foresight or vision. They have a very narrow outlook. Therefore, they are not admirable specimens of our citizens abroad and they are constantly coming up against new rules and regulations which are made and which we cannot resist unless they are particularly aimed at our own people. Even so, our resistance will have to be in a friendly way. We cannot make a major issue of it, because that really hurts them more than anything else. Now, take this business of education. The Chinese are much more alert and advanced in this matter. Twenty years ago I went to Malaya and Singapore and I saw a number of very fine Chinese schools run entirely by the Chinese. There were fine buildings and huge playing fields and these were entirely raised from Chinese money and they cooperated fully for giving Chinese education there. I think they did not take any money from the State. And so far as Indians were concerned, at that time, they took me to a small night school in Singapore which was the only place where the Indians made a mighty effort. The difference between the Chinese effort and the cooperative feeling among the Chinese nationals and the Indian effort was amazing. The Indians have been completely lacking in that national spirit, cooperative spirit, classless society, and functioned in small and separate groups—Gujaratis, Sikhs, Malayalees and what not—not mixing together properly except when somebody like me went there. Now, that is a very big problem. It is a problem of India really transported abroad but transported abroad without the more life-giving elements that are present in India, and isolated. It simply stagnates and they become worse and worse. What can we do about it? It might, of course, be worthwhile for us, Mr Tyabji²

2. B.F.H.B. Tyabji was the Ambassador of India in Indonesia.

said, to have a survey. I do not know whether any survey as such will get some more facts about it.

I do not like the idea of the Government of India opening schools there. They may help in various ways. They may send teachers. But there is no question of taking responsibility for opening schools all over the place. Quite apart from the financial aspect of it, it has certain political aspects too. We would be suspected. The local people and the local authorities may not view it with favour even though our intention may be quite good. And also the sense of self-help does not arise. In many of these places Indians are fairly well off and they should be able to organise proper schools with the assistance and goodwill of the Government there. Our Education Ministry ought to help them. It is helping in fact in many ways. Apart from sending teachers they can supply equipment. They can send books and newspapers. But the initiative must come from there. In order to keep them in touch with the developments that are taking place here, we should have proper libraries with newspapers, weeklies and all kinds of things. I am sure there are plenty of Government of India publications as well as other publications. I think that will be a far better publicity than the normal type of publicity to bring the Indians together by some common bond. The Government of India will not mind spending some money over it. We are, of course, prepared to help in various ways. If they do not realise that, they go to pieces and they will not fit in with the new life in India.

It is very unfortunate to learn from Mr Saksena that all the beggars in Rangoon are Indians. In Rangoon or Burma if from a distance you cannot recognise a man, but you see his clothes are dirty, he is bound to be an Indian because no Burmese wears dirty clothes. Their clothes are always white and clean looking. I was introduced there in Rangoon some years ago to a Marwari gentleman who was probably one of the most prosperous of the Indians in Rangoon. But he was in a filthy dress. He wore a dirty kurta and dhoti. One must have a certain standard of cleanliness. And here he was one of the richest Indians in Rangoon.

Our missions must necessarily realise, and the Indians there should realise, that conditions are changing, i.e., the economic policies and others in various ways. And no Indian can expect to have his particular vested interests protected when the conditions are changing. Three or four years ago we even talked about our propaganda abroad and in spite of our efforts we have not been quite satisfied with what has happened so far. Not that we did not make an effort, not that we did not send out vast numbers of telegrams and letters and papers, but I have always a feeling that a great part of our effort is wasted and a great part of the papers we send out are of no use to anybody. Now, I do feel that the very

basis of any kind of community life is the establishment of contacts through the library system. A good library with other activities should really become a kind of a club house for everybody. And naturally Indians will be more interested in it, they will go there and be in touch with all the things happening in India. If necessary, even a film can be shown and a certain community life has to be developed there. Of course, something has been done, but I am not at all pleased with the rate of progress. I think, it is essential that we should push it further and that will probably have a more marked effect on the life of the Indians there. And the other people also might be in a position to know something about India. That may well become the centre of other activities and you must have a physical centre. Unless you have a physical centre it is all diffused. You may have a public meeting sometimes, but that may not be as good as a physical centre where people can come and go and meet each other.

We would not give businessmen coming back to India from Burma any preferential treatment. They misbehave there and I have absolutely no sympathy for them. Let them go to the wall so far as I am concerned. Burma does not want them and India does not want them here. They disgrace our good name. For one thing, they have no conception of the huge internal changes that are taking place here and what we are doing here. Of course, if they have enterprise and ability they may fit into what happens in India. Preferential treatment means giving them special licences to do something. So far as these licences and other things are concerned the whole system is being revised and gradually we are shifting to state trading in major matters.

People of Indian origin in Ceylon who have not been admitted to either Ceylonese or Indian citizenship are not foreigners. They are stateless. Potentially they may be Indians. But whatever they are, they are stateless. You can say that you will not take a destitute person or a person with incurable diseases, but these tests cannot apply to those unhappy people who, for no fault of their own but because of certain laws, have become stateless. I do not know exactly the tests that we can apply. I am not sure whether we can apply the test of destitution.

Then about the problem of the Lushais in Burma. I think it is a very small problem. All the Lushais in the wide world, I should imagine, are 300,000 or 400,000. And there on the Indo-Burma border they are a very fine and a very attractive lot of people, extraordinarily active. About eighty-five per cent of them are Christians. Once I was asked to open a road in the Lushai Hills and the proceedings started by recitation of the Bible in the Lushai language. I asked: "What is this?" They said: "It is the Bible". And the Lushai priest also attended the function.

9. Leadership and Socialist Pattern in India¹

I think the general pattern we are trying in India is fairly clearly indicated in the Second Plan but not quite clearly and deliberately so. We do not even know exactly what the final shape will be. For instance, are we going to socialise agriculture? I do not know and for two or three reasons. I am not quite convinced as to what that final shape might be. I am convinced that it has to be dealt with on cooperative lines, but what form these cooperative lines in agriculture might take I do not know. First of all you should have small farms. By small farms I do not mean very small farms. We are gradually putting a ceiling on land, a ceiling which is fairly big, say, fifty or seventy acres. At the moment these holdings are very small. As a matter of fact they are one or two acre holdings, all under five acres on an average in UP. These can only flourish by a system of cooperative working. That is clear enough. Whether that cooperative working will subsequently develop into something in the nature of collective farming, I do not know. We are going to have state farms also. We have some and we will have more. The main thing, therefore, is first of all to diminish the large holdings of land and, secondly, to introduce the cooperative element.

With regard to industry more and more we want to develop heavy industries in a big way and naturally in the public sector. I am not very much concerned as to what shape things might take. This kind of theoretical approach to a particular structure in the distant future is not something that we need worry about. What we are worried about today is the next few steps. We are worried about the resources and about the balance between heavy industry and light and cottage industries.

1. This statement was in response to some written questions put to Nehru by one of the participants at the Conference. Pointing out the relevance of the question "After Nehru what?" posed by people in India and abroad, especially since the strength of India's internal and external policy seemed to revolve round Prime Minister, the participant asked whether there was an attempt to build up institutions, political parties, and administrative cadres; to produce enough skilled and technical personnel; and to educate the youth on the right lines in order to provide a strong base for the edifice planned to be built in India. He also drew attention to a feeling both inside and outside the country that there did not exist a capable second line of leadership in the country. Nehru was also asked to explain the ideal of a "socialist pattern of society" and the methods to be employed to achieve it.

About resources I think I have a paper here with me giving us a few new lines of thinking and new ideas. It is a paper by a Professor of Economics in Stanford University of America. He suggests something which would shock a number of people.

“Economic surplus appears under a number of headings. The whole point is.... India’s social and economic development will be largely determined by the volume of investment in the country and by the nature of methods by which the resources are mobilised, and the allocation of this investment among different branches of economy”. “This object of planning for economic development should be the attainable Increase of national output in the period encompassed by the planning horizon twenty or twenty-five years”. “It is fallacious to accept as target some moderate rate of growth of national income and plan the country’s economic development with a view to the attainment of that moderate objective. Such moderate objectives which are considered to be prudent and realistic are, in actual fact, quite utopian without the inspiration stemming from a supreme effort Even the relatively small target will remain unrealised”. Then he points out where the surplus disappears. I do not know if his figures are correct.

“Shares of agricultural output withdrawn from the direct producers by the landowners in the form of rent and by the moneylenders in the form of interest are Rs eight hundred crores and Rs six hundred and fifty crores a year ... Unproductive workers of every kind, redundant merchants, agents, tax evasion specialists and the like might come to an aggregate of Rs 1,200 crores”. So he arrives, after considering a number of other items, at a figure of Rs 3,150 crores per year or more than twenty-five per cent of India’s national income. And he says: “This is what a poverty-stricken society places at the disposal of this unproductive strata.” He says we must get a large chunk of it. There is no doubt that you have to divert a good portion of the surplus wealth into productive channels. At present perhaps some twenty per cent goes there but it is not enough. It should be at least fifty to sixty per cent.

There is this matter of defining more clearly what the future pattern is likely to be. I do not think we need worry about it. It does automatically take place gradually. In the course of the last two or three years there has been a great deal of thinking and a great deal of clarification broadly speaking. Now, we talk in the Five Year Plan of perspective planning. Perspective planning means what kind of picture we want to see fifteen or twenty years later so that we may drive in that direction. Our objective is not final and it is a distant objective at which we are aiming. In the course of going in that direction we deal with the land and other problems (and they shape out accordingly) always remembering that we have got to go in a particular direction.

It is true that clearly laying down the picture of the future structure helps. But then there are two or three difficulties about it. One, of course, is that in a varied country like India, it is not right to put down rigid patterns. Secondly, owing to the tremendous development of technology these patterns tend to change although the basic principle might be the same. Therefore, we should not be rigid. Thirdly, it is not a question of a leader or a small group of people at the top laying down what the country aims at, but our bringing up the thinking of the rest of the country to that level. That is not only the democratic method but something more. Simply, political democracy means putting the programme to the vote of the people and getting their vote for it and then carrying it through Parliament. But here we want something much more and that is their active cooperation in a dynamic programme in the country. Therefore, they have to be brought up to that level of thinking or emotional reaction to it.

There is always a tendency among the socialist or communist groups or the so-called leftist groups to function as narrow sectarians. It is a sort of thesis they discuss and get excited about a phrase here and there in the thesis, and that usually makes them think. Maybe they think more clearly in a very narrow sphere and if in that rigid scheme of thinking a little of it goes out their whole structure is upset. However the point is, we have got to proceed. It is open to our economists and others to put more detailed pictures before the country but as a government or as a political party, we have to carry large numbers of people with us. Whether we will succeed in this or not I do not know. But in the past apart from the political revolutions that were brought about in this country, other changes have been rather remarkable. They have been brought about with a large measure of consent and in a peaceful manner—the removal of the Indian Princes, abolition of the *jagirdari* and the zamindari systems, and the land reforms. These are the things which have given rise to major class conflicts in other countries. We try to solve our problems and try even to deal with class conflicts not by refusing or ignoring the class or conflicts, but by accepting their existence and by trying to do away with them; not by increase of conflicts but peacefully. Now, where there is class conflict the socialists or the communists say: “Let us make this class conflict more and more intense, more and more bitter till they clash and one class overwhelms or liquidates the other”. The democratic way is, of course, for one class, the dominant class, through democratic methods, through parliamentary procedures, gradually, if you like to use the word, ‘liquidate’ the other class as a class. Now, whether we can do that through peaceful methods or not nobody can say fully but we have done a good bit. We are dealing with a very conservative country. Do not judge of this country by handfuls of communists or socialists or Congressmen or

others. It is a frightfully conservative country and we have to carry it and the conservative elements in it.

So the main thing is to have the broad picture as to where we are going and to take firm steps towards that, keeping an open mind as to the nature of the next step. Probably it will not take very long. In the course of the next year or two these things will become clearer and clearer. In fact the progress made in India during the course of the last eighteen months is remarkable both in regard to public thinking and in regard to development of our Plans and I do not agree with something said in this note about the reaction of the people. I think broadly speaking the reaction of the people has been very satisfactory. Naturally it does not come up to the level of what has been done in China whatever the reasons. But I think it has been satisfactory considering that it is democratic reaction in which the people are not pushed all over the place and it may well become a bigger reaction in the future.

Now about leadership. Leadership rightly is not talked of in personal terms but rather in terms of building up of organisations and cadres. That is good essentially because if you do not have that structure and cadre then we are not firmly established, and at any moment the country may not only be prevented from going forward but may relapse. There is that danger inherent in the situation which the communists protect against by their authoritarian regime and by building up cadres of young men, boys and pioneers. In the ultimate analysis the regime is not there because of the guns behind it. Maybe every Government has guns somewhere behind it, but in the ultimate analysis the communist regime goes on because they build up numerous cadres all over the place from the school upwards and children upwards and that supports it. One of the questions asked by one of the Chinese leaders when I went to China was: "What cadres are you building up?" The word "cadre" may become associated in your minds with a communist regime. It is not so. You may say for instance the ICS cadre. We have to build up cadres in a very big way, partly in the Service and partly in other ways.

I might say one thing here. You have been discussing administrative problems, but I am quite convinced that the distinctions in status and prestige of our various Services must go. I think it is fundamentally and basically bad. Naturally some Services perform higher, more important and more responsible tasks. That is a different matter from a more capable man being given greater responsibilities. This kind of thing that some person from some Service is higher in status—I may call the caste system in Service—is thoroughly bad and I think it should go. I am sorry this question has been so long pending. It has not been dealt with properly so that to put it in a narrower way one of the most

difficult problems we have to face is that of the industrial cadres that are required because of the growth of this public sector. We have not got that. Of course, in the old days, it was thought that a member of the ICS could perform any job. He could be put in charge of a factory or anything and he could do it. Well, that of course is a completely erroneous notion. These are highly specialised jobs and probably you will find that in future, as technological knowledge grows, the process will be completely reversed. Today the administrative expert comes into the technical and managerial lines. Finally the technical man will become the administrative man. He has to administer because ultimately the technical man is far more important than the administrator. An administrator can be replaced but not a first-class technical man. He is unique. You cannot do without him and that is why you find in these countries, USA or Russia, technical men holding high offices. They become ambassadors. They become ministers. In Russia most of their ministers are technical men. In America technical or businessmen come in and they run the administration. The old British administrative type—or the old Indian administrative type under the British—had a limited outlook. It does not fit in completely with this new and rapid growth of state-owned industries. Now, the important thing is the tremendous speed with which technical men are made available, what the universities are doing and how they are being organised.

We are not doing very much and in spite of the fine display of strength in India there are very big disruptive forces at work. Essentially Indians are a strange mixture of hide bound customs and there are the anarchists. They are both quite opposed to each other. They are both bad. Roughly speaking only an intellectual can be an anarchist. It is each person going his own way and the lack of capacity to function together, cooperate together and subordinate oneself in favour of a group or some such thing. It is highly developed in Malabar and Travancore-Cochin or the Malayalam speaking areas.

Now we may try to work out our cadres but ultimately it is the basic character of the Indian people that will pull us through. If we have not got it and if we cannot develop it well, then we fail, if not completely, at least partly. We simply go to pieces and one of the worst developments was the reaction to the States Reorganisation Commission's Report. Quite apart from the merits or demerits of it, it is not at all good that people should get so frightfully excited about it as to bring about riots on a big scale. Even a riot perhaps may occasionally be excusable but they should calm down. This excitement continued. Now, take some area between Orissa and Bihar or Bengal and Bihar. It is a matter of the least significance to the Government of India which way a particular district goes. It is a quarrel between two States or two linguistic areas. There is no

harm if a district is slightly this way or that way, but if the people get so excited as to break each other's heads, it simply means that if they were independent states it would be even worse. If they cannot settle these questions in an organised manner it is a very bad sign.

As regards a second and third line leadership, well, these are much more easy to define in an authoritarian state than in a democratic state. There it is deliberately done. Of course, even in a democratic state one has to think about it and one has to prepare. But that is a different thing and if there is a second line of leadership most of you will not probably know about it now. They may be well-known in their own states but not in the all-India circle. The people who played a leading part in our struggle for freedom also subsequently were in position of authority in the Government. That was an advantage because there is continuity and the continuity is in the public mind too. They knew these things. Now, regardless of the competence of others who follow them, they are not likely at any time to have that widespread popularity and influence which the present generation has drawn from the past struggle and, therefore, the next lot of leaders will necessarily not have that strong and all-India standing as the present have had the advantage of.

All this business of, let us say developing cadres, whatever they may be, whether it is the Boy Scouts or the National Cadet Corps, are all meant to give a certain character, strength and moral background, apart from a particular training. The reason why I lay stress on the economic aspect is this that we are faced with a very difficult struggle for absolute survival. There must be no complacency about it. I want you to realise that there is a struggle for survival and we shall survive only if we make good. Not that these cultural and other aspects will not help. They are essential but we will go down if we do not make good on the other plane. You cannot isolate culture, you have to have other things. In fact the whole character that you build up for a nation and for working for a cause, is more important than the finer points of culture. That is the big culture. When you give life everything else thrives upon it. If there is no life it is essentially *durbar* life which has no meaning. Today it is interesting to see the symbol of life in India. Our various cultural aspects are developing by help and by themselves spontaneously. That is a sign of life. It is far more important than the superficial aspects of culture. Not that the superficial aspects of culture do not count. The main thing is that the Indian people should be full of this life, hope and spirit of self-reliance.

One thing I should like you to keep in mind all the time is that we are living in essentially revolutionary times. By that of course I do not mean people hitting each other on the head. That is a minor phase but the whole political,

economic and social structure of the world is changing and changing essentially because of technological changes. Culture changes because of that. Our ways of life change obviously. We talk about untouchability in India. We pass laws. We have propaganda and it is disappearing. But the real reason for its disappearance is that our ways of life are changing completely. Nobody can easily practice untouchability in railways or factories. People mix together. It is only certain conservative people who try to keep up the ancient ways. So this is essentially a revolutionary period and the symbol of that revolution is the technological symbol. The advance in technology in the last thirty or forty years is really amazing. People know about it and talk about it but our minds are rigid and conservative. Whatever we might say, it is an odd thing that all these tremendous changes after all, have been made by human beings or by a collection of them. They all come out of the human mind and yet the human mind is so slow that it cannot catch up with the changes which it itself has initiated. These revolutions burst out in violence when they are delayed. You remember the battle cry of the French Revolution was liberty, equality and fraternity. But even the French Revolution was slightly out of date; that is to say, while the French Revolution was taking place the Industrial Revolution was also gradually appearing on the scene in England and in one or two other places. New problems were arising which were not solved by the battle cries of the French Revolution. While the Industrial Revolution went on progressing in this way the whole of Europe—intellectual Europe—was thinking in terms of the battle cries of the French Revolution. In 1848, or what is called the year of revolutions in Europe, there were plenty of petty revolutions which were mostly crushed. And they were still thinking in terms of the French Revolution. Among all the other major revolutions the Industrial Revolution was changing the whole fabric of society and the realisation of that came in the latter half of the 19th century. But in Asia where the Industrial Revolution was not felt we got helplessly entangled in various urges and old habits. Our desire for the industrial revolution, as the old Industrial Revolution itself, is out-of-date and something else is coming out due to atomic energy. Because of this tremendous technological improvement and the power that it has let loose, it has become essentially important to know what the human being is. So you come back a full circle to what you might call the moral standards of the human being. And if he has not got them all, this tremendous power is used for mischief.

10. The Second Five Year Plan

Now it is a good thing that our Second Five Year Plan is the result of innumerable discussions, arguments, etc., not only in the Planning Commission, but by panels of economists. They all came and discussed it and there is the National Development Council which consists of all Chief Ministers and Ministers of the Central Government. So, in the process of evolving something rather pragmatically, naturally one has to proceed with no dogma but with some kind of principle of the type of society one should aim—not a rigid picture but a broad picture of, say, high standards, equal opportunities, and reducing the great difference between people. Then we produced this Plan. That is discussed in Parliament, in Assemblies and all over. In many States we have got collections of the heads of panchayats. We bring them together and they discuss them. We are developing in most universities, cells for discussing the Plans. I think next month we are going to have a kind of university forum here with two or three persons from each university—at least one professor and one senior student—coming here and discussing this Plan. It may be a waste but some of it may be good. Let people think and find out, let them realise that this is the common effort. All that is good. It is true that we are, in spite of all this, in the initial stages of thinking of these Plans.

Other countries have done more economic thinking on different lines. In regard to planning, naturally the Soviet Union has done more thinking than any other country. They have been planning for the last twenty five years and more, true, on their own lines. But even on their own lines they cannot ignore the economic factors. What are the major problems before a country apart from political problems, which are temporary problems. The problem becomes one of balancing, let us say, production and consumption—heavy industry, light industry or, say, cottage industry. There is the major problem of how to make the machine of life work in regard to production and consumption and you will find therefore in countries which are thinking on those lines that most of their internal conflicts are based on these factors. Once you start planning, it is quite inevitable that the planning authority or the State should have certain amount of strategic control, otherwise it is not planning. In private enterprise everyone does what he likes. But even in private enterprise there is good deal of State interference now, even in a country like America.

The best way to understand planning is to think of a State in war-time. In war-time certain things are accepted. And every one aims at achieving certain results. If necessary there is denial of civil liberty. Certain inconveniences are put up with. Goods are not available or are in short supply. There are controls.

Nobody wants controls in peace-time, and civil liberty should not be restricted. Not that we want to have controls or to curtail civil liberty, but when you want to make an undeveloped country into a developed one, you have to make tremendous effort and something in the nature of the urgency of a war situation has to be visualised, though not to the same extent. Certainly you cannot afford to see what may be done under a war economy either in regard to civil liberty or control. But some measure of it has to be accepted, the major difference being that in a democratic country it is democratically accepted or not accepted. You should choose democratically, choose, whether in order to gain some advantage in the future you are prepared to shoulder this burden today.

What are the major problems? There are so many major problems. One major aspect of it is how much money you can find for investment? In a State venture, assuming, of course, that it is run properly, you can invest practically all the profits of the State venture into further activity. In a private venture part of it will be invested, but a good part of it is not invested and goes towards higher standards of living or is just lost. When you are living from hand to mouth you cannot afford that waste. Apart from pulling in different directions or everybody going his own way, you cannot afford that much waste. Therefore, inevitably two things are necessary. Firstly, you want strategic controls. Secondly, you want to get hold of all this profit or a good part of it and that for two reasons. First of all, we would like to utilise it for higher standards for the people, not for a few individual groups, but for the general people. Secondly, we want it for further investment, thereby speeding up the process of change.

We have a very high rate of taxation on paper—ninety per cent super-tax. But what is the result? In England many people say that the rates are higher still and it is tolerated, because really it is not given effect to. There are so many loopholes—I am talking about legal loopholes, quite apart from the evasion of taxes. There are so many loopholes and so it gives one impression of high taxation—quite intolerable—but it is tolerated because really there are so many ways of not paying it. The question is whether this taxation which is largely copied from England is the right system for us or not. At the present moment there is a professor from Cambridge—Prof. Kaldor¹—who has a fairly

1. Nicholas Kaldor (1908-1986); economist; taught in the London School of Economics and Cambridge University; Member, Royal Commission on Taxation of Profits and Income, 1950-55; participated in a Survey on Indian Tax Reform, Government of India, 1956; served in advisory capacity with the Governments of Ghana, 1961, British Guiana, 1961, Turkey, 1962, and Australia, 1963; special adviser, British Chancellor of Exchequer, 1964-68; author of *An Expenditure Tax* (1955) and *Causes of the Slow Rate of Growth of the United Kingdom* (1966).

high reputation and has produced a book called *An Expenditure Tax*. It is creating some stir, not in Conservative but in Labour circles and it is conceivable that if a Labour Government were to come there may be a big change. Whatever a Labour Government may do in England, according to him and according to the Harvard Professor, this will be eminently suitable to India and the matter is being thought about.

Under the present system of taxation, you do not get much money. For if you really get money, since this system has been there for the last thirty years or so, there should be no rich man left in England. But there are plenty of rich men in England. In fact they are richer than ever. That is because of the legal and other loopholes. So he says, you must change it and he suggests a different system. There is to be the income-tax which should include super-tax also, but it should not be at any time more than fifty per cent, and for India he has suggested seven annas in the rupee, which is a bit less than fifty per cent. And, secondly, there is to be an expenditure tax, a tax on what you spend, not on your income but on your expenditure.

Our rate of exemption for income-tax is very high. In England it is low, so also in America.

Another proposal is an Estate Duty or Death Duty and a tax on gifts. He calculates—and he is prepared to stake his reputation—that this system, if it were applied here, would enable us to raise a minimum of Rs one hundred and twenty crores per annum more than what we are raising now, with less of burden on the people. Maybe that it may come to this figure in a few years time, in three or four years. But obviously if we can raise even one hundred crores a year it is a very big gain for us and it will relieve tension very much.

We cannot go into details. In India there is far more of economic thinking now than at any previous stage. I am not referring to the high-class thinking economists. They are of course there, but the average politician and even others are made to think of plans and economic consequences. Political thinking is becoming rather overshadowed by economic thinking and this is a sign of advance and growth. A country which is backward, always thinks in terms of political problems and a still more backward country always thinks in terms of its past.

IX. GENERAL

1. Economic Development of Asia¹

I am here both on my own behalf and on behalf of the Government of India to bid you welcome to this Conference here held in Bangalore City. You have just been reminded that eight years ago this Commission had this Conference in Ootacamund and I had the privilege to be present there also.² I am happy to have this second opportunity of being present at one of your conferences and to meet the distinguished representatives of various countries of Asia here.³

First of all, may I express my gratification at something which is not directly connected with this conference, that is, the fact that some members of this conference have recently found admission in the United Nations—Cambodia, Ceylon, Laos and Nepal.⁴ I am sure every country in Asia has welcomed this although we have had them for sometime in the ECAFE. This wider association in the United Nations will be helpful to us in Asia and I hope to the larger causes of the world.

I would have wished that two other countries—one represented here and one not—had also found admission in the United Nations, the great country of Japan and outer Mongolia. And I hope that their admission will not be long delayed. And I hope anyhow that in this ECAFE Conference which seeks, I hope, to have the largest measure of cooperation in this region, Outer Mongolia will also find its place.

Indeed it has struck me as very odd that when we seek this large measure of cooperation in this vast continent, a very large area of this continent should not be represented here, the area which is known as China. I am not referring to this matter from any political point of view—politics can be discussed in other places—but from the economic point of view, from the point of view of

1. Inaugural address at the twelfth session of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, Bangalore, 2 February 1956. JN Papers, NMML.
2. For Nehru's inaugural address at the third session of the ECAFE held at Udagamandalam on 1 June 1948, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol.6, pp.455-462.
3. The countries represented at the Conference were: Afghanistan, Indonesia, Myanmar, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the UK, the USA, and the USSR.
4. These countries were among the sixteen new countries admitted to the UN in December 1955.

knowing what the resources of Asia are. In any larger schemes of development we surely must have the largest measure of cooperation; and to leave out a very large part of this continent must necessarily be disadvantageous to your own activity and, if I may say so, to your own integrated thinking on this great problem.

Many of you are experts in the matters that come up before you. But I would venture to place some considerations of a wider nature before you, because I do feel that unless we keep these wider considerations before us, we may not perhaps be able fully to understand the nature of the problem that we consider. I suggest that while you consider the industrial or the agricultural or the economic aspects of this problem, nevertheless there is something more that one has to keep in mind in order to gain a full awareness of this problem. There is the tremendous urge and passion of millions of people wanting to do something, wanting to get something which they have lacked and that is a tremendous force. If rightly applied, it takes you forward in the right direction; if wrongly used, it not only hinders your going forward far, but may take you in the wrong direction. Therefore, it is of the most vital importance that there should be some adequate conception among the statesmen of the world of the vital urges that move the people of Asia today. Many of you, distinguished delegates here, know all of this.

The problems of Asia were often decided elsewhere without any reference to Asia or Asia's people. Now that old practice is out of date. Yet there is a hangover which continues and an attempt is made to decide Asia's problems in far away places, away from Asia and without much regard to what Asia feels or thinks.

A new awakening has come to the people of Asia. They have a sense of having been kept back for hundreds of years by the processes of history, if you like, by various things that happened, when their economy was governed by other countries and in favour of other countries. Politically, many of those countries of Asia have got out of that confining structure and they want to progress, to go ahead. Why do they want to progress and go ahead? Not only because progress is good, but rather because they lack the primary necessities of life. It is not a question of academic debate for them but a matter for survival. The new political and economic awakening and consciousness today refuses to submit to this continuing lack, which naturally does not like the vast disparity in economic and social conditions between the countries of Asia and the countries of some other parts of the world. So their approach to this problem is very far from being academic. There is a dynamic and a passionate urge behind it. And if we fail to understand that, then we are not wholly aware of

this problem, and being not fully aware we are apt perhaps to fail in finding suitable remedies for it.

I referred to disparity. This disparity in the well-being of the economic progress of nations is becoming greater and greater. Countries in Asia are advancing, I believe, but the distance that separates them from other more developed, industrially developed countries, becomes much greater. I believe even in the last ten years or so, since these new organisations came into existence after the Second World War, the disparity between these countries has grown and not lessened.

In this connection it seems to me that most of the very eminent people in Western countries—economists, statisticians, planners, etc.,—who have dealt with problems of economic development have usually and naturally considered these problems from the point of view of their own industrially developed countries, and not so much from the point of view of underdeveloped countries. The nature of the problem changes, whether you are dealing with an industrially developed country with large resources at its disposal or with a country which is underdeveloped and which has in the past had a rather static economy. And therefore, it is for this Commission and for all of us to consider these problems of underdeveloped countries in a somewhat different light. It is no good our copying the maxims or the methods or the procedures of the highly developed countries, because they do not apply here, because the problems in the underdeveloped countries are somewhat different.

We in Asia will have to solve our problems ourselves, learning from others. If we seek to imitate them or to copy what has happened there—in any sphere, whether it is political, economic or social—then I don't think we shall succeed, because somehow we become rootless and we try to find sustenance from something else which has no roots in our country, which may not fit in. So it is one thing to learn and have the closest cooperation with the countries which are more developed. It is another thing merely to imagine that by a certain process of imitation of what is happening there our country will benefit.

We want to expand peacefully above all. That is the main thing, and we resent everything that is likely to come in the way of our growth. That is why also, the manner of thinking, broadly speaking, of people in Asia who clamour to satisfy their primary needs is somewhat different from the manner of thinking of people in the more developed countries, where, broadly speaking, the primary needs have been satisfied and they can play about with other problems. We have no time to play about with other problems. If they are thrust upon us, naturally, we have to play such part as we can. But our basic object is to satisfy the primary needs of our people and I venture to say that that is the object of people in many other parts of Asia too.

The Chairman⁵ referred to the need for industrialisation. In industrialising our countries are we going to go through that painful process which accompanied the early industrialisation of some of the Western countries? Obviously not. First, because we should learn from experience. Secondly, because our people will not tolerate that today. We cannot repeat what happened a hundred years ago in Western Europe. We just cannot do it and it would be folly to do it. Therefore, we have to think of the process of industrialisation too in different terms today, above all, in human terms.

For instance, we can never forget the fact of large-scale unemployment and underemployment. How are we to bring employment to them? Obviously we cannot pursue out of date methods; we have to progress with latest technique. At the same time if the latest technique and the latest machine far from solving our problem of employment worsen it, then we are in a great quandary. These problems come up—the problems of the balance of heavy industry and light industry, of cottage industry and household industry and the like. One has to deal with them from day to day and there can be no fixed rule about it which applies to every country.

As you know, we are nearly at the end of our First Five Year Plan. And by and large we have met with considerable success in that Plan. What is most heartening is the fact that that Plan has given self-reliance and a measure of self-confidence to our people. And that is a tremendous factor, because no great economic or social progress can be made in a country in a big way by pure governmental effort or by pure financial means.

In the context of India today, I attach more importance to our community schemes, Community Projects and National Extension Service than almost anything else. I think of all these things in a revolutionary context, because they are producing a new climate in the minds of hundreds of millions of our rural people.

A year ago, you are well aware, that all the countries from Asia represented here and from Africa and some others too met at the Bandung Conference. That Bandung Conference was, I believe, a very significant and historic event from the point of view, more especially of the countries of Asia and Africa. Among other things, a certain approach was made in it towards economic and cultural cooperation, which did not go very far. Naturally, we could not discuss details there. But I hope that this Commission will pay heed to some of the

5. Abbas Khaleeli of Pakistan chaired the session.

suggestions made at the Bandung Conference in regard to economic and cultural matters; and perhaps take some steps to further the aims and views expressed there.

A careful survey of minerals as well as of other power resources is a thing in which I imagine this Commission can be of greatest help. I believe something has been done—some good work has been done by this Commission in the past. But the problem is a much bigger one and it should be tackled in that way. Another very important aspect of this problem is flood control and use of well-waters. We have been, in India, very much concerned with them. We have great rivers, we have built up a great irrigation system—one of the biggest in the world. Nevertheless, it is small compared to what we really want in India; and to push our big river valley schemes we have developed electric power also. These are many of the matters in which surely this Commission could particularly help.

The other day we had the Atomic Energy Conference in Geneva⁶ in which many countries present here were represented and many decisions were made there. Among the subjects discussed—I do not know whether there was a decision or not—was the necessity of knowing where the raw material for the production of atomic energy was available. Asia, from that point of view, is largely an undiscovered continent. It is necessary to know that. The Conference, which started its work of trying to find out what the world contained, seemed not to think of the huge territory of this region, called China, and did not know what resources it has.⁷ Here we want to know how much a particular mineral for atomic energy is available, is likely to be available, what the world contains today, and while making estimate of Asia we leave off one quarter of Asia. That is totally unscientific and that is one difficulty. If we consider social and economic problems and if we are constantly being pushed in one direction or the other by political considerations, then those social and economic problems suffer.

Aid is necessary from one country to another. Other countries in the past have grown up by such aid. More specially today it should be to the interest of the world to see that the growing disparity between developed and underdeveloped

6. The International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy was convened at Geneva from 8 to 20 August 1955 under the presidentship of Homi J. Bhabha.
7. For Nehru's views on this matter expressed at the time of the Asian-African Conference at Bandung in April 1955, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol.28, pp.205-209.

countries ceases, because this disparity itself might be the cause of all kinds of future troubles and difficulties. At the same time, speaking for my own country, we have felt that no country grows except by its own efforts, by its own labours, trials and tribulations and experiences. So, we have been generously helped and aided by many friendly countries and we have thankfully accepted that aid. But that aid has been ultimately a very small fraction of our effort.

Our effort has been very largely based on our own strength and resources, whatever they are. More for psychological reasons than any other, I do not want my people to think, for an instant, that they can get things without working hard, and suffering for them. That is a bad way for a nation to grow. I want them to labour, to work hard and then to achieve and to value the achievement because it has come through their hard work. Labour and work and suffering themselves will train the nation to higher effort later. If even economic and social aid become the plaything of political considerations and all these issues are confused, we do not raise that psychological atmosphere which helps; indeed one raises a certain atmosphere of conflict. That is why we welcomed the recent proposals—they are not very recent, but anyhow the last session of the United Nations General Assembly considered them—it is called in brief, SUNFED, Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development.⁸ I think that approach is right. And for the United Nations, this great organisation representing the world community, to help a part of that world community is the proper approach to this problem. Of course, everybody will know that certain countries which may be considered wealthy or capable of giving that help will give it through the United Nations.

We have made to international problems an approach of non-aggression, non-interference, mutual respect and recognition of sovereignty of each other and peaceful coexistence. I submit that if we discard war, there is no other way but to adopt the approach of peace and there is no other approach to peace except the approach to live peacefully with each other. We can't have an approach to peace with warring designs.

8. On 6 December 1955, the UN General Assembly unanimously approved a resolution asking all members of the UN and its specialized agencies to give their detailed views on the structure and operation of the proposed Special UN Fund for Economic Development in underdeveloped countries. The purpose of the Fund was to make grants-in-aid and long term, low interest loans to such countries, thus helping to speed their development by financing essential but non-profit yielding projects, and its creation had been recommended in the Ninth Session of the UN Assembly held from 21 September to 17 December 1954.

2. Invitation to USSR to the Asian-African Conference¹

It seems to me rather odd for Parliament to consider a resolution which calls upon the Government of India to recommend to the Colombo Powers to invite the USSR at the next session of the Bandung Conference. This Conference is confined to independent countries of Asia and Africa. Even though the Soviet Union extends to Asia, it can hardly be called an Asian Power. In our opinion, therefore, it cannot be invited without doing violence to the rules previously laid down for this Conference. Apart from this, it would be improper and highly embarrassing for Parliament to consider something in the nature of a request to a large number of other countries whose approval will have to be sought. If, as is highly likely, the others do not agree, then it is almost a rebuff to our Parliament.

2. On the other hand, if the resolution is considered by Parliament and opposed by Government, as it is bound to be, then this becomes a rebuff to the USSR.

3. I am quite clear that the consideration of this resolution is not desirable and will create difficulties and embarrassments all round.

4. A copy of this note might be sent to the Lok Sabha Secretariat for the consideration of the Honourable Speaker.²

1. Note, 3 February 1956. JN Collection.

2. G.V. Mavalankar.

3. To G.D. Birla¹

New Delhi
6 February 1956

My dear Ghanshyamdasji,²

This is a brief answer to your letter of the 21st January in which you inform me that you are going to the United States.³

2. It is rather difficult for me to give you any precise advice. In effect, this would involve writing at length about the international situation as it has developed and is now. You are of course acquainted with our broad policy and I have often spoken about it. That policy aims essentially at peace and endeavours to maintain friendly relations with all countries. Some years ago, when we tried to explain and act up to this policy, there was much misunderstanding almost everywhere. Each major group or bloc was so convinced of its own rightness and considered the other party as the devil, that it could not understand at all how we could be blind to this patent fact. Gradually, however, there has been greater understanding, both of our motives and policy. Whether people agree with us or not, most of them realise that we are honest about what we say and do.

3. As a matter of fact, this policy has yielded very substantial results and I have little doubt that it has helped in bringing about ceasefire in Korea and the termination of the Indo-China war. This by itself is no small accomplishment. It has done more. We have sometimes functioned as links or bridges between the opposing hosts and thus have lessened the tension.

4. I do not agree with the basic communist creed. But, during the last two years or so, the policy of the Soviet Union has definitely been one of peace. I am not so sure about the American policy. I think that the American policy has been a failure in many respects, whether in the Far East or in the Middle East. In Europe, after some successes, they have arrived at a dead end and there is no way of escape from it except to change the policy they proclaim, or have war. It is now generally understood that war should be ruled out. If that is so, then cold war itself becomes quite pointless and absurd. Cold war creates

1. JN Collection.

2. Leading industrialist; was on close terms with many Congress leaders.

3. As Birla was going to the US, he sought Nehru's guidance for his talks with the Americans.

only the impression if you can frighten the other party and there is a danger of real war following. If there is no such danger, then it has no meaning, and yet the whole attitude of the United States Government is one of promoting this cold war. It is true that the Soviet Government has not been behindhand in this matter, though it has certainly toned down greatly during the past year.

5. There is much talk of communism and anti-communism. In reality, the real contest is one of power between two mighty nations. We shall understand the situation only when we consider this in terms of a struggle for power and a certain overriding influence over the world. In the past this might have led to a war. Today that war means large-scale annihilation for everybody, so that way is not open whatever our feelings may be. The only other way is to accept things as they are, broadly speaking, and not seek to change them by threats which have no effect and which merely keep up tension and prevent a settlement.

6. Geography is an important factor in international relations. We cannot ignore the fact that both China and the Soviet Union are neighbours and will continue as such. It is also obvious that they have strong and stable governments which are not likely to change. The way to influence them is not by threats of war, which make them retaliate in kind. The only way is to develop contacts with them, trade and other, and thus lower the tension. We must remember that both countries have passed through fierce revolutions. The Soviet Union has hardly had any breathing time during the last thirty-eight years because of two World Wars, a Civil War, a war of intervention and often a blockade. This has produced, naturally, a complex as if the country was besieged. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union is becoming normal now and, I have no doubt, would become more so, given the opportunity. China is still in the revolutionary stage. At the same time, China is one of the most civilised and cool-headed countries in the world.

7. American policy is constantly to threaten these countries and thereby keep up the war fever and bring about reactions in these countries. Non-recognition of China is shutting one's eyes to a patent fact. All policies based upon it must necessarily be wrong. Trade embargoes make the communist countries more self-reliant and cut off from the world.

8. So far as India is concerned, Dulles' statement⁴ about Goa angered everybody here. Indo-American relations are much more affected by this kind

4. On 2 December 1955. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 31, pp. 423-424.

of thing than by the aid they may give. Then there is the American military aid to Pakistan which is a constant and growing threat to us and, in effect, adds to our burdens much more than the actual aid they give to us.

9. Americans do not seem to realise that there are other things than money which count more and that not only India, but other countries in the East have a certain pride and are not going to be bought over by money. It is goodwill that counts and good policy.

10. At the present moment, American policy is disliked even in England and Canada and, much more so, in France and these countries are their allies. They hold on to each other simply because of common dangers. But their alliance becomes weaker. This is largely because of Mr Dulles' policy. In the Middle East, British policy has failed completely.

11. As for aid to India, you have rightly said that we are prepared for any friendly aid from any country provided it is not connected with politics and has no strings attached. I am, however, not very anxious to get aid to such an extent that it upsets our own economy, apart from the moral and psychological reactions it may produce.⁵ I do not wish to create an impression in this country that we are dependent upon others. That will be a vital thing, psychological and political.

12. The US Ambassador here, Cooper, because of his friendly attitude, has done more good to Indo-American relations than all the aids that they have given. Unfortunately, his good work is undone by Mr Dulles repeatedly.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. Pointing out that India would need during the next ten years a large amount of foreign exchange, Birla suggested that a loan of about a billion dollars might be raised in the US within the next five years.

4. The Question of Antarctica¹

Your telegrams Nos. 110 and 112 regarding Antarctica.

2. It is evident that there is considerable misunderstanding in Argentina and Chile about our request to place the item "the Question of Antarctica" on the provisional agenda of the UN.² It is not our desire to challenge rights of Argentina or Chile. Whatever steps we may take in future will be after consultation with them and other powers concerned. Owing to various factors, and particularly development of atomic energy, new problems are likely to arise leading to conflicts in future. Quite apart from Argentina and Chile, there are several other countries claiming sovereignty over parts of Antarctica on grounds of discovery, occupation, geographical proximity, etc. No country has hitherto argued that the whole of the continent belongs to it. Some claims are recognised by certain States and not by other States. Even the Russians have now such claims.

3. Although there are no populations on this continent, it is possible that it might become a field for international war which in atomic age would be disastrous. Even atomic experiments and explosions in these regions may have very harmful results on the climate of the whole world.

4. Much constructive work in regard to meteorology and observations of cosmic rays might be possible in Antarctica. In fact, UNESCO is sponsoring

1. Telegram from M.A. Husain, Joint Secretary, MEA, to N. Raghavan, Indian Ambassador in Argentina, 1 March 1956. File No.12 (35)-UN II/55, MEA. Sending a draft of this telegram to Foreign Secretary, Nehru noted on 1 March, "If you agree with what I have written, this may be sent to our Ambassador in Buenos Aires.... I think a separate telegram should be drafted for the other countries." Raghavan was concurrently Indian Minister to Chile.
2. In February 1956, the Government of India had requested the inclusion in the provisional agenda of the 11th session of the General Assembly an item entitled "The Question of Antarctica," to ensure that the vast area and its resources were used entirely for peaceful purposes and for general welfare. The Governments of UK, USA, Soviet Union, France, Scandinavian countries, Japan, South Africa, Australia, Chile and Argentina had some claims or other to parts of Antarctica challenged by some of the other countries. India's request provoked strong criticism in many of these countries, especially in Chile and Argentina, in the belief that their rights might be challenged in the course of discussion in the UN.

an international expedition to Antarctica in the international geographical year 1957-58. Meanwhile many individual countries have already organised voyages of exploration in this region. There has never been in the past an international effort of this magnitude in this area. A general debate in the UN will provide opportunities for clarification as well as for constructive work. It is not our purpose that debate should be made against any country or for the support of any rival claims, nor do we wish to censure anyone or take sides. We feel however that in the interests of the peace and international development and cooperation such a debate would be helpful. For the present we are only placing item on provisional agenda. Before matter develops we shall keep in touch with and consult interested parties.

5. We have no doubt that these questions relating to Antarctica will become increasingly important in future and if matters are left to drift, without some general international guidance, they might lead to major conflicts in the future. We have thus to try to avoid any dangerous developments and have to think in terms of the atomic age which will probably govern many of these considerations in future.

6. You will please explain this fully to Foreign Ministers of Argentina and Chile and point out clearly that our move is in no way against their interests.

5. Employment Rules for the Wives of Officials Posted Abroad¹

I do not particularly like the idea of a woman and a wife to be considered as an appendage to her husband, with no individual life or work of her own. This is a carry over from the days of the leisure class. In industrial establishments, both husband and wife are frequently workers. There is no reason why in other types of work, they should also not have their separate employment.

2. This is theoretically correct, though it is conditioned by several factors. One is the social set-up, and the other is the provision made by the State for the education and looking after of the children. So long as the State does not provide adequately for these, a wife and a mother has necessarily to spend a good deal of time in looking after her home and children.

3. However, these are broad and general considerations. In regard to the Foreign Service, undoubtedly, there are special considerations. Much as I dislike a competent woman not to be utilised, I agree with you that there are difficulties in this, and complications might well arise. I think here also some difference might be made between the wives of the officer class and other wives. In regard to other wives, perhaps some relaxation might be permitted. Such cases are not likely to be many.

4. Generally speaking, therefore, the present rule applied to wives might remain as it is. There is the question of employment in the Mission itself. That should not be allowed. There is, then, the question of outside employment, that is, in a foreign country. Normally, this also should not be allowed, nor should such wives be allowed to become press correspondents. I suppose, however, that any wife doing writing work other than that of a newspaper correspondent, can do so, that is to say, she may write articles for magazines and the like. She can, of course, write books, if she is capable of doing that.

5. As is suggested in one of these notes, we need not be strict about the employment of wives or dependents in schools or hospitals. I do not myself see any objection to their teaching in schools or working in hospitals even on payment, provided permission is taken each time.

6. I think we should expect definitely the wives of our officers and others to help in the teaching of the children of the Mission. This would be in an

1. Note to Foreign Secretary, 1 March 1956. JN Collection.

honorary capacity. As has been pointed out, there is this difficulty of education. Even if these children go to schools in foreign countries, they have no chance of learning Hindi or much about their country. It would be right and proper for the wives of officers and others to organise this work properly and teach Hindi as well as, maybe some other Indian subjects like Indian History, current events, etc., to children there. The other forms of social humanitarian work also, which they can do.

7. Broadly speaking, therefore, I agree with FS.

6. Cigarettes for Mao Tse-tung¹

So far as I remember, I took no cigarettes for Chairman Mao² and I have no recollection of giving him any cigarettes.³ When Madame Soong Ching-ling was here,⁴ as she was leaving she mentioned that she liked the cigarettes we had in the house, that is, State Express 555, and further that Chairman Mao liked them too. It was late at night then and she was leaving the next morning. With some difficulty, I managed to get two thousand of these cigarettes, which I gave to her. I had hoped to give her more on her return from Pakistan, but she never came.

2. Therefore, presumably, Chairman Mao likes State Express 555. Possibly, these can be obtained from Rashtrapati Bhavan. If we send these cigarettes to Chairman Mao, ten tins of fifty each are not enough. The least we can send is one thousand or, preferably, two thousand.

1. Note, 8 March 1956. JN Collection.
2. Chairman, People's Republic of China.
3. Nehru visited China in October 1954.
4. Soong Ching-ling, widow of Sun Yat Sen and a Vice Chairman of the standing committee of the National People's Congress of China, visited India from 16 December 1955 to 2 January 1956.

7. World Scenario and National Security¹

I shall talk to you a little about external developments. The last year or so has been rather remarkable from the point of view of these new developments. As you know, during the last week or ten days, I have met the Foreign Ministers of three great powers, UK, USA and France. One of them I met before the Karachi Conference of SEATO and two afterwards. The Karachi Conference irritated us very much because of its reference to Kashmir and other matters. It is clear that that reference was made chiefly due to pressure from Pakistan and to the support she received from one or two other countries—USA and Australia. So far as the UK is concerned, before the SEATO Conference Mr Selwyn Lloyd said that this subject would not come up there,² and it was rather against his opinion that he was probably pushed in this direction. France knew nothing about it. She was not at all interested. Philippines and Thailand were prepared to support anybody.

Of course, there is a considerable difference between the American approach to world affairs and ours. The United Kingdom and France are somewhat in between us two. France, i.e., the new Government in France³, is much nearer to us in the general appraisal of the situation. England is not so near but nearer than America.

At the present moment, England is completely in a jam and in very grave difficulties in Western Asia or the Middle East as it is more commonly called. In fact, it is a very dangerous situation for England. Similarly, Algeria has created a very dangerous situation for France. These situations have been created because of the wrong policies in the past, not realizing what the new forces were. Everybody knows that the Baghdad Pact is almost dead but England's prestige and also her interests in the Middle East are so bound up with this matter that the British stick on to it⁴ and want help from other quarters, like the

1. Address at the conference of Deputy Inspectors-General of Police (CID), New Delhi, 13 March 1956. JN Collection.
2. Selwyn Lloyd said at a press conference in New Delhi on 5 March that Kashmir was not a suitable topic for discussion at the forthcoming SEATO conference and hoped that the issue would be settled directly by India and Pakistan through negotiations.
3. Guy Mollet's government was formed in France in January 1956 after general elections.
4. Britain joined the Baghdad Pact in April 1955 with its adherence to the Turko-Iraqi treaty of February 1955.

United States, in their favour. In a wider sense, England's future is very largely dependent on the oil she gets and other profits she obtains from the Middle Eastern countries. If that oil is stopped, England would rapidly become a third class power and so it is important. As things are at present, they are very bleak for England from this point of view. It shows how wrong policies based on agreements with some odd leading personalities and ignoring the popular forces at work lead to deadlocks. In the Middle East, the British policy has in the past few years made numerous mistakes. In Iran, they got into difficulties. Iraq is their own special country. There is a strong man—Nuri Pasha⁵—who may be a very able man but who is totally ignorant of anything that has happened or is happening during the last thirty or forty years. I cannot say how his mind works but it is a pre-First World War mind. Now these people—England and America—invariably enter into treaties with a man like Nuri Pasha, and if Nuri Pasha is pushed out, then the whole structure built up by England and America collapses. It depends upon individuals and not on national feelings or any support of the people. There will always be difficulties because they deal with individuals, usually reactionary individuals who are not in touch with the developments of today. England is thus in a very bad way in the Middle East and that again makes her much more dependent on the United States than others because they look to the United States to pull them out from these difficulties. France is terribly tied up with Algeria and they have arrived at a position in which I feel they really wish to get rid of Algeria—lock, stock and barrel—but it is not so easy as that because in Algeria there are over a million people of French descent living there for the last four or five generations. They have no contacts with France except cultural and business. Not only are their numbers great but they are a prosperous people and strongly entrenched. What is happening in Algeria is practically a civil war between the Arabs and the French—a very difficult position which it is beyond the capacity of the French to deal with. The French have now an army in Algeria of over 330,000—a good army, but it cannot control the situation in Algeria.

Of all the major things that have happened in the past year and a half, the most important is the realization by all the heads of governments that a new world war would be utterly disastrous. Atomic war must be avoided. If this is accepted, then other consequences flow. If there is going to be no war, people know that even a threat of war has no meaning. An empty threat—the cold war—has no meaning because a cold war is a prelude to a hot war. So if you

5. Nuri el-Said, Prime Minister of Iraq.

once decide that a war has to be avoided because a war will destroy mankind, more or less, then the only logical consequence is that we should accept things as they are and live peacefully with each other without interfering with each other. That is what our Five Principles say. That does not mean that the world should be petrified. Changes will have to come, but these changes should be made in a peaceful way and not by resorting to wars.

Now, in the course of the last year or so, the initiative, broadly speaking, in the international affairs in the West and Europe, etc., has been with the Soviet Union, except on one or two occasions. And every step that they have taken has rather upset the calculations of the Western powers, e.g., their pacts with Austria, Finland and Germany⁶, and so many other things that they have done. Their disarmament proposals were in fact an acceptance of the Anglo-French proposals. So if they accepted their opponents' proposals, there should be no difficulty, but difficulties were created by the United States and in fact the tendency now is to go away from disarmament. The last of the major steps that the Soviet Union has taken is the declaration of its policy in the XXth Congress of the Communist Party held about a month back. There is no doubt that the declarations made there have great importance and it is immaterial how far a particular declaration is honestly meant or not. The mere fact that these declarations have been made indicate a fairly vital change in the communist policy. As you know, communist policy has been much more dogmatic and rigid, rather like some one's approach to religion than to any political policy, these being written and argued from a metaphysical point of view. For the communists to basically change their approach is a big thing because it shakes up the faith that they had implanted in their people deeply. It is like a person who believes in certain dogma in religion, and if you shake his belief in that dogma, he is rather uprooted in mind. I have no doubt that the recent decisions of the XXth Congress in Moscow are a development of the last few years especially the last year or two—a development which may have started in the minds of the people before Stalin's death. Afterwards, when they had more opportunities, this developed. I think that to some extent the exchange of visits by Mr Bulganin and Mr Khrushchev and myself and the Prime Minister of Burma have had a very strong effect on the Soviet leaders.⁷ It was for the

6. In 1955, the USSR negotiated a peace treaty with Austria, established diplomatic relations with West Germany, and restored the Porkkala Naval base to Finland.
7. Nehru visited the Soviet Union in June 1955. U Nu visited the Soviet Union in October-November 1955. Bulganin and Khrushchev visited India and Myanmar in November-December 1955.

first time that they came out of their homes and they came to a country which was friendly to them, which gave them a great welcome, though it followed its own policy. So they were impressed in many ways, but the basic impression was that a country which followed a different policy could be friendly. It is not necessary that to be friendly, another country must follow your own policy. That is an important thing. There were other impressions from what they saw in India, industrial, cultural, and otherwise. In India there was dynamism. She was making progress. The people were a free people and appeared jolly, and our Government was a popular government, supported by the people. Again and again, Mr Bulganin and Mr Khrushchev told me that they had to change their opinion about India completely by coming here. They completely revised their opinion about India.

But apart from the opinion about India which they had, their broad approach to international problems changed. This was one element for the revision of their policy in the XXth Congress. You remember that it is now nearly thirty-nine years after their revolution—more exactly thirty-eight years and a half—and during this period they had two major wars, a civil war, and all kinds of internal difficulties. They have lived practically in a state of siege. That is what they told me. When I rather politely complained of their criticising other countries here⁸, they acknowledged it and they said that “you must remember our background. We have been in a state of siege almost for the last thirty to forty years and every attempt has been made in the past to crush us. We have survived by dint of tremendous effort, but we have become terribly suspicious of others who are not our friends and we react quickly to them because of this complex which has developed.” I told them we are friends of others with whom they were not yet on terms of friendship. So just before going away, Mr Khrushchev said at a little dinner we had, “We want to be friendly with you and we do not want to come between you and your other friends: in fact we want to be friends with your friends”, which meant that they want to be friends with England, America and others. The Russians and the Americans have very many common features. They may be fighting with each other today but they are fundamentally like each other. Apart from the basic things, they both worship the machine and technical civilisation and think that technology would solve every problem. The Americans have of course been technical people for over hundred years or more. Like them the Russians have also become highly technical people for the last thirty years.

8. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 31, pp. 352-353.

Their peasantry is technical—they work with machines. Apart from this, they are both a very hospitable people, a very open and friendly people—and rather emotional. If you make a friendly approach to an American or a Russian, he reacts quickly, but not so much an Englishman. The Englishman is phlegmatic, but not the Americans and the Russians. I am talking about the people and not their leaders. They are friendly and hospitable but apt to become very angry if they think that you are going against them. Though slightly unrestrained in their anger, with the right approach they react easily.

Now at the present moment, as I said, the initiative in international affairs has been largely with the Soviet Government—whether it is disarmament or other matters. The only thing where the initiative was with the Western powers was in regard to Germany. They went ahead and they got West Germany into the NATO,⁹ much to the annoyance of the Soviet. But the Soviet countered it afterwards by more or less accepting West Germany in the NATO but adopted a policy which perpetuated Eastern Germany, so that the main aim of Western policy, which was a united Germany under the influence of the Atlantic powers, was defeated. The Soviet Government simply said, “There is an Eastern Germany and if you want Eastern Germany, go and talk to Eastern Germany”, but none of these people recognised East Germany. Thus West Germany does not recognise East Germany and the Soviet Government is quite happy to sit tight. In dealing with East Germany, West Germany, America and England have to give up the stand they have taken about East Germany. It is a very clever position to take up by the Soviet and the result has been that they have to do nothing except to sit tight. They say, “If you want this, you can go to East Germany, and if they agree, we are agreeable too.” All this makes England and America very angry because all their three or four years’ policy in regard to Germany which brought West Germany into the NATO, has suddenly come to a dead halt. Gradually in West Germany the people are becoming dissatisfied with this negative policy and are moving towards having some agreement direct with East Germany and with Russia. This is not liked by America and others, but the pressure is great as the Germans want unity. France also, i.e., the new Government, is gradually moving away from that rigid Western position and is advocating closer contacts with the Soviet Union. So, altogether there is a slight cracking of the Western alliance. Internally they may continue but externally, because they aimed too high, they cannot keep up that position.

9. On 5 May 1955.

At the present moment, the most dangerous parts in the world are Israel and Egypt, where there are fifty-fifty chances of war in the next two or three months. It may not take place, but there is that danger and the war will come, of course, from Israel, because they are very much afraid that Egypt may become stronger and stronger and then it will be useless to have a war because Egypt will crush them within a few days. So what is called a preventive war may be started by Israel. I do not think personally that war will take place but nobody knows. That is the most difficult position today in the world from the point of view of war.

Then going further up, Baghdad Pact and the rest, that is all in a hopeless state of mess—complete mess. We see in Jordan, the King and the Government being forced by public opinion to dismiss General Glubb Pasha. It is due to public opinion. Similar feelings are spreading in Iraq, not to that extent, against Nuri Pasha and others. That is to say, the position that the Western powers—England and America—had built up is being undermined not because of Soviet propaganda—the Soviet is not there—but really because the Arab League has split up. The Arab nations have split up because of this Baghdad Pact¹⁰ and those who are against the ‘Baghdad Pact’ are carrying on intense propaganda against it in countries like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, etc. This is a bad position from the point of view of England.

On the Eastern side, that is East Asia, the situation is fundamentally bad but for the moment not in a state of crisis. That is a broad review of the present day happening.

In Indo-China, we are in a very difficult position as we are there because of the Geneva Agreement. We were appointed to the International Commission under the Agreement. Now the Prime Minister of South Vietnam, Diem, refuses to acknowledge that Agreement. This is most embarrassing for us because if the Agreement is not acknowledged, we have no position there. At the same time he wants us to be there, because we are in a sense giving him an assurance that there will be no revival of the war. In South Vietnam, the Americans and the French have been at loggerheads for a long time and working against each other.

10. At the Conference of Arab Prime Ministers held in Cairo in January-February 1955, the Egyptian Premier, Nasser, strongly criticized the proposed Iraq-Turkey Pact which came to be known as the Baghdad Pact with its formalisation at Baghdad on 24 February 1955. Nasser alleged that Iraq intended to tie herself completely to the Western Powers. An Egyptian resolution proposing that the Arab States should not conclude Pacts with powers outside the Arab League was, however rejected by Syria, Lebanon and Jordan.

It is a difficult position all over the world, but you will see that the countries which have relied on others for development and are carrying on because of external help and as they are not relying on their own people, they are gradually getting weaker and are in most difficult circumstances. I think the past two and a half years have shown the fundamental correctness of our basic international policy. Countries even like France under the present Government, in spite of their difficulties, are beginning to acknowledge privately how right our policy is and wish to cooperate with us. Of course, Yugoslavia is very near to us in regard to broad policies. We are seeing an inevitable shift over of the balance of power in Asia, in Africa, Egypt and in the Middle East. I can very well understand the British Government or the American Government disliking many things, e.g., Russian arms going to Egypt. But their dislike is based on the idea that the Middle East, Near East and all those countries are their particular concern and the preserve of certain Western powers. There is no logic or reason why it should be said that America or England should supply arms to certain countries and not Russia or Czechoslovakia. Foolishly, they brought great pressure on Egypt in many ways. They did not supply them arms and all that and now when Egypt goes to Czechoslovakia to get arms,¹¹ they get upset. Then there is the Baghdad Pact. They have brought about this situation on themselves by their own activities. The moment arms went to Egypt from Czechoslovakia, a big thing happened, that is to say, the Western sphere of influence in Western Asia was broken. Something new happened. It is bound to happen in different ways but it has happened now. And this type of push-out from place to place is likely to continue chiefly because of their own basically wrong policies and their founding their policies on some odd individuals like Nuri Pasha of Iraq.

So far as we are concerned in India, it is very encouraging that the people of other countries value our advice and more and more come to us to discuss matters. That is no doubt a burden for us. The SEATO Council is an attempt by some powers to say that we must behave, otherwise we will get into trouble. And that was the principal meaning of the SEATO meeting in Karachi just to give us a warning that we must behave in future. Now this thing, even in the case of much weaker countries than India, is a very foolish policy. As you have seen in the Middle Eastern countries which are weak, they have reacted to this threat and reacted for two reasons. One, of course, is that every country

11. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 31, pp.381-382 and 525.

reacts to pressure tactics, unless it is very very weak and has to surrender. Secondly, there is a country like Egypt, which went to the Soviet not only for arms but also machinery. The time for countries to resort to pressure tactics is past now. In the case of India, of course, it is more difficult for them to do so. Apart from the fact that we are stronger than other countries, we are having popular policies and therefore, we have the support of our people and all our background has been not to submit to any kind of threat and they know it.

Another thing in which you must be interested of course is: what will be the effect on India of this apparent change in the Russian communist policy? It is rather difficult to be precise about it. I think undoubtedly in the international sphere, the Soviet Government, because of international reasons, would not like anything to happen which would be against the Government of India and India generally. They support us and therefore they are more careful not to encourage in India any definite opposition to us. When I talked on the last day to Mr Khrushchev and Mr Bulganin, I talked very frankly about communist activities here.¹² I took up the line that I was not mentioning this to them because we were worried about the communists. We can deal with them. They are not very strong, nor very intelligent, but we attach importance to this matter because communist activities in India came in the way of good relations between India and Russia. That was the point I took—"We want to be friends with you and whether it is a fact or not, it is believed that the communists here receive inspiration from Moscow. They rush there for advice and directions. Apparently they receive large sums of money in various ways." I gave them a number of instances. I said communists were spending large sums of money, and if they do not get it here, wherefrom does this money come in? They have bought properties in Madhya Pradesh and Poona. The Soviet Embassy and communist embassies here employ communists on their staff and encourage them in this way. I told them about the visits that some of our communist people like Ajoy Ghosh had paid to Moscow in recent years. One visit was even after I went to Moscow. I said that these people go there and receive advice from the highest quarters. I said, for instance, my information was that the communist leader, Ajoy Ghosh, went to Moscow after my visit there, and said here to his partymen that they need not worry much about what was said in public as the "private policy" remains the same. About this kind of thing, especially I was quite frank with them. They denied this. They said that they did not know anything

12. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 31, pp. 338-345.

about our Communist Party. Mr Khrushchev said that they had never met any important Indian communist in Moscow or here. He had seen only one—a tall man—from a distance. They sympathised with communists because they are communists themselves. But they do not want to interfere with our Communist Party. This party is behaving very foolishly. Whether it was true or not, I wanted to make it clear how we felt about it and I have no doubt that it had some effect on him and that effect was partially transmitted to the Communist Party here. That is in so far as the international policies are concerned, but for us to expect that the Communist Party of India will behave is rather silly because it will not behave here. They will seek every opportunity to cause trouble. At the same time that strong ideological basis which was a practical feature in communism in India for young men and others, has weakened and that makes a difference. Undoubtedly, the Communist Party of India cannot function in future with that clarity of mind as it used to do. It is confused as to what policy to adopt and what not. In matters like states reorganisation, it is bound to create some trouble. They pick up such issues against Government.

The PSP is in a bad way. It has become utterly irresponsible. I had always a certain feeling of sympathy with this party. I want some party in opposition, but it seems to be wholly incapable of functioning with any responsibility, and they have been, as you know, participating fully in troubles in Bombay, Orissa and elsewhere. It is very unfortunate.

The point is that, in the world we are passing through a stage of acute transition and change in the people's thinking, which is conditioned by various factors: first of which is nuclear energy, an enormous power that is coming, nobody knows what it is. We know that it can do tremendous harm and can also make enormous improvements in technology. All these things are changing the world very rapidly and we have to be very wide awake and any person who goes on thinking in the old rut is just left behind. He cannot understand this change in the world.

So far as the external danger to India is concerned, the only possible danger is from Pakistan. There is no other danger—not even the remotest danger. Whether Pakistan functions by itself or is helped by others is another matter. I do not think any other country wants Pakistan to start a war against India, but they are creating conditions which make it easy for Pakistan to be hostile. It is a great danger for us, of course. Pakistan is an irresponsible country with a bad economy, which is based on foreign help. We have naturally to be prepared, vigilant and ready for all contingencies.

Internally, I do not attach much importance to communists. The communists function against the states reorganisation and do mischief. The problem before

us at present is the States reorganisation problem. I suppose we have had the worst of it, and the one danger area like the Punjab is likely to quieten down.

We are naturally, from the intelligence point of view, more interested in our border countries than distant countries, and I think we should concentrate more on the border countries. We are interested in what is happening there. In the other, distant countries we are interested no doubt, but I do not know what the present intelligence set up is in the distant countries. Gradually we have to develop direct contacts with some countries at least in Europe and elsewhere which would be very helpful. We should be able to know through important people what is happening there. Obviously every government ultimately has to rely on information called intelligence. Without proper intelligence, decisions taken may be faulty. One of the most remarkable features of the Maratha regime in pre-British days was that on the one side they had tremendous enterprise, dash and courage, but complete lack of intelligence—such astonishing lack of intelligence that they did not even possess maps. Galloping across the country bravely, they had to deal with the British people who had a complete system of espionage in every Indian court—often ministers in the old Indian courts were in the pay of the British. I am talking of the time when Britishers were not very dominant in India but were here and there, e.g., in Bengal. They had relatively good maps. They had agents in every Indian court, and here were the Marathas who, outwardly the strongest power in India, did not know how long and broad India was, and had no contacts with any place except very nearby places. All this courage is wasted, if you have no correct information and no intelligence. You cannot fight a battle if you do not know where the enemy is. I referred to the Marathas because the Marathas were in a dominant position in India and any person living then would have said that the Maratha Empire might cover the whole of India and not that of the British. It was a sign of technical and other backwardness. We have to be up to date in these matters of intelligence. Real intelligence is most important both from our own as well as chiefly from the border countries.

Thank you.

8. Tribute to Lord and Lady Mountbatten¹

Mr President,² Lady Mountbatten, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, Standing here today my mind goes back to another occasion when I stood up at this table to propose a toast to Lord and Lady Mountbatten. That was nearly eight years ago.³ It was rather a sad occasion for all of us because we were parting, from two persons who had not only become our friends, who had grown into our lives and activities. I do not know how many of you present here tonight were present on that occasion also—many were I have no doubt. And when I think of many other occasions, many other pictures come up before my mind, all that rather hectic period during which we faced together many problems, many difficulties.

I remember the first occasion when I met Lord Mountbatten. That was almost exactly ten years ago in Singapore.⁴ I met Lady Mountbatten slightly later the same day and that was in a rather remarkable fashion. And perhaps this meeting with Lady Mountbatten was some kind of a prelude to many other upsets that we had to face later. If I may, with her permission, take you into my confidence, I was taken by Lord Mountbatten to an Indian soldiers' canteen in Singapore. Well, the Indian soldiers were lined up very properly but within about two or three minutes of our arrival there, some kind of stampede took place and Lady Mountbatten disappeared and I was very worried—what had happened to her? She crawled out and presented herself, and that was my first introduction to her.

Then I remember nearly nine years ago, in this very month of March, when they arrived here and we went to welcome them at Palam Airport.⁵ That day started a new chapter in our history and in our activities. Now, history is often said to be a record of big people, kings, leaders, captains and the like, great

1. Speech at a state banquet in honour of Earl and Countess Mountbatten, Rashtrapati Bhavan, New Delhi, 15 March 1956. JN Papers, NMML.
2. Rajendra Prasad.
3. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol.6, pp. 358-360.
4. Nehru visited Singapore from 18 to 20 March 1946. Lord Mountbatten was the Supreme Allied Commander stationed at Singapore.
5. Lord Mountbatten arrived in New Delhi on 22 March 1947 to take over as the new Viceroy.

battles. That is an out of date idea of history and nowadays we think more of the great and rather impersonal forces at play, which mould the destinies of nations and peoples, of the peoples lives, how they change and develop. That is so. Nevertheless, I think it is true that the individual does make a difference, at any time to some extent and more specially during times of transition. It so happened that during rather a significant period of India's history, Lord Mountbatten came here as Viceroy, subsequently transformed himself into a Governor General, and he played a very important and vital part during that period of our history.

It was a brief history. It was a brief period, fifteen months altogether, but those fifteen months saw great changes. They put an end to the period of British rule here and started independent India on her new career. That was a brief period but it was quite extraordinarily a full period, and I suppose those of us who lived through that period were so powerfully impressed by all happenings that on the one hand it stands out, on the other hand by the very multitude of impressions it is rather confused and certainly when I try to recall the details I get very confused and the details stand out. And during that period Lord Mountbatten and Lady Mountbatten played a part which, if I may say so, nobody else could have played and it is quite conceivable that the historic changes and developments that took place—although they had their roots in many things, many forces at play and the final culmination was a resultant of those forces and those happenings—I have little doubt that if Lord Mountbatten had not been here during that period, something different might well have happened.

But I am not talking politics today. What I remember most of all—it is a remarkable thing—that during a period like that when passions were roused all over India, and in what is called Pakistan now, when all kinds of horrible things occurred and people misbehaved, yet Lord Mountbatten survived all this, survived not physically I mean, but survived in the estimation and affection of the people which is a remarkable thing indeed. Many people, all of us, who functioned in those days had to face severe trials and tests. All of us did not go out, yet out of those trials and tests, some did, others stood by the way, but one thing is quite certain that Lord Mountbatten came out successfully out of every trial and test that came before us in those days. And as for Lady Mountbatten, she became so popular with our people because of the healing touch she brought where she went, that some of us became somewhat jealous of her.

But apart from the personal factor, another thing stands out and that is—after a very long period of conflict, mental conflict and pulling in different directions and ill will, which inevitably follows, from some kind of imposition

which is not right, we solved that problem amicably and in a way which left no traces or hardly any traces of that past record of conflict and ill will. That, I think, was a remarkable achievement. I think, of course, that the person who was most responsible for that was our Leader and Master, Gandhiji, who had trained this great nation to behave, not to harbour ill will. We did not all come up to his test, but some little bit of that discipline and training remained in us and saved us often enough. And yet this could not have been so if there had not been an equal measure of response from the other side. The meeting, an attempt to meet as friends and despite everything that had happened, and even when there is that, some kind of catalytic agent has to bring about that meeting of minds. Lord Mountbatten proved to be such an agent at a very critical period of our history. And so we saw this remarkable development that India, which had been in conflict with Britain, rather suddenly becoming friends with her and forgetting or almost forgetting its past record of conflict and ill will. And when two or three years later we became a Republic, still it did not make any difference to that relationship because that relationship was not based on any hoops of steel or ropes or anything. It was a relationship of free will about anything, not even the silken bonds. And because there was nothing to tie, there was nothing to break it. We see often enough today all kinds of strong bonds being forged to tie one country to another, iron and steel bonds, other things made of iron and steel, and they apparently tie them. And yet that iron breaks and even the steel melts away, and that strong bond becomes in a moment of crisis not so strong as it looked. But the manner of relationship which was evolved between India and England was of a different kind and different texture. And because there was nothing to tie them in that way, because we had known each other, both in conflict and in cooperation, and had settled our conflicts in a civilised human way, we have survived many things, many differences of opinion because we were to differ and because we fundamentally wished and had developed the mood to cooperate as far as possible and to cooperate even if we differed. It is a little difficult to define that relationship because it is indefinable, and it is often the indefinable things that are most important and precious of all.

This world grows in some ways better, in some ways perhaps not so good as it was. It grows less gracious. Somehow people prefer to talk not in gentle terms to each other but rather toughly. All of us, I suppose, are mixtures of toughness and gentleness but it is unfortunate that in international relations the ideal of toughness prevails a little more than the ideal of graciousness and gentleness. Perhaps if we could bring a little more gentleness and charity into our dealings with each other, even our differences will become much less and

ways could be found to resolve them and therefore a relationship might evolve which, in spite of all differences of opinion, is essentially based on a friendly approach, on a civilised approach, on an attempt to be, if I may use the word, gracious, to each other and, if possible, with a certain element of permanence which even ill fortune cannot take away from it. I do believe that that type of relationship is a much enduring one, a much better one because it harms none and sets an example to others of good and civilised behaviour. We cannot all agree and any attempt to make people agree by compulsion and coercion defeats its purpose. We have to win over people, win people's minds and hearts in so far as we can, and if we cannot win them, at least to lessen the hostility in the other's mind.

Now Lord Mountbatten undoubtedly was one of the principal architects of the relationship for the success between India and England today and therefore he has served not only his country well, not only India well, but I think many others also. We of course have long ceased to look upon him and Lady Mountbatten as strangers or as people, well, belonging to some other country and not belonging to us.⁶ And so his coming back here after so many years has been a special occasion for us to look back on these events which stirred us and moved us so deeply and which conditioned us too for the future. It has been a great pleasure to me—and I have no doubt to all those present and many others—to welcome him. And Lady Mountbatten, we have welcomed you, Madam, on many occasions when you came here quietly, informally and in a friendly fashion. I hope you will continue to do so and I hope you, Sir, will also not allow another eight years to elapse before you come back here.

May I ask you to drink to the health of Lord and Lady Mountbatten!

6. Disagreeing with the views of the UK High Commission that Mountbatten should be received in India as the First Sea Lord of UK and no honours were due to an ex-Governor General as such under the British Regulations, Nehru noted on 3 March 1956: "In terms of our protocol, he must be treated as an ex-Governor General and wherever he goes in India, that precedence will be given to him.... He is an ex-Head of the Indian Government. He was chosen as such by us after independence and the British Government has nothing to do with this matter."

9. Dissemination of News About Asia¹

I think that the Asian Conference of the International Press Institute,² which is going to be held in Tokyo soon, is of considerable importance. In this swiftly changing world, where events follow each other in quick succession and crisis succeeds crisis, it is of the utmost importance that full and impartial news should be available to the public. I realise that it is no easy matter to give impartial news when the purveyors of news themselves hold strong opinions. Nevertheless, an attempt has to be made.

In particular, this is important for Asia. We have largely depended in the past on news services from outside Asia. I do not complain of these news services, but it is obvious that they are designed to serve the needs chiefly of Europe and America. In Asian countries we have a fair amount of news from Europe and America, but very little from different countries of Asia. This is not only bad because we remain largely ignorant of what is happening round about us but at the same time the news we get has often a special bent.

From every point of view, therefore, it is important that an effort should be made for the proper exchange and dissemination of news among the countries of Asia. Their resources may at present be somewhat limited. But I feel sure that a cooperative effort would meet with success. There is a vacuum today which has to be filled.

We in India today are tremendously interested in our own development and in the development of other Asian countries. I take it that there is this same feeling in many other countries of Asia. We are not much interested in sensational news which attracts attention for a day and is forgotten the next day. Our major interest is to know how the countries of Asia are advancing and making good, what their successes are and their failures. We can all learn

1. Message to the Asian Conference of the International Press Institute, released to the Press on 18 March 1956. Press Information Bureau. The Conference, held at Tokyo from 19 to 23 March 1956, was attended by all the national committees of the Institute from Asia. Other participants included representatives of newspapers and news agencies from all over the world. Communist countries, South Korea and Taiwan were not represented.
2. Founded in London in 1951 as a non-governmental association of editors, publishers and broadcasters supporting the principles of a free and responsible press, the Institute was active in promoting the free flow of news and training in journalism in the developing countries.

from each other and try to help each other. This type of news is particularly lacking at present.

I hope, therefore, that this Conference will consider this vital problem and indicate some solution for it.

10. A Survey of Foreign Affairs¹

Mr Speaker,² Sir, during the past few months, as the House is aware, we have had the pleasure and privilege of welcoming to India many eminent visitors from abroad. These visitors came from many lands, as messengers of goodwill from nations with widely differing cultures and systems of thought and organisation. To all of them we extended a warm and cordial welcome in that spirit of friendliness towards all, which distinguishes our foreign policy, as indeed it does the traditions of our country and our people. I had long and detailed conversations with all of them, both on the major problems of the world, in their many aspects, and on matters of mutual interest to the particular country concerned and ourselves. I should like to take this opportunity of saying how valuable have been these talks and how much I have profited by them. It was, of course, not to be expected that, as a result of these talks, there would be sudden changes in the foreign policy of our country or of any of the other countries concerned. Foreign policies are not made and changed in that way. All the same, these talks at a personal level, held in a frank and informal atmosphere, have enabled us, and I hope our visitors too, to appreciate better each other's point of view. They have helped us to obtain a better understanding of the minds of those who in their respective countries, are directly concerned with the formulation and direction of policy. Where we have been unable to agree, we have agreed to differ.

It is not possible for me to cover all the ground of these talks or to refer, in this statement, to the many problems that afflict the world and are a matter of concern to us. Perhaps, at a later stage, I might refer in this House to some of these international problems.³ For the present, I should like to mention some important matters which were recently discussed by us with our distinguished visitors.

Of these visitors, the three recent ones have been Mr Selwyn Lloyd, Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr Dulles, Secretary of State of the USA,

1. Statement in the Lok Sabha, 20 March 1956. *Lok Sabha Debates*, 1956, Vol.II, Pt.II, cols. 3041-3050.
2. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar.
3. Nehru made a statement in the Lok Sabha on 29 March. Extracts printed, see *post*, pp. 515-516.

and M. Pineau, Foreign Minister of France.⁴ We welcomed them as representatives of three leading countries in the world, and with each of them I discussed the international situation and also how best tension could be relaxed and peace, which is the objective of all countries, could best be promoted.

The occasion which brought these statesmen to this region of the world was the meeting of the SEATO Council in Karachi. To our great surprise, the Council at this meeting thought it fit, at the instance of one of its members, to discuss the question of Kashmir and include a declaration on this question in its final communique. In doing so, the Council confirmed our worst apprehensions about the organisation which it represents. The declared purpose of the South East Asia Treaty is to increase the defensive strength of the parties to the Treaty against aggression from outside and against internal subversion. How the question of Kashmir could come within the scope of the SEATO Council is not clear to us. Its reference to Kashmir could only mean that a military alliance is backing one country, namely, Pakistan, in its disputes with India. For any organisation to function in this way to the detriment of a country, which is friendly to the individual countries comprised in the organisation, would at any time be considered an impropriety. In the present case, however, there is a further aspect. We have noted with regret that three other Commonwealth countries have associated themselves with the offending declaration. We have communicated our protest to all the countries concerned at the unusual procedure adopted by the Council.

I had talks with Mr Dulles about the US military aid to Pakistan. I told him how this aid has been causing us serious concern. The atmosphere in Pakistan seems to be one of threats and menaces towards India. India continues to be the subject of bitter attack in sections of the Pakistan Press, and bellicose statements appear from time to time even from responsible leaders. More recently, there has been a recrudescence of border incidents which have, by their frequency and dispersion over a wide area, assumed a special significance. Substance is thus lent to the growing belief in this country that whatever the object of the United States in giving military aid to Pakistan, in Pakistan itself the resulting acquisition of military strength has been generally welcomed not because it will increase Pakistan's defensive capacity against a potential aggressor, but because they hope thereby to be able to settle disputes with India from what is called a position of strength.

4. They visited New Delhi in the first half of March.

We in India wish Pakistan well. She has just declared herself a Republic, and we offer her our best wishes at the threshold of a new chapter in her history. We are sending one of our Ministers as a special envoy to Karachi to convey our felicitations in person. It is not our intention to enter upon any arms race with Pakistan or with any other country, even if we could afford such a competition. Our energies and our resources are completely absorbed, and will continue to be absorbed for many years to come, in our Five Year Plans, and none of us would wish to divert any part of our limited resources to further expenditure on arms. Nevertheless, those responsible for the destiny of India have to take note of certain facts. I can only express our regret and disappointment that at a time when we in Asia should be bending our energies to the task of development, a new factor making for tension and instability should have been introduced by this arms aid. I have explained our views on this point clearly to Mr Dulles and I hope he now has a better appreciation of our feelings.

Recent developments serve once again to focus attention on military pacts. These pacts, instead of dwindling in numbers, seem to be on the increase, and are being strengthened and enlarged, irrespective of previous commitments and declarations. This is the history of all pacts, more especially of the South East Asia Defence Treaty and the Baghdad Pact. The former came into existence at a time when, after many years of warfare, there was peace in South-East Asia. Tensions were relaxed and people looked forward to a return to normality. There was no possibility of aggression in the foreseeable future. Yet, at this moment of relief and the beginnings of hope, this Pact came into existence⁵ and resulted immediately in increasing tension. The more recent Baghdad Pact has already brought disruption, insecurity and discontent in Western Asia. Thus, the very objective for which these pacts were made is being defeated. It has been our firm conviction that these two treaties and similar military pacts and alliances do not add to the intrinsic defensive strength of the regions in the interest of which they are supposed to have been devised.

Talks on disarmament in the face of military pacts by either bloc and further preparations for war are inconsistent and a mockery of avowed purposes. There

5. A treaty to set up the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation, providing for the security of South-East Asia and South-West Pacific, was signed in Manila on 8 September 1954 by Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, UK and US. On 21 July 1954, at the end of an international conference held at Geneva to restore peace in Korea and Indo-China, the participating nations had signed ceasefire agreements covering Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia bringing to an end the war in Indo-China.

is always time to revise policies even if the great powers are involved in them, if the revision is in the common good and in the interests of peace. It is not by military alliances and the matching of strength with strength that tensions can be lowered and peace and stability re-established where conflict now prevails. We hold, and with each new experience are further confirmed in our conviction, that in the adherence to and the practice of the Five Principles, now widely known as the *Panch Shila*, alone lies the promise of a new era of international peace and stability.

The coming of atomic energy, and the dreaded weapons that it has let loose on the world, has made all previous thinking not only in regard to military matters but also other matters, out of date. Thinking people and the leaders of nations have, as a consequence, ruled out war. In this new situation, there is no logic in clinging to the idea of a cold war. We have stated repeatedly that nuclear weapons must be banned and that atomic energy must be used for the benefit of humanity and not be controlled by the great powers. If war is to be ruled out, then cold war becomes illogical and harmful. It can only keep up the atmosphere of hatred and fear, and the ever-present danger of being converted into a nuclear war.

I had discussions also on Goa with Mr Secretary Dulles. As the House is aware, the joint statement issued by him and Mr Cunha, the Foreign Minister of Portugal, some weeks ago, caused a deep feeling of resentment throughout India. We took this matter up immediately with the United States Government and explained to them how, in the context of the present situation in Goa, the association of the US Secretary of State with a statement of that kind could only have one effect, that being to give encouragement to Portugal in pursuing a policy which represents the worst type of colonialism. I told the House then that we would place our correspondence on this subject with the US Government on the Table of the House. I am doing so today and honourable Members will have an opportunity of seeing our notes and the reply of the United States.

Mr Dulles, in his talks with me, assured me that, in subscribing to the joint statement, the US was not supporting Portugal as against India. We do not, of course, doubt this statement, but the position nevertheless is that the joint communique is being interpreted, especially by Portuguese authorities, as if it supported their claims. We have made our position clear to the US Government, and I want to repeat here that in no circumstance will we tolerate the continuance of the last remnants of Portuguese colonialism on Indian soil. We have been patient, and we shall continue to be patient, but there will be no compromise on this issue. I still hope that friendly countries will impress on Portugal the un wisdom of following a policy of sixteenth century colonialism in the second half of the twentieth century.

With all the three Ministers I have had detailed discussions about the situation in Western Asia. All are agreed that this situation is an explosive one. I do not presume to give advice about any quick solution to this difficult problem. At the same time, I have no doubt in my mind that a solution can only emerge from a gradual relaxation of tension. Here again, the Baghdad Pact is partly responsible for a good deal of the present trouble which now plagues West Asia. It has rent asunder Arab unity and has thereby made the solution of a problem already difficult, still more difficult and complicated.

I discussed the situation in Indo-China with the three Foreign Ministers, particularly, with the Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom, who is a Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference. When, in response to the invitation of the Geneva Powers, India accepted the Chairmanship of the three International Commissions in Indo-China, we did so in the hope that at long last peace would return permanently to this troubled region in South East Asia which is so close to us and with which we have so many old and historic ties. It appears now that the time schedule for elections as a preliminary to the unification of the two parts of Vietnam, which was envisaged in the final declaration at Geneva, is unlikely to be fulfilled. We are compelled, therefore, to review the situation in so far as it concerns us. We have no intention of trying to escape from a position of responsibility, or to take a step which would hamper a peaceful settlement. We have, therefore, suggested to the two Co-Chairmen that they should review the position and decide on the steps that should be taken to secure compliance with the Geneva Agreement. I have reason to hope that the two Co-Chairmen will meet and discuss the present situation.

The discussion with the three Foreign Ministers also covered the present situation in East Asia, particularly in relation to the two coastal islands of Quemoy and Matsu as well as Taiwan. I explained to them once more how in our view the basic cause of the trouble in East Asia is the non-recognition of a patent fact. That fact is the emergence of a new China, unified as never before in its history, strong powerful and conscious of its rights and dignity. I do not think that, so long as the Chinese People's Republic is not admitted to the United Nations, the situation in East Asia will return to normal. In particular, I expressed the view that China will never feel secure so long as Quemoy and Matsu remain in the occupation of hostile forces. The essential first step would be the withdrawal of those forces from these islands so that they can become part of the mainland. The Taiwan issue will still remain but I believe that if the coastal islands were to return to China, the problem of Taiwan could be handled a little more easily.

In this context we have been watching with interest the course of the talks at Geneva between the Ambassadors of the United States of America and China.⁶ Both sides are broadly agreed that they should settle disputes between them through peaceful negotiation. The main difficulty now is that of applying this principle to the particular case of Taiwan. We hope that a satisfactory formula in regard to this also will be found, thereby paving the way for a discussion of other outstanding matters including a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the two countries.

I should like to refer in particular to the talk I had with M. Pineau about North Africa. We in India appreciate and welcome the steps taken by France to restore sovereignty to Morocco and Tunisia. The difficult problem of Algeria still remains. I was glad to find that M. Pineau takes a realistic view of the situation. The problem there is complicated by the existence of about one and a quarter million persons of European descent, who have been settled there for some generations. The House will not expect me to go into further details of these discussions. I hope that the problem of Algeria will also be solved to the mutual satisfaction of the French and the Algerian peoples.

Shortly before M. Pineau reached Delhi, we received from the French Government a draft of the treaty for the *de jure* transfer of sovereignty over the former French establishments in India. We do not foresee any difficulty about agreement on this draft and I hope that the *de jure* transfer of sovereignty will not be long delayed.

If peace is to be aimed at, disarmament is essential. As with every other difficult question, perhaps it is easier to proceed step by step. A sub-committee of the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations has been meeting in London and there is already a large measure of agreement on this subject.⁷ Unfortunately, however, the growing tensions in the world do not create an atmosphere in favour of disarmament and yet the urgency of disarmament grows

6. The talks started on 1 August 1955.

7. The UN Disarmament sub-committee met in London between 19 March and 4 May 1956. Although three sets of proposals were put forward by both Western and Soviet sides, no progress was made. The only step forward was support for the proposal put forth by Jules Moch, French representative to the Sub-committee, first articulated in November 1955. He suggested that the disarmament and control plans put forth by western countries and the Soviet side be combined. Although Moch's appeal for a 'synthesis' between the Western and Soviet viewpoints won the general support of other western representatives, it was criticised by the USSR.

in proportion to the invention and accumulation of weapons of ever-increasing destructive potential. We believe in the unconditional prohibition of the production, use and experimentation of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons and, as a step to that end, the suspension of experimental explosions and an armaments truce.

I should like to take this opportunity of drawing the attention of the House to a very important event in recent weeks. I refer to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which met recently in Moscow. There can be no doubt that this Congress has adopted a new line and a new policy. This new line, both in political thinking and in practical policy, appears to be based upon a more realistic appreciation of the present world situation and represents a significant process of adaptation and adjustment. According to our principles, we do not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, just as we do not welcome any interference of others in our country. But any important development in any country which appears to be a step towards the creation of condition favourable to the pursuit of a policy of peaceful coexistence, is important for us as well as others. It is for this reason that we feel that the decisions of the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Union are likely to have far-reaching effects. I hope that this development will lead to a further relaxation of tension in the world.

I should like to make some brief reference to a speech delivered by the Prime Minister of Pakistan yesterday in his Parliament.⁸ Normally, I would wait for a fuller and a more authoritative version before commenting on the speech. But, as I am speaking here today, I think I should say something about it.

I have read the brief report of this speech with sorrow and surprise. Chaudhuri Mohammad Ali has spoken in anger and has made some statements which are manifestly incorrect. He says that India was carrying on a campaign of fear and hatred and had created an atmosphere of hatred against Pakistan. It is easy to compare the press of India with the press of Pakistan and the statements made by responsible persons in India with those made in Pakistan.

There have been for long the most virulent attacks in Pakistan on India and frequent appeals for jihad. Has any responsible person or newspaper in India talked of war or indeed talked of hatred? We have even now an unceasing flow of migrants from East Pakistan to India. That is a great burden on us and

8. See *ante*, p. 317.

a matter for serious concern. We have naturally drawn attention to this and to the reasons which compel people to leave their hearths and homes and lands and seek refuge in another country.

Mr Mohammad Ali has referred to the recent border incidents and has said that they had been created by India and that in every single instance, aggression had come from the Indian side. It is a little difficult for me to deal with statements which have little connection with truth. I can give long lists of these incidents and I can give the facts behind them, in so far as we know, and any impartial authority can judge. I shall only mention one well-known incident here because, in that case, an impartial authority did enquire and judge and give its decision. That was the Nekowal incident on the Jammu border. The United Nations Observers enquired into this and stated clearly where the fault lay. The then Prime Minister of Pakistan had assured us publicly that he would abide by the decision of the UN Observers and punish those who were guilty. We still await the carrying out of this assurance. We have written repeatedly with no effect.

Mr Mohammad Ali has said that he wrote to me and made certain proposals and that he had received no reply from me. This is correct. But his message reached me night before last. We have had just one day to consider it. We hope to send an answer soon.⁹ In his message, Mr Mohammad Ali has referred to a decision arrived at a meeting of the Joint Steering Committee on the 11th and 12th March 1955 for the demarcation of the Indo-Pakistan border and apparently accuses India of delay in giving effect to this decision. This decision was further considered at a meeting of our Home Minister with the Pakistan Home Minister in May 1955 and they arrived at an agreement, referred to as the Pant-Mirza Agreement. The Pakistan Government took no action for the ratification of this agreement till the end of December 1955, and then suggested certain amendments to the agreement, which, in effect, largely modified it. However, I welcome the Prime Minister's proposal for the demarcation of the Indo-Pakistan border and we are prepared to take this up immediately.

Mr Mohammad Ali has suggested in his speech that India and Pakistan should declare that they would never go to war with each other. I welcome this proposal. Everyone knows that we have been suggesting a no-war declaration by both India and Pakistan for some years now. Our proposal,

9. See *ante*, pp. 317-320.

however, was not accepted by the Pakistan Government. I am glad that Mr Mohammad Ali now looks with favour on this proposal and we shall gladly pursue this matter further.

There can be no greater folly than conflict between India and Pakistan. We have endeavoured to create friendly feelings between the two countries and I believe that, in spite of many unfortunate occurrences, there is today a large measure of friendship between the people of India and the people of Pakistan. It is not by military methods or threats of war or of talking to each other from the so-called positions of strength that we shall come nearer. In this world of the atom bomb, both India and Pakistan are weak. But we can develop strength in other ways, strength in friendship, in cooperation and in raising the standards of our people. I offer, in all goodwill and earnestness, the *Panch Shila* to the Prime Minister of Pakistan and I have every faith that if we base our dealings with one another on those Five Principles, the nightmare of fear and suspicion will fade away.

11. Purchase of Passenger Ships¹

There can be no doubt about the desirability of our purchasing some ships.² I have discussed this matter with the Minister of Railways and Transport,³ and with the Commerce & Industry Minister. Rather casually, Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri mentioned today that some arrangement had been arrived at with the Russians about shipping. I do not know what this is.

2. You should keep in touch with the Ministry of Transport and encourage them to get ships. I do not myself fancy buying ships which are thirty years old. It may be, however, that some of the old ships are worthwhile.

1. Note to C.S. Jha, Joint Secretary, MEA, 20 March 1956. File No.26(30)-WANA/55, MEA.
2. In a note addressed to Jha in October 1955, Nehru had expressed the view that Government should do everything possible to enter the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea with their shipping, both for commercial and political reasons, and desired that the matter might be examined in consultation with the Ministry of Transport. Jha reported on 17 March 1956 about a decision reached at a meeting with the Transport Secretary to acquire two second-hand passenger ships. Subsequently, enquiries were made through Indian Missions in several countries, whereupon 20 offers were received in respect of ships constructed from 18 to 30 years ago with cost ranging between Rs 20 to 40 lakhs.
3. Nehru on 17 March wrote to Lal Bahadur Shastri, "I understand that there are various proposals, before you about purchase of ships—old and new. This question of shipping is becoming more and more important and our complete dependence on foreign ships is bad. We should make every effort to get some usable ships.... This matter should be discussed by us at top level and not left in the normal way at secretarial level."

12. UN Fund for Underdeveloped Countries¹

...There is one larger thing which I should like to refer to, namely, this question of the economic growth of the underdeveloped parts of the world, which is intimately connected with political conditions, intimately connected with the question of giving aid or not, political pressures exercised, military pressures exercised, and which has almost been considered not purely from the economic angle but from the political angle also.

It is obvious that if this imbalance continues between the very rich countries and the poor, apart from being a source of misery and unhappiness, it will be continuously a source of trouble and conflict, and might lead to conflicts, so that it has to be remedied even from the point of view of the richer countries. Now, there is nothing wrong about the richer countries, from their own point of view or from any other, helping to remove it, giving aid to the development of those countries. But it may be that some element of wrong comes in the manner of doing it; it produces wrong results.

In this connection, I should like to refer to a proposal with which India has been associated for some time, a proposal before the United Nations; and it is still being discussed; in fact, I think, in about six weeks' time there is a meeting in New York to discuss it further. This is known in the modern way of capital letters as SUNFED, SUNFED meaning Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development. You will notice perhaps that the word 'Special' was put in there; if 'S' was not there, then it became 'UNFED', which was very unfortunate. So, 'S' was put in to avoid this.

In the last three or four years our representatives in the United Nations have been persuading us, the idea being that help to the more undeveloped nations should come through international agencies, and not so much by bilateral arrangements which tend to have political consequences. We have met with enormous difficulties. The great Powers, whoever they might be, do not like this way of doing things. They like to distribute largess to the poor and needy, and have not only the mental satisfaction of having done good but also that of knowing that the other knows that they have done good to it, and maybe, getting something in exchange.

1. Statement in the Lok Sabha, 29 March 1956. *Lok Sabha Debates*, Vol. III, Pt. II, 1956, cols. 3737-3738. Extracts.

We have arrived at a stage now—even now, it has not been decided—but at last we have arrived at a stage where various countries, all the other countries, have been asked to give their reactions to this proposal and these reports are going to be considered in about six weeks' time in New York.²

I mention this because I attach a good deal of importance to this proposal for SUNFED, because it will bring about gradually and completely, I hope, a different relationship between the giver and the taker, which will be advantageous to both, certainly to the taker, but also to the giver, because then it is done impersonally through international organisations, and there is not this giving of largess by one country to another, and sometimes with political strings attached....

2. In pursuance of a resolution passed by the General Assembly on 6 December 1955 asking the member countries to give their views by 31 March on the proposed Fund, a sixteen-member committee was appointed the same day to study the views of the member countries and submit interim reports to ECOSOC and a final report by 1957, on the understanding that no Government would be committed by any suggested course of action. See also *ante*, p. 479.

13. To Ahmed Soekarno¹

New Delhi

7 April 1956

My dear Soekarno,²

I am taking advantage of the return of our Ambassador³ to Djakarta to send you this letter. As you perhaps know, we have had a conference of our Heads of Missions from Asia and Africa to discuss, amongst ourselves, recent developments in the world situation and our own policies in regard to them.⁴ This conference has been a very helpful one to all of us and I think that our Ambassadors will return to their posts with a clearer knowledge of the situation and of our policies.

We have naturally been particularly interested in South East Asia where Indonesia plays such an important part. We are happy that a new and strong government has been formed there, as a result of the elections.⁵ We hope to have the friendliest relations with this government and to further the many common causes that both our governments have at heart.

As I write to you, the elections in Ceylon indicate that Sir John Kotelawala and his party are not likely to succeed and a somewhat leftist group will form the government.⁶ So far as India and Indonesia are concerned, I think that any new government formed in Ceylon will pursue the broad lines laid down by the Bandung Conference. In Burma there are going to be general elections soon also. I have little doubt that the present government, headed by U Nu will succeed in these elections.⁷ India will have her second big General Elections early next year.

1. JN Collection.

2. President of Indonesia.

3. B.F.H.B. Tyabji.

4. The conference was held in New Delhi from 24 March to 3 April.

5. No single party obtained a majority in the first general elections to the Indonesian House of Representatives held in September-November 1955. After the announcement of the election results on 1 March, Prime Minister Harahap resigned and Sastroamidjojo, Prime Minister in 1953-55 and leader of the Nationalist Party which received the largest vote in the elections, formed a coalition government on 20 March.

6. General elections held in Sri Lanka between 5-10 April resulted in a severe defeat for the ruling Nationalist Party. An absolute majority was won by the People's United Front led by Solomon Bandaranaike, the former leader of the Opposition in the House of Representatives, who formed the new Government on 12 April.

7. General elections held in Myanmar on 27 April resulted in a victory for the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL) headed by U Nu.

I am writing to you, however, more particularly, about the general world situation. It is right that we should keep in touch with each other and have the benefit of each other's experience and appraisal of the situation. I think that the most important thing that has happened in recent weeks is the new line laid down by the Soviet Union. It was not an absolutely new line because I noticed these trends when I visited the Soviet Union last year. It seemed to me then that there were strong forces at work in the Soviet Union, both at the top and below, in favour of normalisation. The rather aggressive urge of the Revolution, as of every revolution, has necessarily to tone down. This has been delayed in the Soviet Union because of two great Wars, intervention, civil wars and all manner of internal upsets. Now we see the process of normalisation at work. Probably it would have started much earlier but for Stalin. Immediately after his death this became evident. Even from the strictly practical point of view, it is to the advantage of the Soviet Union to concentrate on economic development and to try to compete with the other great powers in that field. I have no doubt that the Soviet Union wants peace and an opportunity to develop internally. It has still a complex personality, developed during these long years of conflict and fear and suspicion. But it is becoming much more self-confident and self-reliant and that helps in normalisation.

Some people in the United States think that the change in Soviet policy is due to internal weakness and fear. I do not agree with this view. I think the Soviet Union is strong, both politically and economically. It is now carrying the burden of helping China to develop rapidly. Nevertheless, its resources have increased greatly and offer a challenge to the economic policies of Western countries.

In the United States, I think, that there is an increasing realization that the broad policies pursued by the State Department have not been successful. More particularly, this relates to their Asian policies and even the Republican Party feels that some change must be made. The Democrats go further. I do not think that any marked change will be made before the Presidential elections. But immediately after, whoever wins that elections, some changes are likely to follow. Among other things, it is increasingly realised in the United States that a purely military policy does not yield results and, in fact, increases hostility to the US in Asian countries.⁸

8. After his meeting with Eric Johnston, Chairman, US National Development Advisory Board on 29 March 1956, Nehru recorded: "He felt very strongly that US policies in Asia had been wrong and the system of military pacts was unwise. In fact, the pacts were just paper structures. It was foolish and wrong for the resources of poor Asian countries to be diverted to arms at the cost of their own development. It had also been demonstrated that it was unwise for the US to support reactionary Governments.... He said also that the idea of American forward bases in other countries will have to be given up. They create hostility wherever they are established...."

Among the Democrats and more especially in organised labour, feelings are more advanced and are widespread. Probably, though it is by no means certain, Eisenhower will be elected President again. Even so, some policy changes are likely.

Broadly speaking, one might say that the cold war, though continuing, is likely to tone down. In the long perspective, the USA and the USSR are coming slowly nearer to each other. It may take some considerable time for the gap between them to be narrowed greatly. But the tendencies are there both in the political and even in the economic field. This is of course all to the good. The aggressive character of communism in the Soviet Union and the lack of civil liberties there are both likely to be lessened. Possibly, the Cominform might fade out.⁹ In the US, in spite of monopoly capitalism on a huge scale, there are tendencies towards socialisation. Both these great countries, in spite of their conflicts, are in many ways remarkably similar. Both have become highly technical minded and worship the machine.

The United Kingdom is in great difficulties in Western Asia and is gradually being edged out of the areas which it considered its own. France is facing a very difficult situation in North Africa.

Probably the most explosive situation in the world today is between Egypt and Israel and war is a possibility. I think, however, that it is unlikely because neither the UK nor the USA wants it and they will try to prevent it. In the Arab countries, Egypt is playing a leading role which has become increasingly important in recent months. The SEATO and Baghdad Pacts have done little good to their sponsors and members.

All this seems to indicate that, in spite of the confusion that exists in the world, there are definite progressive forces at work, in Asia and elsewhere. This casts a burden on our countries to be wide awake and to line up with these progressive forces in our own countries as elsewhere. Ultimately, our future is going to be governed more by economic development than anything else. That is why we are giving a great deal of thought in India today to our Second Five Year Plan.

9. Communist Information Bureau or Cominform, organised by USSR in 1947 to coordinate the exchange of information between East European and some West European communist parties, was disbanded in 1956.

Last evening I met a number of Indonesian women officials who had come to India to study our Community Projects work. I was happy to meet them and to see how earnest and enthusiastic they were. I might tell you that S.K. Dey, the Director of our Community Projects Organisation, who paid a visit to Indonesia last year, has the highest opinion of the potentialities in this respect of Indonesia. He thinks that your country and your people will make rapid progress and may well be an example to us and others. I was happy to hear this.

I shall be going to England at the end of June to attend a conference of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers. From there I shall pay a very brief visit to President Eisenhower for about three or four days only. I cannot afford to be away from India for a long period because of the tremendous problems we have to face here.

With all good wishes and warm regards,

Yours very sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

14. Security Concerns vis-a-vis Pakistan¹

Yes. You should write to Gundevia² and tell him that he must on no account get entangled in these proposals and conversations.³ If anyone else makes a suggestion to that effect, he should be told that the matter has to be discussed directly with India.

2. President Eisenhower's open skies proposal for the Western countries and the Soviet Union is, I think, by itself, completely inadequate, in so far as disarmament is concerned.⁴ It is likely to lead to incidents. It may of course be considered together with other proposals of real disarmament. In fact, the open skies proposal is not disarmament.

3. Any application of this principle to India will lead to trouble. It means that we should be flying over Pakistan territory and trying to find out what is happening there and Pakistan will do likewise in India. I am quite sure that this will give rise to incidents and petty conflicts.

4. As for the British assurance that Pakistan is not receiving much aid from the United States, probably we know more about this than the UK Government. We have in fact fairly accurate information. I read this out in part to Dulles who agreed with the figures I gave. He was also a little surprised to learn about the present strength of our army which, he said, was by no means big for this country.

1. Note to Commonwealth Secretary, MEA, 7 April 1956. JN Collection.

2. Y.D. Gundevia, Deputy High Commissioner of India in UK.

3. In his discussions with Douglas-Home, British Secretary of State, Commonwealth Relations, and Gilbert Laithwaite, Permanent Under Secretary of State, Commonwealth Relations, and a former High Commissioner in Pakistan, in February 1956, Gundevia had shown concern at the prospect of India, despite herself, being pushed into an arms race due to the deliberate upsetting of the "accepted military ratio" with Pakistan caused by US arms deliveries. This, Gundevia reported, had "led to a very salutary suggestion that we might be openly kept informed of the actual arms deliveries to Pakistan from American sources." He wrote to M.J. Desai in the last week of March that recent developments had strengthened his view that the idea might be seriously examined.

4. Gundevia wrote that it might be possible to work out Eisenhower's idea of armament disclosures and "open skies" on a limited, geographical plan and apply it to India and Pakistan. He thought the Prime Minister had welcomed the "open skies" idea as a possible step in disarmament and reduction of world tension.

5. Lord Mountbatten's or Selwyn Lloyd's talks with us had little effect on our decision.⁵ That decision had been arrived at previously. The essence of that decision is not merely that we are not buying Soviet aircraft now but that we are completely free to buy them in future if and when we so choose, provided that we give full information of this to the UK Government before coming to a final decision.

6. It is obvious that we cannot be tied up to the UK or the USA in such matters. As a matter of fact, the Soviet aircraft have certain definite advantages over the UK and USA ones from the point of view of our needs and they are definitely cheaper and can be obtained easily at short notice. Nevertheless, having regard to all the circumstances, we decided not to buy them.

5. Gundevia wrote that he had been relieved to learn that Government had decided not to go in for Soviet bombers and seemed to believe that Mountbatten had "reassured us in some ways again."

15. To Homi J. Bhabha¹

New Delhi
13 April 1956

My dear Homi,²

I have received your telegram of the 12th April, in which you refer to meeting Clifford Willson³ of TCM and the proposal to set up what is called an Asian Atomic Centre in the Philippines. We shall, of course, discuss this matter when you come here.

There is no question of our helping this financially or of our being connected with it in any other way. Nor is there any question of our recognising it. I believe the suggestion was made at the ECAFE meeting in Singapore some months ago. The United States were anxious to set up such an Atomic Centre somewhere. The money was theirs and the choice was theirs. We could hardly oppose it. We would have preferred some other country to the Philippines, if a Centre of this kind was to be set up outside India.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, and Secretary, Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India.
3. Director, US Technical Cooperation Administration Mission in India.

PORTUGUESE POSSESSIONS IN INDIA

1. Egypt's Representation of India on Goa¹

The First Secretary of the Egyptian Embassy who paid a visit to Goa, has carried out his task in an exemplary manner.² I think that we should write to the Egyptian Embassy separately expressing our deep appreciation for what he has done. I think also that we should ask our Ambassador³ in Cairo to express our appreciation of this to the Egyptian Government.

2. I do not think that any statement of the kind suggested should be made in Parliament.⁴ If there is a question asked, we shall answer it briefly.

3. I agree with FS that we should request the Egyptian Government to bring the existing conditions in Goa in regard to Indian prisoners formally to the notice of the Portuguese Government in Lisbon and ask them to take immediate steps to remedy this situation. It is true that Mr Khalil has spoken to and addressed the Governor-General⁵ in regard to these complaints. Nevertheless, it will be desirable for the Egyptian Government to take up this matter as a whole with the Lisbon Government.

4. I agree that we should bring this matter to the attention of some leading countries, more especially, the UK, the USA, France and any others you can think of. I see no objection at all to our doing so.⁶ We should prepare a note or

1. Note to Subimal Dutt, 25 February 1956. JN Collection.

2. Khalil, First Secretary of the Egyptian Embassy in India, visited Goa at the request of the Government of India and on his return submitted a full report on the condition of Indian prisoners in Portuguese jails. This was done after arrangements for the Egyptian Government to look after Indian interests in Goa were made. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol.30, pp.385-386.

3. Ali Yavar Jung.

4. Subimal Dutt, in his note of 25 February 1956 raised the question of what action India could take immediately on the issue of conditions under which Indian prisoners in Goa were interned. Among others, there was a proposal by the Joint Secretary, MEA, for Nehru to make a statement in Parliament, which Dutt opposed saying that this would raise a hue and cry for action against the Portuguese in India and if nothing was done the Government would be embarrassed. The other aspect was to ensure continuance of access to Egypt to the prisoners in Goa, which could be jeopardised by a public statement, noted Dutt.

5. Paulo Benard Guedes.

6. Dutt wanted information about Indian prisoners in Goa to be given to Portugal's allies not so much to seek their intervention, "but in letting them know the character of the government" with which India was dealing.

an aide memoire giving all this information and hand this informally to the representatives of these Governments in Delhi. The note should be fairly full and should give some of the information which has been included in Joint Secretary's draft statement, such as, the number of Indian prisoners there, their sentences, the two prisons where they are kept, etc. Their sentences should be mentioned. It should be stated that these prisoners include a Member of Parliament,⁷ an ex-Member of the Bombay Assembly, noted authors and such other description as may indicate their position in life. Particular attention should be drawn to the women prisoners.

5. The fact that some prisoners, including a well-known woman prisoner,⁸ were kept apart and not allowed to be interviewed on the plea that they were Goans, should be mentioned.

6. It should be mentioned that, because of the visit of the Egyptian representative, some new arrangements had been made quickly. In fact, the condition of these prisoners previous to that was even worse.

7. Then, some detailed reference should be made to the various complaints. In the draft letter addressed to the Embassy of Egypt here, these complaints are listed. I think that the order of these complaints in the list is not suitable. The question of the daily allowance (iv and v) should be towards the end. No. (viii) about living conditions should be brought up as this is far more important than the daily allowance.

8. In the note to the Embassy of Egypt also some reference should be made in appreciation of the work of the representative of the Egyptian Embassy who went to Goa. The number of prisoners there should also be noted. The idea is that the note should be more or less complete and the Egyptian Government can take action on it immediately.

9. The aide memoire which is to be given to the UK, the USA, etc., missions here, might also be given by me when I see Mr Selwyn Lloyd and Mr Dulles. I want to speak to them about this matter in fairly strong language. Copies, therefore, should be kept.

10. I do not think it is necessary to send all these papers to the Members of the Foreign Affairs Committee or the Chief Minister of Bombay. But a summary should be sent to them.

7. Tridib Chaudhuri.

8. Sudha Joshi (b.1918) was born in village Priyol in Goa. The Portuguese took the stand that Khalil could not interview her since she was not an Indian.

PRESS CONFERENCE

1. Pakistan, Defence and Domestic Matters¹

Jawaharlal Nehru: As usual, you might indicate some subjects.

Subjects suggested: Pakistan Prime Minister's latest charges; question of arms supply; Cambodian crises; Vietnam; visit to United States; Second Five Year Plan; Bombay, and Bengal & Bihar merger.

JN: Let me speak just in the order of things in my mind. The first thing, which is not of international importance, but for the moment is affecting my mind a great deal, is my visit to the Delhi slums yesterday.² Whenever I visit these slums, here or elsewhere, I feel very rebellious—I do not know quite well, against whom—may be against myself, but anyhow I feel very unhappy and rebellious.

But apart from this domestic concern of ours, the thing that is concerning us most is the exodus from East Pakistan to West Bengal. It has been our concern all the time of course, but the proportions that it has now assumed and the fact that it is a continuing exodus, I think this is a matter of supreme importance. I suppose you know, broadly speaking, the population figures. I suppose at the time of the Partition, there were about thirty-nine million people in East Bengal. Of these about thirty per cent were Hindus. One does not quite know the exact figures—these figures are as before the Partition. About four million have already come over in the last few years. It happened during two or three periods—the first was at the time of the Partition; there was no big exodus then, as in the western region; then it came down, although it continued, but less. Then, you might remember round about 1950 beginning there was again a big exodus both ways at that time, that is, from East to West and West to East. This is about the time, I think, when devaluation of the rupee took place³, not the Pakistan rupee which was kept up at the old level. Then followed that agreement with the then Pakistan Prime Minister, Mr Liaquat Ali Khan.⁴

1. Press conference, New Delhi, 2 April 1956. From Press Information Bureau. Also available in File No. 43(73)158-PMS.
2. See *ante*, pp. 163-165.
3. On 19 September 1950, India devalued its rupee against the dollar as a sequel to the devaluation of the pound on 18 September.
4. According to the Nehru-Liaquat Ali Khan Agreement, signed on 8 April 1950, among other things, both the Governments agreed to ensure complete equality of citizenship to minorities and to extend all facilities to migrants from East Bengal, West Bengal, Assam and Tripura.

It helped a great deal in reducing the abnormality. But anyhow, in the last six, seven months, this has again become acute. There is no end, anything up to 50,000 a month who come over. This is an extraordinary situation we have to face. How are we to receive thirty per cent of the population of East Bengal in an already highly thickly populated area? We have received four million already out of twelve and a half million, and it is bound to have far-reaching consequences not only in India but in Pakistan also. I cannot imagine these large numbers of people coming over, without serious interior upsets in both countries. I think these people are agriculturalists, tied to their land. Why should they come, unless, for good reason or bad, they feel no future for themselves there and are afraid. This is an important matter.

Now, one of you asked me about Kashmir. I dealt with this question rather fully in my speech.⁵ I am very glad I did so because of the enormous amount of confusion about facts. One can understand difference in interpretation or approach to this question, but surely certain basic facts should be recognised, and I repeated them on that occasion and I am prepared to repeat them now. I think that what Mr Mohammad Ali, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, has said⁶ in regard to the facts is utterly incorrect, in regard to many of them.

I have said so many times before. First, about the accession—there is no doubt about the legal and constitutional fullness of the accession, and for Mr Mohammad Ali or others to go on saying that it was a fraudulent transaction does little credit to him or to others in Pakistan. Secondly, there is no doubt that the people who invaded and committed aggression in Kashmir were aided, abetted, supplied with arms and transport and petrol by Pakistan. Pakistani people who did it have made statements in the past year or two and of course,

5. In his speech on 29 March 1956 in the Lok Sabha, Nehru stated that the talk of plebiscite in Kashmir was "entirely besides the point" and there could be no question of holding it until Pakistan had withdrawn all her armed forces from the state. He also said that the Kashmir problem had to be viewed afresh because of the American military aid to Pakistan and added that Pakistan's joining the Baghdad Pact and SEATO had invalidated the old arguments relating to the question.
6. In the National Assembly of Pakistan on 31 March 1956, Mohammad Ali denounced Nehru's stand as withdrawal from expressed commitments and opposed Nehru's point that Pakistan was an aggressor. He rejected Nehru's linking of military aid to Pakistan and her participation in SEATO and the Baghdad Pact with the plebiscite question in Kashmir as "strange logic" and "irrelevant." He also said that the entry of Indian troops into Kashmir was an act of naked aggression committed under the 'fraudulent' instrument of accession, surreptitiously obtained from the Maharaja.

it is a well known fact. Now, Mr Mohammad Ali says that Pakistan armies went into Kashmir in May 1948, i.e., when, according to him, Pakistan was threatened by Indian Armies in Kashmir. We say that Pakistan armies—I cannot remember the date—were there in November 1947⁷ and we have the most absolute proof of that. When the raiders were driven out of the valley of Kashmir by our forces, limited forces—about one thousand, I think probably two thousand, our soldiers may be a little more—beyond Baramulla, the raiders obviously could not withstand an organised army. When our forces reached Uri, suddenly they found that there was an organised army sitting there and that was the Pakistan army at Uri entrenched with big guns and the like. It became a different problem. For the first time, I realised that Pakistan was not merely helping and aiding the raiders, but was actually sitting there with its own army. Some of you may remember that we had an exhibition in Delhi, some time in 1948, with captured arms and various other things which had been captured in Uri and elsewhere which belonged to the Pakistan army—an interesting exhibition. Of course, this matter was argued at some length in the United Nations in those days. People have forgotten it.

Then Mr Mohammad Ali talks a great deal about what had happened in Poonch or in parts of Jammu.⁸ I think he has given an exaggerated version of that. I am not going into the details, but the point is that there was absolutely no trouble of any kind in Kashmir proper. When these people came, the raiders, there had been no trouble of any kind there. It was an absolutely uncalled for, unjustifiable invasion or aggression. You may not remember but those motor vehicles that brought these raiders had rather curious inscriptions on them. Inscriptions were often “To Delhi” via Kashmir—not merely, ‘Kashmir’ or ‘Srinagar’ but “To Delhi” via Kashmir. Well, this may have been a flight of imagination of the person who put it there, so that all this long argument of Mr Mohammad Ali about some disturbances in Poonch which undoubtedly occurred, this question of tax payment and what not—and I am not here obviously to justify what the Maharaja did, I am not interested in the Maharaja’s doings and I think he very often misbehaved a lot, that is why I was very glad

7. Actually it was in October 1947 the Pakistan armies entered Kashmir.

8. In early 1947 the inhabitants of Poonch started a no-tax campaign and in August 1947 some Muslims of Poonch and of some parts of Jammu openly advocated accession to Pakistan. By September when they started to take militant stand against the Government, troops were sent in to maintain law and order. This Mohammad Ali interpreted as ‘a genocide of the Muslims.’

that he had to quit—but the point is the way Pakistan wants to justify it. First of all the argument is: “We had nothing to do with this business in Kashmir. Others did it”. How others can walk over the body of Pakistan without their knowing it and doing it, I cannot understand. Secondly, it justifies by what happened in Junagadh,⁹ in other odd places which has nothing to do with Kashmir. He does bring in, as you know, the argument of genocide. Well, there was genocide and genocide undoubtedly in Pakistan, undoubtedly in parts of India, both places. Many of us witnessed that in both places, it was a horrible affair, but what has that got to do with a deliberate invasion of Kashmir, I do not know. You see how a relatively simple issue is mixed up with other matters so as to produce confusion in people’s minds. Throughout Pakistan has dealt with this matter in this way. Mr Zafrullah Khan stated his case in the United Nations and made many statements there which, I say with all responsibility, were a tissue of lies.¹⁰ I said that in Parliament and I repeat it. It has nothing to do with this business of invasion of Kashmir.

Now, another interesting thing is that there was no Indian army, not a soldier for many days after the invasion; the whole of the valley of Kashmir was open to any invader. Srinagar was defended by the people of Srinagar, just volunteers. It was rather a remarkable period, for a few days, which one sometimes sees in revolutionary upheavals, i.e., the common people stirred by distant danger defending their city and their valley. Naturally they could not do it for ever. But it was remarkable that they did it even for a few days. It showed the spirit of the people and their anger and resentment and opposition to the invaders. So, these broad facts have to be remembered.

And the second aspect is—I cannot go into eight years’ history, but all that has happened during this period of eight years—we waited year after year for, well, the issue to be settled with Pakistan, because we wanted friendly relations

9. The Nawab of Junagadh, Mahabatkhanji Rasulkhanji and Dewan, Shahnawaz Bhutto, unable to maintain law and order in the State, fled to Pakistan. By his letter of 8 November 1947, Bhutto handed over the administration of the State to the Government of India. In a plebiscite held in February 1948, the people of Junagadh overwhelmingly decided in favour of accession to India.
10. Zafrullah Khan, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, said in the UN on 15 January 1948 that there was a genocide of the Muslims in various parts of India since June 1947. He added that in direct consequence of a planned massacre of the Muslims of India some five million Muslims had trekked into Pakistan in condition of utter destitution, shattering her economy and alleged that India’s objectives were not only to kill Muslims but also to liquidate the State of Pakistan. He also denied that assistance to the raiders in Kashmir was given by Pakistan and that an act of aggression against India had been committed.

with Pakistan. Nothing happened. Ultimately, we had to go ahead and there were elections in Kashmir.¹¹ An assembly was elected for drawing up its programme. The whole phase has been changing not only on this side, but on the other side. And all I have said is that you cannot ignore everything that has happened in these nine years. We must take them into consideration—the constitutional developments, the practical developments. And, therefore, I say that the statement made by Mr Bulganin and Mr Khrushchev in regard to Kashmir was legally, constitutionally and practically completely correct.¹²

Q: They made a speech in Kashmir. They said something rather different.

JN: I do not know. Well, I have not got here the exact words with me. They just made the statement. I said legally and constitutionally it was quite correct and practically too, because many things have happened. If the person wants to argue with me on the legal and constitutional issue, well, then I am quite prepared to argue on the basis – on the very first, initial beginning of this problem, that is “aggression”. If you want to have the law, you will have the law. Either you deal with it legally, constitutionally or practically. If you want the law, we have to consider this aggression, and the legal accession is completely legal and everybody has admitted it, except perhaps those who refuse to open their eyes and admit obvious facts. If you want to see practically, I admit that, practically, I do not want to go into the legal quibbles in discussing a problem in which human beings are involved and national relationships are involved. Let us look at it from the practical point of view, because we want above all the welfare and freedom of the Kashmir people. We want good relations with Pakistan – between India and Pakistan. That is very important to us, than some strictly legal or constitutional interpretations. But if the law is thrust upon us, then we shall have the law, and the law is that the aggressor is the guilty party and that the law is Kashmir has acceded to and is part of the Union of India. That is the law; the rest is a practical approach.

Now, I come to the second point—the Nagas.

Q: The demand for the prior withdrawal of the Pakistani forces pre-dates the offer of military aid to Pakistan which was later given and which has changed the context of the whole problem. Would it now be adequate merely if Pakistan withdraws its forces from Kashmir? What difference did that military aid make?

11. Elections to the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir were held in September-October 1951.
12. For the statements of Bulganin and Khrushchev on Kashmir see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 31, p. 291.

JN: Throughout this period of discussion with Pakistan, we had got bogged up over the question of the pre-requisites to a plebiscite. Among them, there are many points. The very first thing is the withdrawal of troops, etc. We never got over that difficulty. If we had got over it, of course, there are other important problems. Well, we did not get over that difficulty.

Again, this question of military aid which altered the whole situation—military situation and political situation, both from the point of view of the defence of Kashmir, because it makes little difference now to what extent they withdrew, because there was a much more increase of military potential sitting there behind them which made a huge difference.

Secondly, all this has become a matter of high importance from the defence of India's point of view. And all these factors have to be considered with large bases surrounding India, and not only surrounding India, but so far as my knowledge goes, in the Pakistan-occupied territory of Kashmir. It makes a tremendous difference to us in many ways. The whole context of the question changes.

Q: Do you propose to do anything further?

JN: I have to go in 15 minutes time. I have not much time.

Nagas: I have not much to say except that in the Naga Hills District, there have been many instances—many deliberate killings—of the Nagas killing their own people, Nagas, who, they thought, were not with them.¹³ It has been a bad show. And it is always difficult to deal with these matters in these hilly areas. It is not to have a battle with anybody. It is just isolated attacks here and there or in some outposts. We have, therefore, now decided to give the overall command to a senior Army Officer¹⁴ under whom the Armed Police will function.

Then, I was asked about arms purchase about which there is something in the newspapers. Newspapers either sometimes look far ahead of what is going to happen, or sometime, wake up to something which happened years ago. We have been discussing the arms purchase with some Governments, notably the UK Government for the last two years.

Tanks, aircrafts, these things take a long long time. They are to be examined, experimented upon and all kinds of things. It is true that we have recently arrived at some finalisation of parts of the order. The order has been given there, and the order for most things was given long ago. The question was of

13. See *ante*, p. 124.

14. See *ante*, pp. 122-123.

delivery.¹⁵ We have now come to some agreement about that. And I may tell you that, so far as we are concerned, we are not tied down and we do not consider ourselves to be tied down to any country for arms purchase. It is for India to decide where and when and what to purchase, according to her capacity and needs.

Q: Has Russia made any offer of arms with special attractive prices?

JN: Russia has made no offer of arms. We have made enquiries in Russia.

Q: Are we to buy UK arms come whatever may?

JN: Did you not hear what I said? I said we are not committed to purchasing from any one or two or three countries or for not purchasing from any country. It is entirely a matter for India to decide. It is true that we have developed our arms etc., more or less in line with those of some countries like the UK and most of our armaments have been obtained from the UK in the past—all the Navy matters and all that. That is true and it is convenient to continue something that you have got, otherwise, it means changeover in spare parts and everything. But that is a matter of convenience which we have to measure from time to time, but there is nothing to prevent us whatever we do. Of course, in such a matter, whatever we may do, we know what to do, and we do it. We do it with full knowledge and intimation to all concerned; we don't function in a secretive way in these matters.

Q: You mentioned about inquiries made in Russia about arms supplies. What was the outcome of it?

JN: No inquiries about arms as such have been made. Certainly inquiries were made about aircraft, about civil aircraft and military aircraft, and so many other things which we are beginning to get more and more from the Soviet Union, civil things I mean.

Q: Did you discuss this question with Lord Mountbatten when he was here?

JN: I may tell you, Lord Mountbatten specially discussed the question of aircraft carrier—not today but for the last year or two we have been discussing it with Lord Mountbatten. He is a naval man, particularly interested in naval matters.

Q: Don't you think the purchase of bombers and fighters means a fundamental change in our policy?

JN: Every air force has bombers and fighters. Every air force will always have them. We always have had bombers right from the beginning of our Air Force.

15. See *ante*, pp. 290-291.

The difference is we go in for short distance bombers. We do not think in terms of going far, because these are for defence of our borders only.

Q: Don't you think the purchase of arms will have repercussions on the Five Year Plan?

JN: That depends on many circumstances. I cannot definitely say, it may have repercussions. I think we may adhere to the Five Year Plan and put an additional burden on ourselves, if necessary.

Q: Were delays in supplies of arms from the UK, by any accident?

JN: How can I answer this? Delay can take place because they have many commitments, and priorities have to be given to their own needs, and what not.

So far as South Vietnam is concerned, the attitude of the Government there has put the International Commission in a position of great embarrassment. The International Commission has gone there because of the Geneva Agreement. It has no other reason to function there. The South Vietnam Government has not accepted the obligations arising from that Agreement, because they say they never signed it. The fact is that they did not sign it because they were not an independent Government then. The French Government signed it and subsequently the South Vietnam Government became the successor State to that French Government. The South Vietnam Government gladly accepted all the advantages accruing from the Geneva Agreement. They only objected to the obligations. That is exactly the situation. The International Commission cannot continue there, unless it is given free field to work under the Geneva Agreement. We do not want to run away from responsibilities because we know if the International Commission comes away, there is a break down of the Geneva Agreement and there may be conflict there. We do not want it. Nobody wants but we are not going to function unless we can function with some authority and some respect.

Q: There was a recent report of your having said in Parliament that they are likely to cooperate.

JN: What I said was that there were some slight indications that they might accept the obligations¹⁶ but this is all I can say. Meanwhile we are waiting for the two Co-Chairmen to meet, Mr Selwyn Lloyd and Mr Molotov, because the matter may be referred to them.

16. On 29 March 1956 Nehru said in the Lok Sabha, "I do not know how things will develop but there have been some hopeful signs recently that the South Vietnam Government might accept the obligation flowing from the Geneva Agreement."

Now, during the last two or three days, a very odd situation has arisen in Cambodia and Prime Minister Prince Norodom Sihanouk has resigned.¹⁷ I need not say much about it, because he has been giving a number of press conferences stating why he has resigned and how they had to bring pressure upon him from both sides of the frontier, from the South Vietnam side and from the Thailand side. All I can say is that my sympathies are with Prince Sihanouk in this matter. I think during the last year or two, indeed after the Geneva Conference, he has steered the country through difficult conditions with a measure of success, and he has adhered more particularly to the basic idea of the Geneva Agreement, i.e., that the countries in Indo-China should remain independent and not align themselves with any power group. Otherwise the moment one does it, the other does something else and Indo-China becomes the cockpit of major power politics each trying to harm the other.

Q: In regard to Cambodia it is said sometimes in the West that it was all very well for a big and powerful country like India to follow a policy of independence or neutrality. In view of the latest statements of Prince Sihanouk, do you think that there is some truth in this?

JN: I should imagine that it is small countries particularly which profit by that policy. A big country can look after itself more or less anyhow. For instance Switzerland in Europe which has been consistently neutral, has profited by that. It is a very good example, not because the Swiss Government or people cannot challenge the rest of the world or any major power, but because they don't align themselves, don't enter into wars and each party knows that if it commits aggression in Switzerland, the other party will also do so. It is not a question of a small or big country. That obviously cannot be done but it is a question of balancing factors. The whole of the Indo-China situation was a situation in which mighty forces external to Indo-China were coming into conflict in Indo-China, and the only way to get out was to isolate Indo-China and see that this will not be a region of conflict or alignment, so that neither of the major forces need be afraid of its being exploited against them.

I was asked about my visit to the USA. I can say I am looking forward to going there.¹⁸ It is a brief visit of about less than 4 days. I would have the

17. Sihanouk and his cabinet resigned on 24 March 1956 owing to the pressures from the United States and France to give up the policy of non-adherence to any power bloc and protests against his visit to Beijing. The resignation was accepted by the King Suramarit on 30 March 1956.

18. The proposed visit from 7 to 11 July 1956 was later postponed and Nehru visited USA from 16 to 20 December 1956.

privilege of meeting President Eisenhower and discussing matters with him frankly, because I think it does a lot of good for these controversies today—different viewpoints—to be discussed fully and frankly. Fortunately, we have had the advantage in the last few months of discussion with very eminent guests of ours, who came from various countries representing different viewpoints. That has enabled us to get their viewpoints and for them to appreciate somewhat our viewpoints.

I cannot dilate on the great changes that are taking place in the world. I do think that almost every viewpoint that helped a few years back has to be revised owing to changes in the world situation, owing to all kinds of developments. And one of the major difficulties in the world situation is the habit of countries to follow traditional policies which have no relation to the present day world. They are out of date and yet they follow traditional policies and they have not quite adapted themselves to these new developments which, looking at purely from the political point of view or from the point of balance of power, will often upset their own balance of power. And we cannot be like humpty dumpty; we cannot put him back, he has fallen down. There the matter ends. You have to think afresh as to what to do.

Q: Will you be going to Ottawa, Sir?

JN: Not this time, I cannot. I am only going for 3 ½ days to the USA. I am going to West Germany,¹⁹ cutting short my stay in England; somewhat between my visit to England and West Germany.

Q: And France?

JN: No, I do not think it possible.

It may interest you—it was about an interesting paper I came across. It is not a very new paper, but still it is interesting. It is “Baggage Declaration Form”—“Pakistan Government’s Baggage Declaration Form, General Instructions”. It is not new; it is dated June, 1953. I do not know whether it is in use or not. The interesting point in this Baggage Declaration Form is that—a passage in it—something about this: “Provided that the Customs Collector is satisfied that the articles have been imported not more than four months in the case of passengers from foreign ports, in Pakistan States or in ‘Portuguese Pakistan’ or in Ceylon or Burma etc.” Now, this ‘Portuguese Pakistan’—it is

19. From 13 to 16 July 1956.

very interesting. We have not heard of this in our geography. But I think it indicates the thinking of the people of Pakistan that, when the Portuguese go away from Goa, as they are bound to, they may set up a claim on Goa.

Q: May I ask a question about Nagas?

JN: Yes, if you like.

Q: Is the problem being entirely treated as a law and order problem?

JN: How can it be? How can any problem be treated as an entirely law and order problem? Nagas are our own countrymen and they have to be won over rather than coerced. But you have to keep in mind the law and order problem. You cannot talk to a man who comes and shoots at you.

Q: But what is their basic crime?

JN: Shooting us. We did not mind all these years any policy they pursued, even though it was completely opposed to us, so long as it was more or less a peaceful movement. But when it comes to organising armed bands, killing, murder, looting, abduction, extortion and all that, one has to combat it.

Q: It wants to be an autonomous State in the Indian Union. What is the real point?

JN: Their claim has been one for complete independence. They have got even under our Constitution a very large measure of autonomy, called Autonomous District Councils.²⁰ We may consider it here and change it but we are certainly not prepared to discuss the question of independence. But even so we do not come in their way. But when they take to armed rebellion, then it is a different matter. We have to deal with that.

Q: An inference has been drawn in certain sections that you do not want the plebiscite in Kashmir to be held now. Is it correct?

JN: Largely so. I will explain myself. What I have said was that we have tried and discussed this question of plebiscite for six or seven years, but the pre-conditions have not been fulfilled. Meanwhile, other things have taken place, like military aid, etc., which have increased the difficulties tremendously of this problem, and I cannot discuss this matter further. But as a practical person, I think that this is leading us to a blind alley. We have, therefore, to discuss it

20. The Sixth Schedule of the Constitution provided for six Autonomous District Councils for the hill areas of Assam. Five Councils were formed in 1952 but the Council for the Naga Hills District could not be formed as the Nagas there boycotted the elections. The provision of the Council offered the Nagas a large measure of self-government.

from another point of view in regard to the conditions that have arisen now and try to come to an agreement. As a matter of fact, I expect that the Constitution of Kashmir will be finalised soon.²¹ It has been largely finished but will be completely finalised soon, and in all likelihood there will be general elections there on the basis of the new Constitution sometime in the future.²²

I want to say a few words about Bengal, Bihar, Bombay, etc. So far as Bengal and Bihar are concerned, this matter, as you know, has been discussed fully. We have not put it in the Bill because we wanted to deal with it separately, and chiefly because we wanted to give full opportunity for discussion. It is a matter of no concern to the Government of India whether Bengal, Bihar or any other provinces unite or do not unite. We may have views on it, we may prefer one thing but these are not questions of vital importance. One may consider it from the point of view of the industrial development, economic advantages and so many things, but it is not a question, I submit, on which people should get vastly excited this way or that way.

Ultimately we should decide. It has to be decided broadly according to the wishes of the people. Now we know that this issue of Bombay city, Maharashtra and Gujarat, has excited people greatly. I must confess that I am not at all feeling happy about all this. I do not wish to criticise anybody because I think almost everybody, including myself, concerned with this matter, have not, well, come off with remarkable success—to put it mildly and moderately. It is in no spirit of criticism, but I cannot congratulate either the Maharashtrians or the Gujaratis or the Bombay people or the Government of India. All I can say is that the Government of India tried their utmost. As I said it was a matter of no intrinsic importance to us from the Government's point of view, what arrangement was made about Bombay, whether Bombay was a State or a Centrally administered area or a composite State or with Maharashtra. We were prepared to accept any or all of these. Personally speaking for myself I do believe that the best solution was and is still a composite State. I am not merely saying this from the point of view of Bombay city, although it is important, but what is much more vital for the future, for the goodwill and cooperation of the Maharashtrians and the Gujaratis. Now, if I may mention

21. The Constitution of Kashmir was adopted on 17 November 1956 and came into force on 26 January 1957.

22. Under the new Constitution elections to the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly were held in March 1957.

an entirely personal matter, one of my sisters is married to a Maharashtrian²³ and the other to a Gujarati,²⁴ so that I had intimate contacts with both, and I really am not frightfully interested at the present moment as to what happens to Bombay. I am frightfully interested that the Maharashtrians and the Gujaratis and others become friends and cooperate. If that does not happen, then whatever the decision about Bombay, there will be ill will, lack of cooperation and Bombay will suffer and Maharashtrians will suffer and Gujaratis will suffer. Here are two of the most important communities in India, highly developed, highly advanced intellectually and in various ways, and for them to pull in different ways, is fatal regardless of the merits of the particular problem. The chief merit is to pull together, other things are secondary, and therefore, what happened in Bombay, those disturbances were peculiarly distressing to me as revealing—let us admit it frankly—our own weaknesses, I say yours and mine, not only Gujaratis' and Maharashtrians', because we are all in it, we have the same weakness, the same strength. It is no good blaming anybody. It is quite likely that we would have functioned in the same way if the difficulty faced us. That is a bad thing and it is a bad thing now that charges and counter charges continue to be levelled against each other. But this basic situation one has to face—not coming to some decision here and now, this way or that way about Bombay city. Also my difficulty is that having on three occasions come to some kind of a decision or semi-decision in regard to this particular matter, each time we found it not acceptable, and we have to shift our position.

Now, I am very anxious not to take anything unless I am dead sure. And my advice to everybody will be to try to develop this fullness of cooperation because it is essential, it is obvious—anyone of you can conceive. Then it does not matter in the final analysis that Bombay is in Maharashtra or separate. It does matter a great deal how the people of Bombay behave towards each other and that is the basic thing.

Q: With a view to promoting goodwill between Maharashtrians and Gujaratis, would you as a practical measure towards that end make an announcement that Bombay issue is not closed and can be reopened?

JN: This is a curious thing to say. I have repeatedly said that there is no finality about this. Many times I have said and I say it again, that it should not be

23. Nehru's second younger sister, Krishna Nehru was married to G.P. Hutheesing of Bombay.

24. Nehru's first younger sister Sarup Nehru who later took the name Vijayalakshmi, was married to R.S. Pandit, a barrister from Rajkot.

reopened in the context of strife and coercion. That is my point. Otherwise, one can always reconsider it and go into it in a better atmosphere.

Q: Your reflections on the visit to the slum areas?

JN: Reflections? Rebellious reflections.

One thing more may I say? Just I should like all of you, gentlemen, to remember that South East Asia is not only important in itself in the world context, but it is of peculiar interest and importance to India, to us. And I should like you in your newspapers to pay much more attention to what is happening in South East Asia.

Q: Like President Eisenhower, would you consider such a weekly Press Conference of half-an-hour or 20 minutes?

JN: I tried to have a monthly once; but that did not come off.

LETTERS TO CHIEF MINISTERS

I¹

New Delhi
14 February 1956

My dear Chief Minister,

I am writing to you on the eve of the new session of Parliament² and almost immediately after the Congress Session at Amritsar.³ Since I wrote to you last, we have had not only the celebration of the Republic Day and all its connected functions, but also something else which has, for the moment, cast a shadow over India.

2. The reorganisation of states has led to certain occurrences, in Bombay and Orissa chiefly, which have shown up some of our basic weaknesses.⁴ It is not much good our blaming each other for it even though the censure might be deserved. We have to face a deeper problem and those of us who are in a position of responsibility have to face it fairly and squarely. We cannot solve a problem by running away from it or by casting the blame on others.

3. I do not propose to write at any length about this problem because enough has been said about it. Soon after the first major shock, the Congress Working Committee met and they passed a resolution called "Call to the Nation".⁵ I would invite your special attention to this. More recently, at the Amritsar Congress, this matter was again fully considered. The resolution⁶ passed indicate the great importance which we attach to these recent developments and our resolve to do our utmost to meet these new dangers. This is, of course, not a merely governmental matter or a police matter. We have to go much deeper down into the minds and hearts of our people as well as our own, and then seek a remedy which will have a healing effect. It is well known that the

1. File No. 25(30)/56-PMS. These letters have also been printed in G. Parthasarathi (ed.), *Jawaharlal Nehru: Letters to Chief Ministers, 1947-1964*, Vol. 4 (New Delhi, 1988), pp. 343-365.
2. Held from 15 February to 30 May 1956.
3. Held from 11 to 12 February 1956.
4. See *ante*, pp. 3-4 and 223 and *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 31, p. 209.
5. For the text of the resolution, drafted by Nehru and passed on 23 January 1956 in New Delhi, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 31, pp. 210-212.
6. The resolution on reorganisation of states was passed on 12 February 1956. For Nehru's speech at the Subjects Committee at Amritsar on 10 February in support of the resolution, see *ante*, pp. 227-232.

deepest injuries are those that are self-inflicted and they take long to heal. We have to start the process of healing as far as we can, keeping always the major objective in view. We cannot surrender to violence, nor can we govern by violence.

4. You must have read all the resolutions of the Congress in the newspapers.⁷ They deserve a closer study and I hope to send them to you later in pamphlet form.

5. So far as the question of states reorganisation is concerned, the Government of India have already announced their decisions, except in regard to the Punjab and one or two relatively minor matters in the South.⁸ Before long, these other decisions will also be announced and Bill will be framed accordingly. The final decision, of course, can be made only by Parliament.

6. Amritsar was unique in many ways. The Congress had met there after over thirty-five years. The last Amritsar Session of the Congress was in December 1919, a few months after the Jallianwala Bagh massacre and martial law in the Punjab. Even after this long period of time, the memory of Jallianwala Bagh hovered over the Congress Session and was a continuous reminder to us of what we had gone through and what we had achieved. Are we to imperil all this achievement by our folly? And yet, there was folly enough. Amritsar saw three major political gatherings and three huge processions. There was the Congress, of course, and then there were the Akalis and the Maha Punjab people,⁹ and latter two bitterly hostile to each other, and the Congress occupying a position of its own, different from that of the others.¹⁰ Many people feared

7. The Indian National Congress had passed resolutions on socialism, economic policy, international affairs, foreign settlements, party organisation, and some other matters like abolition of caste system, the curbing of communalism and all social and legal disabilities affecting women, implementation of proposals for land reform and extension of cooperative and credit facilities in villages.
8. In a communique issued by the Home Ministry on 16 January 1956, the Government announced acceptance of most of the recommendations of the States Reorganisation Commission. See also *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 31, p. 204.
9. The Congress and the Akalis met on 11 and 12 February respectively and the Maha Punjabists on 12 February.
10. The Maha Punjab Samiti had started an agitation for the merger of Pepsu, Punjab and Himachal Pradesh into one province as suggested by the States Reorganisation Commission, while the Akalis insisted on formation of Punjabi Suba with the merger of Punjab and Pepsu states. The Congress viewed that language could not be the dominating factor in the demarcation of states, although it was an important factor to be considered. Any attempt to have rigid unilingual states would be unjust to the bilingual areas and would come in the way of the movement of population which naturally takes place in a rapidly developing country.

trouble and foreign correspondents gathered in large numbers like vultures scenting death. Fortunately they were disappointed. This was not only because of the very adequate arrangements made by the Punjab Government, but even more so, because nobody really wanted trouble. If there were some trouble makers, they knew well that they would not have an easy time.

7. I think that both the Akalis and the Maha Punjab people, aggressive and militant as they were, did not really mean all that they said. There was a great deal of showmanship about it and an attempt at pressure tactics. Of course, this kind of behaviour always involves some risk and even a small incident might grow.

8. There was then this exhibition of political immaturity and a lack of democratic sense. There was also an exhibition of how even a difficult and dangerous situation can be dealt with by political maturity and cool heads. Personally, I do not think that normally such rival processions should be allowed at the same time. The idea that everyone can brandish a sword or a lathi about at any time he likes is not my conception of civil liberty. Apart from inherent dangers, the public suffers and the life of the city is held up. However, I think, on this particular occasion it was worthwhile to allow this complete freedom and to demonstrate that we could control it peacefully.

9. While these conflicts and arguments about the reorganisation of states have naturally filled people's minds, a far more important question we have to face is the Second Five Year Plan. A draft outline¹¹ has just been issued and I commend it to your careful attention. This is a brave attempt to fashion our future and it will require all the strength and energy that we possess. I believe that ultimately this is the only way to deal with the separatism, provincialism and sectarianism that we have to combat. Mere pious exhortations do not have much effect and are forgotten soon. But, to approach this question indirectly by diverting people's attention to constructive work appears to me to be the only effective way. I suggest, therefore, that the Second Five Year Plan should be brought before the public in every way and their attention directed to it.

10. I am not writing at any length to you on this occasion and I do not propose to discuss foreign affairs, though much is happening in this changing world. The general situation at present in the world is not as good as it was a

11. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 31, p. 68.

few months ago. This has been indicated in the Congress Resolution on international affairs.¹²

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

12. The resolution, adopted by the Indian National Congress on 11 February 1956 at Amritsar, hoped that all disputes in East Asia would be settled peacefully and without outside interference. Criticising the SEATO Pact, the resolution commended the affirmation of faith in *Panch Shila* by some other countries and hoped that People's China would soon take her place in the United Nations. It called for total prohibition of the manufacture, use and experimentation of weapons of mass destruction. For Nehru's views on the resolution at the Subjects Committee at Amritsar, see *ante*, pp. 233-239.

II

New Delhi

14 March 1956

My dear Chief Minister,

I wrote to you last just a month ago. During this period we have suffered the loss of our Speaker, Shri G.V. Mavalankar,¹ and Acharya Narendra Deva.² Both, in their respective spheres, played a very important part during this transitional period in India. It is generally admitted that Shri Mavalankar was a great Speaker and he helped in giving an inner content to our Parliamentary institutions. Acharya Narendra Deva, though rather a solitary and scholastic figure, was undoubtedly one of the outstanding leaders in our struggle for freedom and subsequently. He was more a thinker than an actor and yet in the field of action also he had played an important part. He had been a close comrade of many of us in Uttar Pradesh for nearly forty years.

2. Parliament has begun again and the General Budget and the Railway Budget have been introduced. Both show hopeful trends and the results are better than had been estimated previously. There is no doubt that our Railways are making progress, but at the same time the demands upon them are greater than ever. There is the demand to keep pace in regard to transport requirements with the progressive industrialisation of the country and there is the ever-increasing number of passengers which leads to overcrowding. This increase in passenger traffic is to some extent an indication of more money being in circulation as also of the growing population. Efforts are being made to meet these urgent demands and a large sum of money has been allotted to the Railway in the Second Five Year Plan, and yet even this sum is hardly adequate for the purpose.

3. I think that an immediate necessity is to check ticketless travelling (as well as other malpractices) which not only leads to considerable loss of revenue but also to overcrowding. Any money spent for this purpose will be well spent.

4. The General Budget has, on the whole, been welcomed. It is a Budget on conservative lines. Perhaps we shall have to think of new methods and some changes in our basic approach to taxation. A good deal of thought in fact

1. Mavalankar passed away at Ahmedabad on 27 February 1956.

2. Narendra Deva passed away on 19 February 1956. For Nehru's tribute to him in the Rajya Sabha see *post*, p. 568.

has been given to this, both for the purpose of making our taxation system more efficient and equitable and in order to raise more revenue for our five year plans.

5. The work on the reorganisation of states has been greatly delayed. We have at last arrived at the stage of finalising the Bill and circulating it to the States.³ It is a happy omen that the difficult and ticklish question of the Punjab has been settled more or less satisfactorily.⁴ In fact, most of the problems we have had to face have been settled with a large measure of consent of the people concerned. Unhappily the question of Bombay and Maharashtra has led to a great deal of ill will and conflict.⁵ It must be our endeavour to remove this ill will and restore normal conditions. No solution is a satisfactory one if it leaves a trail of bitterness and frustration behind.

6. The new proposal of a union of Bihar and West Bengal has led to a great deal of controversy and has caused some excitement.⁶ I understand that the proposed Bill for Reorganisation will not deal with Bengal and Bihar. A separate Bill will have to be brought later for this purpose.

7. We have had some distinguished visitors and they have received a warm welcome wherever they have gone. Among these visitors have been the Shahanshah and the Queen of Iran. It is well known that our policy is not in line with that of Iran, more especially since Iran joined the Baghdad Pact. Nevertheless, the welcome that the Shahanshah got was cordial and I believe he was not only surprised but greatly pleased with it. We demonstrated in this case as in others that we can be close friends even when we differ.

8. During the last few days, we have had visits from three Foreign Ministers—Mr Selwyn Lloyd of the UK, Mr Dulles of the USA and M. Pineau of France. These visits more or less coincided with the meeting of the SEATO Council in Karachi where an extraordinary reference was made to Kashmir as

3. See *ante*, p. 210.

4. See *ante*, p. 209.

5. See *ante*, pp. 180, 183, 185-188, 197-202, 207-208, 210-212 and 214-217.

6. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 31. pp. 212-214 and 216-219. Also see *ante*, pp. 190-192 and 194-195.

well as to the Durand Line.⁷ I had long talks with all these Foreign Ministers and, even though we did not agree about many matters, I think our position was explained to them fully and frankly. The area of disagreement was largest with Mr Dulles and smallest with M. Pineau. Indeed, I was agreeably surprised to find how much there was in common between our approach to many international problems and that of M. Pineau. Incidentally, his visit here helped us to put finishing touches to the proposed treaty relating to Pondicherry etc.

9. Mr Selwyn Lloyd came here before the SEATO Council meeting at Karachi, the other two came after that meeting. In speaking to Mr Dulles, I laid stress naturally on the statement made about Kashmir at the SEATO meeting and on Mr Dulles' previous statement on Goa.⁸ Both of these statements were singularly misconceived and harmful. Probably, they have come in the way of better relations between India and the USA more than anything else. Many people imagine that our relations with the US depend on the amount of financial aid that they can give us. This is a complete misapprehension. Whether the US give as much or little or nothing at all, our relations with them will not be affected much, provided other factors are satisfactory. It is these other and political factors that are constantly coming in the way. Our general approach to the world situation differs from that of the US which is based largely on military considerations. We think that there can be no solution of the major problems of the world if the approach is chiefly a military one. Indeed we have seen a progressive deterioration because of this military approach.

10. I think there might have been some justification for the NATO being formed some years ago.⁹ But the later extension of this organisation for purposes for which it was not originally intended, and the new pacts and alliances in the Far East and South East of Asia, as well as the Baghdad Pact, have been most unfortunate and have certainly not helped the cause of peace or security. In Eastern Asia, there is an interlocking of these various alliances, with all the evil effects, but on a much larger and more dangerous scale, of the interlocking of companies and corporations. Among these pacts and alliances in East Asia

7. The SEATO Council meeting at Karachi was held from 6 to 8 March 1956. See *ante*, pp. 335 and 337.

8. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 31, pp. 423-424.

9. Formed under the North Atlantic Treaty signed in Washington on 4 April 1949.

are: the US and South Korea,¹⁰ the US and Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan,¹¹ the US, Australia and New Zealand,¹² and the SEATO Pact which includes the US, the UK, France, the Philippines, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand and Pakistan.¹³ (It is not clear how Pakistan finds its way in a South East Asia Pact. Indeed, Mr Dulles told me that Pakistan had no business to be there).¹⁴ In this interlocking of military alliances, it is possible for one country to take a step which would result in dragging in the others. Thus President Syngman Rhee or Chiang Kai-shek might commit some aggression and drag in the United States even against their will. If the US was dragged in, the other countries of SEATO would also be affected.

11. We have seen an instance of this, in a relatively small way, at the recent SEATO meeting in Karachi. Apparently, none of the countries represented, except Pakistan, was at all keen on referring to Kashmir. But, on the insistence of Pakistan, all the other countries fell into line. As a matter of fact, Mr Selwyn Lloyd had clearly stated before the SEATO meeting that the Kashmir question could not be raised there, but, no doubt under pressure from others, he had to agree. The only country which could have stopped this reference to Kashmir was the US. Presumably, they did not wish to do so.

12. By reference to Kashmir and the Durand Line, the SEATO Pact extends itself far beyond its geographical area and even beyond its declared purposes. Its reference to Kashmir and the Durand Line means that a military alliance is backing one country, namely, Pakistan, in its disputes with India and Afghanistan. For any organisation to function in this way, in the absence of the other party, could be considered an impropriety, to say the least of it. In the present case, there is another aspect. There were three Commonwealth countries, apart from Pakistan, present at this SEATO meeting, and all these sided with Pakistan against another Commonwealth country, India.

13. I need not go into these details as you are well acquainted with them. This has raised a serious issue, and we are not going to allow it to rest where it is. I think that our strong reaction has already rather shaken up many of these

10. The USA and South Korean Mutual Defence Treaty came into effect on 17 November 1954.

11. In 1954, the USA signed a defence treaty with Chiang Kai-shek's Government.

12. The Pacific Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States (ANZUS) was signed on 1 September 1951 and came into operation on 20 April 1953.

13. The South East Asia Defence Treaty was signed at Manila on 8 September 1954.

14. See *ante*, p. 379.

SEATO countries as well as other countries. It must be remembered that behind all this SEATO business, there is the flow of military aid from the US to Pakistan. This has grown in extent and is already considerable. It is raising difficult problems for us in defence, and we shall have to take steps to meet the new situation. Probably, in a year's time, if this aid continues as it is likely to, Pakistan's military position will be quite strong. I am afraid all this is going to cast a heavy burden on us. There is talk of American aid in our civil developmental programme. It is seldom realised that by their giving military aid to Pakistan, they are adding very greatly to our burdens.

14. While the SEATO Pact has attracted much attention recently, on the other side of Asia the Baghdad Pact has had a very bad time.¹⁵ Indeed one might almost think that it has no life left. But for reasons of prestige as well as economic interests, chiefly in connection with oil, it has to be kept up. This Pact has had the most disastrous consequences already for the countries that joined it. The United Kingdom is in desperate straits over it. If they were wise, they would acknowledge their error and try to find some way out. But they are insisting upon it, in spite of every adverse circumstance and begging the USA to help them in this matter. No doubt the USA will help, but all the help that they can give cannot make the Baghdad pact a success. In the final analysis, money does not go very far and it is the people who count. Already in Jordan the people have compelled the King and the Government to keep out of the Baghdad Pact and to dismiss Glubb Pasha.¹⁶ In Iran and Iraq there is a great deal of dissatisfaction with the Baghdad Pact. Egypt and Syria and Saudi Arabia are opposed to it and a virulent propaganda has been carried on against the Pact from Cairo.

15. The Baghdad Pact was ostensibly meant to keep out the communist countries. It has resulted in actually bringing them in into this region. For the first time the Soviet Union has appeared on the scene and it will no doubt have its say. For a long time past this region was under British influence. The Americans, came there against the wishes of the British, but they had to be tolerated. Now this new factor appears and the Soviet Union has given notice, one might say, that no decision can be made without its cooperation.

16. The position of the United Kingdom is a peculiarly unhappy one. They have got entangled in the Baghdad Pact and they have made a mess of the

15. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 31, pp. 248, 306 and 384-387.

16. See *ante*, p. 335.

situation in Cyprus.¹⁷ In effect they are powerless to deal with these situations without depending more and more on the United States. This itself indicates that they have not the strength to maintain their old imperial position in these areas or for the matter of that elsewhere. If they lose the oil of Western Asia, this will be a terrible blow to their economic position. Their prestige has already sunk to a low level. Internally, the present Government in the United Kingdom is not in a happy position.

17. France also is facing an exceedingly difficult situation in Algeria.¹⁸ In Morocco¹⁹ and Tunisia,²⁰ fairly satisfactory settlements have been made. But Algeria is a much more difficult problem because of the presence there of a million and a quarter people of French descent who settled there many generations ago. There is a large army there, but it has been unable to cope with the situation. There is some kind of civil war going on. I found that M. Pineau took a fairly realistic view of this situation which his Government had inherited.²¹ He was prepared to go very far indeed and even to give up Algeria as a French colony. But the presence of the large number of people of French descent there complicated the problem terribly. Delay in dealing with these North African countries has made the position almost intractable now.

18. Probably one of the most important recent developments has been the twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party.²² There can be no doubt that this Congress has deliberately adopted a new line which, in some ways, is entirely opposed to the old Stalinist line. Communists are so tied up with ideological approaches and communist dogmas that for them to make an important change has a greater significance than elsewhere. They have recognised many things which they had denounced previously. Thus they say that socialism can be of many kinds, that it can be achieved through peaceful methods and through parliamentary forms. All this and more are indications of a gradual return of normality to which I have previously referred. Some

17. See *ante*, p. 439.

18. See *ante*, p. 346.

19. The French and the Moroccan Governments reached an agreement on 2 March 1956 in which the independence, sovereignty and integrity of Morocco was recognized.

20. On 20 March 1956, France recognised Tunisia's independence and her right to conduct her own foreign policy and form her own army. Both countries agreed to discuss the details of their future cooperation, especially in regard to defence and foreign affairs.

21. See *ante*, pp. 390-391.

22. See *ante*, p. 334.

people argue that all this might well be an eyewash and not really meant. How far it is sincerely meant or not, I cannot say, though I think it is a natural development and a realistic approach to the conditions of today. But even if there is some doubt about sincerity, the mere fact of making this change is significant and has far-reaching effects.

19. This indicates the resilience and adaptability of the present rulers of the Soviet Union. Compared to this, the attitude of the USA is much more rigid and has been unrealistic such as in the non-recognition of the People's Government of China and their reliance on reactionary regimes and military factors.

20. Mr Dulles asked me for my appraisal of this Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party. I told him of my own impressions when I went to the Soviet Union and when Mr Bulganin and Mr Khrushchev came to India. Those impressions were that there was a powerful urge towards normality and a lessening of the tensions and high excitement which exist today. The Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party had confirmed these impressions. Oddly enough, Mr Dulles agreed broadly with my analysis, but he added that the pace of change was likely to be slower than I imagined. It might take a generation before real normality was restored. My view might well be a correct one in the long term, but he, Mr Dulles, was for the present concerned much more with the short term. The obvious answer was that a short term policy which does not fit in with a long term approach and with the progressive changes in the situation, was likely to be unrealistic and to fail.

21. I told Mr Dulles, of course, about our strong feelings in regard to Goa and what he had said in his joint statement with the Foreign Minister of Portugal. He could give no adequate reply except to say that the Portuguese Foreign Minister wanted him to go much further and he had restrained him.

22. It is difficult for me to give you a detailed account of the long talks we had with Mr Dulles, Mr Selwyn Lloyd and M. Pineau, but I have tried to give you some brief idea about them.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

III

New Delhi
3 April 1956

My dear Chief Minister,

Events have moved fast and furiously in the world. The most striking has been the Twentieth Session of the Soviet Communist Party, to which I referred in my last letter. The importance of this session has become even more obvious since then and a good part of the world is wondering what exactly it signifies. Is it a sign of strength or weakness? Is the Soviet structure cracking up and is the line laid down by the Twentieth Congress an attempt to hold it together? Or is this just a natural development, a process of normalisation which always follows big revolutions? Whatever it is, the importance of it from the world point of view is very great.

2. The American point of view is, and this is held, I believe, by Mr Dulles, that this is due to internal weaknesses and the inability of the Soviet regime to cope with them successfully. An even extremier view is that the communist system in the Soviet Union is in a bad way and is unpopular. What puzzles people is not so much the broad change in policy indicated by the Twentieth Congress but the deliberate and rather violent denigration of Stalin. Why was it necessary to blacken Stalin's reputation to this extent, because, undoubtedly, this meant blackening their own reputations also to some extent? Had this become necessary because of some pressures in the Soviet Union? Obviously nothing done outside the Soviet Union would produce this.

3. I confess I do not understand this sudden change in regard to Stalin. It has been obvious enough in the last two years that the Stalin cult was being played down. This was clear to me when I went there and I also sensed the beginnings of the change of policy in other directions. I mentioned this on my return in some of the notes that I wrote. Nevertheless, I cannot understand why it was considered necessary or desirable to blacken Stalin's reputation in so many ways. Perhaps there was already a strong feeling in the rank and file to which the leaders thought it wise to give expression. Or perhaps it is the way of leaders of violent revolution to function to go to extremes in whatever they do. Theirs is not to follow the golden mean or the middle path.

4. I cannot believe that the Soviet Union is weak either in the military sense or in the economic sense. Every evidence is to the contrary. Nor do I think that it is frightened of the western Powers. I think that the changes of policy are largely due to normal causes and a reaction from the high tension in which the people of the Soviet Union have lived for many long years. No

doubt, it is due also to certain pressures from below, but those pressures themselves were caused by this desire for normality. Anyhow, this is a major turn from the period of active revolution. One might almost say that that revolutionary period is over, at any rate, from any aggressive point of view. The economic gains or changes of the revolution will certainly continue, but the long reign of the secret police and the suppression of every protestant will gradually grow less. Some measure of civil liberties will grow, though the process will be slow. Also, there might be a gradual shift towards the production of consumer goods which the people demand. All this is to the good.

5. The question arises as to what effect this will have on world communism, on China, on other communist countries, and on the many communist parties in the non-communist countries. It is clear that the effect so far produced has been profound everywhere, and communist parties have not quite recovered from the shock. It is true that they are lining up gradually behind the Soviet Communist Party in its new garb. It is not clear what the reaction in China has been and how far China is prepared to agree to the abandonment of what has been called "the cult of the individual". In China, Mao Tse-tung is the great and wise leader whose words are always true.

6. Perhaps, while the Soviet Union is receding from the high pitch of revolution, China is still at that pitch and will continue there for some time. Indeed, new developments in China indicate that they are speeding up the processes associated with revolutionary communism. They began with dividing up the land, giving to each family a tiny patch. The next step was the formation of agrarian cooperatives, which spread with amazing rapidity. It is now proposed to take the third step, that is towards collectivisation of land. From such accounts as we have, it appears that, while the second step is being completed, the third step is already being organised. It is difficult for me to say how the peasantry of China are reacting to all this, but we have had no information about any obvious adverse reaction. The Chinese Government has taken care that, whatever the change, the actual income of the agriculturist should show an increase. This increase in income is supposed to come from better and more cooperative methods of production. Once the farmer is assured of this increase, apparently he does not care very much about cooperatives or even collectives which deprive him of the ownership of his particular patch.

7. From the point of view of a student of historical changes or of current affairs, this change in Russia is thus of the highest importance, and it will no doubt be followed by far-reaching consequences not only in the Soviet Union but elsewhere. For us, it is interesting to speculate what reaction it will produce

on the Indian Communist Party or on the communist parties of nearby countries in Asia. They will certainly tone down, I think, in their broad ideological approach and, perhaps, even in their violence and aggressiveness. But that does not mean that they will become wholly constitutional and peaceful parties, in spite of the new garb they might put on. They have been trained differently, and cannot get rid of the old habits of thought and action. But, I imagine that the influence of the Soviet Union will be on the side of restraint rather than of aggressiveness.

8. I spoke in Parliament on two occasions recently and said something about my talks with the three Foreign Ministers who came here and referred to a number of world changes.¹ I referred in some detail to Kashmir. What I said there in public in regard to Kashmir, has been said often enough in private. Indeed, I had taken up this line a year ago when the then Prime Minister of Pakistan came here accompanied by Major-General Iskander Mirza. My speech has created something of a sensation not only in India but, even more so, in Pakistan.² I am glad that we have succeeded in pulling out the Kashmir issue out of the ruts in which it had got stuck. This does not mean that we have finished with it. We shall have trouble enough in the future. But everyone will be compelled to think in new terms. My argument, briefly stated, is that we must recognise certain obvious legal and constitutional facts as well as certain important developments that have taken place during the past few years. I have not said that I rule out a plebiscite, but I have said that a plebiscite in existing circumstances, is not a feasible proposition and the only practical way of looking at this problem is to accept things as they are with such minor modifications as may be agreed upon, provided we accept the present basis. There can be no doubt that, apart from constitutional developments and innumerable changes that have taken place, the US military aid to Pakistan and SEATO and the Baghdad Pact have made a vital difference to the situation. We have to consider primarily the good of Kashmir and her people, but we have also to consider the security and defence of India which have been so powerfully affected by these new developments and pacts.


9. Another factor to be kept in view, not only because of its intrinsic importance but because of its wider effect even on Kashmir, is the great exodus

1. For Nehru's statements in Lok Sabha on 20th and 29th March respectively see *ante*, pp. 505-513, 515-516.

2. See *ante*, p.301 and *post*, pp. 532-536.



RECEIVING THE MOUNTBATTENS AT THE NEW DELHI AIRPORT, 14 MARCH 1956
S. Radhakrishnan, the Vice-President is on right



WITH ACHARYA VINOBA BHAVE AND OTHERS, MADHORAOPALLI NEAR HYDERABAD,

6 MARCH 1956

of Hindus that is taking place from East Pakistan.³ This is a major event bringing tremendous consequences in its train both for India and Pakistan. If the present somewhat unsteady equilibrium in Kashmir is upset, what will happen? More migrations on a great scale, whether to India or to Pakistan, more trouble, more conflicts and more dangers to India.

10. This migration from East Pakistan has become a major domestic issue for us and its international aspect is equally important. None of the suggestions made in Parliament to meet it are at all feasible, and yet the continuation of it is also not to be tolerated for long. We have already had four million people from East Pakistan during the past few years. It is true that a considerable number of Muslims have also gone from India to Pakistan during these years. But their number is much less. Four million is about thirty per cent of the total Hindu population as it was at the time of the Partition. That total Hindu population was itself about a third of the total population of East Bengal. Is this process going to continue till the remaining eight or nine million Hindus in East Pakistan pour into India? The dimensions of this problem become terrific and there appears to be no easy solution of it. Merely to shout and denounce Pakistan does not help. Indeed, we have arrived at a stage when we should be very careful about denunciations and the like. We cannot afford this luxury when the situation is a serious one and our words must be carefully chosen so as not to make the situation worse.

11. There has been much reference in Parliament and elsewhere to our defence needs and demands have been made that we should strengthen ourselves to meet any emergency that might arise. We are taking some steps to this end. But we must not allow ourselves to be swept away and lose perspective. The strength of a nation depends far more on its economic and industrial development than on arms purchased abroad. Indeed, the whole Second Five Year Plan might truly be considered a plan for adding to our defence strength, in addition to raising the standards of our people. All this means that the burden we shall have to carry in the future will be even heavier than we had anticipated. We cannot give up or weaken the Second Five Year Plan. Indeed, we may well be compelled by circumstances to add to it.

3. Replying to a question in Lok Sabha on 9 August 1956, Sadath Ali Khan, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of External Affairs, said that from February to April 1956, 1,28,726 Hindus migrated from East Pakistan to West Bengal which was much higher than the previous years. See also *ante*, p.309.

12. In this context of growing crises, national and international, we have to examine our internal problems. It surprises and distresses me that some people should even now carry on an aggressive agitation in connection with the States Reorganisation Bill. Whatever the merits of a particular decision might be, it is lack of wisdom to carry on any activity which encourages the spirit of disunity.

13. In the North-East of India, some of the Nagas have started an armed revolt. There is no need for us to get alarmed about this, although it is distressing that some of our countrymen should behave in this way. The real difficulty comes from the nature of the terrain and the lack of communications. We have put the Army in command of these operations, though the civil power will continue to perform its normal functions.⁴

14. The latest of our distinguished visitors from abroad was Mr Mikoyan, the First Deputy Prime Minister of the Soviet Union. In order of importance, he is said to be No. 3 there, that is, he comes after Mr Khrushchev and Mr Bulganin. I had very interesting talks with him⁵ about recent changes in Russia and our Commerce & Industry Minister also had very useful talks. These are likely to yield substantial results in the shape of trade and development of heavy industry. It is also proposed to have a joint shipping line running between India and the Soviet ports to facilitate exchange of goods.

15. We have been having during the last week a Conference of the Heads of our Diplomatic Missions in Asia and Africa.⁶ I have given much time to this and all of us who attended it have profited by it. It is important that in this rapidly changing world we should know each other's minds and have a clear policy.

16. As you know, President's rule has been proclaimed in the Travancore-Cochin State.⁷ It is no pleasure to set aside normal constitutional government in any state, but there was no choice left and there was no possibility of any Ministry which could function with stability.

17. While Russia has her own troubles and difficulties, the Western Powers are also facing critical situations, British policy has broken down in Western Asia and in Cyprus. France is facing a rebellion in Algeria. In Cambodia, the

4. See *ante*, pp.122-123.

5. See *ante*, p.401.

6. See *ante*, pp.408-473.

7. The Congress Ministry headed by P. Govinda Menon resigned on 11 March 1956 when its majority was reduced to a minority in the State Legislature after six Congress MLAs resigned in protest against the transfer of five Tamil-speaking districts to Madras.

Prime Minister, Prince Sihanouk, has resigned and openly protested against the pressure exercised upon him by the South Vietnam and Thailand as well as USA.⁸ In another corner of the world, even little Iceland has called upon the United States to remove their base from the island.⁹ The Balkan Pact which included Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece has practically broken up. Yugoslavia attaches no importance to it now and Greece and Turkey are not on good terms with each other because of Cyprus. The Baghdad Pact, whatever the shouting, was practically still-born. Israel and Egypt hover on the brink of war.

18. Meanwhile experimental explosions of Hydrogen Bombs are going to take place in spite of protest. America is going to have them somewhere near the Marshall Islands. The UK proposes to have it somewhere in Australia and the Soviet no doubt will continue their experiments. It is strange world we are living in.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

8. See *ante*, p.539.

9. The Iceland Parliament adopted a resolution on 28 March 1956 calling for the removal of American military forces from the US Air Force base at Keflavik. The Parliament also voted for a revision of the US-Iceland Pact of 1951 which allowed manning of defence installations in Iceland by foreign forces

1. To B.V. Keskar¹

New Delhi
13 February 1956

My dear Keskar,

Tendulkar,² the author of *Mahatma* is in a bad way. His little house in Bombay has collapsed and his valuable library is in danger of destruction. We are trying to make some temporary provision for it. But this will not take us far.

I think that he is capable of very good work provided he is given suitable surroundings and facilities. What he would like to have is a small cottage near the sea. By itself, this is not very costly, but everything in Bombay is expensive. I am going into this matter.

Meanwhile, I have received a letter from Tendulkar offering to dispose of his copyright in *Mahatma* to Government if they are prepared to have it. *The Times of India* press, which published it, made, I am told, five lakhs out of it. The book is out of print and there is still a demand for it. Do you think it is a feasible proposition for this copyright to be taken over by Government? If so, the money he gets for it might help him tide over his house difficulty. But, quite apart from this, I am inclined to think that it would be worthwhile for Government to take over this copyright.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 2(427)/62-64-PMS.
2. D.G. Tendulkar; biographer and writer; known for his eight volume biography of Mahatma Gandhi—*Mahatma: Life of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi*.

2. Tribute to Acharya Narendra Deva¹

Mr Chairman,

I crave your leave, Sir, to refer to the sad death of a Member of this House, Acharya Narendra Deva.² It is proper that reference should be made to him here, but the death of Acharya Narendra Deva is something much bigger for many of us and, I think, for the country than just the passing away of an important person. He was a man of rare distinction—distinction in many fields—rare in spirit, rare in mind and intellect, rare in integrity of mind and otherwise. Only his body failed him. I do not know if there is any person present here in this House who was associated with him for a longer period than I was. Over forty years ago we came together and we shared innumerable experiences together in the dust and heat of the struggle for independence and in the long silence of prison life where we spent—I forget now—four or five years together at various places, and inevitably got to know each other intimately; and so for many of us, it is a grievous loss and a grievous blow, even as it is a grievous loss for our country. There is the public sense of loss and there is the private sense of loss and a feeling that somebody of rare distinction has gone and it will be very difficult to find his like again. So, I ventured to mention this matter to you, Sir, and to this House.

1. Statement in the Rajya Sabha, 20 February 1956. *Rajya Sabha Debates*, 1956, Vol. XII, Part II, col. 199.
2. Acharya Narendra Deva, an eminent savant, freedom fighter, socialist leader and educationist died at Erode, Tamil Nadu on 19 February 1956.

3. Report of a Speech of Escott Reid¹

I enclose a letter from the Canadian High Commissioner.² I do not think it is necessary for me to reply to it.

2. When I first read the report of his speech, the thing that surprised me most (and I think I commented on it) was his impression that Indians did not expect Independence when it came and indeed some people here thought that the probable date would be 1970.³ I really do not know from whom Mr Escott Reid has got these impressions. Hardly anyone within my large circle of acquaintances ever thought so. We first thought that we would gain Independence in the twenties. In fact, we were almost sure of it. We then thought it would certainly come in the thirties. The delay in its coming had a frustrating effect. I have little doubt that if the Second World War had not come, we would have gained Independence perhaps even earlier than we did. I remember telling Lord Linlithgow in the summer of 1938 that I gave him and his country an outside limit of ten years more in India.⁴

1. Note to Secretary General, Foreign Secretary and Commonwealth Secretary, MEA, 21 February 1956. File No. 26(1)-AMS/56, MEA. Also available in JN Collection.
2. In his letter of 21 February, Escott M. Reid, the Canadian High Commissioner in India, conveyed his apology to Nehru for the unauthorized publication, in the *Christian Science Monitor* dated 19 January, of his speech in the Canadian Institute of International Affairs at Toronto in June 1955 which was supposed to be "off-the-record" and in which he had made several observations about India and Nehru.
3. Reid said that he was shocked when told in India "that up to the outbreak of the Second World War, Indian leaders thought independence to be so far distant that they had not even been thinking in terms of a possible date by which it might be achieved By the end of the War the date was advanced but ... almost no Indian leader thought it would come anywhere near as soon as it did."
4. For Nehru's report of his conversation with Lord Linlithgow, Viceroy of India, in London on 19 July 1938 see *Selected Works* (first series), Vol. 9, pp. 89-90.

4. Talks with Vinoba Bhave¹

Panditji informed Vinobaji about the basis of discussion between the Government and the Akalis relating to the reorganisation of Punjab. He also informed him about tentative decisions regarding Hyderabad and Andhra. The idea of Regional Council was being applied to both the places.

As regards Bombay Panditji told Vinobaji that he had declared in Parliament that once normal conditions were restored in that area he would be willing to discuss relevant matters at any time.² It would not be proper to open further discussions till complete peace is restored in Maharashtra. Shri Jayaprakash had written to Panditji about the idea of holding plebiscite in disputed areas.³ Panditji had declared in Parliament that he did not mind holding plebiscite in some areas although it was not possible to follow this procedure in all cases.⁴ Panditji made it clear to Vinobaji that while he made a reference to the holding of plebiscite, he did not have Bombay in his mind, although his speech may have created some misunderstanding in the minds of people. Panditji also referred to a statement by Shri Shankarrao Deo that he was opposed to the holding of a plebiscite in Bombay on the ground that the will of the majority should not be imposed on the minority.⁵ Panditji thought that by making the statement Shankarraoji had indirectly admitted that majority of the people in Bombay were not in favour of joining Maharashtra. Vinobaji told Panditji that

1. At Madhoraopalli, near Hyderabad, 6 March 1956. This gist of the talks was prepared by Shriman Narayan on 11 March 1956. File No. G-1(S)/1955-56, AICC Papers, NMML. Extracts.
2. On 23 February 1956, while speaking on the dispute over reorganisation of Maharashtra, Nehru stressed the need for calming down the passions that had been roused there, before discussing the matters.
3. On 19 February 1956 Jayaprakash Narayan wrote to Nehru that "the only honest manner in which to consult the wishes of the people is to hold a plebiscite."
4. Nehru declared in the Lok Sabha on 23 February 1956 that a plebiscite "may be desirable in some areas" to resolve disputes over states reorganisation.
5. Shankarrao Deo, the President of the All-Party Samyukta Maharashtra Parishad and the chief advocate of the demand for Samyukta Maharashtra, while addressing a public meeting at Nasik on 27 February, ruled out the idea of holding a plebiscite on the question of inclusion of Bombay in Samyukta Maharashtra and said that no solution should be imposed on a minority by the majority.

Shankarraoji had detailed talks with him about Bombay and Maharashtra.⁶ His impression was that Shankarraoji will be willing to agree to any democratic procedure for ascertaining the wishes of the people of Bombay about joining Maharashtra. Vinobaji also felt that a bilingual State with Saurashtra and Vidarbha would be the best solution. Panditji said that such a bilingual State could be formed only with the goodwill and mutual agreement of both the Maharashtrians and the Gujaratis. He had no doubt that such a bilingual State would be in the best interests of both the Maharashtrians and Gujaratis. But recent incidents in Bombay had shocked the Gujaratis greatly and it might not be possible to have further talks in this connection till normal conditions were restored.

Panditji also informed Vinobaji about the latest developments in regard to the proposal for the merger of Bengal and Bihar.⁷ Panditji was very much disturbed by the attitude of students and young men in Bengal and elsewhere.

Vinobaji told Panditji that Shri Shankarrao Deo, Shri Rao Saheb Patwardhan and others desired that he should make a statement on Maharashtra⁸ although he himself was not eager to do so. Vinobaji also showed Panditji a draft statement in which he had pleaded for a bilingual State. Vinobaji also thought that if bilingual State was found to be impossible, Bombay should be given an opportunity of merging with Maharashtra through a proper procedure. Vinobaji also made a reference to the letter that he had written to Shri Dhebarbhai⁹ after consulting Dr Rajendra Prasad who had met him about a month ago.¹⁰ Panditji thought that the statement might create further controversies. He also made a few suggestions which might be incorporated in the statement.

Vinobaji also told Panditji that Shankarraoji and others desired that Panditji should issue a statement in which he should assure the Maharashtrians that justice would be done to them. Vinobaji also showed Panditji a draft statement for this purpose.

6. Shankarrao Deo discussed about the future of Bombay and Maharashtra with Vinoba Bhave in Hyderabad on 28 February 1956.
7. For details see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 31, pp. 212-214.
8. During the discussions with Vinoba Bhave on 28 February Shankarrao Deo and Rao Saheb Patwardhan, a close associate of Vinoba in the Bhodan movement, expressed their desire that Nehru should issue a statement assuring the Maharashtrians that justice would be done to them.
9. Vinoba Bhave had written to U.N. Dhebar on 9 February 1956, reminding him of his promise that Bombay city could be merged on the basis of democratic process with Maharashtra after some time.
10. Rajendra Prasad met Vinoba Bhave on 11 February in Hyderabad.

Panditji told Vinobaji that he was not prepared to believe that he or the Government had done any injustice to Maharashtra consciously. Panditji informed Vinobaji that he was thinking of touring Maharashtra after about two months. He had already told Parliament that he would be willing to discuss anything at any time after normal conditions had been restored.

Vinobaji asked Panditji about his meeting Jayaprakashji. Panditji informed him that Jayaprakashji was meeting him sometime on the 13 March.¹¹ But he was not sure whether his talks with J.P. would be helpful or would create further complications.

I told Panditji that Shri Dhebarbhai was keen that he and Vinobaji should have joint discussions on basic education in order to make it the future pattern of national education according to a definite programme. Panditji had already seen notes of my talks with Vinobaji about basic education. Panditji said that the Government of India had already decided to introduce basic education throughout the country.¹² But there were many vested interests in the educational sphere which had to be dealt with properly and tactfully. He was not very much in favour of many retired people becoming teachers in schools¹³ because these retired persons become generally static and could not be expected to make a dynamic experiment a success. However, he would welcome some good retired people to work as teachers. There was one more difficulty which had to be considered. Under the Indian Constitution education was a State subject and the States resent excessive interference by the Centre on the strength of financial help. Moreover, each State had its own ideas about basic education and resent the imposition of any rigid system.

Panditji was in full agreement that the University degrees should not be the sole criterion for admission into Government services. Students of basic and post basic schools as well as others who might not have taken any degrees should be allowed to take competitive examinations for Government services on their own merits.

11. Jayaprakash Narayan met Nehru on 13 and 14 March and discussed the reorganisation of states in the light of public reactions specially in Maharashtra, Bengal, Bihar and Orissa following Government's decision to implement the recommendations of the SRC. His meeting with Nehru was in compliance with Acharya Narendra Deva's last wishes to help solve the states reorganisation problems.
12. The idea of basic education was initiated by Gandhiji in a Conference on Education at Wardha in 1937. In 1952 the Government of India accepted the system of basic education as the pattern of universal, free, and compulsory education all over the country.
13. Vinoba Bhave had suggested that a large number of retired teachers could be persuaded to become teachers in public schools in, more or less, honorary capacity.

As regards the question of having only one salary grade for all basic education teachers, Panditji thought that this was essentially a financial matter because uniformity of salaries would mean a higher average salary for all teachers. Still every attempt should be made to reduce economic disparities among basic education teachers.

Vinobaji told Panditji that he regarded the land reforms bill in Bihar¹⁴ as a test case. In Bihar he had spent about two years in Bhoodan work¹⁵ and had created the necessary atmosphere for radical land reforms. It would be very unfortunate if the Congress could not utilise the healthy atmosphere created by the Bhoodan movement in Bihar by introducing a radical piece of legislation.

... Vinobaji told Panditji that the present system of elections was the root of many troubles. Elections should be direct at the base and indirect from the village upwards.

Panditji agreed with Vinobaji that the present system of elections must be changed. There was some danger of corruption in indirect elections. But various methods could be found to obviate this evil. If the Government proceeded to change the entire system of election at present, the opposition would surely misunderstand. This matter could be taken immediately after the General Elections.

14. Apart from adopting the Zamindari Abolition Bill, the Bihar Government took two other important measures for land reforms. The Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Bill was adopted in 1956 but could not be implemented effectively. Similarly, the Bihar Agricultural Land Ceiling and Management Bill was also passed in 1956. This Act had fixed the ceiling for land at 30 acres for the plains and 50 acres for the hilly areas. This Act too could not be implemented properly. As a result, the expected land reforms could not be achieved in Bihar.

15. Vinoba Bhave stayed in Bihar from August 1954 to May 1956 for the cause of Bhoodan.

5. News and Non-News¹

I do not quite know what to talk about. Mr Rosenthal² suggests to me that I might say something about the implications of the recent changes in policies in the Soviet Union. Well, I am hardly competent to speak about them. I made a slight mention of them in Parliament today. But one thing that fills my mind is the process of change going on all over the world, the tempo we live through. Perhaps many of us do not quite realise it, specially in India where the process is not so swift. I suppose ultimately this process is connected with technological change. Technological change necessarily leads to new conditions of life. New conditions of life lead to new conditions of thinking, and so the whole environment goes on rapidly changing.

I often refer to the atom bomb. The atom bomb, apart from its military significance which is great, becomes a symbol really of this technological change. Atomic energy represents tremendous force which might be used for good purposes or evil. These technological changes are going to change the whole basis of human society, may be in twenty, thirty or forty years, I do not know, just as the Industrial Revolution changed it in the course of some generations, one hundred and fifty years ago. It is something big like that, and I am fascinated by this prospective change that it will lead to. Apart from the external manifestations of change, I think it is bound to affect all our economic thinking. It has affected military thinking, it has affected political thinking but I think it will affect almost every other thinking, including economic, and I think that much of the economic thinking, whether it is orthodox economic thinking, or heterodox. I have lived especially during the last ten years, a rather hectic life. Yet in a sense I think that my most fruitful period was when I spent in prison, fruitful in the sense of reading and thinking, and a little writing. And perhaps it is the accumulation of my thinking in those days that has helped me greatly later. That is, I have a storehouse of accumulated thought. It may not be up to date but there is some historical perspective in it. I studied history, history in the sense of large happenings, the general sweep of events and the interrelation of each other and from the world point of view. It gave me some

1. Address to the Foreign Press Association, New Delhi, 20 March 1956. AIR tapes, NMML.
2. A.M. Rosenthal, an American journalist attached with New Delhi bureau of *The New York Times*.

kind a perspective. It need not be wholly right. But it gave me a continuous picture of things happening and I tried to fit in any new things that happened with that broad approach and perspective.

So, whenever I begin thinking of a subject, immediately I open out some kind of cupboard or drawer in my mind, where there is some accumulated thinking on that particular subject in the past. It does not always fit in. So, I tend to look and I quite deliberately have to look at current events in a perspective connected with the past, and try to think of the future trend they might take. Now I do that for a variety of reasons, partly because of the habit that developed previously, and partly because it is very helpful to take me out of, well, the stress and strain of the present. One is naturally overwhelmed by the problems one has to deal with from day to day, with decisions to be made. The moment I take myself out of that and look at the problem of today in some long perspective, the burden of the present becomes less. It does not go, one has to shoulder it. It becomes less in the long perspective and somehow it appear to be less important than otherwise one would have thought.

You, ladies and gentlemen, function very much, if I may say so, from day to day. Events appear big immediately when they happen. And yet perhaps a year later, even a month later, that event might not be so big. Is it not odd how rapidly the newspaper of today become rather stale a week later or a month later? It strikes me as very curious how we live from day to day and today's news become completely stale a few days later except some outstanding news. Let us take a great philosopher of the middle ages in Europe, Erasmus. Erasmus was considered a very well read man, a very wise man. His entire library consisted of fifty books. No doubt he knew those books well. I presume he used them well. Today, I suppose, books are read by hundred of thousands of people, and yet I wonder how much they absorb from what they read. Many may not be worth absorbing. We tend to become rather superficial. We do not develop those deep roots which people with greater leisure in the past used to do. That is why I value the period which I had to endure, rather compulsorily, in prison because I had time to read and time to think somewhat and time to write. My writing, as a matter of fact, was only subconsciously meant for publication. I knew of course, it might be published. It was more to order my own thoughts. I had got into the habit in prison of making rather copious notes of the books I read. I seldom read the notes again but I had a substance of the books in my memory. I had to think hard of what a book meant, put it down and that became for me a library of reference. I am afraid I have not added to my note books for many years, but still I believe I have thirty of such notebooks to which I can refer and which help me in my subsequent writing.

However, my point is that the world is changing, developing. India was for hundred and hundreds of years static. It had lost that capacity for change. Change there was to some extent but not enough. Now, the problem always is how to have that capacity for change, for development and yet have roots somewhere in your deeper self or the past, because both are necessary, roots and the flowering tree at the top. You can't have only roots and nothing else. It is absurd. You can't have much growth and leaves and flowering unless you have roots. The problems of adjusting to the continuity of change.

Now, to go back to the atom bomb. It represents the beginning of a period of rather rapid change, which I think will affect the whole of human society, I am not referring to the military aspect at present, although that is very obvious, but to the consequences of the force that is let loose in the world and that people are trying to control. Whether they will succeed or not I do not know. I suppose they will, ultimately, because it is quite extraordinary how human beings in the past have survived all kinds of catastrophes. They have a remarkable power of survival and I have little doubt in my mind that they will survive even the atom bomb and the forces released by it.

So, in thinking of those changes that are likely to be brought about, I am led again to the conclusion that the world, which has been drawn together, just cannot again function in compartments. We are too close to each other. We sit on each other's lap. And unless we develop the spirit of tolerance and cooperation, we shall do injury to each other, and the seal of injuries becomes bigger and bigger. Therefore, there seems to be no other way except gradually to learn the lesson of tolerating each other. Otherwise the consequences will be terrible. I imagine that this is being increasingly realised everywhere and that ultimately, and rather labouriously, we shall reach a stage where there is a little bit more of mutual understanding and less fear and suspicion of each other. I should think that the present phase we are passing through, difficult and critical as it is, is not perhaps quite as vital as we suppose. It is yet vital enough for us. If we take a wrong turn, it may have very serious consequences.

You know that in science people started with something hardly scientific, like astrology. They went on to astronomy and gradually on to physics. Chemistry again came from alchemy. Physics developed, chemistry developed and other sciences developed and we got to know more and more about the physical world we live in. We did not know very much about ourselves. We know a great deal of the physical world and of the universe. In the recent years, biology has developed. Then psychology. Now we enter into the domain of learning something about ourselves. Yet, we will talk about atomic energy, very few people understand it because it concerns itself with the most intricate

mathematical formulas. In fact, the universe is now considered a kind of mathematical formula. Physicists and cosmic energy people and the atomic energy people and the like are opening out a new world. At the same time, another aspect is in terms of knowledge of the human being, in terms of psychology and the rest. Many of you remember that almost all the old philosophers, Plato and Pythagoras and other big philosophers of Europe, the old Indian philosophers, and the old Chinese philosophers thought or talked about knowing yourself. I think Pythagoras had an inscription on the door of his school, "Know Thyself"; it is odd that having acquired tremendous knowledge about the physical world, we do not know too much about ourselves. It may be that we are on the verge of knowing more and more about ourselves, and that will help us in adapting ourselves to this knowledge of the physical world. Anyhow we do seem to be on the verge, in this age of remarkable developments of human knowledge, external or internal, which will no doubt affect human society and our lives greatly. There is a great danger of external knowledge outstripping our knowledge of ourselves. Then we cannot utilise that knowledge and we go astray.

I am sorry I have been philosophising to you, frankly I have no particular subject in my mind to talk to you about, and also I thought that your chief concern is with the day's events and catastrophes and disasters. After all, what does a newspaper contain? Many things, of course, but normally the odd things and not, as somebody said, a story of innocence. A story of somebody living a staid and sober life is not interesting enough. There is no story in it. It is only when you move out into the domain which is irregular and exciting that it becomes a story. Whether it is a flood or a disaster or a murder, that is news.

I remember, long, long ago, reading a couple of books by Prince Kropotkin, an atheist leader before the Russian Revolution, in which he tried to show that the world was carried on by cooperation, in spite of so much struggle and strife. This is basically true.

The danger is that the Press, the radio, television, give so much publicity to the odd events that the regular events which really fashion life do not get much publicity. So, one gets an idea of the world which is much more vicious than the world really is. If something wrong happens in any part of the world, it gets worldwide publicity. All the happenings in the various parts of the world, which are not exciting enough, do not get publicity. So, is it not true that we people are likely to get a rather perverted view of the world, not a balanced view any way, but an unbalanced view? I suppose one cannot help that, and I suppose gradually one gets used to it and allows for that. Anyhow, thank you for inviting me here and giving an opportunity to meet you.

6. Talks with John Strachey¹

Mr Nehru is today at the summit of his powers: a seasoned world statesman, bearing an immense load of responsibility but seeming at least to bear it without strain. His air is light, graceful—often gay. His step is springy. He laughs often, his eyes flash.

Jawaharlal Nehru: It is an exciting job to lead the Indian people today.

John Strachey: Perhaps the most exciting job in the world?

JN: You see in India we have such an immense diversity not merely diversity between one part of the country and another, between state and state, between places as far away from each other and as different as England is from Sicily, but also diversities between age old traditions and ultra-modern developments. And even our rapid present day development is extremely diverse. In our Five Year Plan for instance, we are building ultra-modern, large-scale industries and at the same time developing our cottage industry and our handloom weaving. And added to all that there is India's special position in the world, her special relationship with the East and with the West.

JS: Prime Minister, the British people know and understand pretty well India's position in world affairs, and they profoundly appreciate her stand for peace. But in Britain we have only just begun to realise the tremendous things that are happening inside India, we have only just begun to hear about your gigantic Second Five Year Plan, about your determination to industrialise this vast country—to do it on the basis of a socialist pattern of society, and to hold fast at the same time to democratic freedom. Don't you think that it is very important that the British people should realise all that is happening in India?

JN: No doubt it is. But do not think we are underestimating our difficulties and our problems in all this development.

JS: Would it be true to say that the example of the rapid Chinese economic development has been a big incentive to India in her turn to planning and industrialisation?

JN: No. It would be wrong to say so. Indian economic planning, Indian determination to industrialise goes back to a period long before the Chinese

1. Recorded by John Strachey, British author and politician and a Visiting Professor at the Indian Statistical Institute in March-April 1956, New Delhi, 26 March 1956. JN Collection.

development of the last eight years. As early as 1938, even before Independence, Congress took up the question of planning.² Of course at that time we were not the Government. The Congress Party did form the Government in the provinces—but we had no power over the Central Government. Congress appointed a Planning Committee, of which I was the Chairman, and we began to work out plans for all round Indian economic development. Then there were interruptions. There was the War and then we were all sent to prison. In 1947 came Independence. Soon afterwards we launched the First Year Plan which has now been actually carried out. Our current Second Five Year Plan is much bigger. But it is a logical development from the First. All this has been a purely Indian development.

JS: We in Britain are apt to think of China and India as being in a sort of peaceful and friendly race or contest as to which can develop more rapidly and successfully. Might not this be a good thing and a stimulant to both of them.

JN: I think that this may be good.

JS: To the student of your Second Five Year Plan the most striking thing about it is that the Plan proposes development of two opposite kinds, as it were. On the one hand, you are beginning to build up the very latest types of large-scale modern industry—for instance I have just seen your superb new locomotive building workshop at Chittaranjan, your fertiliser plant at Sindri and your 120 foot seam of open cast coal at Bokaro. But then, on the other hand, and at the same time you propose, I understand, not only to preserve but actually to develop your cottage industry—you propose actually to develop and extend the spinning and weaving of textiles by hand on hand spindles and handlooms. I realise that all this may be quite right and logical in Indian conditions, but it is certainly startling.

JN: Yes, I know. But you must remember two things. First, hand spinning and weaving—specially handloom weaving is by no means dead in India. There are still many thousands of handlooms being worked in cottages throughout India. We believe that this deep Indian tradition of handicrafts must not be allowed to die out. We believe that it can be developed most fruitfully.

2. In October 1938, at the initiative of the Congress Working Committee, the representatives of the Congress governments in the provinces set up the All India Planning Committee with Jawaharlal Nehru as its chairman. For his speech at its first meeting, see *Selected Works* (first series), Vol. 9, pp. 367-368.

Then in the second phase the spinning and weaving of textiles by hand is an integral part of the whole nationalist tradition of which the Congress Party has been the leader and organiser. For instance, I am quite a good spinner. I used to like to use the hand spindle. I found it an interesting and skilled occupation—a splendid relaxation from mental activity. On the other hand, handloom weaving—rather than spinning—is perhaps the most promising process for our cottage industry development.

JS: What about the economies of the thing? Can the handloom possibly compete?

JN: Do not draw hasty conclusions about this. Remember that there may be great economies for the country as a whole in this cottage industry, and in particular in handloom weaving. There are economies in transport. Not only is the raw material often produced next door, the same village where it is spun and woven, but also there are vast social advantages in not herding millions of men and women into the great cities, in order to mobilise them for large-scale machine industry. Think of the vast resources which India would have to put into city transport and the other public services, if she were to develop all of her industries in the cities. Only a country which is planning its development on a socialist pattern can take into account these major social economies. For they do not affect the individual firm, since the individual firm does not have to pay for these vast developments of public utilities, city housing, transport etc. But the country does have to pay for them. So there may be great advantages in cottage industries after all.

JS: But what about the immense extra labour involved in the handloom?

JN: I know, but India has only too much labour! Our problem is to find a way of employing the unemployed and the millions of additional workers who come upon the labour market every year. Of course, we are not against mechanisation or large-scale industry. When they are necessary and suitable we are going in for them wholeheartedly. Even in this case of weaving it may be that the final answer will prove to be neither large-scale mechanised weaving in the city mills nor the handloom itself. It may be that the final answer will be the power loom electrically driven in the cottage of the weavers. That might be not only the socially best solution but also actually the most efficient solution in the unique circumstances of present day India.

JS: Prime Minister, May I put you the question which concerns the people in Britain most of all. Do you feel confident that you can carry through this vast process of industrialisation—of making over India on the basis of a socialist pattern of society and yet preserve your democracy, your

personal freedom, your basic rights of discussion, of assembly and of association; that you can preserve these precious human values, those values which India does so splendidly preserve today?

JN: I am sure that democracy and freedom and all that goes with them will be preserved in India. Nor will their preservation prevent us from developing India on the socialist pattern. The most that I would concede is that here and there the preservation of freedom and democracy may slow things down. But rest assured that Indian development will go forward without in any way restricting Indian democracy and freedom.

JS: No doubt in the short run democracy and freedom—such things as full discussion and debate with every right of protest and dissent for the opposition may slow down development. But may it not be that in the long run such full democratic discussion as you have in India may prove a method of avoiding tremendously costly mistakes? So, in the long run democratic development may actually be the more truly efficient way also?

JN: That may be. History may show that the democratic method of development may be comparatively slow to start with. But history may also show that in the end democracy may actually prove, not only by far the most humane, but actually also the fastest method of development.

JS: If India can industrialise herself, upon a socialist basis, and at the same time preserve her democracy and freedom she will show the way forward to the whole world.

Prime Minister, conservative circles in Britain were distinctly nervous about the possible efforts of Mr Khrushchev and Marshal Bulganin's visit to India. They thought that your distinguished Russian guests might be exercising an undue influence on India—to put it bluntly, that they might be pulling India their way.

JN: Do people of the West ever think of this? They always seem to be nervous about the effect which our Russian visitors may be having upon us. Do they never consider the question of what effect we may have on our Russian visitors?

JS: I am bound to say that I think that that will be a new idea, to many people at any rate, in Britain.

JN: That is a pity, because in fact, I believe that the whole atmosphere of India—Indian friendliness, Indian tolerance, Indian democracy and Indian freedom had a considerable effect on our Russian visitors. For example, I believe, that it was a most welcome and, if I may say so, beneficial experience for them to visit a country which had no particular disputes with Russia; to visit a country

like India which has very few outstanding problems, even, between herself and Russia. Therefore, Mr Khrushchev and Marshal Bulganin and myself could survey the world situation somewhat calmly and with a measure of detachment.

JS: Do you think that all this did have an effect on the minds of your Russian guests?

JN: I think that the whole atmosphere of India may have acted as a kind of release on men who, after all, had seldom been outside Russia. My Russian guests seemed to me to relax perceptibly during their visit to India. And that surely was a very good thing. After all Russia during the whole of their active lifetime has rightly or wrongly felt that she was living in a perpetual state of siege. I cannot help believing that it was a worthwhile experience for our guests to come to such a country as India.

JS: Did Mr Khrushchev and Marshal Bulganin make any suggestions to you about India?

JN: Oh yes. For example, Mr Khrushchev is an ex-miner and when he went to our coalfields he was full of most interesting and useful suggestions. He is evidently a most knowledgeable man technically. Again both he and Marshal Bulganin and their staff were greatly interested when we took them in the Indian villages. They made many comments, both positive and negative on our agriculture.

JS: Did they comment on India's relationship with Britain and other western countries?

JN: Both Mr Khrushchev and Marshal Bulganin repeatedly said that they were particularly anxious that their close and friendly relations with India should not interfere with India's friendship with any other country.

JS: In that case might they not have been a little more reticent in their comments on what they called British colonialism?

JN: They spoke on the subject of colonialism. I reminded them that we in India had a much fuller experience of colonialism. But I told them that that fact did not affect our present relation with Britain. We had put all the bitter past behind us and now were close friends with Britain.

JS: That must have been somewhat difficult for them to understand.

JN: I judge that their visit was valuable to them because they repeatedly said that it had caused them drastically to revise their whole estimate of India and the Indian situation.

JS: It must be difficult indeed for men who have lived their whole lives in the atmosphere of the Russia of the past thirty-five years to imagine the

kind of relationship which has now been established between your country and mine. Prime Minister, it must be difficult indeed for them to believe in the existence of the warm feelings which we in Britain certainly feel for India and which I encounter so often here in India for Britain, in spite of all the past. They may have expected to find an India which was bitterly anti-British.

JN: That may be so. But you must not suppose that the India of today thinks that all these questions are solved. Naturally there are many things which are being done in the world at the present time by various nations—in Africa for example—of which we in India strongly disapprove. But we always try to express our views, firmly indeed, but temperately and moderately. We trust and believe that in the long run this is one of the most useful example which we can set to the world.

JS: To sum it up Prime Minister, you consider that close and cordial relations between India and Russia are at least as likely to result in India influencing Russia as in Russia influencing India?

The Prime Minister nodded his head and smiled.

7. Netaji Enquiry Committee¹

Shri Suresh Chandra Bose² and Shri Shah Nawaz Khan³ saw me this morning. The former gave me the attached letter.⁴

2. I told him that the enquiry⁵ had necessarily to be private and not a public one. It was not a judicial enquiry in the normal sense of the word, and no oaths could be given. The matter was complicated because the enquiry will largely take place in a foreign country namely Japan, and we could not impose any terms on the Japanese Government. We had to proceed with their full cooperation. Our effort should be to get as many facts as possible about Netaji Subhas Bose's last days—his disappearance or death or whatever it was. Apart from the direct evidence which we have thus far received and which may further be obtained, it seems to me almost inconceivable that Netaji should be alive. Over ten years have passed since the aircraft accident. Even if he had escaped then, I cannot conceive, how he could possibly remain silent during all these years when it was very easy for him to communicate in various ways with India. All presumptions therefore, are that he died and the real enquiry would be largely about the circumstances, but it was open to the Enquiry Committee to enquire into every fact and circumstance available to them.

3. These are the general terms of reference. It is not necessary to make them more precise. On arrival in Japan, the Committee should immediately get into touch with representatives of the Japanese Government and discuss this matter with them and seek their cooperation. They will, of course, keep in

1. Note to Foreign Secretary and Commonwealth Secretary, MEA, New Delhi, 2 April 1956. JN Collection.
2. (b. 1891); elder brother of Subhas Chandra Bose; member, Netaji Enquiry Committee.
3. He was Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Railways and Transport and also Chairman of the Netaji Enquiry Committee.
4. The letter dated 2 April 1956 to Nehru, sought certain clarifications regarding the terms of reference, itinerary and procedure to be followed by the Committee and whether the enquiry would be held in camera.
5. The Netaji Enquiry Committee was set up in April 1956 by the Government of India with Shah Nawaz Khan as chairman and Suresh Chandra Bose and S.N. Maitra as members, to enquire into the circumstances concerning the departure of Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose from Bangkok on or about 16 August 1945; his alleged death as a result of an aircraft accident; and subsequent developments connected therewith. The Committee in its report submitted in 1956 declared that Netaji met with his death in an air crash, and that the ashes kept at Renkoji Temple, Tokyo, were his ashes.

constant touch with our Ambassador.⁶ As our Ambassador is in Delhi now, it is desirable that they should meet him before he goes back to Japan. Only two Members of the Committee are in Delhi at present. The third Member, Mr Maitra,⁷ has not arrived yet. He is expected in a day or two.

4. I pointed out to Shri Suresh Bose that Dr Radha Binod Pal's appointment⁸ to this Committee was not suitable because of the part he played in the War Criminals' trial.⁹ He is of course, a very eminent criminal jurist and is well known in Japan and elsewhere. But, in the circumstances, his functioning in this Committee might raise difficult problems and might not be liked by some foreign countries like the USA, which has considerable influence in Japan still. Apart from this, my impression is that Dr Pal has accepted some kind of work on an International Commission elsewhere.¹⁰

5. I told Shri Suresh Bose that the question of War Criminals does not arise and we are not going to ask the USA or any other country as to whether Netaji is in the list of their War Criminals. Possibly, their answer would be that they believed he was dead. Anyhow, we do not propose to do anything in the matter. There can be no question whatever of our handing any person, even a non-Indian who seeks refuge in our country, to a foreign power, much less an Indian national of repute.

6. I did not say anything specific about Shri Shah Nawaz Khan being a Member of the Committee because he was present at the time. I think the Committee that we have constituted should function without any change.

7. CS might keep in touch with FS in this matter as the latter dealt with this in the earlier stages.

8. I think that our Ambassador in Tokyo, Shri B.R. Sen, should meet Shri Suresh Bose and Shri Shah Nawaz Khan. This should be arranged.

6. B.R. Sen (1898-1993); joined ICS 1922; District Magistrate, Midnapore, 1937-40; Revenue Secretary, Government of Bengal, 1940-43; Director-General of Food, Government of India, 1943-46; Secretary, Department of Food, 1946-47; Minister at the Embassy of India in Washington, 1947-50; Ambassador to Italy, 1950-51, USA, 1951-52, Yugoslavia, 1952-55, Japan, 1955-56; Director-General, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1956-67.
7. S.N. Maitra (b.1912); joined ICS, 1935; served in the West Bengal Government in various capacities; member, Netaji Enquiry Committee, 1956.
8. In his letter of 2 April 1956, Suresh Chandra Bose wrote to Nehru that the position of Shah Nawaz Khan as the Chairman of the Netaji Enquiry Committee was not appropriate and suggested the name of Dr Radha Binod Pal to head the Committee.
9. Radha Binod Pal served as a judge, International Military Tribunal, for trial of War Criminals for the Far East in Tokyo, 1946-48 and gave dissenting judgement in the trial.
10. At this time Radha Binod Pal was the Second Vice-Chairman of the International Law Commission.

8. To Thakur Das Bhargava¹

New Delhi
13 April 1956

My dear Thakur Dasji,²

... I am particularly distressed at a report that I have received. This is to the effect that a friend asked you why you opposed the Health Minister in season and out of season. Your reply is said to have been that you did so under orders of the Arya Samaj of which you are a member.³ I should like to know if this report has any truth in it. If so, it raises a very important issue. Does the Arya Samaj bring in its politics through Congress members in the Lok Sabha and what is more, does it bring in its animosity to the Christian or any other religion there?

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. Member, Lok Sabha.

3. In his letter of 17 April to Nehru, Thakur Das Bhargava clarified that he did not make such a disclosure to any friend and was never the member of the Arya Samaj. He also said that he criticized the attitude of the Health Ministry towards the Ayurvedic and Unani systems but had not criticized Amrit Kaur personally.

9. To Gulzarilal Nanda¹

New Delhi
16 April 1956

My dear Gulzarilal,

In your various river valley schemes, you create huge reservoirs of water and cover up a vast number of trees. What steps are taken to plant new trees to replace those which are submerged? I understand that in many countries it is the regular practice to plant new trees where any of them are submerged. I think we should keep this rule in mind.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

10. Policy of Prohibition¹

In India we have long advocated the policy of prohibition.² In many other parts of the world attention is being increasingly attracted to the dangers of alcoholism. Not only does the health of a nation suffer from this, but there is a tendency to increase conflicts both in the national and the international sphere.

The real question for us and others to consider is how to meet this situation. The methods to be adopted are of great importance because sometimes they might fail to achieve their purpose and lead to other dangers. I am not an expert in regard to these methods, and all I can say is that we have to proceed effectively and yet with full consideration of the consequences of any action that we might take. Compared to other countries, India is much more favourably situated for a policy of prohibition because of the widespread public sentiment in favour of it.

There are, roughly speaking, two classes that incline towards alcoholism. There is the small strata at the top which considers this as something fashionable and therefore indulges in it and develops habits. Then there is the wider section among our working population and others who seek relief in it from their drab and dull lives.

We have to approach this problem therefore from two different angles. We must get rid completely of the idea that there is anything desirable or decent about alcoholism. Indeed, it tends to become rather vulgar. If the people at the top realise this and a suitable atmosphere is created, then at least one important result is achieved.

So far as others are concerned, it is necessary to make their living conditions a little more worthwhile and provide them with some positive content in them so that they might not seek relief merely in intoxication.

1. Message to B.G. Kher, President, International Commission for the Prevention of Alcoholism, South East Asia Bloc, New Delhi, 17 April 1956. JN Collection.
2. Since the days of non-cooperation movement, prohibition had been one of the main items of the Congress movement. The Directive Principles of State Policy also laid down that the state should endeavour to bring about prohibition. The Congress Working Committee adopted a resolution on prohibition on 5 April 1954.

Laws have inevitably to be framed to deal with these matters and they should be framed having regard to their effectiveness.³ A law which goes half way to begin with and is effective is perhaps better as a step than a law which is supposed to go the whole way and is rather ineffective. The main thing appears to me to create a widespread public sentiment, more especially at the top of the social level, against alcoholism.

3. The Planning Commission had set up a Prohibition Enquiry Committee in December 1954 under the chairmanship of Shriman Narayan to make recommendation for a programme of prohibition on national basis. The Committee gave its report in October 1955, recommending that prohibition should be made an integral part of the Second Five Year Plan and by 1 April 1958 prohibition should become law throughout the country.

GLOSSARY

abhinandan patra	an address of welcome
Bharat Mata	Mother India
devanagari	script for Hindi, Sanskrit and some other Indian languages
gram	a village
gram sabha	a village assembly
hakim	a practitioner of Unani medicine
jagirdar	holder of a jagir
jagirdari	a system of assignment of a tract of land and its revenue
katra	an enclosed inhabited piece of land, a small rectangular bazar
krishi pundit	an agricultural expert
morcha	picketing
panch shila	five basic principles of international conduct
panchanga	almanac
pradhan	chief, leader, head
sarpanch	head of a village council
sarsanghachalak	president of an organisation
takali	spindle with disc at the bottom for drawing thread from cotton slivers
talukdar	a landowner
talukdari	a system of land holdings
tapasya	penance, prayer, dedicated effort
toshakhana	a store room
vaid	a practitioner of Ayurvedic medicine

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The present volume covers the period from 1 February to 30 April 1956.... The major developments were in the economy of the country and the planning process. Jawaharlal Nehru is increasingly interested in collaboration with foreign nations as well as self-reliance....

Nehru was in favour of scrupulously abiding by the conclusions of the SRC, but would be happier with larger regions than small linguistic states.... He was anxious for the retention of Bombay city as either the metropolis of a territory comprising Maharashtra and Gujarat or an economic entity with special links with the Centre....

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